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World Trade Center Bombing-1993

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1993 WTC Bombing

  

At 18 minutes after noon on February 26, 1993, a huge bomb went off beneath the two towers of the World Trade Center. This was not a suicide attack. The terrorists parked a truck bomb with a timing device on Level B-2 of the underground garage, then departed. The ensuing explosion opened a hole seven stories up. Six people died. More than a thousand were injured. An FBI agent at the scene described the relatively low number of fatalities as a miracle.Eight and one half years prior to the devastatingly fatal blows to the World Trade Center in New York, a Ryder truck carrying approximately 1,200 to 1,500 pounds of a homemade fertilizer-based explosive detonates at 12:18 in the afternoon. 

The blast produced a crater stretching over 150 feet through five floors on the 26th of February 1993. Let it also be noted that this was the second anniversary of the ending of the first Gulf War. Initial reports suggested that the blast was the result of an exploded generator, but evidence gathered shortly thereafter suggested that it was clearly a malicious act that resulted in the injuries of over 1,000 people, and the deaths of six others. 

The mastermind behind this terrorist attack was Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, a previously sought criminal who was suspected for the formulation of criminal plots against Pope John Paul II, President Bill Clinton, and potentially fatal attacks against numerous flights in 1995. Yousef’s capture later that year lead to the discovery of al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden’s network of loosely tied Islamic militants. Yousef was convicted of the WTC bombing on November 12, 1997; however, a concrete analysis of the 1993 WTC attack must include an in depth examination of this figure, which will be discussed further. 

On that fateful day in 1993, dispatcher Frank Raffa, of the FDNY, recalls the sentiment of the initial emergency phone call. “The working theory was that a transformer vault explosion had occurred in the basement of the World Trade Center Complex.” 

However, as Raffa Writes, “Normally, when a fire or emergency occurs that generates numerous phone calls, the phones stop ringing once an apparatus arrives. This time the phones never stopped.” This was the sign that a major catastrophe was developing.” Such calls indicated that smoke spread through the first thirty-three floors of the WTC towers, as well as the Vista Hotel, within only three minutes. With such a mass volume of telephone calls from panicking personnel in need of immediate help, the incident command was divided into three zones, one for each affected building. 

Even still, due to the sheer numbers of callers and absent the responders to field these calls, the acts of milling, rumors, and keynoting, the basic components to human interaction during a collective behavior situation, resulted in poor advice from certain actors and mediums. Such an event is described by Raffa: 

“One of the newscasters went on the air and advised people in the towers that if they were having trouble breathing, they should break out the glass window. This was the worst thing they could have done. By now the entire tower was filled with smoke and was acting like a 110 story smokestack. About that time I answered a call from someone seeking instructions. By now, we were told to tell all callers to stay where they are, block all air vents with whatever rags they could find, stay calm, and wait. ”

“The caller told me he was going to break out a window. He was on the 54th floor. I advised him not to stating that there are over 500 emergency personnel on the ground and he’d kill someone with the falling debris. Not to mention the fact that the open window will allow smoke to enter the area and vent itself. He hung up and went to break the window. I advised the radio dispatcher to let the command post know to expect falling glass from the 54th floor. Later, the newscaster was “admonished” by his supervisors.” 

The bombing was noted as having been the largest incident ever handled in the City of New York Fire Department’s 128-year history prior to September 11, 2001. In toll, based on the number of units that responded, the incident resulted in the equivalent of a 16-alarm fire. 

On February 26, 1993, a 1,000-pound nitrourea bomb was detonated inside a rental van on the B2 level of the WTC parking garage, causing massive destruction that spanned seven levels, six below-grade. The L-shaped blast crater on B2 at its maximum measured 130 feet wide by 150 feet long. 

The blast epicenter was under the northeast corner of the Vista Hotel  

  • FDNY ultimately responded to the incident with;
  • 84 engine companies,
  • 60 truck companies,
  • 28 battalion chiefs,
  • 9 deputy chiefs,
  • 5 rescue companies and
  • 26 other special units (representing nearly 45 percent of the on-duty staff of FDNY)
  • The department units maintained a presence at the scene for 28 days
  • It is estimated that approximately 50,000 people were evacuated from the WTC complex over a course of eleven hours, including nearly 25,000 from each of the two towers
  • Six people died and 1,042 were injured.
  • Of those injured;
  • 15 received traumatic injuries from the blast itself
  • Nearly 20 people complained of cardiac problems, and nearly 30 pregnant women were rescued. Eighty-eight firefighters (one requiring hospitalization),
  • 35 police officers, and one EMS worker sustained injuries
  • Fire alarm dispatchers received more than 1,000 phone calls, most reporting victims trapped on the upper floors of the towers
  • Search and evacuation of the towers were finally completed some 11 hours after the incident began

Major structural damage to the buildings, absent the five-level crater, included partition walls blown out onto the PATH train mezzanine, damaged fire alarm and public address systems, as well as temporary termination of elevator service for several weeks. 

There also resulted the almost complete termination of power to the complex, as primary circuitry was extensively damaged by the initial blast; in addition, water-cooled emergency generators shut down as a result of overheating when water supply was cut, thus disabling building-wide emergency lighting. 

   

    

THE WORLD TRADE CENTER-1993

The 16-acre World Trade Center site was bounded by Vesey Street to the north, Church Street to the east, Liberty Street to the south, and West Street to the west. Seven buildings (1 WTC through 7 WTC) were situated around a five-acre plaza. The complex included also the Port Authority-Trans-Hudson (PATH) and Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) WTC stations and Concourse areas. Underneath a sizable portion of the main WTC Plaza and 1 WTC, 2 WTC, 3 WTC, and 6 WTC was a six-story subterranean structure.The WTC complex was designed by Minoru Yamasaki and Associates of Troy, Michigan; Emery Roth and Sons of New York acted as the architect of record. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PA) was the original developer. Excavation of the site began in August 1966. The complex, which offered about 12 million square feet of rentable floor space, was occupied by various government and commercial tenants. The PA had transferred the entire WTC project to a private individual, under a 99-year capital lease, prior to 9-11.The seven complex buildings included the following:

  1. WTC, the 110-story North Tower. Its first tenant took occupancy in December 1970.
  2. WTC, the 110-story South Tower. Occupancy commenced in January 1972.
  3. WTC , the 22-story Marriott Hotel (west of the South Tower).
  4. WTC, a nine-story office building.
  5. WTC, a nine-story office building.
  6. WTC, the eight-story U.S. Customs House building.
  7. WTC, a 47-story office building (north of the WTC site; it housed the New York City Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management facility).

The World Financial Center (WFC) complex, built in the early 1980s, was to the west, across West Street. To the south were the building designed by Cass Gilbert, at 90 West Street, and the Bankers Trust building at 130 Liberty Street. The 1 Liberty Plaza building was to the east and the Verizon building directly to the north.

 

 

 

Who would have imagined in 1993 what events would unfold in 2001 at the WTC complex and for the nation….

Posted by on February 26, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Collapse, Commandsafety.com, firefighting-operations, High-rise, History Repeating Event, major-incidents, mass-casualty-incident, thecompanyofficer.com • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Thousands Honor Fallen LAFD Firefighter Glenn Allen

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PHOTOGRAPH BY: Liz O. Baylen / Los Angeles Times PHOTOGRAPH BY: Liz O. Baylen / Los Angeles Times

  • Firefighters gather to honor fallen colleague, Glenn Allen, HERE
  • Glenn L. Allen was a Firefighter/Paramedic for over 36 years and last served at Fire Station 97. He is the 61st Los Angeles Firefighter to have died while directly involved in emergency operations during the Department’s 125-year history.
  • The cause of the February 16th fire remains under investigation.
  • Allen was the first Los Angeles Fire Department firefighter to be killed in the line of duty since March 2008, when Brent Louvrien died following an explosion.
  • LAFD LODD: Hollywood Hills Mansion Investigating Building Standards

PHOTOGRAPH BY: Liz O. Baylen / Los Angeles Times

Posted by on February 25, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, in-the-line-of-duty, line-of-duty, LODD • Tagged: , , , , , , , , ,

Ten Minutes in the Street Scenario: On-scene, with Engine Company 13…..

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Ten Minutes in the Street

Ten Minutes in the Street: On-scene, with Engine Company 13…..

Take this scenario and download the details or project the post on a screen and work through the incident and parameters with your company of command officers. Take ten minutes and discuss the operational issue and factors at the Kitchen Table at the firehouse or in the dayroom between calls. Make it a training opportunity today.

Ten Minutes in the Street: On-scene, with Engine 13….You’re dispatched to a commercial building address in your first-due area along with the Truck Company for a report of smoke coming from the building. As you (Engine 13) and Truck 2 respond, another alarm goes out for a reported structure fire with civilians in distress….( take a look at the concurrent Ten in the Street Scenario-Second Alarm that we’re posting along with this scenario HERE). Since you didn’t have enough to do…. Your box alarm assignment is just one and one (Engine and Truck) with a staffing level of five personnel on each company (yah, I know…it’s a real good day on staffing today).

You arrive and are on-scene with Engine 13 and find “some” smoke issuing from the Bravo side (office) and from the Delta side. Both sides have access limitations due to secure fencing.

The building is a commercial building, approximately 100 feet wide x 140 feet deep.

It appears to be a single story; however you can see the grade slope downward on the Bravo Side to the rear: looks like another level in the rear. The Delta side also has a secured fence that separates a vacant exposure structure, which appears to be a vacant convenience store.

Smoke is getting more pronounced..you might say, heavy smoke showin’ at this point.

You’ve got command in the absence.. of a commanding officer. A chief’s enroute, but due to the other alarm, is going to be delayed (either a greater alarm Battalion Chief, or a mutual aide chief is coming). You have additional resources you can call for.

  • Here’s what you have:

  • 100’ x 140’ Unoccupied (Appearing) Building, 14, 000 SF. Circa 1940’s built Type II construction.
  • Masonry perimeter walls, appears to be a heavy wood timber gable truss roof…
  • Security Fencing on both Bravo and Delta sides
  • Apparent vacant exposure structure on the Delta side.
  • Appears to have multiple levels due to grade change on the Bravo side
  • Heavy smoke showing…
  • Forcible entry will be required to gain access
  • You have other resources available, But they are not enroute
  • Hey what about the 360? …what’s up with the Charlie side….?
  • You have another alarm that was dispatched while you were enroute, that sounds like a job with possible civilians’ in distress… so a number of other companies are being dispatched to that call
  • You’re the officer of Engine 13, On-scene with some showing, assuming command….
  • What are you going to do?
  • We’re looking for the usual…IAP, resources, safety, strategy, tactics, limiting factors, risk, operations, construction or occupancy hazards…..


Check out the Ten Minutes in the Street: Second Alarm scenario HERE, it’s the other incident that’s happening across town that we mentioned above, while you were enroute to this alarm….

Posted by on February 25, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, Scenarios, Strategy and Tactics, Taking it to the Streets, Ten Minutes in the Street Scenarios, thecompanyofficer.com • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Cultural Change

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Spending time with colleagues is an awesome experience when the conversation focuses on change in the culture of the fire service.  I recently had the privilege to spend several days with great fire service servants at the 2011 Emergency Service Conference at Pipestem (ESCAPe) in West Virginia.  The dialog and conversations about the need for culture change was plentiful especially after delivering a program on the 16 life safety initiative.  We took the opportunity to sit down and talk about some fire service issue and I got their view as well.  Just  listen to what the conversation turned to after the class.

Talking about culture

Posted by on February 24, 2011 • Filed under: Attitude, command-leadership, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Culture, Doug Cline, Fire Fighter Safety, Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , ,

One Meridian Plaza High Rise Fire: Twenty Years Ago

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Fire Operations One Meridian Plaza

On what began as an uneventful Saturday night twenty years ago, a fire on the 22nd floor of the 38-story Meridian Bank Building, also known as One Meridian Plaza, was reported to the Philadelphia Fire Department on February 23, 1991 at approximately 2040 hours and went on to burned for more than 19 hours. 

The fire caused three firefighter fatalities (LODD) and injuries to 24 firefighters. 

PFD Line of Duty Deaths: 

  • Captain David P. Holcombe, age 52
  • Firefighter Phyllis McAllister, age 43
  • Firefighter James A. Chappell, age 29
  •  
  • The 12-alarms brought 51 engine companies, 15 ladder companies, 11 specialized units, and over 300 firefighters to the scene.
  • It was one of the largest high-rise office building fire in modern American history –completely consuming eight floors of the building –and was controlled only when it reached a floor that was protected by automatic sprinklers.
  • The Fire Department arrived to find a well-developed fire on the 22nd floor, with fire dropping down to the 21st floor through a set of convenience stairs.
  • Heavy smoke had already entered the stairways and the floors immediately above the 22nd.
  • Fire attack was hampered by a complete failure of the building’s electrical system and by inadequate water pressure, caused in part by improperly set pressure reducing valves on standpipe hose outlets.

The USFA published a technical report (USFA-TR-049) on the One Meridian Plaza fire that is still available for download from the USFA web site, HERE. The report clearly defined the need in 1991, for built-in fire protection systems and reiterated the fact that fire departments alone cannot expect or be expected to provide the level of fire protection that modem high-rises demand. That fire protection must be built-in to the structures. This was clearly illustrated in this event when the One Meridian Plaza fire was finally stopped when it reached a floor where automatic sprinklers had been installed.One Meridian Plaza was a 38-story high-rise office building, located in the heart of downtown Philadelphia, in an area of high-rise and mid-rise structures. The building had three underground levels, 36 above ground occupiable floors, two mechanical floors (12 and 38), and two rooftop helipads. The building was rectangular in shape, approximately 243 feet in length by 92 feet in width (approximately 22,400 gross square feet), with roughly 17,000 net usable square feet per floor. Site work for construction began in 1968, and the building was completed and approved for occupancy in 1973. 

Construction was classified by the Philadelphia Department of Licenses and Inspections as equivalent to BOCA Type 1B construction which requires 3-hour fire rated building columns, 2-hour fire rated horizontal beams and floor/ ceiling systems, and l-hour fire rated corridors and tenant separations. Shafts, including stairways, are required to be 2-hour fire rated construction, and roofs must have l-hour fire rated assemblies. 

The building frame was structural steel with concrete floors poured over metal decks. All structural steel and floor assemblies were protected with spray-on fireproofing material. The exterior of the building was covered by granite curtain wall panels with glass windows attached to the perimeter floor girders and spandrels. The building utilized a central core design, although one side of the core is adjacent to the south exterior wall. The core area was approximately 38 feet wide by 124 feet long and contained two stairways, four banks of elevators, two HVAC supply duct shafts, bathroom utility chases, and telephone and electrical risers. 

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES 

  • Origin and Cause: The fire started in a vacant 22nd floor office in a pile of linseed oil-soaked rags left by a contractor. Fire Alarm System The activation of a smoke detector on the 22nd floor was the first notice of a possible fire. Due to incomplete detector coverage, the fire was already well advanced before the detector was activated.
  • Building Staff Response: Building employees did not call the fire department when the alarm was activated. An employee investigating the alarm was trapped when the elevator opened on the fire floor and was rescued when personnel on the ground level activated the manual recall. The Fire Department was not called until the employee had been rescued.
  • Alarm Monitoring Service: The private service which monitors the fire alarm system did not call the Fire Department when the alarm was first activated. A call was made to the building to verify that they were aware of the alarm. The building personnel were already checking the alarm at that time.
  • Electrical Systems: Installation of the primary and secondary electrical power risers in a common unprotected enclosure resulted in a complete power failure when the fire-damaged conductors shorted to ground. The natural gas powered emergency generator also failed.
  • Fire Barriers: Unprotected penetrations in fire-resistance rated assemblies and the absence of fire dampers in ventilation shafts permitted fire and smoke to spread vertically and horizontally.
  • Ventilation openings in the stairway enclosures permitted smoke to migrate into the stairways, complicating firefighting.
  • Unprotected openings in the enclosure walls of 22nd floor electrical closet permitted the fire to impinge on the primary and secondary electrical power risers.
  • Standpipe System and Pressure Reducing Valves (PRVs): Improperly installed standpipe valves provided inadequate pressure for fire department hose streams using 1 3/ 4-inch hose and automatic fog nozzles. Pressure reducing valves were installed to limit standpipe outlet discharge pressures to safe levels. The PRVs were set too low to produce effective hose streams; tools and expertise to adjust the valve settings did not become available until too late.
  • Locked Stairway Doors: For security reasons, stairway doors were locked to prevent reentry except on designated floors. (A building code variance had been granted to approve this arrangement.) This compelled firefighters to use forcible entry tactics to gain access from stairways to floor areas.
  • Fire Department Pre-Fire Planning: Only limited pre-fire plan information was available to the Incident Commander. Building owners provided detailed plans as the fire progressed.
  • Firefighter Fatalities: Three firefighters from Engine Company 11 died on the 28th floor when they became disoriented and ran out of air in their SCBAs.
  • Exterior Fire Spread: “Autoexposure” Exterior vertical fire spread resulted when exterior windows failed. This was a primary means of fire spread.
  • Structural Failures: Fire-resistance rated construction features, particularly floor-ceiling assemblies and shaft enclosures (including stair shafts), failed when exposed to continuous fire of unusual intensity and duration.
  • Interior Fire Suppression Abandoned: After more than 11 hours of uncontrolled fire growth and spread, interior firefighting efforts were abandoned due to the risk of structural collapse.
  • Automatic Sprinklers: The fire was eventually stopped when it reached the fully sprinklered 30th floor. Ten sprinkler heads activated at different points of fire penetration.
  • The three firefighters who died were attempting to ventilate the center stair tower: They radioed a request for help stating that they were on the 30th floor. After extensive search and rescue efforts, their bodies were later found on the 28th floor. They had exhausted all of their air supply and could not escape to reach fresh air. At the time of their deaths, the 28th floor was not burning but had an extremely heavy smoke condition.
  • After the loss of three personnel, hours of unsuccessful attack on the fire, with several floors simultaneously involved in fire, and a risk of structural collapse, the Incident Commander withdrew all personnel from the building due to the uncontrollable risk factors. The fire ultimately spread up to the 30th floor where it was stopped by ten automatic sprinklers.

Take the time to review this report and examine some of similar issues affecting the fire service today in the areas of staffing and resources, construction and materials, building codes, built-in fire suppression systems, training, pre-fire planning, fire load, fire dynamics and the current methodologies on wind-drive fire theory. 

Building Overview NarrativeOne Meridian Plaza was a 38-story high-rise office building in downtown Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Located across from Philadelphia’s City Hall, it was originally constructed in 1972 as the headquarter building for the Girard Bank. By 1991 it housed 27 tenants, and was the regional headquarters for Meridian Bancorp, which occupied eight floors (Menkus 1992). The rectangular building was 243 feet long and 92 feet wide, and contained about 17,000 net usable square feet per floor. Refer to Plan below for a typical floor plan from One Meridian Plaza. The lower two floors of the tower were below grade, floors 12 and 38 housed mechanical equipment, and the roof contained access via two helipads. The building frame was structural steel with composite metal decking, and the structure was also joined on the east side by a connecting link and stairwell to the 34-story Girard Trust Building. In compliance with all codes available in 1972, the building was classified and fireproofed as equivalent to BOCA Type 1B construction (Chubb 1991). The structural steel was protected with spray-on fireproofing, and sprinklers were not required by code, so they were not installed. In 1984 Philadelphia adopted the National Building Code, which required that newly constructed buildings 75 feet high be fully sprinklered. One Meridian Plaza was grandfathered and not required to install sprinklers due to the high installation and retrofit costs (Post March 1991). By 1991, only nine floors of the building had working sprinkler systems. These systems had been installed at the request of the tenants occupying those levels (Mangan 1991). 

Typical Floor Plan (22nd Floor)

Here’s a story posted today at the Phildalphia Daily News with insights on this anniversary 

One Meridian Plaza: 20 years ago, the fire that changed the nation By NATALIE POMPILIO Philadelphia Daily News 

When Jack Bloomer and the other firefighters arrived at One Meridian Plaza that cold February night in 1991, flames were encompassing the building more than 20 stories above, leaping from floor to floor. Smoke poured into the air, and broken glass rained down. 

“It was obvious when we pulled up it was an ugly-looking job,” Bloomer, 61, remembered yesterday. 

He had no idea how bad it would get. 

By the time the 12-alarm fire was declared under control 19 hours later, three firefighters were dead, 12 others were injured and a Center City high-rise was lost. The blaze, 20 years ago today, changed the city’s skyline and the way the nation fights fires. 

“When that fire happened, it was on the news all over the world,” said Chris Jelenewicz, engineering program manager at the Maryland-based Society of Fire Protection Engineers. “The One Meridian fire was one of the most significant fires in the history of high-rise buildings.” 

The fire changed Bloomer, who was driving Engine 11 that night. With him were Capt. David Holcombe and Firefighters Phyllis McAllister and James Chappell. 

Bloomer’s the only one who made it home. Read the entire article HERE 

Jack Bloomer was the only survivor from his platoon. David Holcombe, Phyllis McAllister and James Chappell perished in the Feb. 23 high-rise inferno

  • One Meridian Plaza Photo Slide Show HERE
  • NFPA Summary Report HERE

Other Insights: Good Article related to design, construction and failure issues HERE 

Excerpts: At about 8 p.m. on Saturday, 23 February 1991, linseed oil-soaked rags left behind by a cleaning crew burst into flames on the 22nd floor of the 38-story One Meridian Plaza in downtown Philadelphia. The fire quickly spread, unimpeded by fire sprinklers, throughout the 22nd floor and then upward. Sprinklers were not required by the City’s building code at the time of construction and were being added to the building only as opportunity presented itself. 

The twelve-alarm fire burned for 18 hours. The extreme heat caused window glass and frames to melt and concrete floor slabs and steel beams to buckle and sag dramatically. Large shards of window glass fell from the facade, cutting through fire hoses on the ground around the building. Three firefighters were trapped on a fully engulfed floor, and efforts to rescue them failed. 

The fire would not yield and there were increasing concerns about the stability of the structure. Fire officials called off the attack and allowed the fire to “free burn,” concentrating their efforts on containing the fire to this building. When the fire reached the 30th floor, a tenant-installed fire-sprinkler system was activated, and the worst high-rise fire in U.S. history was finally brought under control. 

Other Notable High-Rise Fires 

First Interstate Bank Building – Los Angeles, California

On May 4, 1998, the 62-story First Interstate Bank Building in Los Angeles, California experienced a devastating fire that damaged five of the building’s floors before it was brought under control. It is thought that the fire was the result of an electrical malfunction, but the cause was actually never determined. The building was in the process of being retrofit with an automatic sprinkler system, which had been installed in about 90 percent of the building, but was not operational at the time of the fire. Security personnel dismissed initial fire and smoke alarms, which delayed the response of the fire department by almost 15 minutes. Also contributing to the spread of the fire was the large quantity of combustible materials on each floor, equipment penetrations and other openings, and a standpipe system that had been shut down due to the sprinkler installation. Firefighters were also forced to battle dangerous conditions that were created by the failure of the glass façade and its subsequent fall to the ground below. The fire was eventually extinguished with the internal standpipe system, but not before one death and over 50 million dollars worth of damage (Routley 1988). 

Schomburg Plaza – New York, New York

The fire at Schomburg Plaza was unusual in the fact that it originated in the upper sections of a trash chute that serviced the 35-story apartment building. The March 22, 1987 fire started somewhere between the 27th and 29th floors, and then traveled up the trash chute and through the walls into surrounding apartments. Investigations following the fire found that sprinklers in the chute either failed to work because they were clogged, or were not actually connected to the piping system. It was also determined that the building was not built according to its plans, and therefore certain areas did not meet the two hour fire rating required by code. A final issue was the initial response to the fire and the misconception that it was a common compactor fire, as had been seen several times before. Neither firefighters, nor dispatchers realized the severity of the fire, and initially believed that it was under control, which created an even more dangerous situation. As a result of this fire, seven people lost their lives (Schaenman 1987). 

High-Rise Condominium – Clearwater, Florida

A more recent high-rise fire occurred on June 28, 2002, in an 11-story condominium building in Clearwater, Florida. The fire originated in the kitchen of a fifth floor apartment, and instead of pulling the fire alarm and alerting the fire department, the tenant tried unsuccessfully to extinguish the fire. This delay allowed the blaze to grow for 17 minutes before the fire department was even notified. As firefighters arrived on the scene they encountered several problems, including radio communication issues, closed standpipe riser valves, and a damaged fire hydrant. Another issue was that some building residents ignored fire alarms and failed to evacuate, believing that it was false alarm. The building was not equipped with an automatic sprinkler system, and therefore several units and the central hallway were heavily damaged by fire, smoke, and water before the blaze was declared under control. In the end two people were killed and many more were injured. The tragedy resulted in one million dollars worth of damage and the installation of an automatic sprinkler system. 

 

Feb. 24, 1991: A Medevac helicopter takes off from 15th Street about 1:30 a.m. Sunday to take urgently needed fresh air bottles to the roof. The bottles were not in time for three of the firefighters. (Mike Levin / Inquirer files)

 

 
 
 
 

 

  

Posted by on February 23, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, Fire Fighter Safety, Fire Fighting, firefighting-operations, High-rise, line-of-duty, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Multiple Alarm Operations with Wind Driven Fire

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The five alarm fire that ran through a seven story multiple occupancy (MO) apartment building in the Flatbush Section in the Borough of Brooklyn (NYC) this weekend considerably challenged operating companies of the FDNY as the fire was fueled and spread in rapid success due to significant wind conditions compounded by news reports that a door to the fire compartment was left open, thus allowing the developing fire conditions to intensify and escalate due to the wind driven conditions that were impacting the building, the fire compartment and initial operating companies.     

Aerial View of the Apartment Building

The seven-story MO Apartment building at 346 East 29th Street is reported to have had 70 apartments and was located midway in the city block. Arriving companies reported a fire on the number four floor and quickly deployed handlines and initiated primary search and rescue and other tactical assignments.   

Street View

First-due operations, from the initial alarm assignment’s arrival, the transmission of size-up communications and the accurate and timely deployment of companies to task assignments is mission critical to an evolving incident.     

The introduction of other challenges such as confronted by FDNY at this alarm further magnify the importance of effective command risk assessment, building size-up, effective and efficient company assignments and deployments with adequate resources (staffing and companies) to intervene with the fire dynamics and growth of an initial developing room and contents to an extending and escalating structure fire.      

       

YouTube Preview Image       

   

Take a few minutes to listen to the radio transmissions on the audio file attached, paying particular attention to the exchange of dispatch communications, first-due size-up and actions, command transmissions and subsequent rapid transmittal of greater alarms, as fire ground operational conditions deteriorated due to the wind driven fire, fire extension, civilian’s in distress and rescue operations.   

Think about the way you would react, interface or address similar conditions and challenges at an alarm in your jurisdiction or department.   

  • Do you have the necessary skills and experience to address timely actions required of company and command officers at a wind drive fire incident?
    • Are you capable of addressing a large single family dwelling, or a large low rise MO apartment building? How about a townhouse or garden apartment complex building?
    • How familiar are you with strategic and tactical considerations wind drive fire incidents?
    • Are you aware of the recent research and operational factors and considerations coming out of emerging research from the NIST and UL?
    • How effective are your capabilities for operating at large scale multiple alarm incidents with your department’s resources, or with mutual aid or external agencies?
    • Have you trained and prepared to manage multiple alarm incidents?

      

Take some to time to gain some insights from this alarm; the communications and the challenges and make this a learning opportunity to gain some insights into wind drive fire theory and operational considerations.   

Here’s some mission critical links and references to make you a more effective and capable company and command officer.   

National Fire Academy On-Line Training Program   

Awareness of Command and Control Decision making at Multiple Alarm Incidents (Q297) 1.5 CEUs Enroll Now »  

This course is both a stand-alone course as well as the pre-course for the 6-day residential delivery of the National Fire Academy’s new Command and Control Decision Making at Multi-Alarm Incidents. Anyone interested in applying for the 6-day residential course must pass this pre-course with a score of 85 percent. The topics covered in this pre-course include: classical and naturalistic decision making, strategies for managing safety concerns at expanded emergency incidents, pre-incident preparation, resource allocation, effective use of on-site communications, set-up of an incident command post and post incident analysis.

NIST: Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Fire Conditions: 7-Story Building Experiments. HERE  

 February 2008, a series of 14 experiments were conducted in a 7-story building to evaluate the ability of positive pressure ventilation fans, wind control devices and external water application with floor below nozzles to mitigate the hazards of a wind driven fire in a structure. Each of the 14 experiments started with a fire in a furnished room. The air flow for 12 of the 14 experiments was intensified by a natural or mechanical wind.. Each of the tactics were evaluated individually and in conjunction with each other to assess the benefit to fire fighters, as well as occupants in the structure. The results of the experiments provide a baseline for the hazards associated with a wind driven fire and the impact of pressure, ventilation and flow paths within a structure. Wind created conditions that rapidly caused the environment in the structure to deteriorate by forcing fire gases through the apartment of origin and into the public corridor and stairwell. These conditions would be untenable for advancing fire fighters. Each of the tactics were able to reduce the thermal hazard created by the wind driven fire. Multiple tactics used in conjunction with each other were very effective at improving conditions for fire fighter operations and occupant egress. Fire departments that wish to implement the tactics used in this study will need to develop training and determine appropriate methods for deploying these tactics. Variations in the methods of deployment may be required due to differences in staffing, equipment, building stock, typical weather conditions, etc. There is uniformity however, in the physics behind the wind driven fire condition and the principles of the tactics examined. The data from this research will help provide the science to identify methods and promulgation of improved standard operating guidelines (SOG) for the fire service to enhance firefighter safety, fire ground operations, and use of equipment. The experiments were conducted by the National Institute of standards and Technology (NIST), the Fire Department of New York City (FDNY), and the Polytechnic Institute of New York University with the support of the Department of Homeland security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Assistance to Firefighters Research and Development Grant Program and the United States Fire Administration.  

pdf icon Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Fire Conditions: 7-Story Building Experiments. (58118 K)
Kerber, S. I.; Madrzykowski, D.  

NIST Wind Driven Fires Studies, HERE  

Smoke and heat spreading through the corridors and the stairs of a building during a fire can limit building occupants’ ability to escape and can limit fire fighters’ ability to rescue them.  Changes in the building’s ventilation or presence of an external wind can increase the energy release of the fire.  This can also increase the spread of fire gases through the building.  In some cases, such as the Cook County Administration Building fire in October 2003, the fire gas flow, into the corridors and the stairway prevented fire fighters from suppressing the fire from inside the structure.  This fire resulted in 6 building occupant fatalities and fire fighter injuries in the stairway.  The Fire Department of New York City has experienced many wind driven fire incidents which have resulted in fire fighter fatalities and injuries.  

 

Postings from Buildingsonfire.com

 

Direct link to the Wind Driven Fire Research Postings on Buildingsonfire.com  HERE 

NIST Wind Driven Fire Simulation Video

NIST Wind Driven Fire Simulation Video Wind Driven Fires Smoke and heat spreading through the corridors and the stairs of a building during a fire can limit building occupants’ ability to escape and can limit fire fighters’ ability to rescue them.  Changes in the building’s ventilation or presence of an external wind can increase the [...]  

Jan, 29 2011 0 Comments Full Story

Positive Pressure Ventilation Research

Positive Pressure Ventilation The objective of this NIST research is to improve firefighter safety by enabling a better understanding of structural ventilation techniques, including positive pressure ventilation (PPV) and natural ventilation, and to provide a technical basis for improved training in the effects of ventilation on fire behavior by examining structural fire ventilation using full-scale fire experiments with and [...]  

Jan, 14 2011 0 Comments Full Story

NIST Wind Driven Fires Programs

Wind Driven Fires Wind blowing into the broken window of a room on fire can turn a “routine room and contents fire” into a floor-to-ceiling firestorm. Historically, this has led to a significant number of firefighter fatalities and injuries, particularly in high-rise buildings where the fire must be fought from the interior of the structure. [...]  

Jan, 14 2011 0 Comments Full Story

Wind Driven Fires

 A million dollar Baltimore County, Maryland  home was destroyed Sunday December 13, 2009  by a fire that tore through the 4,700-square-foot structure with such intensity that firefighters were forced to battle the flames from the exterior. Shortly after 21:00 hours, Baltimore County Fire Dispatch alerted crews for Fire Box 50-2 at 12607 Nancy Lee Court [...]  

Tactical Patience and the New Considerations of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction  on CommandSafety.com HERE, with insights into the new UL Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction

   

ALARM INFORMATION
FDNY   Brooklyn, N. Y. 02/19/11 @ 18:45 hrs.
Flatbush Section Box 2439 address: 346 East 29th St. between: Ave. “D” & Clarendon Rd.     

2439 @ 18:42
Engs. 255, 281, 217 act. 310
T. Lad. 157, Lad. 147
Batt. 41      

10 – 75 – 2439 @ 18:46
Ladder 113 is designated as the “FAST” Truck
Eng. 249
Rescue Co. #2
Squad Co. #1
Batt. 48
Division 15      

Fire Building:
6 Story Brick 100 x 100 O/M/D ( orig. reported )
7 Story Brick 100 x 100 O/M/D ( actual size up )      

All – Hands:
7 – 5 – 2439 @ 18:48
Batt. 41 reports: All – Hands upon arrival, extra Engine & Truck
Fire 4th floor of a 6 Story Brick occupied multiple dwelling
Engine 250 / Ladder 174 s/c      

“Batt. 41 to Brooklyn, Transmit a 2nd Alarm, We also transmitting a 10-70 ( water relay )      

2nd Alarm:
2 – 2 – 2439 @ 18:53
Engs. 310, 240, 283 ( Eng. 310 designated Water Resource Unit )
T. Lad. 159, Lad. 149
Eng. 284 w/ Satellite 3
Batt. 38 “Safety Officer”
Batt. 33 “Resource Unit Leader”
Rescue battalion / Safety Battalion
Fieldcom 1 / Tactical Support Unit #2      

@ 18:58
Batt. 41 to Brooklyn, We have a “May-Day” transmitted from the Fire Apt. We’re putting the “FAST” Truck to work. Assigned another “FAST” Truck, Tower Ladder 159 is assigned new “FAST” Truck      

@ 19:13
Division 15 reports: “May-Day” member located and removed from Fire Bldg. We have fire on the 4th & 5th floors out the rear.
4 – lines stretched, 4 – lines in operation. Fire’s Doubtful.      

3rd Alarm:
3 – 3 – 2439 @ 19:15
Engs. 309, 323, 257, 330
Lad. 123, T. Lad. 170
Batt. 58
Batt. 44 “Staging Manager”
Air Re-Con Chief “grounded” due to winds
Mask Service Unit #1
Staging Area: Clarendon Rd. & Nostrand Ave.      

@ 19:20
Division 15: Box 2439, We have fire on the 4th; 5th; & 6th floors and into the Cockloft. All members being removed from the upper floors, setting up the Tower Ladders.      

@ 19:27
Special Call ( 2 ) additional Battalion Chief’s
Batt. 40 act. 58, Batt. 32 are s/c      

@ 19:30
Special Call a “High Rise Nozzle Co.” Eng. 254 assigned      

@ 19:36
Special Call ( 2 ) Tower Ladders
Tower Ladder 144 act 153 & Tower Ladder 120 are s/c      

4th Alarm:
4 – 4 – 2439 @ 19:38
Engs. 276, 220, 247, 321
Batt. 57 “Planning Chief”
Eng. 262 w/ Incident Management Vehicle
Car 4: Chief Robert Sweeney “Chief of Operations”      

@ 20:39
Fieldcom 1: Progress Report for the 4th Alarm, Box 2439, Car 4, Chief Sweeney reports:
Fire in a 6 Story Brick occupied multiple dwelling. ( 3 ) Tower Ladders in operation in the rear of the Fire Bldg. ( 1 ) Tower Ladder in operation in the front of the Fire Bldg. Setting up 2nd Tower Ladder in the front of the Fire Bldg. ( 1 ) Stang in operation in the rear. Have ( 3 ) floors of fire out the rear of the Fire Bldg. Doubtful Will Hold.      

@ 20:44
Fieldcom 1: By orders of Chief Kilduff, transmit the 5th Alarm.
Special Call ( 2 ) additional Engines above the 5th Alarm for “Brand Patrol”      

5th Alarm:
5 – 5 – 2439 @ 20:44
Engs. 234, 280, 282, 227
Engs. 290 & 214 s/c for “Brand Patrol”
Car 3: Chief Edward Kilduff “Chief of Department”      

@ 20:58
Fieldcom 1: Progress Report for the 5th Alarm, Box 2439, Car 4, Chief Sweeney reports:
Primary Searches on the 4th floor are negative except for Apt. 4 “adam”      

@ 21:13
Fieldcom 1: Special Call ( 2 ) additional Trucks to the Staging Area.
Ladder 132 & Tower Ladder 111 are s/c      

@ 21:22
Fieldcom 1: At this time, We’re releasing Rescue #2 & Squad #1      

@ 21:26
Fieldcom 1: Progress Report for the 5th Alarm, Box 2439, Car 4, Chief Sweeney reports:
All members have been removed from the Fire Bldg. ( 3 ) Tower Ladders in operation in the front of the Fire Bldg. ( 2 ) Tower Ladders & ( 1 ) Stang in operation in the rear of the Fire Bldg. Still have heavy fire on the 4th; 5th; & 6th floors. This will be a pro long operation. Still Doubtful.      

@ 22:15
Fieldcom 1: Progress Report for the 5th Alarm, Box 2439, Car 3, Chief Kilduff reports:
( 3 ) Tower Ladders in operation in the front of the Fire Bldg.
( 2 ) Tower Ladders and ( 1 ) Multi-Versal in operation in the rear of the Fire Bldg. Fire is darkening down on the 4th & 5th floors in the rear. Fire is Still Doubtful.      

@ 22:58
Fieldcom 1: Progress Report for the 5th Alarm, Box 2439, Car 4, Chief Sweeney reports:
Probably Will Hold
The Bldg. has been changed to a 7 Story Bldg. Fire was on the 5th; 6th; & 7th floors and Cockloft.      

@ 23:10
Fieldcom 1: Special call Eng. 233 with Mobile Command 1      

@ 23:12
Fieldcom 1: Special Call ( 1 ) Division Chief, & ( 3 ) Battalion Chiefs for “relief”
Batt. 4, Batt 31 act. 41, Batt. 49 are s/c
Division 1 s/c      

@ 23:18
Fieldcom 1: Special Call ( 3 ) additional Engine’s, ( 3 ) additional Tower Ladders for “relief”
Engs. 330, 248, 220
T. Lads. 107, T. Lad. 161 act. 157, T. Lad. 15 act. 131      

@ 01:58
Fieldcom 1: By order’s of Division 1, Fire is Under Control.      

(Job Duration: 7 hrs./16 mins.)      

Note: 2 Engines, 2 Trucks, 1 Batt. Chief will be Special Called on intervals to support a “watch line”      

( 1 ) 10-45 Code 1 (deceased was located in the Fire Bldg.)   

Posted by on February 21, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Fire Fighting, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, High-rise, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

National Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System; Untapped Resource

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Have you heard about the National Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System (NMRS)? Have you used the NMRS Reports, or submitted a near miss event? Did you know there is a wealth of resources available on the NMRS web site or that there is a Report of the week that is published weekly?

If not, this is a great opportunity to learn about this national fire service program.    

 The National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System is a voluntary, confidential, non-punitive and secure reporting system with the goal of improving fire fighter safety.    

Submitted reports will be reviewed by fire service professionals. Identifying descriptions are removed to protect your identity. The report is then posted on this web site for other fire fighters to use as a learning tool.    

The reporting system is funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program. The program was originally funded by DHS and Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company.    

There are three main goals:
1.  To give firefighters the opportunity to learn from each other through real-life experiences;
2.  To help formulate strategies to reduce the frequency of firefighter injuries and fatalities; and
3.  To enhance the safety culture of the fire and emergency service.    

Fire fighters can use submitted reports as educational tools. Analyzed data will be used to identify trends which can assist in formulating strategies to reduce fire fighter injuries and fatalities. Depending on the urgency, information will be presented to the fire service community via program reports, press releases and e-mail alerts.    

Why should I submit a near-miss report? A near miss experienced by a firefighter can improve the knowledge, skills and abilities of everyone who is made aware of it.  Reporting your near-miss event to www.firefighternearmiss.com will help prevent an injury or fatality of a firefighter.  Near-miss reporting has worked effectively in other industries, especially aviation, since team members have more knowledge.  Industries using near-miss reporting systems have lower injury rates and fewer worker fatalities.   

YouTube Preview Image 
 
 As a Company or Command Officer you have an obligation to capture your department’s near-miss events and contribute to the National Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System data base so the fire service can learn from each event with the objective that they are not repeated or escalate into something more severe or significant in terms of injuries or line of duty death events.
 
Take the time to browse through the NMRS web site and familiarize yourself with the content, resources and information available to you.
 
Realize that the resource center and the near-miss reports are all formulative and can very easily support training drill development, just in time training, table-top discussions, scenario based exercises and review discussions with company, staff or command officers and all station or company personnel.NMRS Resource Section, HERE 
 
 
Links:    
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

   Got a Near-Miss Report to Submit?

Click on the button for a direct link to the NFNMRS here

   

 

Frequent Questions:    

   

Taking it to the Streets, Blogtalk radio on Firefighternetcast.com (link here)

Mark your calendars for Wednesday March 16th at 9:00pm ET for a new edition of Taking it to the Streets, where we’ll be discussing the National Near Miss Reporting System and program with Chief Steve Mormino, NMRS Program Advisor past Chief with South Farmingdale (NY) Fire Department and retired Lieutenant , FDNY. Tune in for an exceptional program.

 

  • Dont’t forget to visit the National Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System booth at FDIC next month

For more information:
Rynnel Gibbs       nearmiss@iafc.org
703-537-4858 www.firefighternearmiss.com   

 Near Miss Reporting System Advisory Board

  • Dennis Smith, Chairman, First Responders Financial Co. (Chair of Advisory Board)
  • Jim Brinkley, Director of Occupational Health and Safety, International Association of Fire Fighters.
  • Alan Brunacini, Fire Chief
  • Linda Connell, Director, NASA/Aviation Safety Reporting System
  • I. David Daniels, Fire Chief/CEO, Woodinville Fire and Rescue (WA)
  • Gordon Graham, Graham Research Consultants
  • William Goldfeder, Deputy Chief, Loveland-Symmes Fire Dept. (OH)
  • Manuel Gomez, Chief, City of Hobbs Fire Dept. (NM)
  • Bill Halmich, Fire Chief, Washington Fire Dept. (MO)
  • Christopher Hart, Vice Chair, National Transportation Safety Board
  • Mark Light, Executive Director/Chief Executive Officer, International Association of Fire Chiefs
  • Ed Mann, State Fire Commissioner, Office of the PA State Fire Commissioner

 Take a look at the NMRS Partners, HERE

Posted by on February 20, 2011 • Filed under: Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, company officer, Fire Fighter Safety, Fire Fighting, firefighter-safety-health • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

ISFSI Live Fire Training

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      Whether you are a career firefighter, volunteer firefighter, company officer, instructor, training officer, chief officer, or whatever your title or role may be; if you have been tasked or assigned to be an instructor in a training exercise that will involve live fire, you have a responsibility to the people you will train, lead, or supervise to have the proper knowledge, skills and abilities. These responsibilities come from a number of sources. First and foremost, there is the moral obligation that comes with putting people in danger. There are also legislative responsibilities, which could be national industrial standards, state laws, local codes, and even the possibility of criminal charges for acts that could be considered malicious or negligent, not to mention specter of a civil law threat.

            You know that history shows that firefighters and students learning to become firefighters, have died or been severely injured during these live fire training exercises. However, you also know that firefighters who don’t possess the knowledge, skills and abilities to perform the job effectively are a danger to their fellow comrades. You also have your peer pressure and superiors’ pushing you to make sure that the drill is “real”. They want to make it worth their time so the rookies can “learn something from it”.

           So you have to achieve a balance of risk in training versus the risk of not having that training. NFPA 1403 was designed to set standards on what should be done to mitigate those dangers and that risk. The International Society of Fire Service Instructors (ISFSI) has designed a Live Fire Instructor credentialed training program designed to teach you how to meet the standards while preparing firefighters through the experiences of live fire training, in permanent live fire training props. For more information contact ISFSI.

Posted by on February 15, 2011 • Filed under: Attitude, christopher naum, company officer, Credentialing, Culture, Doug Cline, Education, Fire Fighter Safety, Fire Fighting, Fire Suppression, Future, KSA, Leaderhip, Officer, operations, Professional Development, Risk Assessment, skills, thecompanyofficer.com, training, training-development, Uncategorized • Tagged: , , ,

Are You Prepared to PREVENT a Line of Duty Death?

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Power is the ability to command or apply force.

Authority is the right to command and expend resources.

A leader is one who can generate effective individual and group action to accomplish agency goals.

The fire service is a dynamic profession that is richly steeped in tradition, noble in deeds and calling. We know the fire service to be constant – yet ever changing in today’s society. We have built this profession upon man and machinery in opposition with an uncontrolled force known as fire. The last fifteen years has shown a shift from traditional fire service missions to encompass a wide scope of service deliveries that is ever expanding. We are challenged daily on the way we do business.
These changes have affected not only the fire service as a whole but also each level
within. The importance of competencies for fire officers in skills, knowledge and training is of the essence in today’s fire service. Fire officer cultural and attitudinal changes are the crucial links that will ultimately determine the future of our business.
Each year the American fire service experiences an average of over 100 line of duty deaths each year. Further we know that the amount of working fires are down approximately 66% of what they were in the mid 1970’s. So what is the score card saying? Why do we continue to know the causes of line of duty deaths and do nothing to change? Summed up it is nothing more than attitudes. We need to change our attitudes. There is no where in the corporate world that you could come in and give an annual report that stated we had a good year, we only lost 100 employees that you would not be escorted out the door before you could get your personal items in a box. Ron Siarnicki of the national Fallen Fire Fighters Foundation (NFFF) made this statement in one of there program. Guess what…HE IS CORRECT! Why do we as leaders in this business continue to allow these issues to occur? Why do we continue to deem it an honor to die in the line of duty? Why are we so resistant to change? We call it tradition! Well as a fire chief and a fire service member I have to say, “GET OVER OLD and BAD TRADITIONS, START A SAFE NEW ONE!” Ok, if I stepped on some toes here, GOOD, they probably needed it. We cannot afford to continue allowing the same mistakes over and over again to occur. At some point we have to start saying it is not acceptable to have injuries and Line of Duty Deaths (LODD). We must change this culture and the time is now and it starts with YOU!
I recently was shuttled to the airport following a conference. I was able to spend that time talking with a young foriegn exchange fire science student who was asking many questions about the culture of the fire service. I asked me how many people get hurt or are killed doing this job as he had seen T-Shirts this week about this. I was ashamed to say we  usually have an average of more than 100 firefighters a year. He then asked why. Boy did this hit home! We know why and how firefighters die in the line of duty but what are we doing to prevent them? In 2010 we had eighty five(85) line of duty deaths. My question is just how many of these could have been prevented? One area that we know we can control the environment and have good chances of not having a line of duty death is training. But in 2010 we had 7 line of duty deaths in training. This equates to 8.2% of the total line of duty deaths for that year. Secondly responding to and returning from alarms accounted for 16 line of duty deaths or 18.8%. Deaths in crashes continue to account for a significant portion of the annual fatalities. How many of these could have been prevented? How many were not wearing their seat belts? How many was speed a contributing factor? To answer the last two questions is far too many. This can be corrected with an attitude adjustment.
Let’s look at how we can reduce these numbers. We need to first address our culture and make attitude changes. These changes need to be at all levels. We can begin this change today without problems by changing the thought process as new firefighters enter the academies across the United States. We can further push with the existing firefighters. We have to hit the dinosaurs hard because they take the new recruits freshly in the field and create dinosaur eggs that then develop into dinosaurs themselves. The year 2009 we saw a reduction in the line of duty deaths to below 100 again. Are we lucky or are we truly focusing on what the issues are. Thus the culture revolves in a vicious cycle. Ok there is the start but what do we do to impact the fire service?
We need to develop and require Comprehensive Health and Wellness Programs. These programs need to include physical conditioning, medical evaluations, and mental conditioning. With more and more firefighters perishing due to heart attacks and strokes ( 56.4%) we need to make sure that we are in the physical condition to do this job. I further think that the statistics are some what skewed. When we see LODDs of fire service personnel 65 years old or older who die after responses who did not engage in suppression activities it is being question as to where or not these individuals would have had a heart attack even if they were not on scene within that 24 hours. How many departments are providing and requiring comprehensive medical evaluations (NFPA 1582) for all of their members? If you are not, you need to look for a way to make this happen. So many times I hear of how certain medical evaluations have found members of the fire service with health issues they never knew existed. These physicals need to be annually. I recently was running a portion of a department’s physical conditioning program which was a job performance physical agility test. I found one of our more experience personnel to be hypertensive (elevated blood pressure). I refused to let him test and the department sent  him for medical evaluation. Guess what…he is alive today and has begun taking on life style changes and has medication to assist in controlling this issue. He had no symptoms of this condition and was at the potential levels for major problems. Simply as your grandmother would say, “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.”
Further we need to evaluate and support physical conditioning (NFPA 1583). These need to set personal goals as each individual is different, department goals and standards as to show everyone who performs must be able to perform at a set level. Lastly, we must have qualitative and quantitative testing of physical conditioning. Not as punishment but as a teaching tool. How many of your members can tell you exactly how long an SCBA will last when they are working at full capacity. As command officers this is important information as we work on scenes and strive to complete accountability of our personnel. More importantly it will keep our personnel safer.
We know this is one of the most stressful jobs anywhere you could travel. So just how well do we condition our folks mentally. Have you ever heard “suck it up it’s your job?” Sitting and talking with some professionals from an FDNY Engine Company they talked about and exhibited significant signs of Critical Incident Stress. This, I am sure, is compounded several times over from the events that affect the lives of these firefighters, but hey lets face facts here. These brothers are hurting and hurting bad. But have we addressed any of this, how about there families? I bet they are hurting too! So what do we do to help this problem? We must provide good Critical Incident Stress (CIS) education and coping techniques not only to the firefighters but also for their families. I know that I have done multiple programs on the east coast about this same issue, addressing firefighters and families together both the firehouse family and our true families all at the table together. This program is titled “Hearts and Sirens” and it explores CIS as it affects both the emergency services working and the family we leave at home when duty calls. My wife tells here heart felt stories of the situations she has had to live through and what helped. Basically we provide education, coping techniques and skills to deal with CIS for families. Let’s face it tough guys, even the hard core folks, struggle with all we face in this job at some point. As they face repetitive issues it becomes cumulative and eventually the levels will build up to the eruption point. This can be prevented and enhance our quality of life with just a little education and swallowing of pride on our part. Face it we are not super human, as much as we wish we were.
Training is the paramount. We must continue to enhance our training in every aspect. This includes going back to the basics. We often see in NIOSH reports where basic and routine components of our job are not performed or are contributing factors to LODD and injuries. So why can’t we do the basics? We have the mentality of hey I been there done that, I don’t need to do that anymore, I have got that down. Ok are you sure? If so show me! If you got it should not be hard or lengthy. Next we need to focus on realism. What are we truly going to face. I deal with the mentality of that wouldn’t happen to us or that’s the big city stuff it’s not going to happen here. Well, last time I checked fire did not discriminate. It does matter who you are or where you are from. Reality check… who would have thought that an aircraft with terrorists on board would crash in rural Pennsylvania. That should prove this point with enough said. We must train hard, train realistically and train often. By doing this we stoke our tool boxes with the right tools for the job.
As we train, we as leaders and trainers must make every effort to pull out the stops. We must not accept or condone any type of training environment or attitude that compromises the safety of any firefighter. We must cease pushing the envelope with cowboy tactics that only prove that you can show boat. If this is you I have a message…Your Dangerous and you need to change. We do not need to hurt or kill firefighters to have good quality training. In fact good quality training starts with no injuries and especially no deaths. In research of training line of duty deaths almost every incident could have been prevented.
In closing we must have to courage to say NO and the courage to be safe. It often is not a popular personality folks want to see, but again is it worth dieing for…Most times not! Come on folks, let’s face it, we are not doing everything correct here. We need to change and we need to change NOW!!! Do your self, your firefighters and their families a favor. Help prevent a line of duty death, change the attitudes and culture in your departments and have the courage to be safe! The families at home depend on you to be a leader and an officer. If you are not willing to do as much as possible to help with the change of the culture, do the fire service a favor, RETIRE or QUIT or RESIGN BEING AN OFFICER because you are part of the problem not part of the solution. Help us support the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation and the fire service quest of “EVERYONE GOES HOME”.

Posted by on February 10, 2011 • Filed under: Attitude, command-leadership, company officer, Culture, Doug Cline, Education, Fire Fighter Safety, firefighter-safety-health, Fitness, Future, Health and Safety, in-the-line-of-duty, Leaderhip, LODD, Officer, operations, Situational Awareness, thecompanyofficer.com, Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , ,

The Future of the Fire Service

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It is perceived by fire service leaders that fire departments across the United States will see a paradigm shift from just emergency response services to a comprehensive community risk reduction and management focus. This statement is becoming more and more common as you sit and talk with fire service leaders across the nation. National fire Academy Executive Fire Officer (EFO) research documents are being developed and presented on this very topic. It was a discussion topic at the International Association of Fire Chief’s (IAFC) strategic planning meeting. So why do we need to change directions?
The fire service already responds and reactively handles the majority of emergencies and crisis within the community. We need to begin focusing on a proactive approach. With this being said, this would allow for not only a safer community but help focus on the quality of life of our citizens. If we are able to prevent most incidents from occurring the costs of those incidents will be significantly reduced, the quality of life will be improved and the potential for economic sustainability is increased. As government budgets continue to shrink, the impact of budget cuts to departments continue. The impact of these cuts is witnessed almost daily in the fire service with browning out of stations, closing of companies, staff reduction through attrition and yes even critical staffing reductions by employees being laid off. The fire service has reached a new fold in its history. With this new fold occurring we must adapt our philosophies, strategies and even our beloved tactics. When corporations and builders engineer and construct disposable buildings then we need to tactically focus our efforts on engineering and code requirements of automatic fire suppression systems and early detection systems. When the owners and builders ignore this option and a fire catastrophe strikes, we need to utilize the new rules of tactical engagement.
Fire departments will need to shift from traditional emergency responses services and transition into a combination of emergency responses services with a primary focus on being a community reduction team focusing on public safety in a multidimensional approach of safe buildings through code enforcement, building requirements, environmental impact, community safety, responder safety, community health and wellness and community risk reduction through research and education. We will become the mother ship that guides critical thinking in all aspects of safety throughout our community.
The fire service will need to focus on assembling a set of best practices in risk reduction and work diligently to manage risk via educating our communities, proactive engineering practices and code enforcement. However, the fire service does not collect data well at all. We have to transition to being very analytical of collecting certain complete and accurate quantifiable data based upon a standard data model for comparative benchmarking studies.
The battle is won however on the proactive side through risk reduction and risk management. The long term impacts will benefit everyone. Our success will be determined by not solely the retrospective data but community and family buy in. This relates to the true potential risk that exists, verses how it has been reduced.

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Posted by on February 8, 2011 • Filed under: administration-leadership, Attitude, BECOME SAFE, building construction, command-leadership, company officer, Culture, Doug Cline, Future, Leaderhip, Risk Management, Situational Awareness, thecompanyofficer.com, Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , ,