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Taking it to the Streets: “All Companies Stand-By”: Transmitting the Box for….Your Street on this Day

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Transmitting the Box

Taking it to the Streets: “All units stand-by: Transmitting the Box for….Your Street on this DayThe importance of knowing your first-due, surrounding response districts, as well as greater alarm, mutual and automatic aid response areas …is fundamental towards achieving operational excellence and maintaining firefighter safety.

The fact that at times, our surroundings do become a blur and fade into the background does occur and should be recognized as a gap and corrected.

Company and Command Officer Responsibilities demand that you know your buildings intimately and have the knowledge base and experience to put Building Construction, Occupancy, Fire in the Compartment and Strategies & Tactics together in an orchestrated manner consistent with risk, demands and requirements dictated by the evolving incident.You know that quiet street you pass daily on your way to “other runs”, or that may not have necessarily required agency service in a while; have you looked at the construction and building features before you’re now showing up first-due with heavy fire showing, and multiple incident priorities all demanding immediate attention?

Take a look at the images from our past post and this one; run through your head what the street looks like (pre-event) and what parameters and factors you’re seeing. Do the same with the fire incident scene and see if you can match pre-incident situational awareness and pre-fire planning insights with what you might be confronting from the front seat or riding backwards….Understand and Know your world….it’s just a matter of time before those bells will be going off and the radio will be crackling….Engine 21 respond to…. For a report of a structure fire.

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Posted by on March 26, 2013 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Fire Dynamics, Fire Fighting, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, Officer, operations, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics, Taking it to the Streets • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Fire Dynamics Simulation of 2011 Baltimore County LODD- 30 Dowling Circle

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Operations at 30 Dowling Circle 01.19.2011 Box 11-09

 On Wednesday, January 19, 2011, a fire occurred in an apartment building located in the Hillendale section of Baltimore County, Maryland. This fire resulted in the line of duty death (LODD) of volunteer firefighter Mark G. Falkenhan, who was operating as the acting lieutenant on Squad 303 . Upon their arrival, FF Falkenhan and a second firefighter from Squad 303 deployed to the upper floors of the apartment building to conduct search and rescue operations. Other fire department units were already involved with both firefighting operations and effecting rescues of trapped civilians.

During these operations, FF Falkenhan and his partner became trapped in a third floor apartment by rapidly spreading fire and smoke conditions. The second firefighter was able to self-egress the building by diving headfirst down a ladder on the front (address side) of the building. FF Falkenhan declared a “MAYDAY” and implemented “MAYDAY” procedures, but was unable to escape or be rescued.

FF Falkenhan was located and removed via a balcony on the third floor in the rear of the building. Resuscitative efforts began immediately upon removal from the balcony, and continued en route to the hospital. FF Falkenhan succumbed to his injuries and was pronounced deceased at the hospital.

Mark Gray Falkenhan had dedicated his life to serving others. He perished in the line of duty on January 19, 2011 while performing search and rescue operations at a multi-alarm apartment fire in Hillendale, Baltimore County (Maryland). He was 43 years old.

 

Firefighter Mark Falkenhan

30 Dowling Circle

 

The Baltimore County (MD) Fire Department published the Line of Duty Death Investgation Report of the 30 Dowling Circle Fire recently.

The report was written by a Line of Duty Death Investigation Team comprised of departmental members, including representatives of the local firefighters’ union and the Baltimore County Volunteer Firemen’s Association.

An overview and executive narrative of the final report (PDF) on the apartment fire where Volunteer Firefighter Mark Falkenhan sustained fatal injuries was posed on CommandSafety.com HERE.

FF Mark Falkenhan

 On Wednesday, January 19, 2011, a fire occurred in an apartment building located in the Hillendale section of Baltimore County, Maryland. This fire resulted in the line of duty death (LODD) of volunteer firefighter Mark G. Falkenhan, who was operating as the acting lieutenant on Squad 303 (for purposes of this report, Mark will be referred to as FF Falkenhan).

Upon their arrival, FF Falkenhan and a second firefighter (FF # 2) from Squad 303 deployed to the upper floors of the apartment building to conduct search and rescue operations. Other fire department units were already involved with both firefighting operations and effecting rescues of trapped civilians.

During these operations, FF Falkenhan and FF # 2 became trapped in a third floor apartment by rapidly spreading fire and smoke conditions. FF # 2 was able to self-egress the building by diving headfirst down a ladder on the front (address side) of the building. FF Falkenhan declared a “MAYDAY” and implemented “MAYDAY” procedures, but was unable to escape or be rescued.

FF Falkenhan was located and removed via a balcony on the third floor in the rear of the building. Resuscitative efforts began immediately upon removal from the balcony, and continued en route to the hospital. FF Falkenhan succumbed to his injuries and was pronounced deceased at the hospital.

The investigating team examined any and all data available, including independent analysis of the self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), turnout gear and autopsy report. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) produced a fire model to assist with evaluating fire behavior. Multiple site inspections were conducted. Extensive interviews were conducted by the team which also attended those conducted by investigators from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). Photographic and audio transcripts were also thoroughly analyzed. A comprehensive timeline of events was developed. All information used to make decisions regarding recommendations was corroborated by at least two sources.

  • In fairness to those units involved in this incident, the investigating team had the advantage of examining this incident over the period of several months. Furthermore, given the size and nature of the event, and the fact that arriving crews were met with serious fire conditions and several residents trapped and in immediate danger, all personnel should be commended for their efforts for performing several rescues which prevented an even greater tragedy.
  • The team did not identify a particular primary reason for FF Falkenhan’s death.
  • What were identified were many secondary issues involving but not limited to crew integrity, incident command, strategy and tactics, and communications.
  • These issues are identified and discussed, and recommendations are made in appropriate sections of the report, as well as in a consolidated format in the Report Appendix.

Some of the issues identified in this report may require some type of change to current practices, policies, procedures or equipment. Most, however, do not. Specifically, the analysis and recommendations regarding Incident Command and Strategy and Tactics show that if current policies and procedures are adhered to, the opportunity for catastrophic problems may be reduced.

  • Mark Falkenhan was a well-respected and experienced firefighter.
  • He died performing his duties during a very complex incident with severe fire conditions and unique fire behavior coupled with the immediate need to perform multiple rescues of victims in imminent danger.
  • It would be easy if one particular failure of the system could be identified as the cause of this tragedy.
  • We could fix it and move on. Unfortunately it is not that simple.
  • No incident is “routine”. Mark’s death and this report reinforce that fact.

On Wednesday, January 19, 2011 at 1816 hours, a call was received at the Baltimore County 911 Center from a female occupant at 30 Dowling Circle in the Hillendale section of Baltimore County. The caller stated that her stove was on fire and the fire was spreading to the surrounding cabinets. Fire box 11-09 was dispatched by Baltimore County Fire Dispatch (Dispatch) at 1818 hours consisting of four engine companies, two truck companies, a floodlight unit, and a battalion chief. All units responded on Talkgroup 1-2.

The location, approximately one mile from the first dispatched engine company, is a three story garden-type apartment complex, with brick construction and a composite shingle, truss supported roof. The fire building contained a total of six apartments divided by a common enclosed stairway in the center with one apartment on the left and one to the right of the stairs.

 

Fire Dynamics Simulation of 2011 Baltimore County LODD- 30 Dowling

Fire Dynamics Analysis and Insights

 

INTRODUCTION:

Assistance from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) Fire Research Laboratory (FRL) was requested for a fire at 30 Dowling Circle by the Baltimore County Fire Investigation Division (FID) through the ATF Baltimore Field Division on the night of January 19, 2011.

ATF Fire Protection Engineers were asked to utilize engineering analysis methods, including computer fire modeling, to assist with determining the route of fire spread and the events that led to the firefighter MAYDAY and subsequent Line of Duty Death.

Download the REPORT HERE

BACKGROUND:

Working closely with the Post Incident Analysis Team, the ATF Fire Research Laboratory created a computer simulation of the garden apartment building using Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS). FDS is a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) modeling program developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).

FDS utilizes mathematical calculations to predict the flow of heat, smoke and other products of fire. Smokeview, a post-processer computer program also produced by NIST, was then used to visualize the mathematical output from FDS. The most current available versions of both programs were used: FDS 5.5.3 and Smokeview 5.6. Below are photographs of the front and rear of the fire building next to an image of the same building constructed in FDS.

Figure 01. 30 Dowling Street

 

Figure 2. FDS representation of the front of 30 Dowling Circle showing the terrace (T), second (A) and third (B) levels.

 

The garden apartment building at 30 Dowling Circle was attached to two similar garden apartment buildings, one on each side. The fire damage was isolated to 30 Dowling Circle, so the exposure buildings were not included in the computer fire model. The entire six unit garden apartment building was modeled in FDS, including the patio and balconies on the rear of the building. FDS works by dividing a space into cubical “grid cells” for calculation purposes. FDS then computes various CFD calculations for each grid cell to predict the movement of mass, energy, momentum and species throughout a three-dimensional space.

The Dowling Circle model consisted of 2,560,000 total grid cells that were each 3.9 inch (10 cm) cubes. The model was used to simulate a total elapsed real time of 27.5 minutes, beginning before the 911 call and ending just after flashover of the third floor and the firefighter MAYDAY.

The model was synchronized in real time with the fireground audio throughout the duration of the fire.

Fiqure 03 and 04

 

FDS has been validated to predict the movement of heat and smoke throughout a compartment, however the accuracy of fire modeling depends on it being used appropriately by a trained user that is aware of its limitations. Due to lack of knowledge about the exact material properties for the various furnishings and other available fuels, a user-specified fire progression was used for this application.

For flame and fire gas movement after consumption of the original burning fuel packages, the fire model calculated smoke and ventilation flow paths through the building and was used to gain a better understanding of the rapid fire growth leading to flashover of the stairwell and third floor.

  • In addition, FDS was utilized to illustrate the complex route of fire spread through the building as verified by witness statements, firefighter interviews, photographs and burn patterns.
  • Input data for the computer model included heat release rate data and video from previous testing conducted by the ATF FRL and NIST.
  • Ambient weather data was also input into the model, including temperature, as well as wind direction and magnitude at the time of the fire. In addition, several alternative compartmentation scenarios were modeled to explore the possible effects of closed stairway apartment entrance doors on the spread of smoke and flames in the stairwell.
  • The statements of each firefighter were reviewed and their individual actions (breaking windows, opening doors, etc.) and observations (fire size, smoke conditions, etc.) were recorded on floor diagrams.

The actions and observations of the firefighters were then associated with specific times in the fireground audio to generate an overall event timeline. All events in the model are based on this master timeline of events. In addition, all photographs were time stamped and synchronized with the model. The Post Incident Analysis Team was consulted throughout the development of the event timeline and the computer fire model to ensure accuracy.

MODELING ANALYSIS:

1. Analysis of Fire Development in the Terrace Level

The fire originated on the stovetop of an occupied apartment on the right (south) side of the terrace level (apartment T2). Flames from a grease fire ignited kitchen cabinets, eventually causing the kitchen to flashover into the attached living room. Upon fire department arrival, a fully developed fire existed in the living room and kitchen of apartment T2. Prior to exiting the apartment, the occupant opened both the rear sliding door and the apartment entrance door in an attempt to ventilate smoke from the apartment.

 

Figure 06. A typical floor plan of the right side apartments at 30 Dowling Circle.

 

An analysis of the ventilation flow path through the apartment with FDS indicated that a significant unidirectional flow path existed up the stairs with an inlet at the rear terrace sliding door and outlet at the front apartment entrance door leading to the stairwell.

Figure 7. Smokeview frame of the rear of the building indicating the fire origin and smoke spread within the T2 apartment. Figure 8. View of smoke flow out of kitchen and open sliding glass door (center of photo) in the rear of apartment T2. Figure 9. Smokeview frame of flashover of the kitchen with flames extending into the living room. Flames also begin to extend out of the rear sliding door and impact the balcony above.

 

Figure 10. Ignition of second level balcony resulting from flame extension from living room.

 

This unidirectional flow path up the stairs is difficult to combat and is often experienced during basement fires as crews attempt to descend interior stairs. The model indicates sustained air temperatures in the stairwell of approximately 600 Fahrenheit (315 Celsius) at velocities of approximately 6 mph (2.7 m/s) from floor to ceiling as crews attempted to descend the stairs. This is consistent with statements from firefighting crews, who experienced extremely high heat conditions and indicated periodically seeing flames in the smoke layer flowing up the stairs.

The elevated air velocity of the stairwell flow path resulted in a high rate of convective energy transfer to the structural firefighting gear and high perceived temperatures as the firefighters attempted to descend the stairs. Firefighting crews flowed a hoseline down the stairs to combat the high temperatures; however no significant cooling was noticed by firefighters because the hose stream could not reach the seat of the fully developed fire in the kitchen area.

The crews were simply cooling the ventilation flow path without cooling the source of the energy in the apartment. It was not until a hose stream was directed through an exterior window and a portion of the fire was extinguished that gas temperatures and velocities began to decrease, allowing firefighters to make entry to the terrace apartment via the stairs.

Figure 12. Smokeview section frame showing unidirectional flow of approximately 600 Fahrenheit (315 Celsius) gases out of the stairwell entrance door

Front photo of unidirectional flow of smoke up stairwell from apartment T2. Note the high volume of smoke from floor to ceiling as the stairwell door serves as the flow path outlet. The ground ladder in the foreground was used to rescue an occupant on the third floor trapped by heavy smoke in the stairwell. (Refer to Figure 014)

Figure 014. Front photo of unidirectional flow of smoke up stairwell from apartment T2. Note the high volume of smoke from floor to ceiling as the stairwell door serves as the flow path outlet.

 

The first arriving engine, E-11, was staffed with a Captain, Lieutenant, Driver/Operator, and a Firefighter. Upon arrival at 1820 hours, the Captain gave a brief initial report describing a three story garden apartment with smoke showing from side Alpha: “The Captain of E-11 will have Command and we are initiating an aggressive interior attack with a 1 ¾” hand line”. Command also instructed the second due engine to bring him a supply line from the hydrant. 

A female resident (victim # 1) appeared in a third floor apartment window, Alpha/Bravo side (Apt. B-1), yelled for assistance, and threatened to jump. Smoke or fire was visible from any of the third floor windows. At 1823 hours, Command advised Dispatch that he had a rescue and that he was establishing Limited Command. Fire Dispatch was in the process of upgrading the response profile to an apartment fire with rescue when the responding Battalion Chief requested that the fire box be upgraded to a fire rescue box. While the Firefighter and Lieutenant prepared for entry into the building, the Captain and Driver/Operator extended a ladder to the 3rd floor apartment window and rescued the resident. The first attempt by the Firefighter and Lieutenant to make entry into the side Alpha entrance was unsuccessful due to the extreme heat and smoke conditions.

The second due engine, E-10, arrived at 1823 with staffing of a Captain, Lieutenant, Driver/Operator, and a Firefighter. At 1823, E-10’s crew brought a 4″ supply line to E-11 from the hydrant at Deanwood Rd. and Dowling Circle and assisted the first-in crew with fire attack.

  • The Captain from E-10 conferred with Command and was instructed to advance a second 1 ¾” hand line.
  • The window to the first floor right apartment (Apt. T-2) was removed, and the second 1 ¾” line was advanced to the building by the crew of E-10.
  • Fire attack was initiated through the removed window. At 1827, Command requested a second alarm.

At this time, heat and smoke conditions just inside the front door improved enough to allow the Firefighter and Lieutenant from E-11 to make entry through the front door and into the stairwell. There they encountered heavy, thick black smoke and high heat conditions coming up the stairs from the terrace level apartment. The Lieutenant reported that the doorway to the first floor apartment was orange with fire and he had to fight his way through heavy heat and smoke conditions to attack the fire in the first floor right apartment (Apt. T-2). Entry was made approximately 3 feet into the doorway when the Firefighter’s low air alarm began to sound, and he exited the building. A member from E-10’s crew replaced the Firefighter from E-11 on the hose line.

At the same time, the Captain from E-11 proceeded to the rear of the structure to complete his initial 360 degree size up. He noted that there was fire emanating from the open sliding doors on the first floor Charlie/Delta apartment (Apt. T-2), extending to the balcony above. E-1, staffed by a Captain, Driver/Operator, and two Firefighters arrived and completed the hookup of the supply line that had been laid to the hydrant by E-10. The rest of Engine 1’s crew grabbed tools and an extension ladder and reported to the Charlie side of the building.

Figure 015 Charlie Side ( Rear) Extension

The Photo above referenced as  Figure 015 shows conditions  from rear of flames in apartment T2 and extension to the balcony above. Note the relative minimal volume of smoke as the sliding door serves as the inlet for ventilation into the apartment. The smoke and heat is flowing in from the rear, through the apartment and up the stairs.

This unidirectional flow path up the stairs is difficult to combat and is often experienced during basement fires as crews attempt to descend interior stairs.

  • The model indicates sustained air temperatures in the stairwell of approximately 600 Fahrenheit (315 Celsius) at velocities of approximately 6 mph (2.7 m/s) from floor to ceiling as crews attempted to descend the stairs.
  • This is consistent with statements from firefighting crews, who experienced extremely high heat conditions and indicated periodically seeing flames in the smoke layer flowing up the stairs.
  • The elevated air velocity of the stairwell flow path resulted in a high rate of convective energy transfer to the structural firefighting gear and high perceived temperatures as the firefighters attempted to descend the stairs.

Firefighting crews flowed a hoseline down the stairs to combat the high temperatures; however no significant cooling was noticed by firefighters because the hose stream could not reach the seat of the fully developed fire in the kitchen area.

The crews were simply cooling the ventilation flow path without cooling the source of the energy in the apartment.

It was not until a hose stream was directed through an exterior window and a portion of the fire was extinguished that gas temperatures and velocities began to decrease, allowing firefighters to make entry to the terrace apartment via the stairs.

Plan view of flow path and temperatures within the apartment. Note the location of the seat of the fire and the location of initial hose stream application down the stairs.

Figure 016

 

Photograph of hoselines being positioned at the stairwell entrance door and front window. Note the heavy smoke venting from all front openings in apartment T2. (Figure 017)

Figure 017 Alpha Side Entry Door

 

Figure 017  Hoselines being positioned at the stairwell entrance door and front window. Rapid Fire Progression Leading to Flashover of the Third LevelFlames extended upwards from the T2 apartment sliding door and ignited the rear balconies of the second and third level apartments above.
 
Fire on the second floor balcony extended into apartment A2 by failing the sliding glass door and igniting vertical plastic slat curtains that were suspended above.As crews searched within the second floor apartment, they noted seeing the burning curtains on the floor with flames extending to a nearby couch (containing polyurethane foam padding) adjacent to the sliding doorway.
 
The fire continued to grow unsuppressed and spread to a second couch as interior firefighting crews were engaged in rescuing two victims from the living room in the second floor apartment.Personnel stated that at this point fire conditions seemed to improve, suggesting that crews were making progress extinguishing the fire. (The first arriving attack crew reported that they were able to see apparatus lights through the sliding doors on Charlie side, which indicated to them that smoke and fire conditions were improving.)Truck 1, a tiller unit staffed by a Lieutenant, two Driver/Operators, and a Firefighter, arrived on side Alpha and immediately began search and rescue operations.
 
Windows on the second floor Alpha/Delta side apartment (Apt. A-2) were vented and ladders were thrown to gain access. T-8 arrived at the alley on side Charlie. E-1 extended a ground ladder to the third floor balcony on the Charlie/Bravo side of the structure (Apt. B-1), and made access to the apartment to search for additional victims.They noted fire venting from the first floor Charlie/Delta apartment (Apt. T-2) out of the sliding glass doors progressing upwards towards the balcony on the second floor.
 
Upon entering the apartment, they conducted a primary search and noted minimal heat with light smoke conditions.The crew accessed the hallway via the apartment entry door and noticed an increase in the temperature and the amount of smoke.They immediately closed the door and exited the apartment via the ground ladder.Upon exiting the apartment, E-1’s crew observed E-292 on the scene with a hand line extending into the apartment of origin, (first floor, Charlie/Delta side, Apt. T-2).
 
The officer on E-1 noted white smoke coming from the unit.Having already laid a supply line from the intersection of the alley and Deanwood Road, E-292’s crew extended a 1 ¾” hand line into the apartment of origin. Moderate fire conditions with zero visibility were encountered, and they reported feeling a great deal of heat on their knees as they crawled through the apartment.The Lieutenant and the Firefighter from Truck-1 entered Apartment A-2 via a second floor bedroom window (Alpha/Delta side) and began a search for additional victims. As they traversed the living room area they found an unconscious male resident (victim #2).
 
At 1836 hours, the Lieutenant notified Command via an urgent transmission that a victim had been located and they needed assistance with evacuation. The Lieutenant and Firefighter noted a small fire in the rear corner near the victim as they exited the room. The crew returned to the bedroom from which they had entered and closed the door behind them. Victim #2 was then evacuated from the apartment via a ground ladder through the bedroom window, and transferred to EMS personnel on side Alpha.
 
Figure 019 Flame extension and suppression efforts at the rear of the structure. Flames caused the second level glass slider to fail and ignite plastic curtains in the doorway located
 

Figure 019

 
 

The middle level apartment (A2) entrance door was opened by a second search crew around the same time as the second couch ignited, creating a ventilation flow path from the second floor balcony, through the apartment, and upwards into the stairwell (third floor). This flow path follows the same general route through the apartment and into the stairwell as was seen in the terrace level apartment below. Squad 303’s crew arrived on scene after the bulk of the fire in the terrace level apartment had been suppressed and appeared to be under control. The crew entered the front stairwell, which had minimal smoke up to the second level and the crew began to systematically search the building.

Squad 303’s crew proceeded to search two apartments before entering the third floor right side apartment to conduct a search, leaving the entrance door open. It should also be noted that carpeting impacted the bottom of the door and prevented the apartment entrance doors on the second and third levels from closing automatically. The entry doors had to be actively pushed closed to overcome the friction of the carpet.

 

Photo depicting building smoke and fire conditions around the arrival of Squad 303.

Note the lack of heavy smoke or fire in the stairwell or terrace level.

There is also no indication of the growing fire in the second (middle) level apartment.

 

 

 

When Squad 303’s crew of two firefighters entered the third level apartment (B2), smoke was banked about halfway down the walls with moderate visibility. The crew could clearly see the floor of the apartment without the need to crawl below the smoke layer to search. Squad 303’s crew was unaware of the flames spreading across the two couches in the second floor apartment below them. The crew split in order to search the apartment faster, with one firefighter searching the front bedrooms and the officer searching the kitchen and living room.

As flames in the second level began to rollover into the apartment entranceway, the smoke layer in the third level quickly dropped to the floor with a rapid increase in temperature. With Squad 303’s crew searching above, flames began to extend into the stairwell, supplied by sufficient ventilation flowing through the apartment. This combination of fuel, heat and oxygen rich fresh air resulted in a rapid increase in heat release rate and flashover of the second level apartment followed by full room involvement.

The open entrance doors on the second and third levels created a ventilation flow path through the second floor apartment, into the sealed stairwell and up through the third floor apartment directly above. The flames followed this flow path and extended from the second floor, through the stairwell and into the living room area of the third floor apartment. Flashover of the third floor occurred approximately 30 seconds after the second floor experienced flashover.

Figure 026 and 027

 

Rollover from the second level apartment into the stairwell.

 

 
 
Flames followed the ventilation flow path and extend into the third floor apartment, resulting in ignition of the couches just inside the doorway.

 

 

    

 

Command sounded the building evacuation tones as flames extended into the hallway and up to the third level apartment.

Two couches just inside the entrance door on the third level ignited, blocking the primary means of egress for both firefighters from Squad 303. Upon hearing the evacuation horns from the trucks, the second firefighter from Squad 303 (searching the front bedrooms) attempted to exit the apartment via the apartment entrance door, however he was blocked by flames in the living room and stairwell.

Trapped in the bedroom, the firefighter bailed out headfirst down a ground ladder on the front side from the third floor. Squad 303 officer’s means of egress through the apartment entrance door was also blocked by the flames in the living room and stairwell. There were no windows located in the rear of the apartment.

The only means of escape was the balcony slider, however the entire balcony was engulfed in flames from the fully involved apartment below. With both escape routes blocked by flames and experiencing extremely high heat conditions, Squad 303’s officer requested assistance and declared a MAYDAY from the rear of the third floor apartment.

Firefighters re-entered the structure to combat the fire and locate the trapped firefighter. The downed firefighter was eventually located on the third level just inside the sliding glass door and was removed to the rear balcony. The firefighter was then extricated in a stokes rescue basket down the aerial ladder of a truck located in the rear, where he was subsequently transported to the hospital.

Effects of Compartmentation on Fire Spread

The Post Incident Analysis Team requested that alternate modeling scenarios be conducted to explore the effects of compartmentation on fire spread throughout the building.

The team specifically wanted to know how the ventilation flow paths through the stairwell would differ if the second or third level apartment entry doors were shut after entering/leaving the apartments. Two alternate computer fire modeling scenarios were conducted.

The first alternative modeling run featured the exact same fire scenario, except the second (middle) level apartment door was closed after the last victim was removed from that apartment. The apartment entry doors from the stairwell were fire-rated doors constructed of solid wood.

  • As soon as the door is shut, the ventilation flow path through the apartment and up the stairwell is blocked.

 

Shutting the second level apartment door blocks the flow path and flame extension into the stairwell. 

Even with the third floor apartment door left open, the model indicates that the stairwell and third floor remain tenable for firefighters. Flames eventually extend from the third floor balcony into the apartment, however the escape routes through the stairwell and the front apartment windows are accessible.           

The model indicates that closing the second level apartment door prevents the flow of smoke, heat and other products of combustion from entering the stairwell, thus preventing flashover of the stairwell and the third level. As long as the second floor entry door remains shut, the model indicated that the conditions within the stairwell and third floor remain tenable for firefighters, even with the third floor apartment door open.

A second alternative modeling scenario was conducted where the third level entrance door was closed after crews made entry to search the apartment.The same fire conditions from the actual model were used.When the door remained closed, the outlet of the ventilation flow path was blocked at the top of the stairs. Without a complete flow path, there wasn’t sufficient oxygen flowing through the second floor apartment to support extended burning in the stairwell.

Consequently after flashover of the second floor, the flames in the stairwell only exist momentarily before consuming all available oxygen and becoming ventilation limited.The fire model indicated that temperatures within the third floor apartment stayed tenable for firefighters, even with a fully developed fire on the second floor and flames in the stairwell.

Flames would eventually extend up the rear balcony to the third level, however they would not block egress through the living room and front windows of the apartment.By closing the apartment door on the third floor and blocking the outlet for fire gases emanating from the second floor apartment, the third floor apartment remains tenable for firefighting crews and the temperatures only briefly spike in the stairwell before the fire becomes ventilation limited.The ventilation flow through the apartments results in an increased burning rate within both the second and third levels, as well as the stairwell.                     

Results of each modeling scenario describing extent of flame spread

Results of each modeling scenario describing extent of flame spread.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Effects of Compartmentation on Fire Damage to the StructureThe impact of compartmentation on fire and smoke spread is evident by examining the post-fire damage throughout the structure. While other factors contributed to the relative fire damage, including fire department overhaul and relative apartment configuration, analyzing the damage to the building and the position of the apartment entry doors provides insight on the benefits of compartmentation.

By closing apartment unit entrance doors and interior hollow core doors, one can slow or even block the ventilation flow path through the structure, thus significantly reducing the rate of fire spread. The photos below represent the post-fire damage in all six apartments within the fire building. Four of the six apartment entry doors were open for the majority of the fire and the relative difference in damage is clearly evident.

Terrace level stairwell landing looking into T1 (left) and T2 (right) apartments.

 

Door Closed……Door Open

 

 

Using doors to compartmentalize and limit fire and smoke spread in a structure is not limited to fire-rated entrance doors. Interior hollow core doors also offer considerable protection for compartmentation purposes.

A search crew utilizing the Vent, Enter and Search (VES) technique through a front window used a hollow core bedroom door to isolate themselves from the developing fire in the living room of apartment A2.

As the crews removed the second victim from the living room to the bedroom, they shut the bedroom hollow core door behind them.

The living room soon experienced flashover followed by full room involvement, however the bedroom remained isolated from the heat and smoke for the duration of the fire. The photos below illustrate this effective use of compartmentation to protect firefighters during a search.

 
Controling the Doors during VES

 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY:
While no fire model will exactly replicate a fire, this model provided insight on the route of fire spread, the rapid fire growth leading to flashover of the second and third level, and the benefits of compartmentation on slowing fire and smoke spread.
  • The unidirectional flow path up the stairs from the terrace level apartment resulted in a high rate of convective heat transfer to the firefighters initially attempting to descend the stairs, making attacking the seat of the fire very difficult.
  • The model then supported the fact that the main stairwell acted as an open channel for fire and smoke spread between the second and third levels, resulting in flashover of the third level in approximately 30 seconds after the second level.
  • This rapid fire growth leading to flashover is supported by photographs, witness statements and fireground audio.
  • The model was then utilized to explore the effects of compartmentation using apartment entrance doors.
  • The FDS model supported the scene observations and indicated that shutting the entrance doors blocked the flow of buoyancy driven fire gases through the structure, ultimately preventing fire extension to the third floor apartment via the stairwell.
  • The FDS model was utilized as part of the overall engineering analysis of this tragic fire and allowed for a better understanding of the events that led to the firefighter MAYDAY and subsequent Line of Duty Death.
  • The model was also used as an educational tool providing insight on potential methods of preventing similar tragedies in the future.
  • The results of this engineering analysis are intended to be reviewed by the Post Incident Analysis Team to assist in the creation of recommendations to mitigate the danger associated with future fire incidents.

References:

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Hose Streams and Fire Suppression Research from the NIST

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Hose Streams and Fire Suppression Research from the NIST

Little, if any, fire suppression research has been conducted on the effectiveness of fire streams from manual hose lines during the past 50 years. Determining the effectiveness of a range of water application methods could have impact on the tactical decisions, equipment choices and water supply requirements that affect fire departments across the country.

Fog Stream

 

 

 

 

 

Smooth Bore

Preliminary experiments examining the distribution of different hose streams.

This project examines a variety of fire fighting hose stream characteristics related to flow, distribution and thermal impact from both solid and fog stream nozzles. A series of real scale, laboratory based experiments have been started to look specifically at the water discharge and distribution characteristics, the impact of hose streams on a hot gas layer in a compartment, the impact of hose streams on gas flows through multi-compartment structures, and the suppression effectiveness on burning piles of wooden pallets. Based on data collected from these experiments, empirical FDS input sets for a solid stream and a narrow fog will be developed in order to re-create the results of the experiments. The final phase of the project will be to conduct a set of real scale validation fire experiments.

The spray measurements and data obtained from the previous full scale fire test series have been used to create a first-order hose stream model for implementation in FDS. The model is currently being refined with data from the following experiments:

Fog StreamSmooth Bore
Preliminary experiments examining the impact of different
hose streams on a pallet fire.
  • Characterize the hose streams in terms of nozzle pressure, flow rate, area of influence and water distribution.
  • Measure the ability of the hose streams to reduce the heat release rate of wood pallet fires burning in the open with no “compartmentation effects”.
  • Measure the ability of the hose streams to reduce the temperature of a hot gas layer in a compartment.
  • Measure the ability of the hose streams to reduce the heat release rate of the wood pallet fires burning in a compartment.
  • Measure the ability of the hose streams to impact ventilation and movement of fire gases in a multi-compartment structure.

Once the data from the above experiments is integrated into the hose stream models, the ability of FDS to predict the impacts of the water delivered by hose streams on the full fire environment will be examined in order to determine the capabilities and limitations of the hose stream models.

The final result from this research will provide a “manual hose line” suppression capability in FDS enabling the results to be used as a portion of a computer based training tool for firefighters. In addition, engineering predictions can be developed for hose streams and other manual water application techniques to provide guidance in the design and use of these fire fighting tools.

For more information, view the full Hose Stream Characterization and Effectiveness Modeling Project underway at NIST.

REPORTS

 
 
 

Reports Archive

VIDEOS

These videos are two examples of the preliminary tests performed on the effects of different types of fire attack strategies.

FROM NIST: http://www.nist.gov/fire/hose_streams.cfm

Posted by on February 1, 2012 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, NIST • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Required Reading: Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction

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Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction

Another must read for all Company and Command Officers: Impact of ventilation on fire behavior in legacy and contemporary residential construction, by Steve Kerber (2011) UL Report. Take some time to increase your proficiencies and compentencies.

Executive Summary

Under the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Assistance to FirefighterGrant Program, Underwriters Laboratories examined fire service ventilation practices as well as the impact of changes in modern house geometries. There has been a steady change in the residential fire environment over the past several decades. These changes include larger homes, more open floor plans and volumes and increased synthetic fuel loads. This series of experiments examine this change in fire behavior and the impact on firefighter ventilation tactics.

This fire research project developed the empirical data that is needed to quantify the fire behavior associated with these scenarios and result in immediately developing the necessary firefighting ventilation practices to reduce firefighter death and injury.

Two houses were constructed in the large fire facility of Underwriters Laboratories inNorthbrook, IL. The first of two houses constructed was a one-story, 1200 ft2, 3 bedroom, 1 bathroom house with 8 total rooms. The second house was a two-story 3200 ft2, 4 bedroom, 2.5 bathroom house with 12 total rooms. The second house featured a modern open floor plan, two story great room and open foyer. Fifteen experiments were conducted varying the ventilation locations and the number of ventilation openings. Ventilation scenarios included ventilating the front door only, opening the front door and a window near and remote from the seat of the fire, opening a window only and ventilating a higher opening in the two-story house. One scenario in each house was conducted in triplicate to examine repeatability.

The results of these experiments provide knowledge for the fire service for them to examine their thought processes, standard operating procedures and training content. Several tactical considerations were developed utilizing the data from the experiments to provide specific examples of changes that can be adopted based on a departments current strategies and tactics.

The tactical considerations addressed include:

  • Stages of fire development: The stages of fire development change when a fire becomes ventilation limited. It is common with today’s fire environment to have a decay period prior to flashover which emphasizes the importance of ventilation.
  • Forcing the front door is ventilation: Forcing entry has to be thought of as ventilation as well. While forcing entry is necessary to fight the fire it must also trigger the thought that air is being fed to the fire and the clock is ticking before either the fire gets extinguished or it grows until an untenable condition exists jeopardizing the safety of everyone in the structure.
  • No smoke showing: A common event during the experiments was that once the fire became ventilation limited the smoke being forced out of the gaps of the houses greatly diminished or stopped all together. No some showing during size-up should increase awareness of the potential conditions inside.
  • Coordination: If you add air to the fire and don’t apply water in the appropriate time frame the fire gets larger and safety decreases. Examining the times to untenability gives the best case scenario of how coordinated the attack needs to be. Taking the average time for every experiment from the time of ventilation to the time of the onset of firefighter untenability conditions yields 100 seconds for the one-story house and 200 seconds for the two-story house. In many of the experiments from the onset of firefighter untenability until flashover was less than 10 seconds. These times should be treated as being very conservative. If a vent location already exists because the homeowner left a window or door open then the fire is going to respond faster to additional ventilation opening because the temperatures in the house are going to be higher. Coordination of fire attack crew is essential for a positive outcome in today’s fire environment.
  • Smoke tunneling and rapid air movement through the front door: Once the front door is opened attention should be given to the flow through the front door. A rapid in rush of air or a tunneling effect could indicate a ventilation limited fire.
  • Vent Enter Search (VES): During a VES operation, primary importance should be given to closing the door to the room. This eliminates the impact of the open vent and increases tenability for potential occupants and firefighters while the smoke ventilates from the now isolated room.
  • Flow paths: Every new ventilation opening provides a new flow path to the fire and vice versa. This could create very dangerous conditions when there is a ventilation limited fire.
  • Can you vent enough?: In the experiments where multiple ventilation locations were made it was not possible to create fuel limited fires. The fire responded to all the additional air provided. That means that even with a ventilation location open the fire is still ventilation limited and will respond just as fast or faster to any additional air. It is more likely that the fire will respond faster because the already open ventilation location is allowing the fire to maintain a higher temperature than if everything was closed. In these cases rapid fire progression if highly probable and coordination of fire attack with ventilation is paramount.
  • Impact of shut door on occupant tenability and firefighter tenability: Conditions in every experiment for the closed bedroom remained tenable for temperature and oxygen concentration thresholds. This means that the act of closing a door between the occupant and the fire or a firefighter and the fire can increase the chance of survivability. During firefighter operations if a firefighter is searching ahead of a hose line or becomes separated from his crew and conditions deteriorate then a good choice of actions would be to get in a room with a closed door until the fire is knocked down or escape out of the room’s window with more time provided by the closed door.
  • Potential impact of open vent already on flashover time: All of these experiments were designed to examine the first ventilation actions by an arriving crew when there are no ventilation openings. It is possible that the fire will fail a window prior to fire department arrival or that a door or window was left open by the occupant while exiting. It is important to understand that an already open ventilation location is providing air to the fire, allowing it to sustain or grow.
  • Pushing fire: There were no temperature spikes in any of the rooms, especially the rooms adjacent to the fire room when water was applied from the outside. It appears that in most cases the fire was slowed down by the water application and that external water application had no negative impacts to occupant survivability. While the fog stream “pushed” steam along the flow path there was no fire “pushed”.
  • No damage to surrounding rooms: Just as the fire triangle depicts, fire needs oxygen to burn. A condition that existed in every experiment was that the fire (living room or family room) grew until oxygen was reduced below levels to sustain it. This means that it decreased the oxygen in the entire house by lowering the oxygen in surrounding rooms and the more remote bedrooms until combustion was not possible. In most cases surrounding rooms such as the dining room and kitchen had no fire in them even when the fire room was fully involved in flames and was ventilating out of the structure.
    UL Report; Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction,

 

 

 

Posted by on October 23, 2011 • Filed under: christopher naum, company officer, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, training-development • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

SFFD Firefighter Memorials and Updates

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More details emerged Monday about last week’s fatal Diamond Heights blaze, as fire officials said an emergency alert accidentally went off on a nearby fire engine about the same time two firefighters’ personal alarms sounded inside the burning building according to published reports.

Lt. Vincent Perez, 48, and firefighter-paramedic Anthony Valerio, 53, of Engine Company 26 both died from injuries they suffered while battling a blaze at a four-story home at 133 Berkeley Way on Thursday morning.

While fighting the fire, one or both of Valerio and Perez’s personal alert safety system devices went off.  Around the same time, a firefighter on Engine Company 20 — which had yet to arrive on the scene — had inadvertently hit the emergency button on the engine.

Firefighter memorials

A joint funeral for fire Lt. Vincent Perez and firefighter-paramedic Anthony Valerio will be held at 12:30 p.m. Friday at St. Mary’s Cathedral, 1111 Gough St. in San Francisco. A vigil for the two men will be held at 7 p.m. Thursday, also at St. Mary’s.

San Francisco Fire Fighters Local 798 has established trust accounts at the San Francisco Fire Credit Union for the families of Perez and Valerio. Donations can be made to SFFCU, 3201 California St., San Francisco, CA 94118.

Condolence messages can be sent to Fire Station 26, 80 Digby St., San Francisco, CA 94131.

Posted by on June 7, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, company officer, Fire Dynamics, Fire Fighting, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, fires, in-the-line-of-duty, LODD, major-incidents, Residential, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

San Francisco FD mourns the loss of a Second Firefighter LODD After Diamond Heights Fire

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SFFD Firefighter Anthony Valerio

It’s being reported that San Francisco Fire Fighter Anthony Valerio passed away this morning as a result of injuries sustained while operating the Diamond Heights fire on Thursday June 2nd. This becomes the second line of duty death from this incident that also resulted in the LODD of Lt. Vincent Perez. Anthony “Tony” Valerio, a 53-year-old firefighter and paramedic critically injured in the Thursday blaze, died at San Francisco General Hospital at about 7:40 a.m., city officials said.

Read more: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/06/04/BA2F1JPNS2.DTL#ixzz1OKjGjnNs

San Francisco firefighter Anthony Valerio is the second firefighter to die from Thursday’s Diamond Heights fire. According to San Francisco Fire Chief Joanne Hayes-White, Valerio had “significant damage to his respiratory system” and burns across his body after Thursday’s fire. Valerio has burns to 12 percent of his body.

WKGO TV ABC7 reports that according to San Francisco Fire Deputy Chief Mike Gardner said most of Fire Fighter Valerio’s burns were from steam and not from fire, adding that the temperature inside the structure was between 500 and 700 degrees.

Previous Coverage, HERE, HERE and HERE

  • Logs show desperate hunt for doomed SF firefighters, HERE

    • 

Read more: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/06/03/BAJG1JPBKV.DTL#ixzz1OKn7vgot

Updated Sunday June 5

  

San Francisco’s fire chief says this is the first time in her 21 years with the department that two firefighters have died in the same fire.

Slowly and silently, Valerio’s body was wheeled to an awaiting van; the silence finally broken by the rain and his family’s tears. The pain hung in the air outside San Francisco General Hospital – a place that became a gathering spot for the hopeful. Valerio’s family and friends had been there around the clock since Thursday. Valerio and Perez were rushed to the hospital after the two were found unresponsive inside a burning house in Diamond Heights – a sudden blast knocked them down. Perez died late Thursday. From Reports published by WKGO-TV ABC 7 ; “It is particularly difficult, you’re mourning the loss of one and then to have another one very close from the same fire is challenging,” said San Francisco Fire Chief Joanne Hayes-White.

Saturday was the first time Valerio’s doctors gave details about the uphill battle the 53-year-old faced – including the fact that he was in cardiac arrest the moment he arrived at SF General.

“Between all the injuries he had from the initial blast, the smoke inhalation, the fact that he had a really bad lung injury, which was precipitated by what happened on the scene, but we try to do everything we can,” said SF General Hospital Dr. Andre Campbell.

But in the end it wasn’t enough. On this day, the firefighter’s two families, his work family at Station 26 and his immediate family – realized Valerio’s 40 hour long fight to survive was over.

The fire department and the families have agreed to have a joint funeral for both Tony Valerio and Lt. Perez on Friday at Saint Mary’s Cathedral.

Lt. Vincent Perez, San Francisco FD
Firefighter Anthony Valerio  

  

From Thursday

Previous postings from Commandsafety.com;

Courtesy Patty Stanton

Courtesy Patty Stanton

Courtesy Patty Stanton

Updates from San Francisco;

Charlie Side

Charlie Side, Fire Extending

Alpha Street Side from Google Streets

Aerial Charlie Side

Coincidentially, we posted a remembrance to the DCFD Cherry Road Townhouse Fire and Double FireFighter LODD from May, 1999 that is worth another look as it has similar connotations related to fire behavior, flashover conditions and multiple floor level construction factors during initial fire suppression operations, HERE

Posted by on June 4, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Crew Integrity, Fire Dynamics, Fire Fighter Safety, Fire Fighting, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, fires, line-of-duty, LODD • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Tactical Patience and New Considerations of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction

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Tactical Patience and the New Considerations of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction

UL Ventilation and Fire Behavior Full Scale Testing

 

Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction

For many of you that have been following my writings and perspectives on building construction, firefighting, command risk management and operational excellence for firefighter safety have long recognized that I have been promoting and advocating the fact the fireground is changining, our stratgies and tactics demand change adn does the demand for increased knowledge within the areas of building construction, fire dynamics, while integrating the art and science of firefighting. The most recent release of the testing report from Underwriters Laboratories; Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction and the accompaning emphirical data further validates assumptions and presmises that many of us shared based upon field obervations and first hand incident operations related to the dramatic changes being witnessed as a result of operational challenges in a wide varity of occupanies and building types.

This material is a must read for all emerging and practicing company and command officers ( for starters) to being grasping the magnitude and extent of quantifiable data that supports the premise that combat fire engagement and suppression operations and the rules of engagement are going to change and that change is fast approaching.

 Considerations for Tactical Patience and Adaptive Fireground Management are continued themes I will expand upon in future postings….

Here’s the executive summary of the report and findings from UL. For an download of the entire UL Report, go HERE.

Under the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Assistance to Firefighter Grant Program, Underwriters Laboratories examined fire service ventilation practices as well as the impact of changes in modern house geometries.  There has been a steady change in the residential fire environment over the past several decades.  These changes include larger homes, more open floor plans and volumes and increased synthetic fuel loads.  This series of experiments examine this change in fire behavior and the impact on firefighter ventilation tactics.  This fire research project developed the empirical data that is needed to quantify the fire behavior associated with these scenarios and result in immediately developing the necessary firefighting ventilation practices to reduce firefighter death and injury.

Two houses were constructed in the large fire facility of Underwriters Laboratories in Northbrook, IL.  The first of two houses constructed was a one-story, 1200 ft2, 3 bedroom, 1 bathroom house with 8 total rooms.  The second house was a two-story 3200 ft2, 4 bedroom, 2.5 bathroom house with 12 total rooms.  The second house featured a modern open floor plan, two-story great room and open foyer.   Fifteen experiments were conducted varying the ventilation locations and the number of ventilation openings.  Ventilation scenarios included ventilating the front door only, opening the front door and a window near and remote from the seat of the fire, opening a window only and ventilating a higher opening in the two-story house.  One scenario in each house was conducted in triplicate to examine repeatability.

The results of these experiments provide knowledge for the fire service for them to examine their thought processes, standard operating procedures and training content.  Several tactical considerations were developed utilizing the data from the experiments to provide specific examples of changes that can be adopted based on a departments current strategies and tactics.

Under the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Assistance to Firefighter Grant Program, Underwriters Laboratories examined fire service ventilation practices as well as the impact of changes in modern house geometries.

There has been a steady change in the residential fire environment over the past several decades. These changes include larger homes, more open floor plans and volumes and increased synthetic fuel loads. This series of experiments examine this change in fire behavior and the impact on firefighter ventilation tactics.

This fire research project developed the empirical data that is needed to quantify the fire behavior associated with these scenarios and result in immediately developing the necessary firefighting ventilation practices to reduce firefighter death and injury.

  • Two houses were constructed in the large fire facility of Underwriters Laboratories in Northbrook, IL.
  • The first of two houses constructed was a one-story, 1200 ft2, 3 bedroom, 1 bathroom house with 8 total rooms.
  • The second house was a two-story 3200 ft2, 4 bedroom, and 2.5 bathroom house with 12 total rooms.
  • The second house featured a modern open floor plan, two story great room and open foyer.

 Fifteen experiments were conducted varying the ventilation locations and the number of ventilation openings. Ventilation scenarios included ventilating the front door only, opening the front door and a window near and remote from the seat of the fire, opening a window only and ventilating a higher opening in the two-story house.

One scenario in each house was conducted in triplicate to examine repeatability. The results of these experiments provide knowledge for the fire service for them to examine their thought processes, standard operating procedures and training content. Several tactical considerations were developed utilizing the data from the experiments to provide specific examples of changes that can be adopted based on a departments current strategies and tactics.

The tactical considerations addressed include:

  • Stages of fire development: The stages of fire development change when a fire becomes ventilation limited.
    • It is common with today’s fire environment to have a decay period prior to flashover which emphasizes the importance of ventilatio
  • Forcing the front door is ventilation: Forcing entry has to be thought of as ventilation as well.
    • While forcing entry is necessary to fight the fire it must also trigger the thought that air is being fed to the fire and the clock is ticking before either the fire gets extinguished or it grows until an untenable condition exists jeopardizing the safety of everyone in the structure.
  • No smoke showing: A common event during the experiments was that once the fire became ventilation limited the smoke being forced out of the gaps of the houses greatly diminished or stopped all together.
    • No some showing during size-up should increase awareness of the potential conditions inside.
  • Coordination: If you add air to the fire and don’t apply water in the appropriate time frame the fire gets larger and safety decreases.
    • Examining the times to untenability gives the best case scenario of how coordinated the attack needs to be.
    • Taking the average time for every experiment from the time of ventilation to the time of the onset of firefighter untenability conditions yields 100 seconds for the one-story house and 200 seconds for the two-story house
    • In many of the experiments from the onset of firefighter untenability until flashover was less than 10 seconds.
    • These times should be treated as being very conservative. If a vent location already exists because the homeowner left a window or door open then the fire is going to respond faster to additional ventilation opening because the temperatures in the house are going to be higher.
    • Coordination of fire attack crew is essential for a positive outcome in today’s fire environment.
  • Smoke tunneling and rapid air movement through the front door: Once the front door is opened attention should be given to the flow through the front door.
    • A rapid in rush of air or a tunneling effect could indicate a ventilation limited fire.
  • Vent Enter Search (VES): During a VES operation, primary importance should be given to closing the door to the room.
    • This eliminates the impact of the open vent and increases tenability for potential occupants and firefighters while the smoke ventilates from the now isolated room.
  • Flow paths: Every new ventilation opening provides a new flow path to the fire and vice versa.
    • This could create very dangerous conditions when there is a ventilation limited fire.
  • Can you vent enough?: In the experiments where multiple ventilation locations were made it was not possible to create fuel limited fires.
    • The fire responded to all the additional air provided.
    • That means that even with a ventilation location open the fire is still ventilation limited and will respond just as fast or faster to any additional air.
    • It is more likely that the fire will respond faster because the already open ventilation location is allowing the fire to maintain a higher temperature than if everything was closed. In these cases rapid fire progression if highly probable and coordination of fire attack with ventilation is paramount.
  • Impact of shut door on occupant tenability and firefighter tenability: Conditions in every experiment for the closed bedroom remained tenable for temperature and oxygen concentration thresholds.
    • This means that the act of closing a door between the occupant and the fire or a firefighter and the fire can increase the chance of survivability.
    • During firefighter operations if a firefighter is searching ahead of a hoseline or becomes separated from his crew and conditions deteriorate then a good choice of actions would be to get in a room with a closed door until the fire is knocked down or escape out of the room’s window with more time provided by the closed door
  • Potential impact of open vent already on flashover time: All of these experiments were designed to examine the first ventilation actions by an arriving crew when there are no ventilation openings.
    • It is possible that the fire will fail a window prior to fire department arrival or that a door or window was left open by the occupant while exiting.
    • It is important to understand that an already open ventilation location is providing air to the fire, allowing it to sustain or grow.
  • Pushing fire: There were no temperature spikes in any of the rooms, especially the rooms adjacent to the fire room when water was applied from the outside. It appears that in most cases the fire was slowed down by the water application and that external water application had no negative impacts to occupant survivability.
    • While the fog stream “pushed” steam along the flow path there was no fire “pushed”.
  • No damage to surrounding rooms: Just as the fire triangle depicts, fire needs oxygen to burn.
    • A condition that existed in every experiment was that the fire (living room or family room) grew until oxygen was reduced below levels to sustain it.
    • This means that it decreased the oxygen in the entire house by lowering the oxygen in surrounding rooms and the more remote bedrooms until combustion was not possible.
    • In most cases surrounding rooms such as the dining room and kitchen had no fire in them even when the fire room was fully involved in flames and was ventilating out of the structure.

Online Training Program

In order to make the results of this study more user friendly for the fire service to examine, UL developed an online interactive training module that can be viewed by clicking here.  The program includes a professionally narrated description of all of the experiments, their results and the tactical considerations.  Experimental video is used and graphical data is explained in a way that brings science to the street level firefighter.

UL University On-Line CBT

 

Comparison of Modern and Legacy Home Furnishings

An experiment was conducted with two side by side living room fires.   The purpose was to gain knowledge on the difference between modern and legacy furnishings.  The rooms measured 12 ft by 12 ft, with an 8 ft ceiling and had an 8 ft wide by 7 ft tall opening on the front wall.  Both rooms contained similar amounts of like furnishings.

The modern room was lined with a layer of ½ inch painted gypsum board and the floor was covered with carpet and padding.

  • The furnishings included a microfiber covered polyurethane foam filled sectional sofa, engineered wood coffee table, end table, television stand and book case.
  • The sofa had a polyester throw placed on its right side.  The end table had a lamp with polyester shade on top of it and a wicker basket inside it.
  • The coffee table had six color magazines, a television remote and a synthetic plant on it.
  • The television stand had a color magazine and a 37 inch flat panel television.
  • The book case had two small plastic bins, two picture frames and two glass vases on it.
  • The right rear corner of the room had a plastic toy bin, a plastic toy tub and four stuffed toys.
  • The rear wall had polyester curtains hanging from a metal rod and the side walls had wood framed pictures hung on them.

The legacy room was lined with a layer of ½ inch painted cement board and the floor was covered with unfinished hardwood flooring.

  • The furnishings included a cotton covered, cotton batting filled sectional sofa, solid wood coffee table, two end tables, and television stand.
  • The sofa had a cotton throw placed on its right side.
  • Both end tables had a lamp with polyester shade on top of them.
  • The one on the left side of the sofa had two paperback books on it.
  • A wicker basket was located on the floor in front of the right side of the sofa at the floor level.
  • The coffee table had three hard-covered books, a television remote and a synthetic plant on it.
  • The television stand had a 27 inch tube television.
  • The right front corner of the room had a wood toy bin, and multiple wood toys.
  • The rear wall had cotton curtains hanging from a metal rod and the side walls had wood framed pictures hung on them.

Both rooms were ignited by placing a lit stick candle on the right side of the sofa.  The fires were allowed to grow until flashover.  The modern room transitioned to flashover in 3 minutes and 30 seconds and the legacy room at 29 minutes and 30 seconds.

View the entire video, or you may also download the video:

Posted by on May 1, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Fire Dynamics, Fire Fighter Safety, firefighting-operations, Research • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

USFA Releases Restaurant Building Fires Report

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Three Alarm Fire Renton, WA 2007 KOMONews.com

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) United States Fire Administration (USFA) has issued a special report examining the characteristics of restaurant building fires.

The report, Restaurant Building Fires, was developed by USFA’s National Fire Data Center and is based on 2007 to 2009 data from the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS).

PDF, 829 KbRestaurant Building Fires     http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/pdf/statistics/v12i1.pdf

According to the report:

  • An estimated 5,900 restaurant building fires occur annually in the United States, resulting in an estimated average of 75 injuries and $172 million in property loss.
  • The leading cause of all restaurant building fires is cooking at 59 percent and nearly all of these cooking fires (91 percent) are small, confined fires with limited damage.
  • While cooking is the leading cause of all restaurant building fires as well as the smaller, confined restaurant building fires, electrical malfunction is the leading cause of the larger, nonconfined restaurant building fires.
  • Nonconfined restaurant building fires most often start in cooking areas and kitchens (41 percent).
  • Deep fryers (9 percent), ranges (7 percent), and miscellaneous kitchen and cooking equipment (5 percent) are the leading types of equipment involved in ignition in nonconfined restaurant building fires.
  • Smoke alarms were reported as present in 44 percent of nonconfined restaurant building fires. In addition, full or partial automatic extinguishment systems, mainly sprinklers, were present in 47 percent of nonconfined restaurant building fires.

Loss Measures

Time of Alarm

 Restaurant Building Fires is part of the Topical Fire Report Series. Topical reports explore facets of the U.S. fire problem as depicted through data collected in NFIRS.

Each topical report briefly addresses the nature of the specific fire or fire-related topic, highlights important findings from the data, and may suggest other resources to consider for further information. Also included are recent examples of fire incidents that demonstrate some of the issues addressed in the report or that put the report topic in context.

Additional Insights and Links

  • NIOSH REPORT:  Restaurant Fire Claims the Life of Two Career Fire Fighters – Texas, 2000 HERE

Operational Safety Recommendations

NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar incidents, fire departments should

  • ensure that the department’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are followed
  • ensure that fire command always maintains close accountability for all personnel at the fire scene
  • ensure that Incident Command conducts an initial size-up of the incident before initiating fire fighting efforts and continually evaluates the risk versus gain during operations at an incident
  •  ensure that vertical ventilation takes place to release any heat, smoke, and fire
  • ensure that fire fighters are trained to identify truss roof systems
  • ensure that fire fighters use extreme caution when operating on or under a lightweight truss roof and should develop standard operating procedures for buildings constructed with lightweight roof trusses
  • ensure that fire fighters performing fire fighting operations under or above trusses are evacuated as soon as it is determined that the trusses are exposed to fire
  • explore using a thermal imaging camera as a part of the exterior size-up
  • ensure that, whenever there is a change in personnel, all personnel are briefed and understand the procedures and operations required for that shift, station, or duty
  • ensure that, whenever a building is known to be on fire and is occupied, all exits are forced and blocked open
  • consider providing all fire fighters with portable radios or radios integrated into their face pieces
  • consider adding additional staff in accordance with NFPA standards
  • establish various written standard operating procedures, ensure record keeping, and conduct annual evaluations to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of their overall SCBA maintenance program.

 Additionally, building owners, utility providers, and municipalities should

  • ensure that all exterior building utilities are accessible and in working condition
  • consider placing the building’s construction information on an exterior placard
  • upgrade or modify older structures to incorporate new codes and standards to improve occupancy and fire fighter safety

 

Posted by on April 16, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Collapse, Fire Dynamics, Fire Fighter Safety, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, NIOSH Reports • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

BECOME SAFE on the Fire Ground

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BECOME SAFE

 BECOME SAFE

  • Building

  • Evaluation

  • Construction/Occupancy

  • Operational Hazards

  • Manage-Time & Elements

  • Engagement

  • Situational Awareness

  • Assessment & Fluid Analysis

  • Fire Behavior & Effects

  • Evaluate & Execute

There is an acute corollary of technical  knowledge and inter reliance on occupancies, construction, strategy, tactics, risk, safety, physics, engineering and fire suppression theory…FACT!

There are Fundamental Domains that can be applied.

It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations.

  • Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by
  • risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments,
  • while maintaining the values and tradition that defines the fire service.
  • Tactical Fire Ground Patience
  • Responsive Tactical Deployment Modeling-RTD
  • Predictive Strategic Process-PSP
  • Command Resiliency

What Defines you as a Company Officer?

Posted by on April 10, 2011 • Filed under: BECOME SAFE, building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Fire Dynamics, Fire Fighting, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, training, training-development, training-fire-rescue-topics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Casa Grande Fire Fighting

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Casa Grande Mega Mansion Fire

At 2356 hours on Saturday March 19, 2011, the Huntingtown (MD) Volunteer Fire Department was alerted for the reported Chimney Fire in a residential house. The home was not conventional by any accounts as it was a 10,000 Square foot single family dwelling.  While en-route, firefighters received information that the owner was trying to extinguish the fire and believed it had spread to the attic.

The first arriving chief officer arrived to find smoke showing from the second floor eaves of this 10,000 square foot mega-mansion. The first-due Engine laying a supply line, advancing a 400′ pre-connect and began pulling the ceiling within the interior, at which time they found fire in the truss loft concealed attic spreading rapidly. Within seconds, conditions deteriorated rapidly resulting in zero visibility accompanied by intense heat. Command immediately ordered evacuation tones.

Due to high winds off the adjacent river, coupled with water supply issues, response distance times from quarters, and the size of the structure (10,000 square feet), fire spread rapidly resulting in nine firefighter injuries during the rapid egress and bailout from the interior positions. Immediately thereafter, the second floor flashed ,several firefighters took extreme measures such as jumping out of windows and running through walls to evacuate the structure.

A detailed account of the incident with video, photos and pre-fire house images is available on CommandSafety.com, HERE

Additional References:

  • 10,000 SF Residential Fire MD, Commandsafety.com HERE
  • Behind the Ever-Expanding American Dream House, NRP HERE
  • LAFD LODD: Hollywood Hills Mansion Investigating Building Standards, CommandSafety.com HERE

Insights and discussion points;

  • Are you aware of large or mega-sized residential occupancies within your district, greater alarm or mutual/automatic aid response areas?
  • Do you pre-fire plan these occupancies?
  • Have you established special protocols, SOPs or procedure for potential operations at these occupancies?
  • Have you considered augmented first-alarm, supplemental or immediate greater alarm response deployments at these structures?
  • Do you have adequate first-due fire suppression capabilities AND fire flow; (GMP and sustainable water flow and pressure) to implement an offensive tactical IAP?
  • Do you have adequate staffing to support the above?
  • Have you practices operations that require deployment and coordinated actions?
  • Do you treat an 8,000 SF; 9,000 or 10,000 SF SFR occupancy the same as you would a 3,000-4,000 SF residence? Does this matter?
  • Do you think the fire load package within today’s residential (minor or mega-house) settings  has any bearing on fire suppression capabilities and the containment? 
  • What have your past experiences indicating to you?
  • Are your personnel and command staff prepared to address “Wind-Driven fires?”
  • Different Strategies and Tactics?
  • Are you adequatly trained, prepared and resourced to address a working fire in a casa grande, mega-residential occupancy?
  • Do Commercial Fire based tactics have their place at “residential” occupancies?
  • Do you understand the concept of; “Occupancy Risk versus Occupancy Type?
  • How does Fire Dynamics, Fire Load, Occupancy compartmentation and fire suppression capabilities or gaps relate to incident scene operations?
  • Are fires in mega-mansions a special concern? If so, what are you doing about it?
Posted by on March 22, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Fire Dynamics, Fire Fighting, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Operational Conditions can Change in a Heartbeat: Remembering FDNY Black Sunday

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Take the time to read both NIOSH reports and remember the sacrafice…

Three veteran FDNY firefighters died in the LODD in Brooklyn, New York and the Bronx on Sunday January 23, 2005, a day that has become known as “Black Sunday” and called one of the saddest in fire department history. Two firefighters were killed and four others were badly hurt when they were forced to jump from a fourth-floor window of a burning building in the Bronx.

Later, a third firefighter died after tackling a basement blaze in Brooklyn.Lt. Curtis Meyran, 46, of Battalion 26, and Firefighter John Bellew, 37, of Ladder 27, died after battling the Bronx blaze on East 178th Street in the Morris Heights section.

Three firefighters were in critical condition at St. Barnabas, and a fourth was in serious condition at Jacobi Medical Center. Six Bronx firefighters became trapped in the building while searching for people on the fourth floor. When the fire from the third floor broke through to the fourth, they were faced with a horrifying choice. They jumped out a fourth-floor window, knowing that they would be critically injured.

Firefighters Jeffrey Cool, Joseph DiBernardo, Eugene Stolowski, and Cawley were badly hurt in the Bronx fire. They were trapped on the fourth floor and were left with the life-or-death choice of leaping 50 feet or burning up. The Brooklyn firefighter, Richard Sclafani, 37, died at a hospital after being injured at a two-alarm fire in the East New York section.

Posted by on January 23, 2011 • Filed under: Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, Fire Dynamics, Fire Fighting, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, LODD, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Training & Tactics Talk: Emerging Dynamics in the Modern Fire Environment Podcast

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Radio@Firehouse.com

Podcasts and Internet Broadcasts for Fire and Emergency Service Professionals: Real Issues. Real Answers. Real Firefighters.

Training & Tactics Talk Hosted by Chief Doug Cline

Training & Tactics Talk: Emerging Dynamics in the Modern Fire Environment

Joining Training and Tactics Talk host Douglas Cline as he talks with his guests from across the United States about the emerging dynamics of the modern fire service environment.

Guests this month include retired Battalion Chief Dave Dodson from Denver, CO; Lt. Rick Mosher from Merriam, KS;  Christopher Naum, Chief of Training of the Command Institute; and Assistant Chief Deron Wilson of Johns Creek, GA.

The group examines several dimensions of the modern fire service as it relates to tomorrow’s fire service. The explore the art of reading smoke, the new rules of tactical combat fire engagement, multi-dimensional aspects of training and how to develop the true understanding of situational awareness.

We invite you to grab a cup of coffee or a cold drink, pull up a chair or take a seat on the tailboard and enjoy the program. Sit back, relax and let’s talk Training and Tactics.

  • Link to the Program HERE

Reference Links:

Posted by on January 7, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, Doug Cline, Fire Dynamics, Fire Fighter Safety, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, fires, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics, training-development • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

FDNY Brooklyn Box 4080: 17 Vandalia Avenue 12.18.1998

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Take a moment to look back at an incident: On December 18, 1998, Three FDNY Firefighters died in-the line of duty while conducting suppression and rescue operations at  fire on the tenth floor of 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly.  At 0454 hours Brooklyn transmitted box 4080 for a top floor fire at 17 Vandalia Avenue in the Starrett City development complex. The sprawling complex is located on Brooklyn’s south shore in the Spring Creek section. The 10 story 50 x 200 fireproof building is used as a senior citizen’s residence. Engine 257 and ladder 170, both quartered in Canarsie, were assigned 1st due and arrived within 4 minutes. By that time the fire already could be seen blowing through two windows. Second and 3rd alarms were quickly transmitted.

As the 1st due Ladder Company, L170′s duty is to search the fire floor. Lieutenant Joseph Cavalieri, and fire fighters Christopher Bopp and James Bohan ascended 10 flights of stairs with extinguishers and forcible entry tools. Their mission was to rescue the resident of apartment 10-D who was believed trapped inside.

NIOSH INVESIGATIVE REPORT SUMMARY (F99-01) On December 18, 1998, several fire companies and fire fighters responded at 0454 hours to a reported fire on the tenth floor of a 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. The fire had been burning for 20 to 30 minutes before it was called in because the resident attempted to put the fire out with small pans of water. As the fire fighters approached the building from the rear, an orange glow was observed in the window of Apartment 10D. As the fire fighters were arriving in front of the high-rise, a call was received from Central Dispatch that a female resident in the apartment next door to the fire apartment was trapped in her apartment and needed help. Several fire fighters entered the lobby area, and some took the stairs to the ninth floor, while others took the elevator to the ninth floor. A Lieutenant and two fire fighters on Ladder 170 (the victims), along with the Lieutenant on Engine 290, took the B-stairs from the ninth floor to the tenth floor, and entered the hallway, in search of the fire, while 4 fire fighters on Engine 290 were flaking out the hose line on the ninth floor and in the stairwell between the ninth and tenth floor in preparation for hookup.

During this same time period, other fire fighters had gone to the tenth floor A-stairwell landing to attempt a hose line hookup to the standpipe in the landing. Engine Company 257 fire fighters, who were attempting to make a hook-up on the fire floor landing, experienced trouble with the heat, heavy smoke, and heavy insulation on the standpipe and were forced to abandon this hook-up. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 and the victims, who were on the B-side, were approaching the center smoke doors (see diagram), when the Lieutenant radioed his driver on the outside, and asked, “Where is the fire?”

The driver radioed back, the fire is in the rear, towards exposure 4. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 then left the tenth floor, descended the stairs to the ninth floor and helped his men drag the hose to the A-stairwell, where they met up with fire fighters on Engine 257, who assisted them in stretching their line and hook-up on the ninth floor. The victims proceeded through the center smoke doors in search of the fire. From the information obtained during this investigation, it is believed the victims found the fire apartment, with the door partially opened, allowing smoke and hot gases to enter the hallway. They then opened the door fully, the wind pushed the fire and extreme heat in the apartment into the hallway, and a flashover occurred, exposing the victims to extreme radiant heat that potentially elevated their body core temperature.

The last radio transmission from the victims was a Mayday call. When the victims were found, all were unresponsive, they were treated at the scene and taken to the hospital where they were pronounced dead by the attending physician.

This wind-driven fire event and the lessons-learned contributed directly to the current body of research and new insights on emerging strategies and tactics. The NIOSH Investigative Report HERE.  NIST References on Wind Driven Fire Research HERE . FDNewYork.com HERE. New York Times Archived Articles, HERE and HERE. Photos and legacy, HERE

Take the time to remember FDNY Lt. Joseph Cavaleiri, FF Christopher Bopp and Firefighter James Bohan from Ladder 170

Posted by on December 18, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, High-rise • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

First-Due Arriving Companies; Are You Prepared?

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As the First-Due Fire Company; Officer and crew, Are you prepared to address the fireground variables and occupancy risks upon your arrival and during the initial stages of your deployment and operations? Are you combat ready or passively engaged?  

It seems we’ve struck some interests over past week since we first discussed the First-Due Fire Officer  on the most recent edition of Taking it to the StreetsTM where we had a vibrant and insightful program in which we discussion some of the expansive facets related to the First-Due Fire Officer.     

 The First-Due Fire Office program can be downloaded HERE at Firefighter Netcast.com   

The formulative discussion revolved around a variety of functional elements, traits, responsibilities and duties befalling the First-Due Officer, and was followed up with a post here on Thecompanyoffer.com. We discussed how today’s First-Due Officer must perform smarter with increased perceptions, discernments and acumens with intelligence and wisdom that is drawn from further progressing and collective fire ground response and operational experiences.   

My good friend Captain Willie Wines (aka The Iron Fireman) posted a great follow-up article associated with the radio program on his blog associated with further interpretations of the First-Due Officer. Check out “The First-Due Officer; What are you thinking?”  HERE.   

To further our dialog on the first-due, I’ve added a few series of video clips and images with related links to promote and stimulate your view of the first-due fireground scene as it relates to the variables and personnel perceptions; the need for diligence and cognitive situational awareness and risk assessment and being truly “prepared” both mentally and physically. By way of physically, I mean- is your gear and PPE, functional, operational and adequately in-place?   

  As you can see there are numerous instances where the difference in the incident outcome correlated to the level of PPE protection that was in-place and implemented at the time of adverse conditions or unexpected or unforeseen circumstances.   

 Here’s today’s situations to think about at the station, around the kitchen table, over a cup of coffee in the day room after your next alarm or tonight at the station for a “back step” company drill.    

  • What are the Adverse Conditions that might be encounted upon arrival as the First-Due?
  • Flashover, Backdraft, Compromised or degraded Structural Conditions, Collapsed Conditions, Structural Collapse, Wind Drive Fire Behavior, Extreme Fire Behavior, Pre-Flashover/ Post-Flashover….
  • How Effective are you in Reading the Smoke?
  • How About Reading the Building? Do you understand Occupancy Profiling and Occupancy Risk?
  • Are you Taking the Time to Read the Subtle or Pronounced Fireground Indicators.; Comprehend their meaning or are you just “too engaged in the tactic or task?”
  • Do you have an appreciation for Tactical Patience?
  • Are your operations Tactically Driven by SOP’s and SOGs?
  • What Rules of Engagment are you considering?
  • Have and IAP in mind?
 YouTube Preview Image   

 There have been a lot of articles and postings on adverse conditions as companies are opening up or pushing into the structure on the initial entry. Take a look at the next two series of video clips related to flashover conditions and the impact of that fire behavior on the companies and personnel. In each instance companies were extremely fortunate that the injuries sustained were not more severe than encountered.  

  • What encounters have you or your company experienced?
  • In retrospect how effective was the initial risk assessment and occupancy profile-was the size-up appropriate or were key indicators missed or neglected?
  • Did the fast pace of the initial arrival and subsequent deployment filter or obscure mission critical indicators that should have been identified and acted upon?  
  • Did the tactical assignment and task overshadow tactical patience?
  • Did someone or everyone miss reading the smoke, fire or occupancy risk?
  • Did other tactical assignments contribute toward the unexpected or adverse conditions encountered, such as ventilation induced flashover? ( More on that topic for a later post; See Taking it the Streets November 4, 2010 show

          

Firefighter Will Gregory exits the home with his PPE on fire. Photo by Brian Haney, The Daily Record.

There are a series of photos  from a previous posting at STATter911 HERE that depicts firefighers working to push-in on a fire in a small residential occupancy. The ensuing flashover ignites the PPE of one firefighter. Look at the series of photographs and  take note of the fire and smoke conditions, the size and profile of the occupancy ( remember it’s Occupancy RISK not Occupancy Type).   

  • Think about the sequencing of your initial operations.
  • Think about the mission critical 360;
  • how does that play into your initial incident actions plan (IAP)?

   

The Dynamics of the Fireground in Seconds

Companies were dispatched for an assignment for a house fire. Both E807 and TK807 responded with crews of 4 personnel each. E813 arrived on the scene and reported light smoke showing on side Alpha. Upon arrival on the scene, the crew from TK807 (four staff) made entry to the house. The following series of events led to conditions in the house that presented a flashover environment. The hose line from E813 burst, a backup line was not charged due to no established water supply, and the house was not yet ventilated. Without the protection of a hose line, the crew was committed to the house when the room flashed. One firefighter was apparently far enough in the house to avoid any injury, A second FF received 2nd degree burns to his right shoulder, and a third FF received the full force of the flashover suffering second-third degree burns to his face, hands, and the majority of his torso. (Original incident information posted at the time of the event)   

  •  Photo 1: Firefighters don PPE and SCBA with light smoke visible in this first of four pictures shot by Tony George of PGFD Station 813  
  •  Photo 2: Six seconds later a small amount of fire and darker smoke can be seen at the sliding glass door. 
  •  Photo3: Forty-eight seconds after the initial picture, more fire and darker smoke are apparent. 
  •  Photo 4: Exactly two-minutes after the first picture was shot, flashover occurs with firefighters inside. 

For a complete narrative and futher incident details of this previous STATter911 postings related to this event go HERE, and HERE  

Take a good look at the performance of PPE when utilized and implemented correctly…. 

Don’t ever underestimate the dynamics and uncertainty of the evolving fireground during your operations. The video clip here depicts how quickly operations can change from an investigation to a major mass casualty incident.

For a comprehensive look at this event go here are two links for you to visit, HERE at Commandsafety.com and the NIOSH Report HERE

     

Be prepared for the unexpected and always use extreme caution and heightened situational awareness and fluid risk assessment and reconnaissance processing to stay atop of any undefined and evolving incident. Do not allow the potential lack of severity; of what may have all the indications of an unremarkable/uneventful and common call run such as a gas odor investigation or a natural gas leak cause your companies to have less than a high level of alert, focus and attentive accretions through all phases and deployments of the incident. Don’t become complacent.

In addition, take a look at some information relate to another tragic incident response to a reported gas leak that occurred in December, 1983 that lead to five fire fighter LODD’s in Buffalo, New York. HERE 

  • Archived Report From STATter911, from May, 2009 HERE and recent 2010 update HERE with fireground Audio
  • Prince George’s County (MD) Fire Press Release from May 7, 2009, HERE
  • Slide Show from WUSA9.com HERE 
  • BING mapping Images, HERE

  Here’s a series of Reports worth your time to read related to the First-Due:

  • City of Charleston Post Incident Assessment and Review Team Phase I Report, HERE
  • Routley Final Phase II Report HERE
  • NIOSH Investigative Report, HERE

  • Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE
  • Reference Data HERE
  • The report is also available for download at the NIST, HERE
  • Synopsis HERE

  • Report: Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse1979-2002
  • Colerain Township (OH) Fire and EMS Department Final Report Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels Nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths Incident Overview, HERE; NIOSH Report, HERE; Investigative Report, HERE
    • Posted by on November 23, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, Crew Management, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, Strategy and Tactics, Taking it to the Streets • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Situational Awarness on Taking it to the Streets; Did you Listen in?

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    Taking it to the Streets hosted by Christopher Naum

    Last month on Firefighter NetCast.com ,Taking it to the Streets presented an exceptional show related to the emerging issues affecting fire ground operations and the emerging and prevailing issues related to situational awareness on the fireground and incident scene  and its relationship to firefighter safety or operational integrity. The show was titled; “We Have a Situation; Are you Aware?” Joining host Christopher Naum, his guests included Battalion Chief Matt Tobia with the Anne Arundel County, MD Fire Department, a metropolitan combination Fire/Rescue/EMS agency in Suburban Baltimore, MD and Battalion Chief Greg W. Collier, Mount Laurel Fire Department, NJ and NFFF/EGH New Jersey State Advocate.

    Together they discussed relevant issues affecting today’s fire service, in the streets  ensuring operational excellence, personnel safety and promoting effective and efficient incident management and mitigation.

    If you missed the live online radio call-in show, you can download all the previous shows to your device and listen to them where ever you are. You can download the programs at Fire Fighter Netcast.com.

    • Download the August 19th, 2010 program  on Situational Awareness,HERE

    Check out Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum this month on Wednesday night September 22nd at 9pm ET with another  live online radio call-in show addressing the most current issues affecting the Fire Service. Taking it to the Streets has in the few short months of production and tranmissions, has become one of the the most talked about, on-line radio programs;  listened to live on-the air and download fire service podcast programs. If your hearing some of the buzz and that humm; then its time to tune into to FireFighter Netcast.com and Taking it to the Streets to hear first hand and have a Rockin Hot Time…

    Join the growing list of live listeners and become a regular follower with this ground breaking and newest radio show on FireFighter Netcast.com at Blogtalk Radio… Stay tuned on TheCompanyOffice.com, CommandSafety.com, Fire Fighter Netcast.com and launching this quater, Buildingsonfire.com for a comprehensive list of future shows, topics and guests.

    Taking it to the Streets With Christopher Naum

    A New Monthly Radio Talk show on Fire Fighter Netcast.com

    A Buildingsonfire.com Series and Fire Fighter Netcast.com Production

     Advancing Fire Fighter Safety and Operational Integrity for the Fire Service through provocative insights and dynamic discussions dedicated to the Art and Science of Firefighting and the Traditions of the Fire Service. Check out more information of Taking it to the Streets, HERE 

    “On your Street, In your City, Across the Country, Around the World”, Taking it to the Streets

    Posted by on September 4, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Fire Dynamics, Fire Fighter Safety, Fire Fighting, Fire Suppression, leadership, line-of-duty, NIOSH Reports, Occupancies, Officer, Research, Situational Awareness, Taking it to the Streets, thecompanyofficer.com, Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    In the Streets; On the Air

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    Taking it to the Streets had its premier July 21st on Firefighter Netcast.com with a lively and provoking discussion on “What’s on YOUR Radar Screen?” The program theme aligned with a recent posting on the same topic. Join me on the program were two prominent and nationally recognized fire service leaders, who I’m honored to have known for many years, Chief Billy Hayes and Chief Doug Cline; the program explored leading fire service issues affecting firefighter safety, training, credentialing and education; fireground operational variables related to the continuing changes in building construction, engineered systems and extreme fire behavior,  and the emerging need for “Tactical Patience” as I’ve been exploring the relationships towards the need for tactical enhancements to our current fire suppression theory and firefighting models.

    Conversations expanded on the NFFF/Everyone Goes Home Campaign and programs, the newest EGH initiatives on Behavioral Health and the successes achieved through the Courage to be Safe Programs and the Advocacy Program.

    Both our guests provided cutting edge perspectives and commentary on the key issues that the fire service needs to have on their radar screen and the need for emerging and practicing fire officers and commanders to continually strive to increase skill sets and maintain a pulse on the leading issues affecting the fire service and apply emerging research  and studies to increase operational capabilities, improve performance and enhance and promote firefighter safety and survival and operational integrity.

    Although technical difficulties from the live feed coming from the Inner Harbor in Baltimore at the Firehouse Expo, precluded the ability to have the call-in segments of the program to work, the 120 minute program gave the listeners a wealth of information to talk over in the firehouse, at the kitchen table or in the apparatus bays.

    The program is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and a Fire Fighter Netcast.com  production, produced by John Mitchell and Rhett Fleitz.  The live program segment will be edited and available for iTunes download soon. You can check out the other programming and shows produced by Fire Fighter Netcast.com HERE. Stay tuned for announcements on the next program date for Taking it to the Streets coming to you live from the IAFC Fire Rescue International Conference in Chicago in August.  

    Taking it to the Streets; Advancing Fire Fighter Safety and Operational Integrity for the Fire Service through provocative insights and dynamic discussions dedicated to the Art and Science of Firefighting and the Traditions of the Fire Service. 

    • Firefighter Netcast.com HERE
    • Taking it to the Streets, HERE, HERE
    • “What’s on your Radar Screen?” July 21, 2010 Program, HERE
    • “What’s on your Radar Screen?” post on Commandsafety.com, HERE
    Posted by on July 24, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, command, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Credentialing, Doug Cline, Fire Dynamics, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, Higher Education, History Repeating Event, Leaderhip, Professional Development, Research, Strategy and Tactics, Taking it to the Streets, thecompanyofficer.com, Tradition, training-development • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Ten Minutes in the Street: “A Little Smoke Showin’ with your Coffee?”

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    New Scenario Posted

    Ten Minutes in the Street

    A Buildingsonfire.com Series

    Interactive Scenarios, Where YOU Make the Call

    Ten Minutes in the Street is back, bringing you insightful and provoking street scenarios for the discriminating and perspective Firefighter, Officer and Commander; where you make the call. You don’t have to have any special rank to participate in this interactive forum, just the desire to learn and expand you knowledge, skills and abilities in order to better yourself, create new insights, while sharing your experience and perspectives to help you and others in the street in making the right call; so everyone has the opportunity of going home.

    Ten Minutes in the Street: “A Little Smoke Showin’ with your Coffee?”

    Volume 10, Number 8

    The recruit firefighters just finished brewing a fresh pot of coffee and you’re about to have your first cup this morning when the tones and bells alert the station of a report of smoke coming from a house across the street from the caller. The communications center advises that the caller doesn’t know if anyone is home, but they are certain there’s smoke coming from the house, even though a slight morning fog layer is beginning to burn off. OK, so much for that coffee. You’re the acting chief this morning, so instead of riding the engine company, you’ve got the chief’s SUV. As you get ready to head out the door, you can hear the engine company fire up a bay over signaling you a driver is in the house and a crew is assembling and preparing to roll out shortly. Go to FireFighter Nation.com for the full scenario and interaction….

    Here’s the download PDF for use in the station or for a drill. Vol10NO08

    Posted by on July 10, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, christopher naum, Fire Dynamics, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, leadership, Professional Development, Risk Management, Scenarios, Taking it to the Streets, thecompanyofficer.com • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Knowledge of Building Construction; Are you Prepared?

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    Check out the latest posting at our sister site Commandsafety.com for the latest release of Buildingsonfire.com’s Building Construction Training and Lecture Series for 2010. Recently updated with a series of new seminar and training program topics addressing the emerging training and educational needs of the fire service, these programs provide timely and relevant information and insights on Building Construction, Command Risk Management, Dynamic and Extreme Fire Behavior, Occupancy Situational Awareness, Engineered Structural Systems and Fire Fighter Safety.

    These programs also present and integrate cutting edge research and emerging concepts on Tactical Patience, Tactical Entertainment, Command Compression, Structural Anatomy of Buildings, Five Star Command Model, Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling and much more.  You can download the training brochure at the following link also; Building Construction Training Brochure 2010

    What’s your level of knowledge, skills and education on Building Construction, Fire Dynamics, Extreme Fire Behavior, Occupancy Profiling and Combat Fire Engagement?

    Posted by on July 2, 2010 • Filed under: BECOME SAFE, building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Fire Dynamics, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, Professional Development, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics, training, training-development, training-fire-rescue-topics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Learning the Lessons from the Past

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    Today is June 17th, to many of you, today is unlike so many other days. Whether it’s going on or off-shift, going to your “day” job; common rituals and activities define our day and are a part of your typical schedule or routine, activities, occupation, trade, leisure or everyday jobs. On any given day, we expect some fairly simple and basic things; Simple and basic from a firefighter’s perspective that is. Let’s clearly put this discussion into firefighter terms and context. We hope that we have a busy day, for the most part; that the alarms and incidents allow us to practice our skills and do what we do best. Deep down inside, we also hope that we have a good “job” come in that allows us to work the job, to fight the fight and put into practice all that we train and prepare to do, we the bell hits and we are called to duty.

    Not that we hope or wish undue miss-fortune, distress or sorrow on anyone, but, IF a fire is going to happen, let it happen on my shift, my tour or while I’m at the firehouse and able to make the first-due. It’s a pretty fundamental hierarchy of need, and it’s what makes us tick at times. Because of who we are and what we do. Right?

    But today is much more than that. June 17th marks the anniversary of two significant fire service incidents that resonate with the values, doctrine and philosophy that define the principles and tradition of the Fire Service.

    Both of these incidents resulted in firefighter line-of-duty deaths at seemingly routine fires, in relatively ordinary structures and occupancies, each with unusual building construction features and conditions that would contribute to the adverse circumstances of the incident operations, and ultimately contribute to the LODD events.

    Hotel Vendome Fire-1972
    On June 17th, 1972, a typical routine day was unfolding for the Jakes in the Boston Fire Department. At 14:35 hours, Box 1571 was received at Boston Fire Alarm Office. It would be the first of four alarms required to extinguish an intense fire at the former Hotel Vendome on Commonwealth Avenue at Dartmouth Street, City of Boston, Massachusetts. It took nearly three hours to contain the blaze. The four alarm fire required a compliment of 16 engine companies, 5 ladder companies, 2 aerial towers and 1 heavy rescue company, with all companies operating with a full complement of personnel staffing.

    Following extensive and strenuous suppression operations, the BFD commenced routine overhaul operation. Then, at 17:28 hours, without warning, all five floors of a 40 by 45 foot section southeast corner of the building collapsed, burying a ladder truck and 17 firefighters beneath a two-story pile of brick, mortar, plaster, wood and debris.

    More than any other event in the three hundred year history of the Boston Fire Department, the Vendome tragedy exemplifies the risk intrinsic to the firefighting profession and the accompanying courage required in the performance of duty. Nine firefighters were killed on that day, eight more injured; eight women widowed, twenty-five children lost their fathers; a shocked city mourned before the sympathetic eyes of the entire nation.

    The Hotel Vendome fire and the Nine Line-of-duty deaths, two Company Officers and seven firefighters
    • Lieutenant THOMAS J. CARROLL, E-32.
    • Lieutenant JOHN E. HANBURY, JR., L-13.
    • Firefighter THOMAS W. BECKWITH, E-32.
    • Firefighter JOSEPH E. BOUCHER, JR., E-22.
    • Firefighter CHARLES E. DOLAN, L-13.
    • Firefighter JOHN E. JAMESON, E-22.
    • Firefighter RICHARD B. MAGEE, E-33.
    • Firefighter PAUL J. MURPHY, E-32.
    • Firefighter JOSEPH P. SANIUK, L-13.

    Built in 1871 and massively expanded in 1881, the Hotel Vendome was a luxury hotel located in Boston’s Back Bay, just north of Copley Square. During the 1960s, the Vendome suffered four small fires. In 1971, the year of the original building’s centennial, the Vendome was purchased. The new owners opened a restaurant called Cafe Vendome on the first floor, and began renovating the remaining hotel into condominiums and a shopping mall.

    Although the cause of the original fire was not known, the subsequent collapse was attributed to the failure of an overloaded seven-inch steel column whose support had been weakened when a new duct had been cut beneath it, exacerbated by the extra weight of water used to fight the fire on the upper floors.

    References and Documents
    • Boston Fire Department, HERE
    • Vendome, Wikipedia, HERE
    • Building Photos and the Firefighter’s Memorial, HERE
    • Gendisasters, Historical Perspective, HERE
    • Boston Globe, HERE
    • Boston FD Ladder 15, HERE

    FDNY Father’s Day Fire-2001
    The relative calm of a quiet Sunday, Father’s Day, June 17th , 2001 was broken at 14:19 hours with a phone call to the FDNY Queens Central Office reporting a fire at 12-22 Astoria Blvd, in the Astoria Section of Queens, New York. For almost 80 years, the Long Island General Supply store has been a fixture in the Long Island City section of Queens serving local contractors and residents with all of their hardware needs. Unfortunately, that included propane tanks and other flammable liquids.

    Two structures were involved in this incident. Both buildings were interconnected on the first floors as well as the cellars.

    • Both structures were built prior to 1930 of ordinary (Type III) construction, and were two stories in height, each with a full cellar.
    • Building 1 measured 2035 square feet and was triangular in shape.
    • Building 2 measured 1102 square feet and was rectangular in shape.
    • Building 1 and Building 2 shared a common or party wall and were interconnected on the first floor and the cellar.Building to building access in the cellar was through a fire door. The fire door was blocked open to allow free movement between the cellars which were used for storage. The hardware stored occupied the first floor and cellars of both buildings. Building 1 had two apartments on the second floor.

    Building 2 had an office and storage space on the second floor. Note: A third uninvolved building was attached to the west side of Building 2. The flat roof system sheathing consisted of 5/8-inch plywood covered by felt paper and rubber roof membrane. The foundation was constructed out of stone and mortar. The support system was a combination of steel masonry posts/lolly columns and wooden support beams.

    FDNY Units arrived within 5 minutes of the dispatch and gave the signal for a working fire. Fire fighters were making good progress but at 14:48 hours something went terribly wrong. Witnesses on the scene report hearing a small explosion followed by a huge blast. The shock wave from the blast blew d
    own every fire fighter on the street and knocked down the exposure 1 wall onto the sidewalk, right on top of fire fighters venting the building.

    As members started sifting through the rubble, the chief ordered a second alarm followed almost immediately by a fourth alarm when a radio transmission was received from FF Brian Fahey from Rescue 4. He was in the basement under tons of collapsed material.

    “I’m trapped in the basement by the stairs. Come get me.” This was a battle cry to everyone on the scene. Every capable member frantically began removing debris to try and get to Brian and the others. The chief ordered more help. Numerous special calls were made.

    There were 144 pieces of apparatus at the scene: 46 engines, 33 ladders, 16 battalion chiefs, 2 deputy chiefs, all 5 rescues, 7 squads, and many more. In fact, with the exception of the fire boats, the JFK hose wagon, the Decon unit, and the thawing units, every type of special unit was at the scene.

    Even with the vast resources of the Department, the task took several hours. The members that were on the sidewalk were quickly recovered.
    • Fire fighters Harry Ford (R4) and John Downing (L163) were removed in traumatic arrest and brought to Elmhurst Hospital were they succumbed from their injuries.
    • Back at the scene members still were trying to get to Brian while others were trying to put out the smoky fire. The battle went through the afternoon and into the evening.
    • The fire was being fueled by some of the flammables in the building.
    • After about four hours they finally reached the basement, but again, it was too late. FDNY Firefighter Brian died in the Line-of-duty.

    Subsequent investigations revealed that two local kids were in the rear yard of the building when unbeknownst to them they knocked over a can of gasoline. The gasoline ran under the rear door, into the basement eventually finding an ignition source in the form of the water heater.

    When the water heater kicked in, it ignited the gasoline. As fire fighters began working in the building the fire caused the explosion of a large propane tank illegally stored in the basement. The resulting blast leveled the building and caused what will be forever known as the worst Father’s Day in FDNY’s history. (Excerpt of the event description published in www.fdnewyork.com).

    The supreme sacrifice was made that day by;
    • FDNY Firefighter Harry S. Ford, Rescue Co.4
    • FDNY Firefighter Brain D. Fahey, Rescue Co. 4
    • FDNY Firefighter John Downing, Ladder Co. 163

    Take the time to read the NIOSH Report, and learn the lessons from that event

    References
    NIOSH Report F2001-23, HERE
    FDNEWYORK, HERE
    Steve Spak, Photos, HERE
    The Late, FDNY Firefighter Andy Fredrick’s Account, HERE
    Online Service Accounts and Coverage, HERE
    Buffalo, NY FD North Division Street Explosion, HERE, HERE and HERE

    Note: The Buffalo, NY, Fire Department experienced a similar event on December 27, 1983 in North Division Street Fire and Explosion that resulted in five firefighter line-of-duty deaths.

    As BFD firefighters arrived at the scene of a reported propane leak in a three-story radiator warehouse (Type III ordinary construction), a massive explosion occurred, killing five firefighters instantly and injuring nine others, three of them critically. The force of the blast blew BFD Ladder 5’s tiller aerial 35 feet across the street into the front yard of a dwelling. BFD Engine 1’s pumper was also blown across the street with the captain and driver pinned in the cab with burning debris all around them. Engine 32’s engine was blown up against a warehouse across a side street and covered with rubble.

    Two civilians were also killed and another 60 to 70 were injured. While operating at the rescue effort, another 19 firefighters were injured. The blast and ensuing fire ignited 14 residences and damaged as many as 130 buildings over a four block area. The explosion occurred when an employee was moving an illegal 500-lb. propane tank with a forklift truck and dropped it, breaking off a valve. The gas leaked out, found an ignition source, and the explosion occurred. Killed in the line of duty were all assigned to Buffalo FD Ladder Company 5; F/F Michael Austin, F/F Michael Catanzaro, F/F Matthew Colpoys, F/F James Lickfield and F/F Anthony Waszkielewicz.

    Taking it to the Streets
    The adage that the fire service has more recently adopted states; “There are no “routine calls”; referring to the safety consciousness that all responding companies should endeavor to consider when responding to an incident, that all too often appears; upon our arrival to be routine in every sense of the word. Whether it’s an alarm system activation, a report of food on the stove, a report of a smoke detector alarming or a report of a gas odor or leak, we have a tendency to treat a lot of things as equal and very routine based upon the periodicity and frequency of the alarm type and the typical, inconsequential nature of the incident outcome or the commonality of the fire and suppression efforts that routinely are employed by our operating companies.

    We seem to do a lot of things at times out of common practice and repetition, you know; “We’ve always done it that way…” syndrome. There’s a resonating theme that is making its way around the fire service dealing with an apparent “culture of extinguishment” and the suggested and inaccurately described “diametrically opposing” fire service safety culture promoted by those on the “Dark Side”

    The daily experience, expectations, our comfort zone;
    • We’re pretty good at what we do-Regularly….
    • We develop profound habits and methods…
    • We treat a lot of things as equal in many respects…
    • We’ve grown accustomed to certain operational modes..
    • We don’t really think anything is going to happen to us, certainly nothing so adverse that I don’t go home after the call.

    Nothing is going to happen to YOU; it happens to someone else….
    BUT to everyone else-YOU are the other Guy!

    On any give day, at any give alarm, the dynamics around us at times may be in or out of our direct control. We may not be able to see what the cards have in store for us, BUT we must ensure we use every fragment of training, fortitude, knowledge, skills, courage, bravery, insights, luck and sometimes (other divine) intervention to get us through.

    Take the time today or this evening to visit and download selective reports from the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program. The lessons learned from these reports and the important recommendations that are written as a direct result of the supreme sacrifices made by our brother and sister firefighters that died in the line of duty speaks volumes. In reality, the words written in these reports are the words from our fallen, they convey the messages to correct deficiencies, close gaps and increase and enhance our operations, training, education, administration, management, supervision, resources, equipment, protocols, preparedness, perspectives, culture and values.

    When you look over these events over the years, it doesn’t take long to identify that many LODD events share similarities, and that specific incident events, deficiencies, outcomes and recommendations are identical in every way, except for the fire department name and geographical location. In other words, we have History Repeating Events (HRE). Events that resonate with common issues, apparent and contributing causes and operational factors that share legacy issues that the fire service fails to identify, relate to and implement. In other words, we fail a times to learn from the past, or we make a deliberate chose to ignore those lessons due to other internal or external influences, pressures, authority, beliefs, values or viewpoints. We make choices and we determine our direction, path and destiny.

    History repeating itself is nothing new to society, it is apparent and self revealing in much of written history and recorded legacies, and as defined by a popular quote states; “Those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it.”

    An interesting series of quotes from noted historian Gerda Lerner states the following;
    “What we do about history matters. The often repeated saying that those who forget the lessons of history are doomed to repeat them has a lot of truth in it. But what are ‘the lessons of history’? The very attempt at definition furnishes ground for new conflicts. History is not a recipe book; past events are never replicated in the present in quite the same way. Historical events are infinitely variable and their interpretations are a constantly shifting process. There are no certainties to be found in the past.”

    She goes on to state; “We can learn from history how past generations thought and acted, how they responded to the demands of their time and how they solved their problems. We can learn by analogy, not by example, for our circumstances will always be different than theirs were. The main thing history can teach us is that human actions have consequences and that certain choices, once made, cannot be undone. They foreclose the possibility of making other choices and thus they determine future events.”

    We must learn for the part, so that we limit or eradicate the opportunity for History Repeating events aligning themselves again and providing emergency incident circumstances to lead to another line-of-duty death, injuries or large loss incident.

    History Repeating Events share may common and familiar themes. Research exemplifies the following shared commonality causes related to History Repeating Events;
    • A lack of pre-incident planning
    • Ineffective or lack of risk management
    • No Incident action plan• Free-lancing
    • Inadequate Training/Skills• Faulted Strategies and/or Tactics
    • Deficient Resources/staffing
    • Lack of Accountability• Insufficient Fire Suppression versus Fire Loading affect• Ineffective or non-existent Supervisory oversight
    • No effective span of control / management
    • Not understanding Building Construction
    • Not understanding Structural Assemblies and Systems
    • Not understanding Construction & Occupancy factors• Not understanding Engineered Building Systems and relationship to Tactics
    • Lacking understanding of Fire Behavior and Fire Dynamics
    • Ineffective Company level supervision
    • Lack of Situational Awareness• Command Dysfunction
    • Failure to implement periodic in-situ reassessments

    Think about your actions, think about what you can do to make a difference or to alter or change the course of a situation. We sometimes have a greater hand in destiny and how the cards are dealt than we think. Take a look and discuss the HRE causal factors listed above, share these with you officers, with you company level personnel or the department as a whole. Pose the question, “What do these mean to you?” See what the different feedback might illustrate and how they may be viewed from a different set of perspectives, generations or rank and assignments.

    Safety Considerations for Operations involving Ordinary or Heavy Timber Type Construction.
    In support of the two (2) incident events discussed in this article related to the Hotel Vendome and the Astoria Queens Hardware Store Explosion. Both of these structures were Type III, Ordinary Construction. This is a good opportunity for you to introduce yourself to or refresh yourself on the Safety Considerations for Operations involving Ordinary or Heavy Ti…

    A comprehensive power point program is available for download from the Near Miss Reporting System web site, HERE

    An accompanying narrative report and its alignment with a Near Miss Report related to a type III occupancy and incident response and close call support the power point presentation, HERE

    Don’t forget, the Near Miss Reporting System, HERE, has exemplary resources, case studies, close calls and lessons to be learned and institutionalized. The same is true about the resources at the NFFF Everyone Goes Home Program, HERE and the IAFC Fire/EMS Safety week web site HERE.

    Take the time to learn something about Ordinary or Heavy Timber Type Construction. As I continue to advocate;  Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety. No more History Repeating Events!
    Here’s a closing quote from the late Senator Robert F. Kennedy;“Few will have the greatness to bend history itself; but each of us can work to change a small portion of events, and in the total of all those acts will be written the history of this generation.”

    Be safe, have a great tour or stay at the firehouse today or this evening.

    Orginally published during  2009 Safety Health and Survival Week.

    Posted by on June 17, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Collapse, FDNY, Fire Dynamics, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, LODD, major-incidents, NIOSH Reports, Occupancies, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    From Waldbaum’s to Hackensack- Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety

    9 comments

    6-15-2009 7-39-58 PM

    From Waldbaum’s to Hackensack- Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety

    “From Waldbaum’s to Hackensack- Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety”; I still find it surprising during my travels around the country lecturing and presenting programs on building construction, that when the audience was asked, “What do the Walbaum’s Fire and Hackensack fire share in common?”, the response typically were blank stares. The more seasoned and experienced veterans (translation; Older firefighters) when present, were able to convey some information on the subject. But yet, the true essence of the basic incident particulars and the lessons learned fail to be fully conveyed. We’re not remembering the past!

    I’ve spoken on numerous occasions about History Repeating Events (HRE), and the common themes related to LODD. Events that resonate with common issues, apparent and contributing causes and operational factors that share legacy issues that the fire service fails to identify, relate to and implement. In other words, we fail a times to learn from the past, or we make a deliberate choice to ignore those lessons due to other internal or external influences, pressures, authority, beliefs, values or viewpoints. We make choices and we determine our direction, path and destiny.

    When you look over these LODD events over the years (NIOSH, NFPA, USFA Reports), it doesn’t take long to identify that many LODD events share similarities, and that specific incident events, deficiencies, outcomes and recommendations are identical in every way, except for the fire department name and geographical location. In other words, we have History Repeating Events (HRE).

    What have we learned from the past? What is it that we’re passing down to each incoming recruit class and probationary firefighter? What are Company and Commanding Officers recalling and considering in their dynamic risk assessment, size-up and decision-making (IAP) process when looking at a particular building, occupancy and fire? Are mission critical operational elements & HRE factors being recollected? (Naturalistic/ Recognition-Prime Decision-making).

    Are the fire service legacies of the past and the lessons learned from those incidents and the sacrifices that were made transcending time? Or are they lost in the immediacy of day to day challenges, issues and operations. Or are these events, lessons and operations issues dismissed and disregarded as a result of their “time and place” not being relevant to “today’s” operations and modern fire service advancements.

    The reality is, we, the present generation of veteran firefighters and officers at times neglect or fail to recognize the importance of passing along the lessons of our life’s journey through our fire service careers, the events of our day and the profound tough lessons and sacrifices learned the hard way. We sometimes need a receptive, sympathetic and compassionate audience that is willing to listen, hear and comprehend the messages conveyed. There needs to be a high degree of empathy related to these past History Repeating Events. For each event, each and every line of duty death has a message and a Legacy of Operational Safety.

    Throughout the past thirty-three years (1977-2010), over 4,000 firefighters have lost their lives in the course and conduct of their duties as firefighters and officers within the fire service. Although there are numerous LODD fire incidents and events that could be discussed, all distinguished and exemplified by heroism, nobility, cause and fortitude. There are four that stand out when related to the lessons learned and the significance and impact each LODD incident had at the time to the national fire service.

    Each of these incidents also have significance as they relate to the building, occupancy, use, construction features, inherent structural systems, fire behavior and fire dynamics; coupled with interrelated elements of strategic and tactical fire suppression operations and incident management . Again, “Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety”.

    The Waldbaum’s Supermarket Fire: Brooklyn, New York August 3, 1978
    Six LODD
    Six FDNY firefighters died at this fire when the wood bowstring truss roof collapsed, 34 were injured. The fire started at 8:40 hrs. in Waldbaum’s Supermarket, Ave. Y and Ocean Ave., Sheepshead Bay, Brooklyn, NY. Nearly 23 electricians, plumbers etc ., were in the process of renovating the building, while it was still open and operating when the fire started in the mezzanine area. An All hands was transmitted at 08:49 hrs. the 2nd alarm at 09:02 hrs. Shortly after 09:20 hrs., with 20 firefighters on the roof a crackling sound was heard and the center portion of the bow string trussed roof fell into the smoke and flames. A total of 12 firefighters fell into the inferno, six were rescued, six died in the line of duty.

    Honor and Remembrance
    • Lt. James Cutillo, 33rd Battalion
    • Firefighter Charles Bouton, Ladder Co. 156
    • Firefighter William O’Conner, Ladder Co. 156
    • Firefighter James P McManus, Ladder Co. 153
    • Firefighter George Rice, Ladder Co. 153
    • Firefighter Harold F. Hastings, Ladder Co.153

    Hackensack Ford: Hackensack, New Jersey July 1, 1988
    Five LODD
    Five fire fighters from the Hackensack, New Jersey Fire Department were killed in the line-of duty while they were engaged in interior fire suppression efforts at an automobile dealership when portions of the building’s wood bowstring truss roof collapsed.

    Honor and Remembrance
    • Captain Richard Williams
    • Lt. Richard Reinhogen
    • Firefighter William Krejsa
    • Firefighter Leonard Radumski
    • Firefighter Stephen Ennis

    Note: The 1988 Hackensack Ford Fire occurred almost ten years to the date of the Waldbaum’s FDNY Fire in 1978. (History Repeating Event…we forgot something along the way regarding bow string trussed roof systems and fire impingement…)

    As a result of this incident passage of a NJ State law mandating the clear demarcation of truss roofs and other structural hazards with warning signs (placards) on building with truss roofs was. In 1991 NJ State law required the State Bureau of Fire Safety to investigate all fires in which a firefighter dies or is seriously injured. See National Truss Placarding.

    The Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Fire: Worcester, Massachusetts, December 3, 1999
    Six LODD
    On December 3, 1999, the vacant, six-story Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Co. building in Worcester, Massachusetts, was set ablaze by two homeless people knocking a lighted candle into a pile of ragged clothes. The Worcester Fire Department responded at 6:13 p.m. to Box Alarm 1438. The Rescue 1 team of Firefighter Paul Brotherton and Firefighter Jerry Lucey entered the building searching for occupants. Fire conditions worsened in the building at an alarmingly unexpected rate. Paul and Jerry, on the fifth floor, became disoriented in the smoke-filled building. Lost, and running low on air, they called for help. Several teams began searching for the lost fire fighters.

    Two teams reaching the fifth floor also found themselves disoriented in the smoke and trapped by the maze of interior walls — Lieutenant Tom Spencer and Firefighter Tim Jackson from Ladder 2, and Firefighter Jay Lyons and Firefighter Joe McGuirk from Engine 3. Though many more brave fire fighters attempted to locate their missing brothers, their efforts proved futile. Their deaths marked the worst loss of fire fighters’ lives in more than 20 years in a building fire in America, and the third worst fire in Massachusetts’ history. Six days after they died, a memorial service drew 30,000 fire fighters and 10,000 civilians in what was believed to have been the largest such service for fire fighters killed on duty.

    Honor and Remembrance
    • Firefighter Paul A Brotherton, Rescue Co.1
    • Firefighter Timothy P. Jackson, Ladder Co.2
    • Firefighter Jeremiah M. Lucey, Rescue Co.1
    • Firefighter James F. “Jay” Lyons III, Engine Co. 3
    • Firefighter Joseph T. McGuirk , Engine Co. 3
    • Lt. Thomas E. Spencer, Ladder Co.2

    Sofa Superstore Fire: Charleston, South Carolina, June 18, 2007
    Nine LODD
    On the evening of June 18, 2007, units from the Charleston Fire Department responded to a fire at the Sofa Super Store, a large retail furniture outlet in the West Ashley district of the city. Within less than 40 minutes, the fire claimed the lives of nine firefighters. The highly flammable characteristics of the materials that were stored in the loading dock and throughout the premises provided an ample supply of fuel and caused the fire to spread rapidly, affecting the building’s structural integrity and adversely affecting manual fire suppression activities.

    Honor and Remembrance
    • Bradford Rodney “Brad” Baity – Engineer 19
    • Theodore Michael Benke – Captain 16
    • Melvin Edward Champaign – Firefighter 16
    • James “Earl” Allen Drayton – Firefighter 19
    • Michael Jonathon Alan French – Engineer 5
    • William H. “Billy” Hutchinson, III – Captain 19
    • Mark Wesley Kelsey – Captain 5
    • Louis Mark Mulkey – Captain 15
    • Brandon Kenyon Thompson – Firefighter 5

    Commemorate and Remembrance
    On the evening of June 18, 2007, units from the Charleston Fire Department responded to a fire at the Sofa Super Store, a large retail furniture outlet in the West Ashley district of the city. Within less than 40 minutes, the fire claimed the lives of nine firefighters.

    The Executive Summary of the FIREFIGHTER FATALITY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT Sofa Super Store Fire, Phase II Report issued MAY 15, 2008 provided critical insights into the apparent and contributing causes that culminated in the event. The Sofa Super Store was a large property that incorporated a very significant potential for a major fire to occur. It’s appropriate at this time to revisit those key factors described within the report in order for provide the opportunity for departments or agencies to recognize or identify similar gaps that exist, and take the necessary corrective actions. These gaps may be precursors to potentially significant or serious future events and extend in operational, training, administrative, managerial, construction, prevention and regulatory and codes.

    • The fire risk factors associated with the Sofa Super Store exceeded the limits prescribed by the applicable building and fire codes. An automatic sprinkler system should have been installed to reduce the level of fire risk or the buildings should have been divided into manageable fire compartments by a system of fire walls.
    • If a sprinkler system had been installed, the fire probably would likely have been controlled within the loading dock area.
    • If effective fire walls had been provided, the fire probably would not have spread beyond the loading dock.
    • The highly flammable characteristics of the materials that were stored in the loading dock and throughout the premises provided an ample supply of fuel and caused the fire to spread rapidly. The burning contents released copious quantities of heat and toxic smoke.
    • Significant quantities of flammable and combustible liquids that were stored in the loading dock likely contributed to the severity and rapid spread of the fire.
    • The fire had extended to the loading dock when firefighters arrived.
    • Charleston Fire Department members attempted to fight the fire by initiating an offensive interior attack into the loading dock.
    • The offensive attack was launched from two directions. One attack line entered the loading dock from the exterior, while a second line was stretched through the showrooms and into the loading dock.
    • The offensive attack failed to control the fire. The fire extended into adjoining areas on three sides of the loading dock.
    • At least 16 firefighters, who were operating deep inside the showrooms, became enveloped in heavy smoke.
    • Conditions inside the showrooms became critical as the fire began to involve this part of the building. Several firefighters became disoriented and were running short of air. Radio messages requesting assistance were not heard.
    • Seven firefighters managed to find their way out of the showrooms. The nine deceased firefighters were unable to find their way out as the fire spread rapidly from the rear of the building to the front.
    • The size and layout of the building, inadequate exits, and the highly flammable nature of the contents likely contributed to the inability of the lost firefighters to escape from the building. Rescue efforts were attempted when the situation inside the showrooms was recognized. In spite of valiant efforts, it was too late to save the missing firefighters before the store became fully involved in flames.

    The analysis of operations conducted by the Charleston Fire Department includes the following observations and findings:

    • Fire fighting operations at the Sofa Super Store did not comply with Federal occupational safety and health regulations, recommended safety standards, or accepted fire service practices.
    • The Charleston Fire Department failed to provide adequate direction, supervision, and coordination over the operations that were conducted.
    • The documented duties and responsibilities of an Incident Commander were not performed and risk management guidelines were not adequately applied to the situation.
    • The culture of the Charleston Fire Department promoted aggressive offensive tactics that exposed firefighters to excessive and avoidable risks and failed to apply basic firefighter safety practices.
    • Insufficient training, inadequate staffing, obsolete equipment and outdated tactics all contributed to an ineffective effort to control the fire with offensive tactics during the early stages of the incident.
    • The Charleston Fire Department continued to apply offensive tactics after the situation had evolved to a point where risk management guidelines called for defensive strategy.
    • Factors that should have caused firefighters to be removed from interior tactical (offensive) positions were not recognized.
    • There was a lack of accountability for the location and function of firefighters who were operating inside the building. The Charleston Fire Department did not have appropriate Mayday procedures to be followed by firefighters in distress, for dispatchers, or for command officers on the scene.

    All of the listed factors and many others were analyzed and discussed in detail within the body of the issued report. If you haven’t found the time or reason to read the report, do so; it would make for a good task activity for Safety Week. The report document presented the dedicated and conscientious efforts of the review team to honor the nine fallen firefighters by making every possible effort to learn from their sacrifice. The operative question is this; “What factors or attributes are comparable to situations or conditions that presently exist within your Department, Organization or community? What are you going to proactively do to address these issues or conditions in a timely manner?

    Understanding the Building Profile and Risk
    The Sofa Super Store occupied a complex of interconnected structures that had been constructed in several phases. The showroom building, facing Savannah Highway, was actually an assembly of three separate structures. The front wall was a façade, with a parapet extending above the roof line, creating the appearance of one large building when viewed from Savannah Highway. (Refer to the Report for diagrams, plans and photographs)
    • The front wall, including the parapet, was approximately 23 feet tall, while the roof behind the parapet varied from 12 to 14 feet above grade.
    • The main showroom was originally constructed as a grocery store, probably during the 1950s or 60s. The original building was approximately 125 feet in width and 130 feet deep, with a rectangular extension in the southwest corner (right-rear facing the building from Savannah Highway).
    • The front wall was brick construction with large storefront windows, while the side and rear walls were constructed of concrete block.
    • The original structure had a flat metal deck roof, supported by lightweight steel bar joists (trusses), spanning from east to west across the store. The side walls supported the ends of the bar joists, while two rows of steel beams and columns provided intermediate support.
    • A suspended ceiling was installed below the roof trusses.

    After the property was converted to a furniture store, two pre-engineered metal buildings were added-on to the original structure to expand the showroom area. Each showroom addition was approximately 60 feet in width and 120 feet deep. The first showroom addition was constructed on the west side of the original building in 1994 and the second was added on the east side in 1995. (The add-on structures are referred to as the east and west showrooms in this report, while the original structure is identified as the main showroom.) Six large openings in the concrete block side walls, three on each side of the original building, provided connections between the showroom areas; their combined floor area was in excess of 31,000 square feet. An additional pre-engineered metal structure was erected at the rear of the property in 1996 to serve as a warehouse. This structure was approximately 120 feet wide by 130 feet deep and 29 feet tall. Furniture was stored on steel racks, 20 feet in height, inside the warehouse.

    Going Forward: The Structural Anatomy of Building Construction
    The following are quotes from Fire Chief Anthony Aiellos (ret) Hackensack (NJ) Fire Department
    Fire Chief during the Hackensack Ford Fire, July, 1988

    “If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner.”

    “This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die, it’s that simple, it’s that obvious”.

    Risk Based Response Assignments
    The buildings, structures and occupancies that comprise typical response districts pose unique and consistent challenges during structural fire attack. The variety of occupancies and building characteristics establish varying degrees of risk potential, with defined and recognizable strategic and tactical measures to be taken-sometimes uniquely to each occupancy type. Although each occupancy type presents variables that dictate how a particular incident is handled, most company operations evolve from basic principles rooted in past performance and operations at similar structures. This is based on what I define as; “predictability of performance.”

    When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future. Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis. We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a given duration of time, that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system.

    We used to know with a measured degree of predictability, how our buildings would perform, react and fail under most fire conditions. This is what our years of fireground experience provided us, and how we ultimately would predict, assess, plan and implement our incident action plans and ultimately deploy our companies-based upon the predictable performance expected. Conventional Construction Structures (CCS) had this “predictably of performance.” You know, that typical residential structure, the 2-1/2 story wood frame, the three story brick and joist type III occupancy, the four story frame multiple occupancy, etc., etc. Unlike Engineered System Structures (ESS) whose predictability is rooted in the fact that they are unpredictable.

    The emerging fire service issues affecting buildings, occupancies and structural systems related to ESS is only beginning to take hold a prominent role and level of significance that is long overdue. The fire service has been dealing with the operational issues and line-of-duty deaths related to ESS since the 1980s and now in 2009, we’re finally raising these ESS issues to a dialog point that is influencing firefighter safety, survival and operations. ( Refer to the Underwriters Laboratory’s (UL) UL University on-line training module for a state-of-the art presentation on Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions and performance results that correlate towards redefining fire suppression operations)

    The fire service is beginning to fully recognize the merits in adjusting, altering, and changing our strategic and tactical ways of doing business in the streets. It’s becoming self evident in the fire service that it’s no longer acceptable to think that ESS buildings and occupancies will perform in the same manner as CCS buildings and occupancies and that tactics deployed in both CCS and ESS buildings and occupancies will react under similar strategic and tactical plans and tasks. These unique and inherent factors within the ESS profiles must give us a new standard for operational deployment; strategies and tactics that are defined by the risk profile of the building, its engineered structural systems, materials and methods of construction and the fire loading present.

    Considerations for changing fire flow rates, the sizing of hose line and the adequacies for fire flow demand and application rates, staffing needs for safe operations, considerations for defensive positioning and defensive operating postures must be considered, and it warrants repeating again; Reckless-Aggressive firefighting must be redefined in the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environment- with determined, effective and proactive firefighting.

    Risk-Preferring and Self-indulging Firefighting
    Don’t mistake determined, effective and proactive firefighting with that of reckless, baseless and risk-preferring and self-indulging firefighting. There is a difference, a big difference. When we address relationships of Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Fire Fighter Safety with the occupancy and structural environment, all personnel, regardless of rank, need to equate the occupancy risk with strategic and tactical incident action plans. These safely compliment the identified firefighting operation risk, with the projected building risk profile and interface appropriate behavioral characteristics in the task level firefighting activities. Again, equating building, occupancy risk profiles with determined, effective and proactive firefighting.

    The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics MUST not only be questioned, they need to be adjusted and modified; risk assessment, risk-benefit analysis, safety and survivability profiling, operational value and firefighter injury and LODD reduction must be further institutionalized to become a recognized part of modern firefighting operations.

    It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations. Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments. Consider the following definitions as they relate to defining structural combat fire suppression operations.

    Aggressive and Measured Approach.
    Aggressive: Assertive, bold, and energetic, forceful, determined, confident, marked by driving forceful energy or initiative, marked by combative readiness, assured, direct, dominate…

    Measured: Calculated; deliberate, careful; restrained, think, considered, confident, alternatives, reasoned actions, in control, self assured, calm…

    You be the judge as to what should be appropriately defining interior fire suppression operations.

    It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management. This is what it’s going to take to truly provide a means for “everyone to go home”.

    Occupancy Risk not Occupancy Type
    Many of today’s incident commanders, company officers and firefighters lack the clarity of understanding and comprehension that correlate to the inherent characteristics of today’s buildings, construction and occupancies. We assume that the redundancy of our operations and incident responses equates with predictability and diminished risk to our firefighting personnel.

    Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction, therefore risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. You need to gain the knowledge and insights and to change and adjust your operating profile in order to safe guard your companies, personnel and team compositions. Again strategic firefighting operations; Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type.
    With this being stated, another primary consideration that must be deliberated and changed as it relates to firefighting and the built environment is the long held fire service tradition and practice of Structural Fire Alarm Response (resources) Assignments being based upon the Occupancy Type. Sending the two Engine Companies and one Truck Company assignment with a Battalion Chief and a RIT team to a reported structure fire in an occupied single family residential structure; is not acceptable.

    As previously stated; the rules for structural fire engagement have changed. Structural Fire Alarm Response (resources) Assignments should be based upon the Risk Profile the occupancy has related to Building construction, systems and projected or determined fire loading. Sending the four Engine Companies, two Truck Companies, a manpower Heavy Rescue Company, two additional Battalion Chiefs, a Safety Officer and support staff assignment with the assigned Battalion Chief on the alarm assignment to a reported structure fire in an occupied single family residential structure, that happens to be 5000 square feet in size with ESS components; IS Acceptable.

    • There is an acute understanding and corollary of technical knowledge and inter reliance on occupancies, construction, strategy, tactics, risk, safety, physics, engineering and fire suppression theory, This is a fact.
    • Previous, historical parameters and Building/Structural Performance always provides a postulated measurement to gauge operational tasks and form the basis for the Incident Action Plan. These parameters must be recognized and integrated
    • There is a need to integrate performance based incident indicators derived from engineering, physics, fire dynamics, historical and statistical basis
    • Basic Size-Up is Antiquated for Firefighting and the Built Environment. – Start Thinking in terms of Dynamic Risk Assessment and Command Risk Management
    • USFA Annual Report on Firefighter Fatalities in the United States; “More firefighters using an aggressive interior attack in enclosed structures die more often, in greater numbers, and with greater multiple line-of-duty deaths than those using the same tactical approach in opened structure fires.”

    Start integrating an understating of Fire Dynamics and Fire Behavior and the impact on structural integrity and operational deployment

    Situational Awareness and Risk Assessment
    Situation Awareness related to Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Firefighter Safety is another mission critical element. Situation Awareness (SA) is the perception of environmental elements within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future. It is also a field of study concerned with perception of the environment critical to decision-makers in complex, dynamic situations and incidents. Both the 2006 and 2007 Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System Annual Reports identified a lack of situational awareness as the highest contributing factor to near misses reported.

    Situation Awareness involves being aware of what is happening around you at an incident scene to understand how information, events, and your own actions will impact operational goals and incident objectives, both now and in the near future. Lacking SA or having inadequate SA has been identified as one of the primary factors in accidents attributed to human error (Hartel, Smith, & Prince, 1991) (Nullmeyer, Stella, Montijo, & Harden, 2005). Situation Awareness becomes especially important in the structural fire suppression and firefighter domains where the information flow can be quite high and poor decisions can lead to serious consequences. Dynamic Risk Assessment is commonly used to describe a process of risk assessment being carried out in a changing or evolving environment, where what is being assessed is developing as the process itself is being undertaken. This is further problematical for the Incident Commander when confronted with competing or conflicting incident priorities, demands or distractions before a complete appreciation of all mission critical or essential information and data has been obtained. The dynamic management of risk is all about effective, informed and decisive decision making during all phases of an incident at a structural fire.

    To the Incident Commander, fire officer or firefighter, knowing what’s going on around you, in and around the building structure and understanding the consequences of building, construction, assembly, fire load and fire development and growth is mission critical to incident stabilization and mitigation and profoundly crucial in terms of personnel safety.The integration of Situational Awareness and Dynamic Risk Assessment related to the building and occupancy is a mission critical element in managing structural fires and in the strategic command management and company level tactical operations as we go forward into the next decade. Traditional phased incident scene size-up and monitoring is antiquated and no longer appropriate or applicable to modern fire service operations.Situational awareness is a combination of attitudes, previously learned knowledge and new information gained from the incident scene and environment that enables the strategic commanders, decision-makers and tactical companies to gather the information they need to make effective decisions that will keep their firefighters and resources out of harm’s way, reducing the likelihood of adverse or detrimental effects.

    Command and company officers and firefighters MUST understand the building, the occupancy features and the inherent impact of fire within and on the structure, AND be able to identify, communicate and take actions necessary to support the incident action and battle plans, mitigate incident conditions and provide for continuous safety protection to themselves, their team, their company and the entire alarm assignment operating at the incident scene.

    It’s Not about Our Entertainment Value
    When we focus our attention on the interdependent functional domains of Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Fire Fighter Safety and the essence of combat structural fires; Structural firefighting is what it’s all about, is it not? The reason we have such veneration for firefighting and the fire service and all it entails; has a lot to do with going into burning buildings and fighting fire. We enjoy it tremendously; because of who we are and what we do-as firefighters. But, firefighting has its adverse consequences, with all too familiar costs, in the form of injuries, debilitating accidents and line of duty deaths.

    As a firefighter, to say that we love firefighting would be an understatement, but one issue that we need to address is the fact that there are many individual firefighters, companies and organizations that employ fireground operational practices that promote the “enjoyment and entertainment” of working a good job within the occupancy compartment of a structural fire in the building environment.-Staying too long in the wrong place, operating tactically in an adverse environment with known hazards that does not have value, for nothing other than the enjoyment of nozzle time and operating time in the fire.

    Fire suppression tactics must be adjusted for the rapidly changing methods and materials impacting all forms of building construction, occupancies and structures. The need to redefine the art and science of firefighting is nearly upon us. Some things do stand the test of time, others need to adjust, evolve and change. Not for the sake of change only, but for the emerging and evolving buildings, structures and occupancies being built, developed or renovated in our communities.

    If the fire service can significantly increase proficiencies in building knowledge and equate that to other fundamental operational aspect in structural fire operations, then there would be a direct enhancement to firefighter safety, through injury and LODD reduction. If we understand buildings, occupancies and construction, and balance this with our understanding of fire dynamics and orchestrate it with appropriate strategies, tactics and command management, then we made the new safety equation work; Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S). It’s all about the Structural Anatomy of Buildings.

    Posted by on May 21, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, firefighter-safety-health, Occupancies, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Changes in Building Construction and Fire Behavior

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    FDIC 2010 Rhett Fleitz, Christopher Naum, John Mitchell. Photo by Art Goodrich

    FDIC 2010 Rhett Fleitz, Christopher Naum, John Mitchell. Photo by Art Goodrich

    I had the extreme pleasure of meeting two wonderful firefighters, who I’m proud to call brothers; Lt. John Mitchell of FireDaily.com and Lt. Rhett Fleitz of the Fire Critic.com both of whom produce and host the Firefighter Netcast.  If you’ve been out of touch-Firefighter NetCast offers live netcasts and podcasts for the fire service and was launched in 2009. I had the pleasure of taping a podcast live from the floor of the Fire Department Instructors Conference (FDIC) on the timely and extremely pertinent topic of Changes in Building Construction and Fire Behavior.

    Having lectured and presented the day before to a packed room on the topic of Building Construction and Risk Management, the live podcast provided us the opportunity to delve into a number of operational and safety issues affecting the fire service today regarding engineered structural systems (ESS), the demands associated with company and command officer training and educational needs in the areas of building construction, fire behavior and the evolving state of combat structural fire engagement. We furthered a passionate dialog on a number of case studies and LODD and talked at length about emerging changes that will affect the way we do business in the street related to strategic and tactical operations in buildings and occupancies.  We discussed the concerns related to knowledge, skills and competencies required in reading today’s buildings and occupancies and the emerging mantra of Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety.

    Take a few moments to head over the Firefighter Netcast and check out John and Rhett’s site, programs and other podcasts from FDIC and from recent show tapings. Check out their show schedule and dates and times and become an active participant. Stay tuned for some exciting future announcements as we plan for great new offerings and expanded coverage on the topics on Building Construction, and the needs for today’s progressive and emerging company and command officer. In addition, stay tuned for upcoming postings on the new 2010 training, lecture and seminar program announcements related to our Buildingsonfire training series on Building Construction & Risk Management, Extreme Fire Behavior and Building and Occupancy Profiling, Buildingsonfire 2010 and cutting edge programs on Engineered Structural Systems, Lightweight Construction and Firefighter Safety.

    Think about the:  Predictability of Occupancy Performance during Suppression Operations

    Changes in Building Construction and Fire Behavior PODCAST HERE

    Posted by on April 28, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, KSA, NIOSH Reports, Occupancies, Risk Assessment, Strategy and Tactics, training • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Multi-Family / High Rise Structure Fires

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    highrise2In multi-story multifamily structures there is a lot more to consider than in single family structures. The population density increases significantly, the size of the structure increases and in high rise operations you have to be concerned with the rapid spread of heat, smoke, toxic gases and fire upward through the structure. The fact that the structural design is significantly different as the size if focused on going vertical verses horizontal.

    These structures have a high life hazard at regardless the time of day. This proposes unique problems as occupant evacuation often hampers fire department suppression operations. With this fact being in place it also changes the focus of operations due to the potential need for evacuation or rescue efforts. Many of these building were constructed with fire escapes on the exterior of the building. These are often in disrepair and become involved in fire as the fire has vented out of a window and prevents the use of the exterior fire escape. Many structures have limited internal stairwells. Often these internal stairwells are not secure from the effects of smoke and heat. These prevent for safe evacuation. It is important to also consider the age of the tenants. The elder population that could live in these structures creates a special need for assistance in evacuation or rescue as they are not able to ambulate efficiently enough to travel the potential distances required for evacuating.

    These structures require massive amounts of man power to be able to operate. It is recommended that for every position assigned a total of three (3) personnel be committed, one in operations, one in staging and one on deck ready for relief. This alone can make a significant impact on available resources.

    Construction features can create a series of fire-control tactical concerns with the stacking of apartments that creates chases that run the entire height of the building. This design feature creates an easy pathway for fire to extend and do so without showing significant signs of fire growth and spread until large quantities of fire exist. This type of feature provides for fast moving fire extension and can compound the loss of life potential.

    Larger buildings have design features that bring light and natural ventilation to rooms in the middle of the structure. These light and air shafts pose danger of allowing the fire to extend horizontally across the shaft. This feature allows the fire to sometimes by pass a fire wall or fire stop. This design will also allow fire to extend vertically as the exposures are increased and the ability to extend both via convection and direct flame contact due to lapping out of windows. The design of these windows being directing opposite or directly above each other contributes to the fire extension. One advantage is that there is not roof over these sections which eliminates the mushrooming concept and will slow the spread of fire to the upper floors.

    Posted by on April 10, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, company officer, Doug Cline, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, fire-rescue-topics, major-incidents, operations, rescues, Risk Assessment, Situational Awareness • Tagged: , , , , , ,

    The Rules for Combat Structural Fire Suppression Have Changed: Did anyone Tell You?

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    3-29-2009 12-58-50 PMOur buildings have changed; the structural systems of support, the degree of compartmentation, the characteristics of materials and the magnitude of fire loading. The structural anatomy, predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and the extreme fire behavior; accelerated growth rate and intensively levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term combat fire engagement.

    The rules for combat structural fire suppression have changed, but we have yet to write the rule book from which the new games plans must be derived. We seek the elusive “Rosetta stone” that aligns and interprets the emerging and traditionalist acumen related to fire stream effectiveness, flow rates, cooling capacity, extreme fire behavior and fire dynamics, compartment fire theory, propagation and cooling capacity and tactical deployment all relate towards defining an engineering approach to firefighting tactics versus the manual, labor-driven tactics of line deployment and rudiment placement of water on a fuel source within the fire compartment (room).

    It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that defines structural fire suppression operations. It begs to suggest that many of today’s incident commanders, company officers and firefighters lack the clarity of understanding and comprehension that correlate to the inherent characteristics of today’s buildings, construction and occupancies and the need for refined engine company operations within the modern building construction setting. We assume that the routiness or successes of our operations and incident responses equates with predictability and diminished risk to our firefighting personnel.

    The work of such notable suppression theory pioneers as P. Grimwood, E. Hartin, S. Särdqvist and S. Svennson and the concepts surrounding 3D firefighting, B-SAHF and other emerging research from the NIST and UL are areas that today’s discerning and progressive fire officer and commanders must become well-informed and conversant. The quantitative scientific data and emerging concepts from continuing research and testing such as the NIST’s Wind Drive Fire Studies and UL’s The Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions are providing enlightenment on fire development, fuel controlled and ventilation controlled fire development, operational time-duration parameters and degradation and failure mechanisms related to compromise and structural collapse in occupancies.

    Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction, therefore risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of combat structural fire engagement.

    • Building Construction Systems
      • Heritage
        • Pre-1919
      • Legacy
        • 1920-1949
      • Conventional
        • 1950-1979
      • Engineered
        • 1980-2010
      • Hybrid
      • Chameleon

    The fundamental compartment that comprised a typical room configuration in terms of area (square footage), volume (height/Width), furnishings (fire load package) and materials of construction (structural anatomy) found within conventional, legacy or heritage construction provided predictability in terms of fire suppression, fire behavior, operational time and survivability (civilian/firefighter). The dramatic changes since the early 1980’s in the evolution of modern building construction and the institutionalization of engineered structural systems (ESS) have created compartment (room) areas in excess 500 SF, volumes that are open and spaciously interconnected to other habitable space, fire load packages that create extreme fire behavior, compromising structural stability in shorter time spans creating decreasing interior operational time and requiring increasing fire flow rates and volume to sustain requisite extinguishment demands.

    Commanders and Company Offices need to gain new insights and knowledge related to the modern building occupancy and to modify and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type and must have the combined adequacy of sufficient staffing, fire flow and nozzle appliances orchestrated in a manner that identifies with the fire profiling, predictability of the occupancy profile and accounts for presumed fire behavior. Today’s engine company operations and fire suppression theory has to progress beyond the pragmatic approaches to fire suppression such as “Big Fire-Big Water principle.

    When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future. Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis. We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system; in addition to having an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions.

    Executing tactical plans based upon faulted or inaccurate strategic insights and indicators has proven to be a common apparent cause in numerous case studies, after action reports and LODD reports. Our years of predictable fireground experience have ultimately embedded and clouded our ability to predict, assess, plan and implement incident action plans and ultimately deploy our companies-based upon the predictable performance expected of modern construction and especially those with engineered structural systems.

    If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner, that is no longer acceptable within many of our modern building types, occupancies and structures. This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die, it’s that simple; it’s that obvious.

    Considerations for changing fire flow rates, the sizing of hose line and the adequacies for fire flow demand and application rates, staffing needs for safe operations, considerations for defensive positioning and defensive operating postures must be considered, and it warrants repeating again; Reckless-Aggressive firefighting must be redefined in the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments- with determined, effective and proactive firefighting

    • Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement
      • Predictive Strategic Process
      • Tactical Deployment Model
      • Dynamic Tactical Deployment
      • Performance Indicators and Street Aides
        • Fire Dynamics
        • Resistance
        • Resilience
        • Structural Systems
        • Occupancy Hazard Profiles

    The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics must not only be questioned, they need to be adjusted and modified; risk assessment, risk-benefit analysis, safety and survivability profiling, operational value and firefighter injury and LODD reduction must be further institutionalized to become a recognized part of modern firefighting operations.

    Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments.

    Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional or legacy construction and occupancies;

    • Risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement.
    • You need to gain the knowledge and insights and to change and adjust your operating profile in order to safe guard your companies, personnel and team compositions.
    • Again strategic firefighting operations; Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type.

    The following are quotes from Fire Chief Anthony Aiellos (ret) Hackensack (NJ) Fire Department, Fire Chief during the Hackensack Ford Fire, July, 1988…

    “If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner. This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes”.

    As a Company or Command Officer, how have your skill sets as well as your attitudes towards combat fire suppression operations have changed. Are you still thinking in terms of “old school” tactics and operations? (Think carefully before you answer….because there’s more to this reply than you think). I’ve asked this question before: “What do you truly know about building construction, fire dynamics and risk profiling?” Have you spent the time to become knowledgeable on rapid changes that have evolved within the building construction industry? Have you taken a good look around your district? If you haven’t, maybe It’s time…remember you have a company or a contingent of companies that are counting on you to make the right call at that next structural fire incident.

    Posted by on April 9, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, christopher naum, company officer, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, KSA, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Criminal negligence on the part of commanders?

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    img_5620South Carolina’s SLED is planning to review records for signs of negligence in the case of the June 18, 2007 Sofa Super Store fire in Charleston, SC. A team of State Law Enforcement Division agents is reviewing records from the Sofa Super Store blaze for signs of criminal negligence on the part of commanders who oversaw the attack on the inferno in which nine firemen died, authorities said.

    Ninth Circuit Solicitor Scarlett Wilson requested the review after meeting with relatives of two firefighters who died in the June 18, 2007, inferno. Family members of captains Louis Mulkey and William Hutchinson gave Wilson eight binders of materials they say prove that commanders exposed fire crews to unnecessary and deadly risks with insufficient training and leadership. Randy Hutchinson said his group has found people with crucial accounts of the fire who were never interviewed by police. From what they can tell, police seem to have focused on the cause and origin of the fire while ignoring questions raised about the commanders’ actions, he said.

    The city’s own experts concluded the Fire Department’s command system was virtually nonexistent at the blaze, leaving firefighters without supervision or clear instructions and leaving commanders with no idea of who was where and what they were doing. No one was monitoring who was in the building, how long they were inside or how much air they had left in their tanks. Key tasks were left undone and standby rescue teams were never established in the rush to funnel as many people inside as possible, according to the consultants’ report.

    For a complete reporting of the leading events go to the Post and Courier article HERE

    Posted by on March 15, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, command, command-leadership, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, LODD, major-incidents, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Seeing Clearly: Cleaning your “Glasses”

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    1110817724023_2Commanders and Company Offices need to gain new insights and knowledge related to the modern building occupancy and to modify and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type and must have the combined adequacy of sufficient staffing, fire flow and nozzle appliances orchestrated in a manner that identifies with the fire profiling, predictability of the occupancy profile and accounts for presumed fire behavior. Today’s engine company operations and fire suppression theory has to progress beyond the pragmatic approaches to fire suppression such as “Big Fire-Big Water principle.

    When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future. Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis. We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system; in addition to having an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions.

    Executing tactical plans based upon faulted or inaccurate strategic insights and indicators has proven to be a common apparent cause in numerous case studies, after action reports and LODD reports. Our years of predictable fireground experience have at times clouded our ability to predict, assess, plan and implement incident action plans and ultimately deploy our companies-based upon the predictable performance expected of modern construction and especially those with engineered structural systems.

    Today’s incident scene and structural fires are unlike those in past decades and will continue to challenge us operationally when confronted with structural fire engagement and combat operations. Operationally, we need to be doing the right thing, for the right reason in the right place to increase our safety and incident survivability.

    The built-environments that form and shape our response districts and communities pose unique challenges to the day-to-day responses of fire departments and their subsequent operations during combat structural fire engagement. With the variety of occupancies and building characteristics present, there are definable degrees of risk potential with recognizable strategic and tactical measures that must be taken.

    Although each occupancy type presents variables that dictate how a particular incident is handled, most company operations evolve from basic strategic and tactical principles rooted in past performance and operations at similar structures. This basis is based upon Predictability of Performance.

    • Modern building construction is no longer predicable, But has defining predictability when taken in the context of structural compromise, integrity and inherent collapse
    • Command & company officer technical knowledge may be diminished or deficient in the areas of building construction, fire dynamics and developing fire suppression therory for extreme fire behavior
    • Technological Advancements in construction and materials have exceeded conventional fire suppression practices and mehtodologies
    • Some fire suppression tactics are faulted or inappropriate, requiring innovative models and methods.
    • Fire Dynamics and Fire Behavior is not considered during fireground size-up and assessment
    • Risk Management is either not practiced or willfully ignored during most incident operations
    • Some departments or officers show and indifference to safety and risk management
    • Command & Company Officer dereliction
    • Nothing is going to happen to me (us)

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    Posted by on March 5, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, company officer, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, Risk Management, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , ,