Box 661 Private Dwelling All Hands Fire
Sunday, January 23, 2011 9:06 hrs FDNY Rescue 2 responded to 628 Lafayette Ave. for a fire on the 2nd floor of a 3 story private dwelling.
Archives for fire-suppression
Take the time to read both NIOSH reports and remember the sacrafice…
Three veteran FDNY firefighters died in the LODD in Brooklyn, New York and the Bronx on Sunday January 23, 2005, a day that has become known as “Black Sunday” and called one of the saddest in fire department history. Two firefighters were killed and four others were badly hurt when they were forced to jump from a fourth-floor window of a burning building in the Bronx.
Later, a third firefighter died after tackling a basement blaze in Brooklyn.Lt. Curtis Meyran, 46, of Battalion 26, and Firefighter John Bellew, 37, of Ladder 27, died after battling the Bronx blaze on East 178th Street in the Morris Heights section.
Three firefighters were in critical condition at St. Barnabas, and a fourth was in serious condition at Jacobi Medical Center. Six Bronx firefighters became trapped in the building while searching for people on the fourth floor. When the fire from the third floor broke through to the fourth, they were faced with a horrifying choice. They jumped out a fourth-floor window, knowing that they would be critically injured.
Firefighters Jeffrey Cool, Joseph DiBernardo, Eugene Stolowski, and Cawley were badly hurt in the Bronx fire. They were trapped on the fourth floor and were left with the life-or-death choice of leaping 50 feet or burning up. The Brooklyn firefighter, Richard Sclafani, 37, died at a hospital after being injured at a two-alarm fire in the East New York section.
- More Details at Buildingsonfire.com HERE
- NIOSH Bronx Report, HERE
- NIOSH Brooklyn Report, HERE
- Transcript : Firefighter_Transcripts_BlackSunday
Radio@Firehouse.com
Podcasts and Internet Broadcasts for Fire and Emergency Service Professionals: Real Issues. Real Answers. Real Firefighters.
Training & Tactics Talk Hosted by Chief Doug Cline
Training & Tactics Talk: Emerging Dynamics in the Modern Fire Environment
Joining Training and Tactics Talk host Douglas Cline as he talks with his guests from across the United States about the emerging dynamics of the modern fire service environment.
Guests this month include retired Battalion Chief Dave Dodson from Denver, CO; Lt. Rick Mosher from Merriam, KS; Christopher Naum, Chief of Training of the Command Institute; and Assistant Chief Deron Wilson of Johns Creek, GA.
The group examines several dimensions of the modern fire service as it relates to tomorrow’s fire service. The explore the art of reading smoke, the new rules of tactical combat fire engagement, multi-dimensional aspects of training and how to develop the true understanding of situational awareness.
We invite you to grab a cup of coffee or a cold drink, pull up a chair or take a seat on the tailboard and enjoy the program. Sit back, relax and let’s talk Training and Tactics.
- Link to the Program HERE
Reference Links:
Double Firefighter LODD Residential House Fire 2002
Lawsuit revived against fire departments in firefighter’s death in 2002 house fire
A New York State appeals court has reinstated a lawsuit against the Manlius (NY) and Pompey Hill (NY) fire departments in the death of a volunteer firefighter battling a Pompey house fire in 2002.
The state Supreme Court Appellate Division in Rochester – in a 4-1 split decision – concluded the law granting personal immunity to volunteer firefighters does not apply to the fire departments themselves or to department officials.
The lawsuit stems from the death of Fayetteville (NY) Firefighter Timothy Lynch in a fire March 7, 2002, at a home on Sweet Road in Pompey. Manlius (NY) Firefighter John Ginocchetti also died in that blaze.
Lynch’s widow, Donna Prince Lynch, sued Onondaga County, New York and then county Fire Coordinator Mike Waters in 2003. The county responded to that lawsuit by suing the Pompey Hill Fire District, the Pompey Hill Fire Department, Assistant Chiefs Richard Abbott and Mark Kovalewski, the village of Manlius, the Manlius Fire Department, Deputy Chief Raymond Dill and homeowner Joseph Messina.
State Supreme Court Justice Donald Greenwood dismissed the claims against the fire departments and the chiefs in 2009 based on the immunity argument.
But the Rochester appellate court ruled last week that Greenwood erred. The majority concluded the section of state General Municipal Law granting immunity to volunteer firefighters in the performance of their duty did not apply to the fire departments or the department officials.
The plain language of the statute reflects the Legislature’s purpose in enacting that law was “first, to immunize volunteer firefighters from civil liability for ordinary negligence and, second, to shift liability for such negligence to the fire districts that employ them,” the majority wrote.
The court rejected the fire departments’ contention – and Greenwood’s earlier decision – that the law only allows fire departments to be held liable for volunteer firefighters’ negligent operation of motor vehicles. The court concluded the Legislature – in enacting the statute in 1934 – meant to expand, not restrict, the liability of fire districts.
“In other words, the Legislature sought to assure that there would be some liability on the part of the fire districts where previously there had been some doubt,” the majority wrote.
Justice Eugene Fahey, in a lone dissent, agreed with Greenwood that the immunity law applied to the departments and their officials as well as the volunteer firefighters. He concluded the fact the Legislature carved out a motor vehicle exception indicated the lawmakers’ intent was to grant immunity to the fire districts in the first place.
This is the second time Greenwood’s rulings in the case have been modified or overturned on appeal.
In 2007, Greenwood dismissed outright the Lynch lawsuit. But in February 2008, the appellate division reinstated the part that charged a violation of General Municipal Law and accused Waters of failing to comply with the state’s emergency command and control system.
The appellate court concluded then that there was an issue for trial as to whether Waters had a supervisory role at the fire scene.
The county responded to that ruling by suing the fire departments and their officials. The county contends that if there was any negligence on Waters’ part, it was less than that of the fire departments and their officials and those defendants should pay any damages.
Because there was no appeal of Greenwood’s separate decision dropping the case against Dill, he remains out of the lawsuit under the appellate court ruling.
- NIOSH LODD REPORT HERE
- A must read from Firerescue1.com from 2008 with original lawsuit details: N.Y. chiefs, departments, homeowner ‘negligent’ in 2002 LODDs HERE
- http://www.in.gov/dhs/files/NIMS_Directives_and_Liability.pdf
- http://www.firefighterclosecalls.com/fullstory.php?65297
- http://www.volunteerfd.org/article/400128/ (about the Fire)
- http://www.firehouse.com/forums/archive/index.php/t-39506.html (Firehouse.com Forum)
NIOSH REPORT SUMMARY
First-Floor Collapse During Residential Basement Fire Claims the Life of Two Fire Fighters (Career and Volunteer) and Injures a Career Fire Fighter Captain – New York
SUMMARY
On March 7, 2002, a 28-year-old male volunteer fire fighter (Victim #1) and a 41-year-old male career fire fighter (Victim #2) died after becoming trapped in the basement. Victim #1 manned the nozzle while Victim #2 provided backup on the handline as they entered the house. After entering the structure, the floor collapsed, trapping both victims in the basement. A career fire fighter captain joining the fire fighters near the time of the collapse was injured trying to rescue one of the fire fighters. Crew members responded immediately and attempted to rescue the victims; however, the heat and flames overcame both victims and eliminated any rescue efforts from the garage entrance. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should
- ensure that the Incident Commander is clearly identified as the only individual responsible for the overall coordination and direction of all activities at an inciden
- ensure that the Incident Commander conveys strategic decisions to all suppression crews on the fireground and continually reevaluates the fire condition
- ensure that Incident Command conducts an initial size-up of the incident before initiating fire fighting efforts and continually evaluates the risk versus gain during operations at an incident
- ensure that fire fighters from the ventilation crew and the attack crew coordinate their efforts
- ensure that fire fighters report conditions and hazards encountered to their team leader or Incident Commander
- ensure fire fighters are trained to recognize the danger of operating above a fire
A report from the New York State Department Of Labor details several problems that happened the night of a fire that claimed the lives of firefighters John Ginochetti and Timothy Lynch. The Pompey Hill Fire Department was issued three citations for problems with training, equipment, and communication.
Included in the report was a detailed listing of the events that happened on the night of March 7, 2002.
7:10 p.m.: 911 receives call about a fire in the basement of a home at 2841 Sweet Road, Pompey Hill.
7:20 p.m.: Manlius Fire Department responds to the fire.
7:28 p.m.: The assistant fire chief on scene reports that smoke is showing in the first floor of the building and that the fire is in the basement.
7:30 p.m.: Firefighters enter the building through the basement and garage.
7:37 p.m.: Fire has burned for 25 minutes.
7:45 p.m.: Gino Ginochetti and TJ Lynch start to ventilate the roof. The assistant fire chief says, “Hang tight, the fire is pretty well knocked down.”
7:47 p.m.: Command refuses 700 gallons of water offered.
7:51 p.m.: Onondaga County Fire Coordinator Mike Waters arrives on scene. Waters broke out the windows on the east side of the building.
7:53 p.m.: A team enters the basement, then discovers that there is no water pressure in their water hoses. The pump operator discovers that the valve system has failed and water will not flow.
7:58 p.m.: Fire has been burning for 48 minutes with no water being directed on it.
7:59 p.m.: Waters orders three firefighters, including Ginochetti and Lynch into the building through the garage and onto the first floor. At this time, both Ginochetti and Lynch fall through the floor and into the basement. The third firefighter, Brian Stevens, tried to pull Ginochetti from the basement. He then had to back away from the fire, which had flashed over. Stevens received burns to the face. Mike Waters entered the building to try and rescue the men, but had to be pulled out when the entire garage went up in flames. Crews outside started to direct water into the area of the collapse.
The report also notes that there were several violations with:
-respiratory protection standards
-number of training hours for the Incident Commander
The direct cause of deaths for Ginochetti and Lynch was found to be a combination of a ten foot fall into the basement and the smoke and heat exposure to both men.
Indirect causes included:
-Command at the fire scene did not maintain communication with attack teams assigned to do interior attack. The team assigned to the back of the building did not maintain communication.
-Command refused the 700 gallons of water offered, and instead said that the fire was under control.
-Communication problems between the teams meant that one group didn’t know whether or not the other had entered the building.
-Command gave orders without knowledge of the fire or the building, although the home owner was on scene to provide the information.
-Pompey Hill Fire Department procedures were deficient, including backup and rescue teams.
Remembering Brackenridge, Pennsylvania December 20, 1991: Four Firefighters Killed, Trapped by Floor Collapse
Four volunteer firefighters died when they were trapped by a partial floor collapse during a structure fire in Brackenridge, Pennsylvania, on the morning of December 20, 1991. All four were members of a mutual aid truck company that had responded to the early morning incident and were assigned to prevent fire extension from the basement to the ground floor of a 2-story building.
Although they were wearing full protective clothing and using self-contained breathing apparatus, it appears that they were overwhelmed by the severe fire conditions that erupted when a section of the ground floor collapsed into the basement.
The collapse cut off their primary escape path, and the fire burned through their hose line, leaving them without protection from the flames.
- For more on the incident and links to a series of incident reports, link here to Commandsafety.com
- Current issues related to recent trends in floor collapse incidents, HERE
Take a moment to look back at an incident: On December 18, 1998, Three FDNY Firefighters died in-the line of duty while conducting suppression and rescue operations at fire on the tenth floor of 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. At 0454 hours Brooklyn transmitted box 4080 for a top floor fire at 17 Vandalia Avenue in the Starrett City development complex. The sprawling complex is located on Brooklyn’s south shore in the Spring Creek section. The 10 story 50 x 200 fireproof building is used as a senior citizen’s residence. Engine 257 and ladder 170, both quartered in Canarsie, were assigned 1st due and arrived within 4 minutes. By that time the fire already could be seen blowing through two windows. Second and 3rd alarms were quickly transmitted.
As the 1st due Ladder Company, L170′s duty is to search the fire floor. Lieutenant Joseph Cavalieri, and fire fighters Christopher Bopp and James Bohan ascended 10 flights of stairs with extinguishers and forcible entry tools. Their mission was to rescue the resident of apartment 10-D who was believed trapped inside.
NIOSH INVESIGATIVE REPORT SUMMARY (F99-01) On December 18, 1998, several fire companies and fire fighters responded at 0454 hours to a reported fire on the tenth floor of a 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. The fire had been burning for 20 to 30 minutes before it was called in because the resident attempted to put the fire out with small pans of water. As the fire fighters approached the building from the rear, an orange glow was observed in the window of Apartment 10D. As the fire fighters were arriving in front of the high-rise, a call was received from Central Dispatch that a female resident in the apartment next door to the fire apartment was trapped in her apartment and needed help. Several fire fighters entered the lobby area, and some took the stairs to the ninth floor, while others took the elevator to the ninth floor. A Lieutenant and two fire fighters on Ladder 170 (the victims), along with the Lieutenant on Engine 290, took the B-stairs from the ninth floor to the tenth floor, and entered the hallway, in search of the fire, while 4 fire fighters on Engine 290 were flaking out the hose line on the ninth floor and in the stairwell between the ninth and tenth floor in preparation for hookup.
During this same time period, other fire fighters had gone to the tenth floor A-stairwell landing to attempt a hose line hookup to the standpipe in the landing. Engine Company 257 fire fighters, who were attempting to make a hook-up on the fire floor landing, experienced trouble with the heat, heavy smoke, and heavy insulation on the standpipe and were forced to abandon this hook-up. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 and the victims, who were on the B-side, were approaching the center smoke doors (see diagram), when the Lieutenant radioed his driver on the outside, and asked, “Where is the fire?”
The driver radioed back, the fire is in the rear, towards exposure 4. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 then left the tenth floor, descended the stairs to the ninth floor and helped his men drag the hose to the A-stairwell, where they met up with fire fighters on Engine 257, who assisted them in stretching their line and hook-up on the ninth floor. The victims proceeded through the center smoke doors in search of the fire. From the information obtained during this investigation, it is believed the victims found the fire apartment, with the door partially opened, allowing smoke and hot gases to enter the hallway. They then opened the door fully, the wind pushed the fire and extreme heat in the apartment into the hallway, and a flashover occurred, exposing the victims to extreme radiant heat that potentially elevated their body core temperature.
The last radio transmission from the victims was a Mayday call. When the victims were found, all were unresponsive, they were treated at the scene and taken to the hospital where they were pronounced dead by the attending physician.
This wind-driven fire event and the lessons-learned contributed directly to the current body of research and new insights on emerging strategies and tactics. The NIOSH Investigative Report HERE. NIST References on Wind Driven Fire Research HERE . FDNewYork.com HERE. New York Times Archived Articles, HERE and HERE. Photos and legacy, HERE
Take the time to remember FDNY Lt. Joseph Cavaleiri, FF Christopher Bopp and Firefighter James Bohan from Ladder 170
As the First-Due Fire Company; Officer and crew, Are you prepared to address the fireground variables and occupancy risks upon your arrival and during the initial stages of your deployment and operations? Are you combat ready or passively engaged?
It seems we’ve struck some interests over past week since we first discussed the First-Due Fire Officer on the most recent edition of Taking it to the StreetsTM where we had a vibrant and insightful program in which we discussion some of the expansive facets related to the First-Due Fire Officer.
The First-Due Fire Office program can be downloaded HERE at Firefighter Netcast.com
The formulative discussion revolved around a variety of functional elements, traits, responsibilities and duties befalling the First-Due Officer, and was followed up with a post here on Thecompanyoffer.com. We discussed how today’s First-Due Officer must perform smarter with increased perceptions, discernments and acumens with intelligence and wisdom that is drawn from further progressing and collective fire ground response and operational experiences.
My good friend Captain Willie Wines (aka The Iron Fireman) posted a great follow-up article associated with the radio program on his blog associated with further interpretations of the First-Due Officer. Check out “The First-Due Officer; What are you thinking?” HERE.
To further our dialog on the first-due, I’ve added a few series of video clips and images with related links to promote and stimulate your view of the first-due fireground scene as it relates to the variables and personnel perceptions; the need for diligence and cognitive situational awareness and risk assessment and being truly “prepared” both mentally and physically. By way of physically, I mean- is your gear and PPE, functional, operational and adequately in-place?
As you can see there are numerous instances where the difference in the incident outcome correlated to the level of PPE protection that was in-place and implemented at the time of adverse conditions or unexpected or unforeseen circumstances.
Here’s today’s situations to think about at the station, around the kitchen table, over a cup of coffee in the day room after your next alarm or tonight at the station for a “back step” company drill.
- What are the Adverse Conditions that might be encounted upon arrival as the First-Due?
- Flashover, Backdraft, Compromised or degraded Structural Conditions, Collapsed Conditions, Structural Collapse, Wind Drive Fire Behavior, Extreme Fire Behavior, Pre-Flashover/ Post-Flashover….
- How Effective are you in Reading the Smoke?
- How About Reading the Building? Do you understand Occupancy Profiling and Occupancy Risk?
- Are you Taking the Time to Read the Subtle or Pronounced Fireground Indicators.; Comprehend their meaning or are you just “too engaged in the tactic or task?”
- Do you have an appreciation for Tactical Patience?
- Are your operations Tactically Driven by SOP’s and SOGs?
- What Rules of Engagment are you considering?
- Have and IAP in mind?
There have been a lot of articles and postings on adverse conditions as companies are opening up or pushing into the structure on the initial entry. Take a look at the next two series of video clips related to flashover conditions and the impact of that fire behavior on the companies and personnel. In each instance companies were extremely fortunate that the injuries sustained were not more severe than encountered.
- What encounters have you or your company experienced?
- In retrospect how effective was the initial risk assessment and occupancy profile-was the size-up appropriate or were key indicators missed or neglected?
- Did the fast pace of the initial arrival and subsequent deployment filter or obscure mission critical indicators that should have been identified and acted upon?
- Did the tactical assignment and task overshadow tactical patience?
- Did someone or everyone miss reading the smoke, fire or occupancy risk?
- Did other tactical assignments contribute toward the unexpected or adverse conditions encountered, such as ventilation induced flashover? ( More on that topic for a later post; See Taking it the Streets November 4, 2010 show
Firefighter Will Gregory exits the home with his PPE on fire. Photo by Brian Haney, The Daily Record.
There are a series of photos from a previous posting at STATter911 HERE that depicts firefighers working to push-in on a fire in a small residential occupancy. The ensuing flashover ignites the PPE of one firefighter. Look at the series of photographs and take note of the fire and smoke conditions, the size and profile of the occupancy ( remember it’s Occupancy RISK not Occupancy Type).
- Think about the sequencing of your initial operations.
- Think about the mission critical 360;
- how does that play into your initial incident actions plan (IAP)?
- The Dynamics of the Fireground in Seconds
Companies were dispatched for an assignment for a house fire. Both E807 and TK807 responded with crews of 4 personnel each. E813 arrived on the scene and reported light smoke showing on side Alpha. Upon arrival on the scene, the crew from TK807 (four staff) made entry to the house. The following series of events led to conditions in the house that presented a flashover environment. The hose line from E813 burst, a backup line was not charged due to no established water supply, and the house was not yet ventilated. Without the protection of a hose line, the crew was committed to the house when the room flashed. One firefighter was apparently far enough in the house to avoid any injury, A second FF received 2nd degree burns to his right shoulder, and a third FF received the full force of the flashover suffering second-third degree burns to his face, hands, and the majority of his torso. (Original incident information posted at the time of the event)
- Photo 1: Firefighters don PPE and SCBA with light smoke visible in this first of four pictures shot by Tony George of PGFD Station 813
- Photo 2: Six seconds later a small amount of fire and darker smoke can be seen at the sliding glass door.
- Photo3: Forty-eight seconds after the initial picture, more fire and darker smoke are apparent.
- Photo 4: Exactly two-minutes after the first picture was shot, flashover occurs with firefighters inside.
For a complete narrative and futher incident details of this previous STATter911 postings related to this event go HERE, and HERE
Take a good look at the performance of PPE when utilized and implemented correctly….
Don’t ever underestimate the dynamics and uncertainty of the evolving fireground during your operations. The video clip here depicts how quickly operations can change from an investigation to a major mass casualty incident.
For a comprehensive look at this event go here are two links for you to visit, HERE at Commandsafety.com and the NIOSH Report HERE
Be prepared for the unexpected and always use extreme caution and heightened situational awareness and fluid risk assessment and reconnaissance processing to stay atop of any undefined and evolving incident. Do not allow the potential lack of severity; of what may have all the indications of an unremarkable/uneventful and common call run such as a gas odor investigation or a natural gas leak cause your companies to have less than a high level of alert, focus and attentive accretions through all phases and deployments of the incident. Don’t become complacent.
In addition, take a look at some information relate to another tragic incident response to a reported gas leak that occurred in December, 1983 that lead to five fire fighter LODD’s in Buffalo, New York. HERE
Here’s a series of Reports worth your time to read related to the First-Due:
Program Instructors Doug Cline and Christopher Naum
Tactical Renaissance and the New Rules of Combat Fire Engagement Seminar
Saturday November 13, 2010
8:00am – 4:00pm
Sponsored by Haywood Community College and Waynesville (NC) Fire Department
Located in Waynesville /Haywood County, North Carolina
Seminar Topics
- Building Construction & Engineered Systems
- Going Beyond the Status Quo
- Extreme Fire Behavior
- The Company & Command Officer in 2010 & Beyond
- Training Today’s Fire Service for Tomorrow’s Challenges
- The New Rules of Engagement
- Redefining Tactical Operations
- Tactical Entertainment & Firefighter Safety
- Tactical Patience & Operational Excellence
- Command Risk Management
- And more
Contact Dee Massey for Registration 828-565-4247
- Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum
On Your Street, In Your City, Across the County, Around the World; Tune in this coming Wednesday night to FireFighter NetCast.com and Taking it to the Streets for; “Tactical Renaissance and the Rules of Engagement”.
Joining Christopher Naum will be Chief Gary Morris (ret) Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department, Deputy Chief John Sullivan, Worcester (MA) Fire Department, along with Dr. Burt Clark from the NFA. We will be discussing the emerging Tactical Renaissance of Combat Fire Suppression Operations and the new Rules of Engagement. Don’t miss out for what will certainly be an insightful look at what the fire ground is transitioning to in 2010 and beyond. Join the live broadcast on Wednesday night September 22nd at 9:00pm ET, or download the post production podcast from Firefighter NetCast.com.
In the weeks ahead we’ll be publishing a six month schedule of upcoming guests and topics along within integrating post production podcast resources, training aides and supplemental reference links to make both the live broadcast program and downloads value added.
Taking it to the Streets is hosted by Christopher Naum and is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Fire Fighter NetCast.com Production.
- Check out the IAFC Safety Health & Survival Section HERE and the newly published Rules of Engagement
- For additional Taking it to the Streets programming, HERE
- Firefighter NetCast.com HERE
- Taking it to the Streets for; “Tactical Renaissance and the Rules of Engagement” Show Link, HERE
Taking it to the StreetsTM On Your Street, In Your City, Across the County, Around the WorldTM ©2010
The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) is committed to reducing firefighter fatalities and injuries. As part of that effort the Safety, Health and Survival Section has developed “Rules of Engagement of Structural Firefighting” to provide guidance to individual firefighters, and incident commanders, regarding risk and safety issues when operating on the fireground. These rules are available in a poster which can be downloaded or ordered from http://fireservicebooks.com
- Taking it to the Streets hosted by Christopher Naum
Last month on Firefighter NetCast.com ,Taking it to the Streets presented an exceptional show related to the emerging issues affecting fire ground operations and the emerging and prevailing issues related to situational awareness on the fireground and incident scene and its relationship to firefighter safety or operational integrity. The show was titled; “We Have a Situation; Are you Aware?” Joining host Christopher Naum, his guests included Battalion Chief Matt Tobia with the Anne Arundel County, MD Fire Department, a metropolitan combination Fire/Rescue/EMS agency in Suburban Baltimore, MD and Battalion Chief Greg W. Collier, Mount Laurel Fire Department, NJ and NFFF/EGH New Jersey State Advocate.
Together they discussed relevant issues affecting today’s fire service, in the streets ensuring operational excellence, personnel safety and promoting effective and efficient incident management and mitigation.
If you missed the live online radio call-in show, you can download all the previous shows to your device and listen to them where ever you are. You can download the programs at Fire Fighter Netcast.com.
- Download the August 19th, 2010 program on Situational Awareness,HERE
Check out Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum this month on Wednesday night September 22nd at 9pm ET with another live online radio call-in show addressing the most current issues affecting the Fire Service. Taking it to the Streets has in the few short months of production and tranmissions, has become one of the the most talked about, on-line radio programs; listened to live on-the air and download fire service podcast programs. If your hearing some of the buzz and that humm; then its time to tune into to FireFighter Netcast.com and Taking it to the Streets to hear first hand and have a Rockin Hot Time…
Join the growing list of live listeners and become a regular follower with this ground breaking and newest radio show on FireFighter Netcast.com at Blogtalk Radio… Stay tuned on TheCompanyOffice.com, CommandSafety.com, Fire Fighter Netcast.com and launching this quater, Buildingsonfire.com for a comprehensive list of future shows, topics and guests.
Taking it to the Streets With Christopher Naum
A New Monthly Radio Talk show on Fire Fighter Netcast.com
A Buildingsonfire.com Series and Fire Fighter Netcast.com Production
Advancing Fire Fighter Safety and Operational Integrity for the Fire Service through provocative insights and dynamic discussions dedicated to the Art and Science of Firefighting and the Traditions of the Fire Service. Check out more information of Taking it to the Streets, HERE
“On your Street, In your City, Across the Country, Around the World”, Taking it to the Streets
The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) recently held its annual Fire Rescue International (FRI) Conference in the great City of Chicago. A stellar addition to extensive pre-conference and workshop presentations was the IAF’s comprehensive Flagship programs entitled; The Company Officer Leadership Symposium (COLS) and the newest addition, The Chief Officer Leadership Symposium.New to 2010, The Chief Officer Leadership Symposium consisted of three days of education geared toward those newly promoted to battalion chief. Similar to the Company Officer Leadership Symposium (COLS), this program was built around and into a three-level course for those in various stages of their career. This year at FRI, the IAFC introduced level one for recent graduates of The Company Officer Leadership Symposium (COLS) program and those looking for education specifically geared toward battalion chiefs.
The three-day Company Officer Leadership Symposium (COLS) provided the perfect mix of what company officers are looking for and what chief’s want for their company officers. The program offerings at FRI 2010 provided in-depth leadership education like for newly promoted company officers and those transitioning to battalion chief. Take a look at the program offerings at FRI for both programs HERE and HERE.
Some Key Reasons that drew participates to these programs included:
- Great takeaways: All Company Officer participants received their own copy of the IAFC Officer Development Handbook
- Unparalleled networking: build relationships as company officers and other battalion chiefs and commander that will benefit participants throughout their career and as they move up the ranks.
- Returning company officers could build on their education and skills. Additionally, graduating from this program demonstrates exceptional professional growth for promotional assessments.
- Participation in these symposiums is a professional development and mentoring opportunity that will benefit company officers, chiefs and the whole department.
- No other program offers such comprehensive classes taught by industry leaders
- New responsibilities come with this new title. Learn from those who have successfully made the transition to company officers and battalion chiefs and how to do effectively.
- Strategic thinking. These sessions were designed to meet the needs of incident commanders out on the fireground while dealing with interpersonal dynamics in the station.
- Learn from the best. According to the IAFC, no other program offers such comprehensive classes taught by prominent national fire service leaders.
TheCompanyOfficer.com and CommandSafety.com’s Christopher Naum, provided a key note general session delivery at the end of day one of the three day symposium and presented a powerful and insightful look at the Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement 2010. Presented to a joint session of students from The Company Officer Leadership Symposium (COLS), the Chief Officer Leadership Symposium and participants of the iWomen’s 2010 Leadership Conference, the multi-media lecture was presented to a standing room only crowd of over 325 participants. The Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement 2010 examined common attributes and emerging insights related to buildings, structures and occupancies that comprise typical response districts and the unique challenges during structural fire attack that require new insights and skill sets for company and command officers and fire service personnel.
Christopher Naum's Joint Session Presentation at IAFC FRI
The program examined and advocated strong principled new views of various buildings and occupancies, providing examples that define and determine how firefighters access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm. Naum introduced defining new concepts related to Tactical Patience, Command Compression, Tactical Entertainment and aligned the Anatomy of Buildings on Fire, Building Construction and Reading Building Profiles and Occupancy Risk while stressing the importance of the emerging Tactical Renaissance and continued emphasis on the Everyone Goes Home Program and 16 Fire Fighter Life Safety Initiatives. The Predictability of Building Performance and the emphasis on dynamic command risk assessment aligned with defined fire suppression operations filled the two hour session.
If you are an emerging, newly appointed or practicing company or command officer, the IAFC ‘s Company Officer Leadership Symposium (COLS) and the newest addition, The Chief Officer Leadership Symposium should be on your radar screen for attendance at IAFC FRI 2011 in Atlanta, Georgia. Keep track of 2011 FRI announcements on the IAFC web page, HERE.
Houston (Texas) firefighters followed the “textbook approach” in fighting a blaze at a high-rise building on the 27th floor Monday night August 30, 2010 when a 4th Alarm was transmitted for operations at a high rise building fire, deploying nearly 175 firefighting personnel. Seven firefighters were injured with non life-threatening. A broken pipe hampered firefighting operations leaving companies without a water source for a half-hour before they could resume structural fire fighting operations.
The fire was located at the JPMorgan Chase building (formerly the Gulf Building) at 712 Main Street, a 36-story structure, which dates to 1929 and was once the tallest in Houston. Reports indicate the building was being retrofitted with a sprinkler system that had yet to reach the upper floors. Go here for a link to the building profile.
A Mayday call was transmitted due to a firefighter who became separated in a dark and smoky stairwell but was promptly located.
Additional links; HERE, HERE and HERE
For those of you operating in response districts with low and high rise structures, how effective are your companies and are they adequately trained to address a multiple alarm fire on an upper floor?
Notable References;
- Highrise Office Building Fire, One Meridian Plaza, HERE
- High-rise Office Building Fire One Meridian Plaza Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 1991, HERE
- LAFD, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY – FIRST INTERSTATE BANK BUILDING FIRE, Here
- USFA Report TR-022 LAFD Interstate Bank Building Fire, HERE
- Cook County, Illinois Administration Building Fire, 2003,NIST Report HERE
- FDNY, New York City Deutsche NIOSH LODD Report outlines high-rise fire recommendations, HERE
- High Rise Apartment Fire LODD, Texas, 2001, HERE
- FDNY OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF HIGH-RISE FIREFIGHTING, HERE
- An Examination of FDNY High Rise Operations and SOP as part of a Risk Management Plant for Operational HERE
The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) United States Fire Administration (USFA) issued a special report examining the characteristics of fires in vacant residential buildings. The report, Vacant Residential Building Fires, was developed by USFA’s National Fire Data Center and is further evidence of FEMA’s commitment to sharing information with fire departments and first responders around the country to help them keep their communities safe.
The report is part of the Topical Fire Report Series and is based on 2006 to 2008 data from the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS). According to the report, an estimated 28,000 vacant residential building fires occur annually in the United States, resulting in an estimated average of 45 deaths, 225 injuries, and $900 million in property loss. Vacant residential fires are considered part of the residential fire problem as they comprise approximately 7 percent of residential building fires. In addition, intentional is the leading cause of vacant residential building fires which are more prevalent in July (9 percent), due in part to an increase in intentional fires on July 4 and 5. Finally, almost all vacant residential building fires are non-confined and half spread to involve the entire building.
The topical reports are designed to explore facets of the U.S. fire problem as depicted through data collected in NFIRS. Each topical report briefly addresses the nature of the specific fire or fire-related topic, highlights important findings from the data, and may suggest other resources to consider for further information. Also included are recent examples of fire incidents that demonstrate some of the issues addressed in the report or that put the report topic in context.
The report, Vacant Residential Building Fires,HERE
Findings
■ An estimated 28,000 vacant residential building fires are reported to U.S. fire departments each year and cause an estimated 45 deaths, 225 injuries, and $900 million in property loss.
■ Vacant residential building fires are considered part of the residential fire problem and comprise approximately 7 percent of all residential building fires.
■ Almost all vacant residential building fires are non-confined fires (over 99 percent).
■ Intentional is the leading cause of vacant residential building fires (37 percent).
■ Half of vacant residential building fires spread to involve the entire building. An additional 11 percent extend beyond the building to adjacent properties.
■ Bedrooms are the primary origin of all vacant residential building fires (12 percent). Following closely are common rooms such as dens, family and living rooms (10 percent), and cooking areas, kitchens (9 percent).
■ Vacant residential building fires are more prevalent in July (9 percent), due in part to an increase in intentional fires on July 4 and 5.
■ January 1, July 4 and 5, and October 31 have the highest incidence of vacant residential fires.
From 2006 to 2008, an estimated 28,000 vacant residential building fires were reported annually in the United States. The number of vacant residential buildings has always been seen as an issue in our society. These buildings are rarely maintained and often serve as a common site for illicit or illegal activity. In addition, vacant residential buildings are sometimes used by homeless people as temporary shelters or housing. A major concern when a vacant building catches fire is that little is known about the building’s overall condition.
Many buildings are in disrepair and can be missing certain structures, such as staircases or portions of floors. If individuals are known to use the vacant building as a residence, the unknown condition of the building and the unknown number of people using the building as shelter can put the firefighters’ lives in danger when they enter the building to attempt a rescue during a fire. The surrounding non-vacant properties are also at risk when vacant residential buildings catch fire.
It typically takes longer for vacant residential building fires to be detected as there are no occupants to be alerted by the smell or sound of the fires or respond to an alarm and the property loss is greater. In addition, if the fire has been intentionally set, especially with multiple ignition points, the damage can be greater, placing the lives of more individuals’ firefighters, adjacent residents, and any squatters in danger.
Fires in vacant residential buildings have become an even greater issue in the past few years. Many communities have seen an increase in the number of vacant residential buildings as the economy has declined; and with that an increase in the number of vacant residential building fires. From 2006 to 2008, intentionally set fires was the main cause of all vacant residential building fires (37 percent, as discussed later in this report), posing a serious issue for the community.
These types of fires continue to be a problem and concern within our society. “Devil’s Night” in Detroit, MI, is an example of the intentional fire issue in vacant properties. Prior to the late 1970s, October 30 or “Devil’s Night,” as it has been referred to in Detroit, was full of childhood pranks and minor vandalism acts. It was not until the late 1970s that this night of mischief went from being innocent to terrifying when arson became the leading cause of fire on Devil’s Night. Devil’s Night activity peaked in 1984 when over 800 fires were set in Detroit alone.
This issue of arson was exacerbated as Detroit was seeing a decrease in real estate values, resulting in some owners of vacant residences using the fires as a means to collect insurance dollars. This situation exists currently in Detroit (as well as other cities). In the 1990s, Detroit’s mayor took a major step in fighting Devil’s Night arson by renaming it “Angel’s Night” and calling upon police, firefighters, and local citizens to help patrol vacant properties that night and by cleaning up, or in some cases, removing the property entirely.
The efforts have proved effective but there is concern that the increase of vacant property within the past few years may lead to an upswing in fires in vacant and abandoned buildings. This topical report addresses the characteristics of vacant residential building fires reported to the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) from 2006 to 2008. Vacant residential building fires, as analyzed in this report, include properties where the building is under construction, under major renovation, vacant and secured, vacant and unsecured, and being demolished. The remaining building status categories (occupied and operating; idle, not routinely used; building status, other; and undetermined) are considered “non-vacant” but not necessarily occupied. For the purpose of this report, the terms “residential fires” and “vacant residential fires” are synonymous with “residential building fires” and “vacant residential building fires,”
From 2006 to 2008, an estimated 28,000 vacant residential building fires were reported annually in the United States. The number of vacant residential buildings has always been seen as an issue in our society. These buildings are rarely maintained and often serve as a common site for illicit or illegal activity. In addition, vacant residential buildings are sometimes used by homeless people as temporary shelters or housing. A major concern when a vacant building catches fire is that little is known about the building’s overall condition.
Many buildings are in disrepair and can be missing certain structures, such as staircases or portions of floors. If individuals are known to use the vacant building as a residence, the unknown condition of the building and the unknown number of people using the building as shelter can put the firefighters’ lives in danger when they enter the building to attempt a rescue during a fire. The surrounding non-vacant properties are also at risk when vacant residential buildings catch fire.
It typically takes longer for vacant residential building fires to be detected as there are no occupants to be alerted by the smell or sound of the fires or respond to an alarm and the property loss is greater. In addition, if the fire has been intentionally set, especially with multiple ignition points, the damage can be greater, placing the lives of more individuals’ firefighters, adjacent residents, and any squatters in danger.
Fires in vacant residential buildings have become an even greater issue in the past few years. Many communities have seen an increase in the number of vacant residential buildings as the economy has declined; and with that an increase in the number of vacant residential building fires. From 2006 to 2008, intentionally set fires was the main cause of all vacant residential building fires (37 percent, as discussed later in this report), posing a serious issue for the community.
These types of fires continue to be a problem and concern within our society. “Devil’s Night” in Detroit, MI, is an example of the intentional fire issue in vacant properties. Prior to the late 1970s, October 30 or “Devil’s Night,” as it has been referred to in Detroit, was full of childhood pranks and minor vandalism acts. It was not until the late 1970s that this night of mischief went from being innocent to terrifying when arson became the leading cause of fire on Devil’s Night. Devil’s Night activity peaked in 1984 when over 800 fires were set in Detroit alone.
This issue of arson was exacerbated as Detroit was seeing a decrease in real estate values, resulting in some owners of vacant residences using the fires as a means to collect insurance dollars. This situation exists currently in Detroit (as well as other cities). In the 1990s, Detroit’s mayor took a major step in fighting Devil’s Night arson by renaming it “Angel’s Night” and calling upon police, firefighters, and local citizens to help patrol vacant properties that night and by cleaning up, or in some cases, removing the property entirely.
The efforts have proved effective but there is concern that the increase of vacant property within the past few years may lead to an upswing in fires in vacant and abandoned buildings. This topical report addresses the characteristics of vacant residential building fires reported to the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) from 2006 to 2008. Vacant residential building fires, as analyzed in this report, include properties where the building is under construction, under major renovation, vacant and secured, vacant and unsecured, and being demolished. The remaining building status categories (occupied and operating; idle, not routinely used; building status, other; and undetermined) are considered “non-vacant” but not necessarily occupied. For the purpose of this report, the terms “residential fires” and “vacant residential fires” are synonymous with “residential building fires” and “vacant residential building fires,” respectively. “Vacant residential fires” is used through-out the body of this report; the findings, tables, charts, headings, and footnotes reflect the full category, “vacant residential building fires.”
Additional References;
On August 9, 2010 Chicago Firefighter/Paramedic Christopher Wheatley was working a grease-chute fire at a restaurant when he fell approximately 35 feet from the ladder of an attached fire escape suffering fatal injuries while he was making his way up to the roof of the burning building with his equipment. The Incident Location was; 615 W. Randolph, Chicago, Ilinois. Incident Coverage, Here, Here and Here. USFA LODD notification, Here .
Facebook Memorial Page, Here; In memory of FF Chris Wheatley; “ He loved being a firefighter. He loved being a paramedic. It was not just a job to him. He was passionate about it,” Rest In Peace FF Chris Wheatley
Fire Daily posted a good summary of FF Wheatley’s career and the events leading to his death HERE.
The Chicago Sun-Times provided a comprehensive story describing the funeral in detail HERE.
Chicago Fire Department Commissioner Robert Hoff giving the eulogy for FF Christopher Wheatley on August 13, 2010, defined in a number of ways what a firefighter should be, and how FF Wheatley lived up to those principles both on and off the job, with a passion. In a posting from The Urban Firefighter, it was quoted; “Commissioner Hoff and Firefighter Wheatley are truly the type of firefighters; young ones hope to be like, and old ones wish they had been”.
Think about the words that defined and charactorized Chicago Firefighter/Paramedic Christopher Wheatley and how he lived and worked as a firefighter, a paramedic and public servant, a son and a loved one. Think about what defines, distinguishes and exemplifies you and how you conduct yourself and interface within this proud and honorable profession of the Fire Service.
As posted on the FireGeezer: To view the entire 493-image photo gallery prepared by Larry Shapiro, CLICK HERE. You will see three buttons. “Funeral” will take you to the 224-image gallery of the funeral procession. “Visitors” will open up a 119-image gallery of shoulder patches from nearly every fire department that was represented. And clicking on the “FD Apparatus” button will open the 50-image gallery of the apparatus that was in the procession.
Chicagoland Fire Photographer Larry Shapiro
- FDNY Waldbaum Fire August 2, 1978
The Waldbaum’s Supermarket Fire and Collapse FDNY 1978
The Waldbaum Super market fire, Brooklyn, New York occurred on August 2, 1978, thirty two years ago. Six firefighters died in the line of duty when the roof of a burning Brooklyn supermarket collapsed, plunging 12 firefighters into the flames. The fire began in a hallway near the compressor room as crews were renovating the store, and quickly escalated to a fourth-alarm. Less than an hour after the fire was first reported, nearly 20 firefighters were on the roof when the central portion gave way.
Thirty-four firefighters, one emergency medical technician and one Emergency Services police officer were injured in the fire and the tragedy is remembered as one of the worst disasters in the New York City Fire Department’s 143-year history.
The FDNY members killed in the Waldbaum’s fire included:
• Lt. James E. Cutillo, Battalion 33
• Firefighter Charles S. Bouton, Ladder Company 156
• Firefighter Harold F. Hastings, Battalion 42
• Firefighter James P. McManus, Ladder Company 153
• Firefighter William O’Connor, Ladder Company 156
• Firefighter George S. Rice, Ladder Company 153
Take the time to head over to Commandsafety.com for the complete posting with incident details, photos, a memorial video clip and diagrams.
The following are a series of photographs of the incident and operations.
Check out the Waldbaum Fire Facebook page, HERE with numerous photos and recollections honoring those that lost their lives and those that operated at FDNY Brooklyn Box 3300.
Ten Minutes in the Street is back, bringing you insightful and provoking street scenarios for the discriminating and perspective Firefighter, Officer and Commander; where you make the call.
You don’t have to have any special rank to participate in this interactive forum, just the desire to learn and expand you knowledge, skills and abilities in order to better yourself, create new insights, while sharing your experience and perspectives to help you and others in the street in making the right call; so everyone has the opportunity of going home.
Ten Minutes in the Street: “Three For One”
Volume 10, Number 9
An alarm of fire clears the airways, as the communications center dispatches a first alarm assignment for a report of a structure fire in a single family residential occupancy in a new neighborhood. Most of these residential structures were built between 2005 and 2010. They vary in size from 2500 SF – 3500 SF. They are closely spaced and are Type V constructed with wood clad or vinyl siding.
Drop in at FFN for and check out the full scenario and get involved, HERE
Here’s the PDF for the scenario that you can download and use for drill, tabletop exercise or kitchen table discussion.Copy of Vol10NO09
BURN is a documentary about Detroit, told through the eyes of Detroit firefighters, who are on the front lines charged with the thankless task of saving a city — and an American Dream — that many have written off as dead. We made a 10-minute trailer. Please SHARE, ASK QUESTIONS, DONATE so we can start production on the film as soon as possible. Take the time to watch the video trailer…..it will speak for itself.
Check out the web site, HERE BURN Trailer from Tremolo Productions on Vimeo.
After a slight hiatus, Ten Minutes in the Street is back, beginning its Summer Tour bringing you insightful and provoking street scenarios for the discriminating and perspective firefighter, where you make the call. You don’t have to have any special rank to participate in this interactive forum, just the desire to learn and expand you knowledge, skills and abilities in order to better yourself, create new insights, while sharing your experience and perspectives to help you and others in the street in making the right call; so everyone has the opportunity of going home.
Check out this lastest posting on Firefighter Nation, and get involved….
Ten Minutes in the Street: “I Hear Ya Knockin’; But Nobody’s Home”
Volume 10, Number 7 Link HERE
Take advantage of the opportunties to share your expereince and to also gain insights on operational challenges that affect all operating companies in the street, on any given day.
These interactive scenarios, “where you make the call;” provides you with the ability to interact and share strategies, tactics, safety and assessment concepts and insights with brother firefighters nationally and internationally with our global fire service community.
It’s all about Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety
Stop in, we’re open 24/7………Ten Minutes in the Street
Don’t forget, check out the latest announcment on the newest Blog Radio Talkshow; Taking it to the Street on Firefighter Netcast.com coming July 21, 2010. Check out these links for more information, HERE, HERE and HERE.
From Waldbaum’s to Hackensack- Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety
“From Waldbaum’s to Hackensack- Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety”; I still find it surprising during my travels around the country lecturing and presenting programs on building construction, that when the audience was asked, “What do the Walbaum’s Fire and Hackensack fire share in common?”, the response typically were blank stares. The more seasoned and experienced veterans (translation; Older firefighters) when present, were able to convey some information on the subject. But yet, the true essence of the basic incident particulars and the lessons learned fail to be fully conveyed. We’re not remembering the past!
I’ve spoken on numerous occasions about History Repeating Events (HRE), and the common themes related to LODD. Events that resonate with common issues, apparent and contributing causes and operational factors that share legacy issues that the fire service fails to identify, relate to and implement. In other words, we fail a times to learn from the past, or we make a deliberate choice to ignore those lessons due to other internal or external influences, pressures, authority, beliefs, values or viewpoints. We make choices and we determine our direction, path and destiny.
When you look over these LODD events over the years (NIOSH, NFPA, USFA Reports), it doesn’t take long to identify that many LODD events share similarities, and that specific incident events, deficiencies, outcomes and recommendations are identical in every way, except for the fire department name and geographical location. In other words, we have History Repeating Events (HRE).
What have we learned from the past? What is it that we’re passing down to each incoming recruit class and probationary firefighter? What are Company and Commanding Officers recalling and considering in their dynamic risk assessment, size-up and decision-making (IAP) process when looking at a particular building, occupancy and fire? Are mission critical operational elements & HRE factors being recollected? (Naturalistic/ Recognition-Prime Decision-making).
Are the fire service legacies of the past and the lessons learned from those incidents and the sacrifices that were made transcending time? Or are they lost in the immediacy of day to day challenges, issues and operations. Or are these events, lessons and operations issues dismissed and disregarded as a result of their “time and place” not being relevant to “today’s” operations and modern fire service advancements.
The reality is, we, the present generation of veteran firefighters and officers at times neglect or fail to recognize the importance of passing along the lessons of our life’s journey through our fire service careers, the events of our day and the profound tough lessons and sacrifices learned the hard way. We sometimes need a receptive, sympathetic and compassionate audience that is willing to listen, hear and comprehend the messages conveyed. There needs to be a high degree of empathy related to these past History Repeating Events. For each event, each and every line of duty death has a message and a Legacy of Operational Safety.
Throughout the past thirty-three years (1977-2010), over 4,000 firefighters have lost their lives in the course and conduct of their duties as firefighters and officers within the fire service. Although there are numerous LODD fire incidents and events that could be discussed, all distinguished and exemplified by heroism, nobility, cause and fortitude. There are four that stand out when related to the lessons learned and the significance and impact each LODD incident had at the time to the national fire service.
Each of these incidents also have significance as they relate to the building, occupancy, use, construction features, inherent structural systems, fire behavior and fire dynamics; coupled with interrelated elements of strategic and tactical fire suppression operations and incident management . Again, “Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety”.
The Waldbaum’s Supermarket Fire: Brooklyn, New York August 3, 1978
Six LODD
Six FDNY firefighters died at this fire when the wood bowstring truss roof collapsed, 34 were injured. The fire started at 8:40 hrs. in Waldbaum’s Supermarket, Ave. Y and Ocean Ave., Sheepshead Bay, Brooklyn, NY. Nearly 23 electricians, plumbers etc ., were in the process of renovating the building, while it was still open and operating when the fire started in the mezzanine area. An All hands was transmitted at 08:49 hrs. the 2nd alarm at 09:02 hrs. Shortly after 09:20 hrs., with 20 firefighters on the roof a crackling sound was heard and the center portion of the bow string trussed roof fell into the smoke and flames. A total of 12 firefighters fell into the inferno, six were rescued, six died in the line of duty.
Honor and Remembrance
• Lt. James Cutillo, 33rd Battalion
• Firefighter Charles Bouton, Ladder Co. 156
• Firefighter William O’Conner, Ladder Co. 156
• Firefighter James P McManus, Ladder Co. 153
• Firefighter George Rice, Ladder Co. 153
• Firefighter Harold F. Hastings, Ladder Co.153
Hackensack Ford: Hackensack, New Jersey July 1, 1988
Five LODD
Five fire fighters from the Hackensack, New Jersey Fire Department were killed in the line-of duty while they were engaged in interior fire suppression efforts at an automobile dealership when portions of the building’s wood bowstring truss roof collapsed.
Honor and Remembrance
• Captain Richard Williams
• Lt. Richard Reinhogen
• Firefighter William Krejsa
• Firefighter Leonard Radumski
• Firefighter Stephen Ennis
Note: The 1988 Hackensack Ford Fire occurred almost ten years to the date of the Waldbaum’s FDNY Fire in 1978. (History Repeating Event…we forgot something along the way regarding bow string trussed roof systems and fire impingement…)
As a result of this incident passage of a NJ State law mandating the clear demarcation of truss roofs and other structural hazards with warning signs (placards) on building with truss roofs was. In 1991 NJ State law required the State Bureau of Fire Safety to investigate all fires in which a firefighter dies or is seriously injured. See National Truss Placarding.
The Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Fire: Worcester, Massachusetts, December 3, 1999
Six LODD
On December 3, 1999, the vacant, six-story Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Co. building in Worcester, Massachusetts, was set ablaze by two homeless people knocking a lighted candle into a pile of ragged clothes. The Worcester Fire Department responded at 6:13 p.m. to Box Alarm 1438. The Rescue 1 team of Firefighter Paul Brotherton and Firefighter Jerry Lucey entered the building searching for occupants. Fire conditions worsened in the building at an alarmingly unexpected rate. Paul and Jerry, on the fifth floor, became disoriented in the smoke-filled building. Lost, and running low on air, they called for help. Several teams began searching for the lost fire fighters.
Two teams reaching the fifth floor also found themselves disoriented in the smoke and trapped by the maze of interior walls — Lieutenant Tom Spencer and Firefighter Tim Jackson from Ladder 2, and Firefighter Jay Lyons and Firefighter Joe McGuirk from Engine 3. Though many more brave fire fighters attempted to locate their missing brothers, their efforts proved futile. Their deaths marked the worst loss of fire fighters’ lives in more than 20 years in a building fire in America, and the third worst fire in Massachusetts’ history. Six days after they died, a memorial service drew 30,000 fire fighters and 10,000 civilians in what was believed to have been the largest such service for fire fighters killed on duty.
Honor and Remembrance
• Firefighter Paul A Brotherton, Rescue Co.1
• Firefighter Timothy P. Jackson, Ladder Co.2
• Firefighter Jeremiah M. Lucey, Rescue Co.1
• Firefighter James F. “Jay” Lyons III, Engine Co. 3
• Firefighter Joseph T. McGuirk , Engine Co. 3
• Lt. Thomas E. Spencer, Ladder Co.2
Sofa Superstore Fire: Charleston, South Carolina, June 18, 2007
Nine LODD
On the evening of June 18, 2007, units from the Charleston Fire Department responded to a fire at the Sofa Super Store, a large retail furniture outlet in the West Ashley district of the city. Within less than 40 minutes, the fire claimed the lives of nine firefighters. The highly flammable characteristics of the materials that were stored in the loading dock and throughout the premises provided an ample supply of fuel and caused the fire to spread rapidly, affecting the building’s structural integrity and adversely affecting manual fire suppression activities.
Honor and Remembrance
• Bradford Rodney “Brad” Baity – Engineer 19
• Theodore Michael Benke – Captain 16
• Melvin Edward Champaign – Firefighter 16
• James “Earl” Allen Drayton – Firefighter 19
• Michael Jonathon Alan French – Engineer 5
• William H. “Billy” Hutchinson, III – Captain 19
• Mark Wesley Kelsey – Captain 5
• Louis Mark Mulkey – Captain 15
• Brandon Kenyon Thompson – Firefighter 5
Commemorate and Remembrance
On the evening of June 18, 2007, units from the Charleston Fire Department responded to a fire at the Sofa Super Store, a large retail furniture outlet in the West Ashley district of the city. Within less than 40 minutes, the fire claimed the lives of nine firefighters.
The Executive Summary of the FIREFIGHTER FATALITY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT Sofa Super Store Fire, Phase II Report issued MAY 15, 2008 provided critical insights into the apparent and contributing causes that culminated in the event. The Sofa Super Store was a large property that incorporated a very significant potential for a major fire to occur. It’s appropriate at this time to revisit those key factors described within the report in order for provide the opportunity for departments or agencies to recognize or identify similar gaps that exist, and take the necessary corrective actions. These gaps may be precursors to potentially significant or serious future events and extend in operational, training, administrative, managerial, construction, prevention and regulatory and codes.
• The fire risk factors associated with the Sofa Super Store exceeded the limits prescribed by the applicable building and fire codes. An automatic sprinkler system should have been installed to reduce the level of fire risk or the buildings should have been divided into manageable fire compartments by a system of fire walls.
• If a sprinkler system had been installed, the fire probably would likely have been controlled within the loading dock area.
• If effective fire walls had been provided, the fire probably would not have spread beyond the loading dock.
• The highly flammable characteristics of the materials that were stored in the loading dock and throughout the premises provided an ample supply of fuel and caused the fire to spread rapidly. The burning contents released copious quantities of heat and toxic smoke.
• Significant quantities of flammable and combustible liquids that were stored in the loading dock likely contributed to the severity and rapid spread of the fire.
• The fire had extended to the loading dock when firefighters arrived.
• Charleston Fire Department members attempted to fight the fire by initiating an offensive interior attack into the loading dock.
• The offensive attack was launched from two directions. One attack line entered the loading dock from the exterior, while a second line was stretched through the showrooms and into the loading dock.
• The offensive attack failed to control the fire. The fire extended into adjoining areas on three sides of the loading dock.
• At least 16 firefighters, who were operating deep inside the showrooms, became enveloped in heavy smoke.
• Conditions inside the showrooms became critical as the fire began to involve this part of the building. Several firefighters became disoriented and were running short of air. Radio messages requesting assistance were not heard.
• Seven firefighters managed to find their way out of the showrooms. The nine deceased firefighters were unable to find their way out as the fire spread rapidly from the rear of the building to the front.
• The size and layout of the building, inadequate exits, and the highly flammable nature of the contents likely contributed to the inability of the lost firefighters to escape from the building. Rescue efforts were attempted when the situation inside the showrooms was recognized. In spite of valiant efforts, it was too late to save the missing firefighters before the store became fully involved in flames.
The analysis of operations conducted by the Charleston Fire Department includes the following observations and findings:
• Fire fighting operations at the Sofa Super Store did not comply with Federal occupational safety and health regulations, recommended safety standards, or accepted fire service practices.
• The Charleston Fire Department failed to provide adequate direction, supervision, and coordination over the operations that were conducted.
• The documented duties and responsibilities of an Incident Commander were not performed and risk management guidelines were not adequately applied to the situation.
• The culture of the Charleston Fire Department promoted aggressive offensive tactics that exposed firefighters to excessive and avoidable risks and failed to apply basic firefighter safety practices.
• Insufficient training, inadequate staffing, obsolete equipment and outdated tactics all contributed to an ineffective effort to control the fire with offensive tactics during the early stages of the incident.
• The Charleston Fire Department continued to apply offensive tactics after the situation had evolved to a point where risk management guidelines called for defensive strategy.
• Factors that should have caused firefighters to be removed from interior tactical (offensive) positions were not recognized.
• There was a lack of accountability for the location and function of firefighters who were operating inside the building. The Charleston Fire Department did not have appropriate Mayday procedures to be followed by firefighters in distress, for dispatchers, or for command officers on the scene.
All of the listed factors and many others were analyzed and discussed in detail within the body of the issued report. If you haven’t found the time or reason to read the report, do so; it would make for a good task activity for Safety Week. The report document presented the dedicated and conscientious efforts of the review team to honor the nine fallen firefighters by making every possible effort to learn from their sacrifice. The operative question is this; “What factors or attributes are comparable to situations or conditions that presently exist within your Department, Organization or community? What are you going to proactively do to address these issues or conditions in a timely manner?
Understanding the Building Profile and Risk
The Sofa Super Store occupied a complex of interconnected structures that had been constructed in several phases. The showroom building, facing Savannah Highway, was actually an assembly of three separate structures. The front wall was a façade, with a parapet extending above the roof line, creating the appearance of one large building when viewed from Savannah Highway. (Refer to the Report for diagrams, plans and photographs)
• The front wall, including the parapet, was approximately 23 feet tall, while the roof behind the parapet varied from 12 to 14 feet above grade.
• The main showroom was originally constructed as a grocery store, probably during the 1950s or 60s. The original building was approximately 125 feet in width and 130 feet deep, with a rectangular extension in the southwest corner (right-rear facing the building from Savannah Highway).
• The front wall was brick construction with large storefront windows, while the side and rear walls were constructed of concrete block.
• The original structure had a flat metal deck roof, supported by lightweight steel bar joists (trusses), spanning from east to west across the store. The side walls supported the ends of the bar joists, while two rows of steel beams and columns provided intermediate support.
• A suspended ceiling was installed below the roof trusses.
After the property was converted to a furniture store, two pre-engineered metal buildings were added-on to the original structure to expand the showroom area. Each showroom addition was approximately 60 feet in width and 120 feet deep. The first showroom addition was constructed on the west side of the original building in 1994 and the second was added on the east side in 1995. (The add-on structures are referred to as the east and west showrooms in this report, while the original structure is identified as the main showroom.) Six large openings in the concrete block side walls, three on each side of the original building, provided connections between the showroom areas; their combined floor area was in excess of 31,000 square feet. An additional pre-engineered metal structure was erected at the rear of the property in 1996 to serve as a warehouse. This structure was approximately 120 feet wide by 130 feet deep and 29 feet tall. Furniture was stored on steel racks, 20 feet in height, inside the warehouse.
Going Forward: The Structural Anatomy of Building Construction
The following are quotes from Fire Chief Anthony Aiellos (ret) Hackensack (NJ) Fire Department
Fire Chief during the Hackensack Ford Fire, July, 1988
“If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner.”
“This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die, it’s that simple, it’s that obvious”.
Risk Based Response Assignments
The buildings, structures and occupancies that comprise typical response districts pose unique and consistent challenges during structural fire attack. The variety of occupancies and building characteristics establish varying degrees of risk potential, with defined and recognizable strategic and tactical measures to be taken-sometimes uniquely to each occupancy type. Although each occupancy type presents variables that dictate how a particular incident is handled, most company operations evolve from basic principles rooted in past performance and operations at similar structures. This is based on what I define as; “predictability of performance.”
When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future. Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis. We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a given duration of time, that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system.
We used to know with a measured degree of predictability, how our buildings would perform, react and fail under most fire conditions. This is what our years of fireground experience provided us, and how we ultimately would predict, assess, plan and implement our incident action plans and ultimately deploy our companies-based upon the predictable performance expected. Conventional Construction Structures (CCS) had this “predictably of performance.” You know, that typical residential structure, the 2-1/2 story wood frame, the three story brick and joist type III occupancy, the four story frame multiple occupancy, etc., etc. Unlike Engineered System Structures (ESS) whose predictability is rooted in the fact that they are unpredictable.
The emerging fire service issues affecting buildings, occupancies and structural systems related to ESS is only beginning to take hold a prominent role and level of significance that is long overdue. The fire service has been dealing with the operational issues and line-of-duty deaths related to ESS since the 1980s and now in 2009, we’re finally raising these ESS issues to a dialog point that is influencing firefighter safety, survival and operations. ( Refer to the Underwriters Laboratory’s (UL) UL University on-line training module for a state-of-the art presentation on Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions and performance results that correlate towards redefining fire suppression operations)
The fire service is beginning to fully recognize the merits in adjusting, altering, and changing our strategic and tactical ways of doing business in the streets. It’s becoming self evident in the fire service that it’s no longer acceptable to think that ESS buildings and occupancies will perform in the same manner as CCS buildings and occupancies and that tactics deployed in both CCS and ESS buildings and occupancies will react under similar strategic and tactical plans and tasks. These unique and inherent factors within the ESS profiles must give us a new standard for operational deployment; strategies and tactics that are defined by the risk profile of the building, its engineered structural systems, materials and methods of construction and the fire loading present.
Considerations for changing fire flow rates, the sizing of hose line and the adequacies for fire flow demand and application rates, staffing needs for safe operations, considerations for defensive positioning and defensive operating postures must be considered, and it warrants repeating again; Reckless-Aggressive firefighting must be redefined in the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environment- with determined, effective and proactive firefighting.
Risk-Preferring and Self-indulging Firefighting
Don’t mistake determined, effective and proactive firefighting with that of reckless, baseless and risk-preferring and self-indulging firefighting. There is a difference, a big difference. When we address relationships of Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Fire Fighter Safety with the occupancy and structural environment, all personnel, regardless of rank, need to equate the occupancy risk with strategic and tactical incident action plans. These safely compliment the identified firefighting operation risk, with the projected building risk profile and interface appropriate behavioral characteristics in the task level firefighting activities. Again, equating building, occupancy risk profiles with determined, effective and proactive firefighting.
The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics MUST not only be questioned, they need to be adjusted and modified; risk assessment, risk-benefit analysis, safety and survivability profiling, operational value and firefighter injury and LODD reduction must be further institutionalized to become a recognized part of modern firefighting operations.
It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations. Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments. Consider the following definitions as they relate to defining structural combat fire suppression operations.
Aggressive and Measured Approach.
Aggressive: Assertive, bold, and energetic, forceful, determined, confident, marked by driving forceful energy or initiative, marked by combative readiness, assured, direct, dominate…
Measured: Calculated; deliberate, careful; restrained, think, considered, confident, alternatives, reasoned actions, in control, self assured, calm…
You be the judge as to what should be appropriately defining interior fire suppression operations.
It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management. This is what it’s going to take to truly provide a means for “everyone to go home”.
Occupancy Risk not Occupancy Type
Many of today’s incident commanders, company officers and firefighters lack the clarity of understanding and comprehension that correlate to the inherent characteristics of today’s buildings, construction and occupancies. We assume that the redundancy of our operations and incident responses equates with predictability and diminished risk to our firefighting personnel.
Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction, therefore risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. You need to gain the knowledge and insights and to change and adjust your operating profile in order to safe guard your companies, personnel and team compositions. Again strategic firefighting operations; Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type.
With this being stated, another primary consideration that must be deliberated and changed as it relates to firefighting and the built environment is the long held fire service tradition and practice of Structural Fire Alarm Response (resources) Assignments being based upon the Occupancy Type. Sending the two Engine Companies and one Truck Company assignment with a Battalion Chief and a RIT team to a reported structure fire in an occupied single family residential structure; is not acceptable.
As previously stated; the rules for structural fire engagement have changed. Structural Fire Alarm Response (resources) Assignments should be based upon the Risk Profile the occupancy has related to Building construction, systems and projected or determined fire loading. Sending the four Engine Companies, two Truck Companies, a manpower Heavy Rescue Company, two additional Battalion Chiefs, a Safety Officer and support staff assignment with the assigned Battalion Chief on the alarm assignment to a reported structure fire in an occupied single family residential structure, that happens to be 5000 square feet in size with ESS components; IS Acceptable.
• There is an acute understanding and corollary of technical knowledge and inter reliance on occupancies, construction, strategy, tactics, risk, safety, physics, engineering and fire suppression theory, This is a fact.
• Previous, historical parameters and Building/Structural Performance always provides a postulated measurement to gauge operational tasks and form the basis for the Incident Action Plan. These parameters must be recognized and integrated
• There is a need to integrate performance based incident indicators derived from engineering, physics, fire dynamics, historical and statistical basis
• Basic Size-Up is Antiquated for Firefighting and the Built Environment. – Start Thinking in terms of Dynamic Risk Assessment and Command Risk Management
• USFA Annual Report on Firefighter Fatalities in the United States; “More firefighters using an aggressive interior attack in enclosed structures die more often, in greater numbers, and with greater multiple line-of-duty deaths than those using the same tactical approach in opened structure fires.”
Start integrating an understating of Fire Dynamics and Fire Behavior and the impact on structural integrity and operational deployment
Situational Awareness and Risk Assessment
Situation Awareness related to Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Firefighter Safety is another mission critical element. Situation Awareness (SA) is the perception of environmental elements within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future. It is also a field of study concerned with perception of the environment critical to decision-makers in complex, dynamic situations and incidents. Both the 2006 and 2007 Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System Annual Reports identified a lack of situational awareness as the highest contributing factor to near misses reported.
Situation Awareness involves being aware of what is happening around you at an incident scene to understand how information, events, and your own actions will impact operational goals and incident objectives, both now and in the near future. Lacking SA or having inadequate SA has been identified as one of the primary factors in accidents attributed to human error (Hartel, Smith, & Prince, 1991) (Nullmeyer, Stella, Montijo, & Harden, 2005). Situation Awareness becomes especially important in the structural fire suppression and firefighter domains where the information flow can be quite high and poor decisions can lead to serious consequences. Dynamic Risk Assessment is commonly used to describe a process of risk assessment being carried out in a changing or evolving environment, where what is being assessed is developing as the process itself is being undertaken. This is further problematical for the Incident Commander when confronted with competing or conflicting incident priorities, demands or distractions before a complete appreciation of all mission critical or essential information and data has been obtained. The dynamic management of risk is all about effective, informed and decisive decision making during all phases of an incident at a structural fire.
To the Incident Commander, fire officer or firefighter, knowing what’s going on around you, in and around the building structure and understanding the consequences of building, construction, assembly, fire load and fire development and growth is mission critical to incident stabilization and mitigation and profoundly crucial in terms of personnel safety.The integration of Situational Awareness and Dynamic Risk Assessment related to the building and occupancy is a mission critical element in managing structural fires and in the strategic command management and company level tactical operations as we go forward into the next decade. Traditional phased incident scene size-up and monitoring is antiquated and no longer appropriate or applicable to modern fire service operations.Situational awareness is a combination of attitudes, previously learned knowledge and new information gained from the incident scene and environment that enables the strategic commanders, decision-makers and tactical companies to gather the information they need to make effective decisions that will keep their firefighters and resources out of harm’s way, reducing the likelihood of adverse or detrimental effects.
Command and company officers and firefighters MUST understand the building, the occupancy features and the inherent impact of fire within and on the structure, AND be able to identify, communicate and take actions necessary to support the incident action and battle plans, mitigate incident conditions and provide for continuous safety protection to themselves, their team, their company and the entire alarm assignment operating at the incident scene.
It’s Not about Our Entertainment Value
When we focus our attention on the interdependent functional domains of Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Fire Fighter Safety and the essence of combat structural fires; Structural firefighting is what it’s all about, is it not? The reason we have such veneration for firefighting and the fire service and all it entails; has a lot to do with going into burning buildings and fighting fire. We enjoy it tremendously; because of who we are and what we do-as firefighters. But, firefighting has its adverse consequences, with all too familiar costs, in the form of injuries, debilitating accidents and line of duty deaths.
As a firefighter, to say that we love firefighting would be an understatement, but one issue that we need to address is the fact that there are many individual firefighters, companies and organizations that employ fireground operational practices that promote the “enjoyment and entertainment” of working a good job within the occupancy compartment of a structural fire in the building environment.-Staying too long in the wrong place, operating tactically in an adverse environment with known hazards that does not have value, for nothing other than the enjoyment of nozzle time and operating time in the fire.
Fire suppression tactics must be adjusted for the rapidly changing methods and materials impacting all forms of building construction, occupancies and structures. The need to redefine the art and science of firefighting is nearly upon us. Some things do stand the test of time, others need to adjust, evolve and change. Not for the sake of change only, but for the emerging and evolving buildings, structures and occupancies being built, developed or renovated in our communities.
If the fire service can significantly increase proficiencies in building knowledge and equate that to other fundamental operational aspect in structural fire operations, then there would be a direct enhancement to firefighter safety, through injury and LODD reduction. If we understand buildings, occupancies and construction, and balance this with our understanding of fire dynamics and orchestrate it with appropriate strategies, tactics and command management, then we made the new safety equation work; Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S). It’s all about the Structural Anatomy of Buildings.
The NIST Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiements was issued this morning. A copy of the report is at CommandSafety.com HERE and is also available for download at the NIST, HERE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Both the increasing demands on the fire service – such as the growing number of Emergency Medical Services (EMS) responses, challenges from natural disasters, hazardous materials incidents, and acts of terrorism—and previous research point to the need for scientifically based studies of the effect of different crew sizes and firefighter arrival times on the effectiveness of the fire service to protect lives and property.
To meet this need, a research partnership of the Commission on Fire Accreditation International (CFAI), International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), International Association of Firefighters (IAFF), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI) was formed to conduct a multiphase study of the deployment of resources as it affects firefighter and occupant safety. Starting in FY 2005, funding was provided through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) / Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Grant Program Directorate for Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program—Fire Prevention and Safety Grants. In addition to the low-hazard residential fireground experiments described in this report, the multiple phases of the overall research effort include development of a conceptual model for community risk assessment and deployment of resources, implementation of a general sizable department incident survey, and delivery of a software tool to quantify the effects of deployment decisions on resultant firefighter and civilian injuries and on property losses.
The first phase of the project was an extensive survey of more than 400 career and combination (both career and volunteer) fire departments in the United States with the objective of optimizing a fire service leader’s capability to deploy resources to prevent or mitigate adverse events that occur in risk- and hazard-filled environments. The results of this survey are not documented in this report, which is limited to the experimental phase of the project. The survey results will constitute significant input into the development of a future software tool to quantify the effects of community risks and associated deployment decisions on resultant firefighter and civilian injuries and property losses.
The following research questions guided the experimental design of the low-hazard residential fireground experiments documented in this report:
- How do crew size and stagger affect overall start-to-completion response timing?
- How do crew size and stagger affect the timings of task initiation, task duration, and task completion for each of the 22 critical fireground tasks?
- How does crew size affect elapsed times to achieve three critical events that are known to change fire behavior or tenability within the structure:
- Entry into structure?
- Water on fire?
- Ventilation through windows (three upstairs and one back downstairs window and the burn room window),
- How does the elapsed time to achieve the national standard of assembling 15 firefighters at the scene vary between crew sizes of four and five? In order to address the primary research questions, the research was divided into four distinct, yet interconnected parts:
- Part 1—Laboratory experiments to design appropriate fuel load
- Part 2—Experiments to measure the time for various crew sizes and apparatus stagger (interval between arrival of various apparatus) to accomplish key tasks in rescuing occupants, extinguishing a fire, and protecting property
- Part 3—Additional experiments with enhanced fuel load that prohibited firefighter entry into the burn prop – a building constructed for the fire experiments
- Part 4—Fire modeling to correlate time-to-task completion by crew size and stagger to the increase in toxicity of the atmosphere in the burn prop for a range of fire growth rates. The experiments were conducted in a burn prop designed to simulate a low-hazard1 fire in a residential structure described as typical in NFPA 1710® Organization and Deployment of Fire
Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments. NFPA 1710 is the consensus standard for career firefighter deployment, including requirements for fire department arrival time, staffing levels, and fireground responsibilities. Limitations of the study include firefighters’ advance knowledge of the burn prop, invariable number of apparatus, and lack of experiments in elevated outdoor temperatures or at night. Further, the applicability of the conclusions from this report to commercial structure fires, high rise fires, outside fires, terrorism/natural disaster response, HAZMAT or other technical responses has not been assessed and should not be extrapolated from this report.
Primary Findings
- Of the 22 fireground tasks measured during the experiments, results indicated that the following factors had the most significant impact on the success of fire fighting operations.
- All differential outcomes described below are statistically significant at the 95 % confidence level or better.
Overall Scene Time:
- The four-person crews operating on a low-hazard structure fire completed all the tasks on the fireground (on average) seven minutes faster—nearly 30 %—than the two-person crews.
- The four-person crews completed the same number of fireground tasks (on average) 5.1 minutes faster—nearly 25 %—than the three-person crews.
- On the low-hazard residential structure fire, adding a fifth person to the crews did not decrease overall fireground task times.
- However, it should be noted that the benefit of five-person crews has been documented in other evaluations to be significant for medium- and high-hazard structures, particularly in urban settings, and is recognized in industry standards.
Time to Water on Fire:
- There was a 10% difference in the “water on fire” time between the two- and three-person crews.
- There was an additional 6% difference in the “water on fire” time between the three- and four-person crews. (i.e., four-person crews put water on the fire 16% faster than two person crews). There was an additional 6% difference in the “water on fire” time between the four- and five-person crews (i.e. five-person crews put water on the fire 22% faster than two-person crews).
Ground Ladders and Ventilation:
- The four-person crews operating on a low-hazard structure fire completed laddering and ventilation (for life safety and rescue) 30 % faster than the two-person crews and 25 % faster than the three-person crews.
Primary Search:
- The three-person crews started and completed a primary search and rescue 25 % faster than the two-person crews.
- The four- and five-person crews started and completed a primary search 6 % faster than the three-person crews and 30 % faster than the two-person crew.
- A 10 % difference was equivalent to just over one minute.
Hose Stretch Time:
- In comparing four-and five-person crews to two-and three-person crews collectively, the time difference to stretch a line was 76 seconds.
- In conducting more specific analysis comparing all crew sizes to the two-person crews the differences are more distinct.
- Two-person crews took 57 seconds longer than three-person crews to stretch a line.
- Two-person crews took 87 seconds longer than four-person crews to complete the same tasks.
- Finally, the most notable comparison was between two-person crews and five-person crews—more than 2 minutes (122 seconds) difference in task completion time.
Industry Standard Achieved:
- As defined by NFPA 1710, the “industry standard achieved” time started from the first engine arrival at the hydrant and ended when 15 firefighters were assembled on scene.
- An effective response force was assembled by the five-person crews three minutes faster than the four-person crews.
- Based on the study protocols, modeled after a typical fire department apparatus deployment strategy, the total number of firefighters on scene in the two- and three-person crew scenarios never equaled 15 and therefore the two- and three-person crews were unable to assemble enough personnel to meet this standard.
Occupant Rescue:
- Three different “standard” fires were simulated using the Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) model. Characterized in the Handbook of the Society of Fire Protection Engineers as slow-,medium-, and fast-growth rate4, the fires grew exponentially with time.
- The rescue scenario was based on a non-ambulatory occupant in an upstairs bedroom with the bedroom door open. Independent of fire size, there was a significant difference between the toxicity, expressed as fractional effective dose (FED), for occupants at the time of rescue depending on arrival times for all crew sizes. Occupants rescued by early-arriving crews had less exposure to combustion products than occupants rescued by late-arriving crews.
- The fire modeling showed clearly that two-person crews cannot complete essential fireground tasks in time to rescue occupants without subjecting them to an increasingly toxic atmosphere. For a slow-growth rate fire with two-person crews, the FED was approaching the level at which sensitive populations, such as children and the elderly are threatened.
- For a medium-growth rate fire with two-person crews, the FED was far above that threshold and approached the level affecting the general population.
- For a fast-growth rate fire with two-person crews, the FED was well above the median level at which 50%of the general population would be incapacitated. Larger crews responding to slow-growth rate fires can rescue most occupants prior to incapacitation along with early-arriving larger crews responding to medium-growth rate fires.
- The result for late-arriving (two minutes later than early-arriving) larger crews may result in a threat to sensitive populations for medium-growth rate fires.
- Statistical averages should not, however, mask the fact that there is no FED level so low that every occupant in every situation is safe.
Conclusion:
More than 60 full-scale fire experiments were conducted to determine the impact of crew size, first-due engine arrival time, and subsequent apparatus arrival times on firefighter safety and effectiveness at a low-hazard residential structure fire.
- This report quantifies the effects of changes to staffing and arrival times for residential firefighting operations. While resource deployment is addressed in the context of a single structure type and risk level, it is recognized that public policy decisions regarding the cost-benefit of specific deployment decisions are a function of many other factors including geography, local risks and hazards, available resources, as well as community expectations.
- This report does not specifically address these other factors. The results of these field experiments contribute significant knowledge to the fire service industry.
- First, the results provide a quantitative basis for the effectiveness of four-person crews for low-hazard response in NFPA 1710.
- The results also provide valid measures of total effective response force assembly on scene for fireground operations, as well as the expected performance time-to-critical-task measures for low-hazard structure fires.
Additionally, the results provide tenability measures associated with a range of modeled fires.Future research should extend the findings of this report in order to quantify the effects of crew size and apparatus arrival times for moderate- and high-hazard events, such as fires in high-rise buildings, commercial properties, certain factories, or warehouse facilities, responses to large-scale non-fire incidents, or technical rescue operations.
Addition project information and insights, Go to CommandSafety.com HERE and HERE
FDIC 2010 Rhett Fleitz, Christopher Naum, John Mitchell. Photo by Art Goodrich
I had the extreme pleasure of meeting two wonderful firefighters, who I’m proud to call brothers; Lt. John Mitchell of FireDaily.com and Lt. Rhett Fleitz of the Fire Critic.com both of whom produce and host the Firefighter Netcast. If you’ve been out of touch-Firefighter NetCast offers live netcasts and podcasts for the fire service and was launched in 2009. I had the pleasure of taping a podcast live from the floor of the Fire Department Instructors Conference (FDIC) on the timely and extremely pertinent topic of Changes in Building Construction and Fire Behavior.
Having lectured and presented the day before to a packed room on the topic of Building Construction and Risk Management, the live podcast provided us the opportunity to delve into a number of operational and safety issues affecting the fire service today regarding engineered structural systems (ESS), the demands associated with company and command officer training and educational needs in the areas of building construction, fire behavior and the evolving state of combat structural fire engagement. We furthered a passionate dialog on a number of case studies and LODD and talked at length about emerging changes that will affect the way we do business in the street related to strategic and tactical operations in buildings and occupancies. We discussed the concerns related to knowledge, skills and competencies required in reading today’s buildings and occupancies and the emerging mantra of Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety.
Take a few moments to head over the Firefighter Netcast and check out John and Rhett’s site, programs and other podcasts from FDIC and from recent show tapings. Check out their show schedule and dates and times and become an active participant. Stay tuned for some exciting future announcements as we plan for great new offerings and expanded coverage on the topics on Building Construction, and the needs for today’s progressive and emerging company and command officer. In addition, stay tuned for upcoming postings on the new 2010 training, lecture and seminar program announcements related to our Buildingsonfire training series on Building Construction & Risk Management, Extreme Fire Behavior and Building and Occupancy Profiling, Buildingsonfire 2010 and cutting edge programs on Engineered Structural Systems, Lightweight Construction and Firefighter Safety.
Think about the: Predictability of Occupancy Performance during Suppression Operations
Changes in Building Construction and Fire Behavior PODCAST HERE
In multi-story multifamily structures there is a lot more to consider than in single family structures. The population density increases significantly, the size of the structure increases and in high rise operations you have to be concerned with the rapid spread of heat, smoke, toxic gases and fire upward through the structure. The fact that the structural design is significantly different as the size if focused on going vertical verses horizontal.
These structures have a high life hazard at regardless the time of day. This proposes unique problems as occupant evacuation often hampers fire department suppression operations. With this fact being in place it also changes the focus of operations due to the potential need for evacuation or rescue efforts. Many of these building were constructed with fire escapes on the exterior of the building. These are often in disrepair and become involved in fire as the fire has vented out of a window and prevents the use of the exterior fire escape. Many structures have limited internal stairwells. Often these internal stairwells are not secure from the effects of smoke and heat. These prevent for safe evacuation. It is important to also consider the age of the tenants. The elder population that could live in these structures creates a special need for assistance in evacuation or rescue as they are not able to ambulate efficiently enough to travel the potential distances required for evacuating.
These structures require massive amounts of man power to be able to operate. It is recommended that for every position assigned a total of three (3) personnel be committed, one in operations, one in staging and one on deck ready for relief. This alone can make a significant impact on available resources.
Construction features can create a series of fire-control tactical concerns with the stacking of apartments that creates chases that run the entire height of the building. This design feature creates an easy pathway for fire to extend and do so without showing significant signs of fire growth and spread until large quantities of fire exist. This type of feature provides for fast moving fire extension and can compound the loss of life potential.
Larger buildings have design features that bring light and natural ventilation to rooms in the middle of the structure. These light and air shafts pose danger of allowing the fire to extend horizontally across the shaft. This feature allows the fire to sometimes by pass a fire wall or fire stop. This design will also allow fire to extend vertically as the exposures are increased and the ability to extend both via convection and direct flame contact due to lapping out of windows. The design of these windows being directing opposite or directly above each other contributes to the fire extension. One advantage is that there is not roof over these sections which eliminates the mushrooming concept and will slow the spread of fire to the upper floors.
Our buildings have changed; the structural systems of support, the degree of compartmentation, the characteristics of materials and the magnitude of fire loading. The structural anatomy, predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and the extreme fire behavior; accelerated growth rate and intensively levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term combat fire engagement.
The rules for combat structural fire suppression have changed, but we have yet to write the rule book from which the new games plans must be derived. We seek the elusive “Rosetta stone” that aligns and interprets the emerging and traditionalist acumen related to fire stream effectiveness, flow rates, cooling capacity, extreme fire behavior and fire dynamics, compartment fire theory, propagation and cooling capacity and tactical deployment all relate towards defining an engineering approach to firefighting tactics versus the manual, labor-driven tactics of line deployment and rudiment placement of water on a fuel source within the fire compartment (room).
It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that defines structural fire suppression operations. It begs to suggest that many of today’s incident commanders, company officers and firefighters lack the clarity of understanding and comprehension that correlate to the inherent characteristics of today’s buildings, construction and occupancies and the need for refined engine company operations within the modern building construction setting. We assume that the routiness or successes of our operations and incident responses equates with predictability and diminished risk to our firefighting personnel.
The work of such notable suppression theory pioneers as P. Grimwood, E. Hartin, S. Särdqvist and S. Svennson and the concepts surrounding 3D firefighting, B-SAHF and other emerging research from the NIST and UL are areas that today’s discerning and progressive fire officer and commanders must become well-informed and conversant. The quantitative scientific data and emerging concepts from continuing research and testing such as the NIST’s Wind Drive Fire Studies and UL’s The Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions are providing enlightenment on fire development, fuel controlled and ventilation controlled fire development, operational time-duration parameters and degradation and failure mechanisms related to compromise and structural collapse in occupancies.
Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction, therefore risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of combat structural fire engagement.
- Building Construction Systems
- Heritage
- Pre-1919
- Legacy
- 1920-1949
- Conventional
- 1950-1979
- Engineered
- 1980-2010
- Hybrid
- Chameleon
- Heritage
The fundamental compartment that comprised a typical room configuration in terms of area (square footage), volume (height/Width), furnishings (fire load package) and materials of construction (structural anatomy) found within conventional, legacy or heritage construction provided predictability in terms of fire suppression, fire behavior, operational time and survivability (civilian/firefighter). The dramatic changes since the early 1980’s in the evolution of modern building construction and the institutionalization of engineered structural systems (ESS) have created compartment (room) areas in excess 500 SF, volumes that are open and spaciously interconnected to other habitable space, fire load packages that create extreme fire behavior, compromising structural stability in shorter time spans creating decreasing interior operational time and requiring increasing fire flow rates and volume to sustain requisite extinguishment demands.
Commanders and Company Offices need to gain new insights and knowledge related to the modern building occupancy and to modify and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type and must have the combined adequacy of sufficient staffing, fire flow and nozzle appliances orchestrated in a manner that identifies with the fire profiling, predictability of the occupancy profile and accounts for presumed fire behavior. Today’s engine company operations and fire suppression theory has to progress beyond the pragmatic approaches to fire suppression such as “Big Fire-Big Water principle.
When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future. Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis. We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system; in addition to having an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions.
Executing tactical plans based upon faulted or inaccurate strategic insights and indicators has proven to be a common apparent cause in numerous case studies, after action reports and LODD reports. Our years of predictable fireground experience have ultimately embedded and clouded our ability to predict, assess, plan and implement incident action plans and ultimately deploy our companies-based upon the predictable performance expected of modern construction and especially those with engineered structural systems.
If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner, that is no longer acceptable within many of our modern building types, occupancies and structures. This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die, it’s that simple; it’s that obvious.
Considerations for changing fire flow rates, the sizing of hose line and the adequacies for fire flow demand and application rates, staffing needs for safe operations, considerations for defensive positioning and defensive operating postures must be considered, and it warrants repeating again; Reckless-Aggressive firefighting must be redefined in the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments- with determined, effective and proactive firefighting
- Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement
- Predictive Strategic Process
- Tactical Deployment Model
- Dynamic Tactical Deployment
- Performance Indicators and Street Aides
- Fire Dynamics
- Resistance
- Resilience
- Structural Systems
- Occupancy Hazard Profiles
The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics must not only be questioned, they need to be adjusted and modified; risk assessment, risk-benefit analysis, safety and survivability profiling, operational value and firefighter injury and LODD reduction must be further institutionalized to become a recognized part of modern firefighting operations.
Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments.
Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional or legacy construction and occupancies;
- Risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement.
- You need to gain the knowledge and insights and to change and adjust your operating profile in order to safe guard your companies, personnel and team compositions.
- Again strategic firefighting operations; Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type.
The following are quotes from Fire Chief Anthony Aiellos (ret) Hackensack (NJ) Fire Department, Fire Chief during the Hackensack Ford Fire, July, 1988…
“If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner. This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes”.
As a Company or Command Officer, how have your skill sets as well as your attitudes towards combat fire suppression operations have changed. Are you still thinking in terms of “old school” tactics and operations? (Think carefully before you answer….because there’s more to this reply than you think). I’ve asked this question before: “What do you truly know about building construction, fire dynamics and risk profiling?” Have you spent the time to become knowledgeable on rapid changes that have evolved within the building construction industry? Have you taken a good look around your district? If you haven’t, maybe It’s time…remember you have a company or a contingent of companies that are counting on you to make the right call at that next structural fire incident.
Head on over to Firefigher Nation to the Fireground Tactics & Firefighter Safety Forum for a new Ten Minutes in the Street Scenario.
We’ve just posted Ten Minutes in the Street: Stretchin’ the line on the First-Due . Join in on the discussions and dialog on strategies, tactics, command, decision-making and firefighter safety. There’s lots to be gained either by active participation or side-line observations of the postings and view points from a wide lattitude of firefighters, company and command officers from around the United States and abroad. So don’t just sit there, get ready to stretch that line in on the action.
Check out other previously published Ten Minutes in the Street Scenarios HERE
These scenarios make for great drill topics, table top exercises and discussion points for all ranks and personnel
Learning from the Past: Five Alarm Church Fire and Collapse leads to two Line of Duty Deaths (LODD) and Twenty-Nine Fire Fighter Injuries three hours into the incident
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Six years ago on March 13, 2004, two career firefighters with the City of Pittsburg (PA) Fire Bureau were fatally injured during a structural collapse of a bell tower at the Ebenezer Baptist Church fire. Battalion Chief Charles G. Brace (55 years of age) was acting as the Incident Safety Officer and Master Firefighter Richard A. Stefanakis (51 years of age) was performing overhaul, extinguishing remaining hot spots inside the church vestibule when the bell tower collapsed on them and numerous other fire fighters. Twenty-three fire fighters injured during the collapse were transported to area hospitals. A backdraft occurred earlier in the incident that injured an additional six fire fighters. The collapse victims were extricated from the church vestibule several hours after the collapse. The victims were pronounced dead at the scene. A total of twenty-nine other fire fighters were injured during the incident.
The Structure
The church was a National Historic Landmark that was built in 1875. The building was still in use as a house of worship and school at the time of this incident. The exterior construction was masonry with several courses of red brick covered with stone. The building foundation was approximately 120 x 70 feet and approximately 50 feet to the roof line. The pitched roof was covered with asphalt shingles and supported by heavy timber roof trusses. The stone façade exterior of the structure was added during a renovation in the 1930s. This renovation also included the addition of a 115 foot bell tower capped with four spires. The bell tower was not a stand-alone structure, but was supported by steel I-beams with a brick and stone façade that was connected into the southwest corner of the original church.
The church had four levels. The entry level or ‘Cay Cee Level’ had the main assembly area with a performance stage, a kitchen and two bathrooms. The top floor was the ‘Sanctuary Level’ which contained the pulpit, choir section, baptismal pool, and balcony. The basement or ‘King Level’ had several meeting rooms, three bathrooms, a computer room, a boiler room, and an electrical room. (Note: An unfinished sub-basement was also present with three rooms).
The church had an attached annex added to the eastern side of the original structure in 1994. The annex was approximately 60 x 45 feet in size and the three story addition contained an elevator that served the entire church. The annex was attached to the original structure via hallways on each floor with a central elevator shaft. On the first floor was a chapel, five offices and a bathroom. The second floor had nine meeting rooms. The third floor contained a fellowship hall, a kitchen and bathrooms.
The Fire
The fire occurred on a Saturday morning as parishioners were preparing to have breakfast. The church staff noticed smoke coming from an electrical outlet. When the pastor went to investigate in the electrical room located in the basement, he found heavy smoke. Building occupants called 911 and reported an electrical fire. Building occupants had evacuated the church prior to the arrival of fire fighters.
The origin of the fire was in the basement ceiling located in the front southwest corner of the church within an electrical/computer room. The actual ignition mechanism of the fire was unable to be determined. The fire spread horizontally through the concealed space between the basement ceiling and first floor. The fire then spread vertically via concealed wall spaces to the structural members, framing and interior furnishings.
There were approximately 70 fire fighters and 13 apparatus on scene during the 4th alarm response when the bell tower collapse occurred at 1213 hours.
At 0845 hours, an alarm was received for an electrical fire at a church. The 1st Alarm assignment included three engine companies, a truck company, another engine company to serve as the RIT team, an acting Battalion Chief as the IC, a Battalion Chief as the Incident Safety Officer (ISO), a Mobile Air Truck used to fill SCBA air tanks and a Safety Unit that maintains command status and fire fighter accountability boards.
- Engine 4 (E4) was the first company on scene at 0850 hours. The apparatus was positioned in front of the church and the crew reported seeing light to moderate smoke inside the church. The church pastor told the crew that the building had been evacuated and that the smoke was coming from the electrical room in the basement.
- The crew advanced a 1 ¾-in hand line through the front southeast entrance and down the stairs to the basement. Once in the basement, the crew was met with intense heat and thick black smoke. The crew could not see any flame but heard crackling sounds that they localized to the ceiling above them.
- The crew then attempted to open the ceiling, but heavy plaster and lathe construction hindered their efforts.
- Truck 4 (T4) also arrived on scene at 0850 hours and positioned the apparatus in the parking lot. The crew was preparing to raise the aerial ladder to the roof and begin ventilation when the IC ordered them to open the floor on the first floor above the fire.
- Once on the first floor, the crew started using a chainsaw and immediately began to experience problems with the saw stalling. (Note: It is believed that the interior smoke conditions and a lack of oxygen caused the gas-powered saw to stall out rendering it unusable.)
- The crew switched to axes and started chopping the floor. The E4 crew could hear the axe strikes above them from the basement below.
- Engine 5 (E5) arrived on scene at 0851 hours and established water supply to E4. The crew advanced another 1 ¾-in hand line to the basement to back up the E4 crew.
- Engine 10 (E10) arrived on scene at 0852 hours and established a second water supply. The crew advanced a 1 ¾-in hand line to the first floor to back up the T4 crew and assisted in opening the floor.
- Both crews experienced heavy smoke conditions upon entering the church.
A 2nd Alarm was requested for additional manpower by Victim #1 at 0900 hours and the assignment included two engine companies, a truck company and the Deputy Chief. Prior to the 2nd Alarm being dispatched, the Deputy Chief was already en-route and upon arrival at 0900 hours conducted a size-up and was briefed by Officers. The Deputy Chief assumed IC while the Acting Battalion Chief became the Operations Chief and Chief Brace became the ISO.
A 3rd Alarm was requested by the IC at 0911 hours and the assignment included three additional engine companies and the Assistant Chief. Since the exact seat of the fire was still not located, the IC made a special request for Engine 29 (E29) to bring a thermal imaging camera (TIC) to the scene. (Note: At the time of this incident, the department had only one TIC, a unit that was on loan from the manufacturer.)
At 0919 hours (approximately 30 minutes into the incident), the IC called for an evacuation and an accountability check based on the deteriorating interior conditions.
- All firefighters on the interior attack crews reported outside to the Safety Unit for the accountability check. After all personnel were accounted for at 0925 hours, the IC continued the interior attack with crews located in the basement and on the first floor.
- The E12 Officer reported to command that they had located the fire in the basement prior to the accountability check; they were ordered to continue fire suppression with E4 acting as back-up.
- Both crews re-entered the basement and began to extinguish the fire.
- The E12 Officer reported that soon after they began to spray water, the basement went “black, totally black, like the fire left.” He immediately yelled for everyone to back out. Some fire fighters reported hearing a “big, loud whistle” followed by a bang.
At 0928 hours, a major backdraft occurred that injured six fire fighters. The E4 Officer who was standing at the top of the stairwell was blown out of the building into the street by the force of the backdraft. The E4 Officer suffered bruises and facial burns. The E12 crew in the basement was beginning to back out when roaring fire rolled over top of them knocking them down.
- They quickly climbed the steps and exited the church with their bunker gear smoldering. The E12 Officer received burns on his back, hands and face; an E12 fire fighter received hand and facial burns and another E12 fire fighter received facial burns.
- The E11 Officer and E11 fire fighter were venting windows from a ground ladder against the wall on the western exterior when they saw that smoke was puffing in and out of the windows. They heard a load roar and started to run, but the force of the backdraft blew them across the street.
- Fire fighters immediately began administering first aid to the injured and the IC ordered an evacuation and accountability check. The accountability check was quickly conducted by the Safety Unit and all fire fighters were accounted for by 0929 hours. Five of the injured fire fighters were transported by ambulance to a metropolitan trauma/burn center.
- Fire fighters from Truck 14 did not reenter the church but were ordered to set up a positive pressure ventilation fan in a window in the front of the church. (Note: This task was not completed prior to the backdraft.)
A 4th Alarm was requested by the IC at 0931 hours and the assignment included two additional engine companies, the Chief, a Communications Officer, and another Battalion Chief as an additional ISO.
- For the next several hours, both ISOs were working their sectors and updating the IC with progress reports.
- At 0948 hours (approximately 1 hour into the incident), heavy smoke was reported throughout the church and the IC changed tactics to a defensive attack and removed all personnel from the building. Numerous master steam appliances and hand lines were operated from all exposure sides in an attempt to extinguish the fire in the church and protect the annex.
- At 0949 hours, fire was present throughout the western side of the church.
- At 1007 hours, heavy black smoke was observed in the eastern side and at 1009 hours, fire was breaking through the roof.
- At 1031 hours, there was heavy fire throughout the church
- At 1048 hours (approximately 2 hours into the incident), the roof was completely burnt away and companies were continuing with “surround and drown” operations.
- At 1148 hours, the IC ordered all exterior hose streams shut down. One ISO left the immediate scene as instructed by the Assistant Chief to impound the fire gear of the fire fighters injured in the back draft. The IC met with company officers and discussed overhaul operations to extinguish the remaining pockets of fire.
At 1213 hours (approximately 3½ hours into the incident), the church bell tower collapsed sending large chunks of stone, brick, heavy wooden timbers, and other debris crashing through the vestibule trapping both victims under debris.
- Other fire fighters operating in the vestibule recall that heavy timbers and wood boards broke through the ceiling and then the entire ceiling came down. Several fire fighters reported narrowly escaping from the collapse. Fire fighters standing outside of the church were showered with falling debris that injured numerous fire fighters.
- The collapse caused some of the heavy timber roof trusses to fail. Falling roof trusses struck several fire fighters and one fire fighter became trapped. The fire fighters made an urgent radio transmission for assistance and requested rescue equipment. Their call went unanswered due to command being incapacitated.
- At 1214 hours, an arson Officer radioed to dispatch that a major collapse had occurred and requested a 5th alarm for additional manpower to assist with rescue efforts. The 5th alarm assignment included three additional engines and two additional truck companies. Fire fighters immediately began administering first aid and transporting injured fire fighters to ambulances. Upon hearing of the collapse over the radio, the other ISO returned to the immediate scene from impounding the fire gear from injured fire fighters.
- The ISO, assisted by an officer of the Safety Unit, conducted an accountability check a short time after the collapse and verified that Victim #1 and Victim #2 were missing. Twenty three fire fighters were injured during the collapse and transported to area hospitals.
According to the NIOSH Report F2004-017 (HERE) investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should perform the following;
- Ensure that an assessment of the stability and safety of the structure is conducted before entering fire and water-damaged structures for overhaul operations
- Establish and monitor a collapse zone to ensure that no activities take place within this area during overhaul operations
- Ensure that the Incident Commander establishes the command post outside of the collapse zone
- Train fire fighters to recognize conditions that forewarn of a backdraft
- Ensure consistent use of personal alert safety system (PASS) devices during overhaul operations
- Ensure that pre-incident planning is performed on structures containing unique features such as bell towers
- Ensure that Incident Commanders conduct a risk-versus-gain analysis prior to committing fire fighters to an interior operation, and continue to assess risk-versus-gain throughout the operation including overhaul
- Develop standard operating guidelines (SOGs) to assign additional safety officers during complex incidents
- Provide interior attack crews with thermal imaging cameras
- Municipalities should enforce current building codes to improve the safety of occupants and fire fighters
References and follow up;
NIOSH Report F2004-017 March 13, 2004
Career battalion chief and career master fire fighter die and twenty-nine career fire fighters are injured during a five alarm church fire – Pennsylvania
NIOSH REPORT 2009-100: Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program: Leading Recommendations for Preventing Fire Fighter Fatalities, 1998–2005
NIOSH ALERT 2009-146: NIOSH Alert: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters due to Structural Collapse (1999)
Missteps cited in Ebenezer church fire that killed two firefighters. Read more: http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06081/674430-53.stm#ixzz0iLzxql7Z
Rebuilt Hill District church honors firefighters killed in ’04 blaze. Read more: http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06338/743322-53.stm#ixzz0iM086J8A
