Skip to content

Archives for near-miss-reporting

See all posts in the network tagged with near-miss-reporting

Central Ohio FOOLS Training Opportunity

No comments

 

 

Central Ohio FOOLS presents

Adaptive Fireground Management for the Company and Command Officer

 This program presents insights into emerging concepts and methodologies related to the unique challenges during combat structural fire engagement that require refined strategic, tactical and operational modeling due to extreme fire behavior, building construction and occupancy risk. The principles of Adaptive Fire Ground Management (AFM) will be presented along with integrated discussions on:

  • Predictive Risk Management, Command Resiliency, Tactical Patience & integration of Five-Star CommandTM model will be presented with discussion on key Building Construction Systems and Occupancy Risk factors for company effectiveness, operational excellence and firefighter safety
  • The program will integrate key case studies, lessons from the fireground, insights into emerging fire ground tactical theory with a focus of understanding occupancy risk with today’s Buildings on fire.  
  • This is an interactive and thought provoking program that challenges conventional fire service paradigms and explores leading edge theories and fire service discussion points from across the American Fire Service profession.
  • This program is for ALL levels of rank and experience, not just officers.

Friday  March 8th, 2013 • 0900-1600 hrs. Ÿ $50.00 per Student

Registration Opens at 8am Columbus FF Union Hall

Station 67, 379 Broad Street, Columbus, OH 43215

CEU: 6 hrs. Provided by Columbus State Community College | Meet & Greet Immediately Following

 Point of Contact: Jason Kay (614) 65-FOOLS, fools@centralohiofools.com

Registration: www.centralohiofools.com via PayPal

 Visit Buildingsonfire.com ∙ Buildingsonfire on Facebook and Twitter  

Program PDF: HERE: CentralOhio_ FOOLS

Posted by on February 22, 2013 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Fire Fighter Safety, Fire Fighting, Fire Suppression, IAFF, Near-Miss Reporting, NIOSH Reports, NIST, Professional Development, training, training-development • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Near-Miss, with RIT Deployment at Structural Collapse: Canada

No comments

A rapid and fast moving early morning fire in downtown Trenton, Ontario Canada resulted in the subsequent collapse of a three story mixed use commerical and apartment occupancy structure. Published media reports indicated the building was over 130 years of age and was in operation as an adult entertainment establishment on the lower level with multiple occupancy use apartments on the upper floors. The fire displaced 12 residents. The commercial portion of  the building on the number one floor was not operating at the time of the alarm.

For a complete overview of the general fire, refer to the links below for the media links.

Two firefighters were nearly trapped while engaged in primary search and rescue operations as the fire conditions deteriorated and compromise and collapse  conditions began to collapse the wood frame structure.

Pre-incident images clearly depict the typical building profile of a heritage type structure of the late 1880′s vintage with it’s sloping roof profile and window treatments that are evident on both the bravo and delta divisions (many with window mounted air conditioning units that constitute a collapse risk to operating companies on the ground perimeter) . As with many buildings in urban areas, the exterior envelope has been renovated in a manner that added an exterior metal clad panel system that is typically mechanically fastened directly to the facade or to a sub-assembly fastening system. This in effect covers the buildings originating facade, building materials and structural and cosmetic conditions.

Common to original building construction and layouts, the alpha division shows the manner in which the first floor wall has been modified with no indication of window locations and conditions in the upper floors. Common to this renovation technique is the placement of the metal facade directly over existing window openings and framing systems, resulting in either boarded and elimination of the window or the fames and glass still present within the interior room compartments compounding search and rescue assignments.

Sherwood Forest Inn, Image from Google Street View

 The metal exterior cladding masks the ability for arriving companies to identify if the structure is wood frame Type V, ordinary Type III or Brace Frame construction.  The profile and charactoristics of this building profile suggests a buidling of Type III Ordinary construction ( Brick and jost) with load bearing masony construction. This is not the case in this structure as fireground photos further depicted. The various fireground photos suggest that this was a wood frame structure with wood exterior sheathing with some brick masonry features applied to the alpha division. The building envelope is encased in a sheet metal panel cladding system attached the perimeter facade.

 

Delta Division, Google Street View Image

  

Image above shows the degree of interior fire involvement and smoke density. The sheet metal cladding that was applied to the surface facade masks the ability to monitor wall degradation and compromise, retains heat within the building envelope and has independent collapse considerations based upon the manner it is atached to the outer facade further compounding the structural integrity of the buildings wall envelope. Photo by Step Crosier.

In incidents taht have building profiles such as this, conservative risk management, establishment of primary and secondary collapse perimeters along the various divisions is imperative for firefighter safety and apparatus operabilty.

Collapse and failure of the primary structural support systems affecting both interior and exterior structural and infill systems. Photo by Marc Venema

The image above shows the extent of collapse. Look at the various construction features consisting of the original wood plank sheathing, brick facade work, wood framing system and the retrofitted metal paneling facade.  

  • How would you Read the Building based upon the pre incident photos shown at the being of this post?
  • Would you assume the building was a type III or IV structure or a wood frame or brace frame structure?
  • Does each building system have a different bearing on fireground operations, strategies, tactics and operational integrity and company and personnal safety?
  • How much operatoinal time do you have for a primary search and rescue assignment or for deployment and effective location of a fire seat and application of hose streams before you developing compromising conditions with the interior compartments?

 

Look at the brick veneer added to the wood sheathing covered by the metal panels in this image. Photo by Steph Crosier

 

 

 

   

 

Posted by on November 5, 2012 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Collapse, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Fire Suppression, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, fires, Near-Miss Reporting, operations, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

The Ides of March: Learning and Remembrance

No comments
 
Operational Safety

Here are five (5) NIOSH Firefighter LODD Event report summaries for incidents that occurred in the March 4th through the 8th time frame in the years 1998, 2001, 2002, 2008.

Take the time to look over the event summaries, discuss and comment on the factors that lead to the events and the recommendations formulated from the subsequent investigations.

Take the opportunity to identify the common themes and apparent causes that were identified and discuss with your company, team or station, relevant considerations that may have a direct or indirect relationship to your organization, past incident calls or district risk profile.

What are your capabilities?

What are your gaps?

How can you prevent a similar situation from occurring?

Promote questions and dialog related to operational issues such as these;

  • Coordinated multi-company operations; how “coordinated” is your incident scene?
  • Do rapidly changing incident conditions get identified promptly and communicated to Command in rapid succession for actions?
  • How effective is the base line knowledge and skill set of company and command officers in “reading the building”?
  • What is the adequacy of your training for conducting operations above the fire floor?
  • When was the last time you “tested” the effectiveness of your RIT/FAST Team? Can they truly perform under the most demanding of incident conditions?
  • When was the last time you trained or drilled on Fire Behavior or on Building Construction?
  • Are you training on calling the mayday and personal survival techniques?
  • Have you implemented and trained on procedures for rapid and efficient transition in operational modes on the fireground?
  • Do you implement a 360 when applicable and delegate when needed?
  • What parameters are you operating under when assuming risk on the fireground?
  • What drives your incident operations: Are they Tactically Drive or Risk Managed?

Down load the complete NIOSH Reports and expand on the lessons learners and their applicably to your organization and capabilities.

Manlius, New York

Floor Collapse and Fire Conditions:
On March 7, 2002, a 28-year-old male volunteer fire fighter and a 41-year-old male career fire fighter died after becoming trapped in the basement. One firefighter manned the nozzle while second firefighter provided backup on the handline as they entered the house. After entering the structure, the floor collapsed, trapping both victims in the basement.

A career fire fighter captain joining the fire fighters near the time of the collapse was injured trying to rescue one of the fire fighters. Crew members responded immediately and attempted to rescue the victims; however, the heat and flames overcame both victims and eliminated any rescue efforts from the garage entrance.

NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should;

  • Ensure that the Incident Commander is clearly identified as the only individual responsible for the overall coordination and direction of all activities at an incident
  • Ensure that the Incident Commander conveys strategic decisions to all suppression crews on the fireground and continually reevaluates the fire condition
  • Ensure that Incident Command conducts an initial size-up of the incident before initiating fire fighting efforts and continually evaluates the risk versus gain during operations at an incident
  • Ensure that fire fighters from the ventilation crew and the attack crew coordinate their efforts
  • Ensure that fire fighters report conditions and hazards encountered to their team leader or Incident Commander
  • Ensure fire fighters are trained to recognize the danger of operating above a fire

NIOSH REPORT: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200206.html

Wall Collapse and Fire Conditions
On March 7, 2008, two male career fire fighters, aged 40 and 19 were killed when they were trapped by rapidly deteriorating fire conditions inside a millwork facility in North Carolina. The captain of the hose line crew was also injured, receiving serious burn injuries.

The victims were members of a crew of four fire fighters operating a hose line protecting a firewall in an attempt to contain the fire to the burning office area and keep it from spreading into the production and warehouse areas. The captain attempted to radio for assistance as the conditions deteriorated but fire fighters on the outside did not initially hear his Mayday. Once it was realized that the crew was in trouble, multiple rescue attempts were made into the burning warehouse in an effort to reach the trapped crew as conditions deteriorated further.

Three members of a rapid intervention team (RIT) were hurt rescuing the injured captain. One firefighter was located and removed during the fifth rescue attempt. The second firefighter could not be reached until the fire was brought under control.

The fourth crew member had safely exited the burning warehouse prior to the deteriorating conditions that trapped his fellow crew members. Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include radio communication problems (unintelligible transmissions in and out of the fire structure that may have led to misunderstanding of operational fireground communications), inadequate size up and incomplete pre-plan information, a deep-seated fire burning within the floor of the office area that was able to spread into the production and warehouse facility, the procedures used in which operational modes were repeatedly changed from offensive to defensive, lack of crew integrity at a critical moment in the event, and weather which restricted fireground visibility.

NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:

  • Ensure that detailed pre-incident plan information is collected and available when needed, especially in high risk structures
  • Limit interior offensive operations in well-involved structures that are not equipped with sprinkler systems and where there are no known civilians in need of rescue
  • Develop, implement, and enforce clear procedures for operational modes. Changes in modes must be coordinated between the Incident Command, the command staff and fire fighters
  • Ensure that Rapid Intervention Crews (RIC) / Rapid Intervention Teams (RIT) have at least one charged hose line in place before entering hazardous environments for rescue operations
  • Ensure that the incident commander establishes the incident command post in an area that provides a good visual view of the fire building and enhances overall fireground communication
  • Ensure that crew integrity is maintained during fire suppression operations
  • Encourage local building code authorities to adopt code requirements for automatic protection (sprinkler) systems in buildings with heavy fire loads.

NIOSH REPORT http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200807.html

Floor Collapses in Residential Fire - North Carolina

 

Floor Collapse
On March 4, 2002, a 22-year-old male career fire fighter was injured and subsequently died and a 25-year-old male Captain was injured when the floor collapsed while they were fighting a residential fire.

The Captain was transported by ambulance to an area hospital where he was admitted overnight for first- and second-degree burns. The victim was conscious and was transported by medical helicopter to a State medical center where he died 2 days later.

NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should;

  • Ensure that each Incident Commander conducts a size-up of the incident before initiating fire-fighting efforts, after command is transferred, and continually evaluates the risk versus gain during operations at an incident
  • Ensure fire fighters are trained to recognize the dangers of searching above a fire
  • Ensure that an Incident Safety Officer, independent from the Incident Commander, is appointed
  • Ensure that ventilation is closely coordinated with fire attack
  • Ensure that a Rapid Intervention Team is established and in position immediately upon arrival
  • Ensure that adequate numbers of staff are available to operate safely and effectively

NIOSH REPORT http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200211.html

 

Fall Through Floor Fighting a Structure Fire at a Local Residence - Ohio

 

Floor Collapse
On March 8, 2001, a 38-year-old male career fire fighter fell through the floor while fighting a structure fire, and died 12 days later from his injuries. At 1231 hours, Central Dispatch notified the career department of a structure fire with reports of the occupants still inside. The Assistant Chief arrived on the scene along with Engine 70 and assumed Incident Command (IC).

The IC immediately called for the second alarm, began conducting the initial size-up of the structure, and confirmed heavy fire in the left front section. At that time, the neighbors approached the IC and informed him that the occupants were trapped inside. The IC ordered the fire fighters on scene to commence search and rescue efforts, and then verified the stability of the structure through radio and face-to-face communications.

Engine 68 arrived on the scene at approximately 1250 hours with an Assistant Chief and the victim. The Assistant Chief provided tactical command of the fire ground, and along with the victim, conducted search and rescue operations. Other crews conducted searches with a thermal imaging camera of the first floor and basement level of the residence with no sign of any occupants. During these searches the stability of the structure was diminishing due to the intense fire that was now venting through the roof.

Fire fighter #3 and the victim were at the front entrance conducting a defensive attack as the third emergency evacuation signal was sounded. The neighbors were still insisting to the IC and fire fighters that the occupants were trapped inside, and one of the occupants was handicapped. The victim and one other fire fighter conducted another search of the structure.

The heat and flames were now extending from the basement level to the first floor when the fire fighter’s low air alarm sounded. The victim and the fire fighter were backing out of the structure when the floor beneath the victim gave way, causing him to fall through the floor and become trapped in the basement.

Attempts were made from the first floor to rescue the victim by utilizing a handline and an attic ladder, but they were unsuccessful due to the intense heat and flames. Two Rapid Intervention Teams (RIT #1 & RIT #2) were deployed simultaneously from separate entrances into the basement to perform a search and rescue operation for the downed fire fighter. The RITs were able to locate and remove the victim on their initial entry. He sustained third degree burns to over half of his body and died 12 days later.

NIOSH investigators concluded that to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should;

  • Ensure that Incident Command continually evaluates the risk versus gain during operations at an incident
  • Ensure that a separate Incident Safety Officer independent from the Incident Commander is appointed
  • Ensure that fire fighters are trained in the tactics of defensive search
  • Ensure that fire fighters performing fire fighting operations under or above trusses are evacuated as soon as it is determined that the trusses are exposed to fire
  • Ensure consistent use of Personal Alert Safety System (PASS) devices at all incidents and consider providing fire fighters with a PASS integrated into their Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus which provides for automatic operation
  • Ensure that personnel equipped with a radio, position the radio to receive and respond to radio transmissions

NIOSH REPORT: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200116.html

 

Roof Collapse and Fire Conditions
On March 8, 1998, one male fire fighter, the Captain on Engine 57, died while trying to exit a commercial structure after his egress was cut off by the wooden trussed roof that collapsed. Task Force 66 was the first on scene and reported light smoke showing from a one-story commercial building. A ventilation team from Truck 66 proceeded to the roof of the building and commenced roof ventilation. Forcible entry into the building required about 7 ½ to 9 ½ minutes from arrival on scene to force open the two metal security doors in the front. While fire companies waited for the security doors to be opened, fire conditions changed dramatically on the roof.

Fire was coming from the ventilation holes opened by the ventilation crew. As soon as the security doors were opened, three engine crews (Engine 66, Engine 57, and Engine 46) advanced hand lines through the front door in an attempt to determine the origin of the fire. Approximately 15 feet inside the front door, the fire fighters encountered heavy smoke with near zero visibility conditions. The engine crews advanced their hose lines approximately 30 to 40 feet inside the building.

As conditions continued to deteriorate inside the building, the members from the four engine companies involved in the fire attack began to withdraw. During this time the victim became separated from his crew and remained in the building. The victim was subsequently located by the Rapid Intervention Team and cardiopulmonary resuscitation was performed immediately and en-route to the hospital, where the victim was pronounced dead.

NIOSH investigators conclude that, to prevent similar occurrences, fire departments should:

  • Ensure that incident command conducts an initial size up of the incident before initiating fire fighting efforts, and continually evaluate the risk versus gain during operation at an incident
  • Ensure that incident command always maintains close accountability for all personnel at the fire scene
  • Ensure communications are established between the interior and exterior attack crews, e.g., the ventilation crew and the interior fire attack crew should communicate conditions among themselves and back to incident command
  • Ensure that Rapid Intervention Teams are in place before conditions become unsafe
  • Ensure that some type of tone or alert that is recognized by all fire fighters be transmitted immediately when conditions become unsafe for fire fighters
  • Ensure sufficient personnel are available and properly functioning communications equipment are available to adequately support the volume of radio traffic at multiple-responder fire scenes
  • Consider placing a bright, narrow-beamed light at the entry portal to a structure to assist lost or disoriented fire fighters in emergency egress.

NIOSH REPORT: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face9807.html

 

Taking it to the Streets on Firefighternetcast.com

Taking it to the StreetsTM

Download the program from March 16th, 2011  Program

Featured a two part program on Near Miss Firefighter Reporting with Lt. Steve Mormino, FDNY (ret) and Capt. CJ Haberkorn, Denver (CO) Fire Department and  special guest, Captain Michael Long, who provided a personal Near-Miss Event account you won’t want to miss.

Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.

  • Download the program from March 16th, 2011  Program on Firefighternetcast.com HERE
  • Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE

Taking it to the StreetsTM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by Christopher Naum and is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production, © 2010-2012 All Rights Reserved

Posted by on March 7, 2012 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, command-leadership, company officer, Fire Fighter Safety, firefighting-operations, Health and Safety, History Repeating Event, Near-Miss Reporting, NIOSH Reports • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Three Firefighters Injured in Residential Collapse

No comments

Cherokee County Fire and Emergency Services

 

Cherokee County Fire and Emergency Services

Cherokee County (GA) Fire and Emergency Services and Woodstock (GA) Fire Department personnel responded to a structure fire at 811 Commons Court, located in the Kingston Square Subdivision, off Highway 92, just east of Woodstock (GA) sunday night for a reported fire in a residential structure; with reports of trapped occupants. During suppression operations, three Cherokee County firefighters were trapped in the basement for a short period of time due the catastrophic collapse of a front wall-floor assembly resulting in the collapse of the entry porch floor system on the alpha division.

Cherokee County 911 received the call of the fire at 1:30 Sunday regarding a structure fire with possible entrapment. Firefighters quickly responded to the scene to find the house fully involved and began a defensive attack. Two Cherokee County firefighters and one Woodstock firefighters were standing on the porch of the structure when it collapsed. The three firefighters were pulled from the burning structure and were later taken by ambulance to Marietta’s Kennestone Hospital.

According to information posted on the Cherokee County Fire and Emergency Services web site and other published media reports,  two Cherokee County Firefighters were treated and released and one firefighter  is still in ICU at a local hospital, struggling to survive; with smoke inhalation and lung injuries resulting from the falling bricks that struck him during the collapse.

According to one report, the three engine company firefighters were operating a handline for an exended period of time on the porch of the home  (Alpha side) when the floor and wall assembly gave way beneath them, sending them tumbling into the basement below. The adjacent wall and canopy fell on top of the firefighters after falling into the area below.  An aerial view of the residence shows a raised ranch style structure with a garage and basement configuration below the main floor. According to public records, the single family wood frame house was built in 1986 and was comprised of 1,910 square feet of occupied space, with three bredrooms.

Aerial View of the Residential Occupancy (Bing)

Unfortunately due to the degree of fire involvment and susequent collapse, firefighters were unable to reach the elderly couple, a 78 year old man and his 77 year old wife, who perished in the early morning fire. The couple’s daughter and her 25 year old son were also living with the couple and they escaped without injury.

We posted some extensive information over at CommandSafety.com related to two past LODD events from 2006 and 2009 along with a number of pertainent informational links realted to floor collapse, firefighter near miss events involving floor compromise and collapse.

Take some time to link over to our sister site and check out the information. (HERE)

We’ll follow up on this event to see if we can gain further insights related to the structural conditions, construction features and contributing factors that lead to the floor collapse.

 
 
 
 

 

Posted by on August 30, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Collapse, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, Near-Miss Reporting • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Combustible Metals and Officer Safety

No comments

NIOSH recently issued its report on a recycling facility fire that occurred on July 13, 2010, in which seven career fire fighters were injured while fighting a fire at a large commercial structure containing recyclable combustible metals. At 2345 hours, 3 engines, 2 trucks, 2 rescue ambulances, an emergency medical service (EMS) officer and a battalion chief responded to a large commercial structure with heavy fire showing. Within minutes, a division chief, 2 battalion chiefs, 3 engines, 3 trucks, 4 rescue ambulances, 2 EMS officers and an urban search and rescue team were also dispatched.

An offensive fire attack was initially implemented but because of rapidly deteriorating conditions, operations switched to a defensive attack after about 12 minutes on scene. Ladder pipe operations were established on the 3 street accessible sides of the structure. Approximately 40 minutes into the incident, a large explosion propelled burning shrapnel into the air, causing small fires north and south of structure, injuring 7 fire fighters, and damaging apparatus and equipment. Realizing that combustible metals may be present, the incident commander ordered fire fighters to fight the fire with unmanned ladder pipes while directing the water away from burning metals. Approximately 2 ½ hours later, two small concentrated areas remained burning and a second explosion occurred when water contacted the burning combustible metals. This time no fire fighters were injured.

Contributing Factors

  • Unrecognized presence of combustible metals
  • Unknown building contents
  • Unrecognized presence of combustible metals
  • Use of traditional fire suppression tactics
  • Darkness

This incident brings to light the many operational and safety issues affecting operational deployment and command and control of incident involving combustible metals. These incidents require a clear understanding of the tactical protocols required to safely manage and mitigate fire incidents.

Take the time to discuss this event with your company or condense and distribute within your battalion, division or organization.

Operational and Training Questions:

  • What training and education have you attained on combustible metals fire? Are you prepared to handle the first-due or initial command?
  • How prepared are your Company Officers and Incident Commanders in addressing Strategic and Tactical operations at incidents involving combustible metals?
  • Does your fire department, company or jurisdiction have the resources to command, control and mitigate such an event?
  • Are you aware of properties, occupancies and structures in your jurisdiction that contain process, store or have primary or ancillary combustible metals risk, hazards or exposure concerns?
  • Are they pre-fire planned, are those plans up to-day?
  • Are you and your organization prepared?
  • What are the gaps within your company of department related to strategy, tactics, command and control of incident involving combustible metals fire?
  • Do you have protocols and SOPs for addressing combustible metal fires in various occupancy situations? How about for vehicles and MVAs?
  • Take the time to do an on-demand tabletop discussion or expanded exercise

Remember its not only the Building and Occupancy Issues…but mobile also;

Posted by on August 22, 2011 • Filed under: Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Fire Fighter Safety, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, fires, hazmat, Near-Miss Reporting, NIOSH Reports • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Near-Miss Report of the Week

No comments

Firefighternearmiss.com The Report of the Week

As an officer, you need to stay abreast of operational issues and situations in order to be knowledgeable and conversant with the variables that may affect company deployments and subsequent operations. The National Fire Fighter Near Miss Reporting System (FFNMRS) has a vast collection of resources that are a few keystrokes and links away.

One of the most useful tools in the FFNMRS Tool Box of resources is the Near-Miss Report of the Week (ROTW). The direct link to the page is here.

Take some time to look over the content and subject matter available to you in the form of the weekly publication. The information provides insights and examples of situational near miss events and close calls that provide the lessons learned so that, when confronted with similar precursors or subtle indications, you may be able to draw from the ROTW and the from the lessons and insights of other Near Miss Reports that may prevent a similar close-call/near miss event or from escalating into a more serious event.

Take the time to review the ROTW, sign up for the weekly email delivery and most importantly- read the reports and integrate them into your training, drills, discussions, tabletops, chalk board or podcast talks. Get the FFNMRS reports embedded into your psyche.

Here’s what was sent out this week….

Multiple units responding to the same incident from different directions creates the potential for unscheduled arrivals at intersecting points. These points are most frequently intersections that are in one form or another controlled by devices ranging from stop signs to traffic lights. In this week’s ROTW, report 11-179, reminds us that a green light does not necessarily guarantee the way is safe to proceed.

[ ] Brackets denote reviewer de-identification.

“A municipal ALS equipped engine and a third service county ALS ambulance were dispatched by the same dispatch, on the same radio channel, to a local park for a trauma patient. While enroute, and less than two miles from our station, we approached a heavy traffic intersection, which is blind to the south side. Upon approach, the [brand deleted] signal preemption system (which both the engine and ambulance are equipped with) was delayed in capturing the light. The driver of the engine began to reduce speed and decelerate toward the intersection. As we approached the intersection we captured the light with the signal preemption system, giving us a GREEN light, but for whatever reason, the driver of the engine made a complete stop at the intersection. Just then the ambulance blew through the intersection, not stopping for the RED light. To our surprise, we didn’t hear or see this ambulance until they were in the intersection. Only because of the driver’s situational awareness and intuition (gut feeling) did we come to a complete stop to avoid a collision.”

Right of way rules, line of sight approaches, traffic light pre-emption devices and emergency response SOPs all support apparatus arriving at the scene of an emergency call. Despite all these efforts, human factor plays a role in the safe arrival of all units to their dispatched destination.

Once you have read the entire account of 11-179, and the related reports, consider the following with your colleagues.

  1. Many departments now have specific rules requiring units to stop at all red lights during emergency response. If your department has such rules in effect, are there any other recommendations for intersection travel to consider?
  2. The reporter states the driver’s “situational awareness and intuition” contributed to collision avoidance. How large of a role do you believe the two factors played? How do you promote/teach the effect of the “gut feeling” in your driver training sessions?
  3. How often do you encounter intersection situations with crossing emergency vehicle traffic? Given your estimate, what is your assessment of the likelihood of a collision based on the frequency?
  4. If your agency uses traffic pre-emptive signaling, how often is the system calibrated/fault-checked to ensure accuracy?
  5. How many “blind side” intersections exist in your response area? What is the significance of knowing where they are?

Emergency response ranges from high frequency, high risk to low frequency and high risk depending on how many calls for service a department receives. Reducing the risk associated, whether the frequency is high or low is an essential element of keeping our promise to the communities we serve. Doing your part by keeping your speed under control and being on the lookout for hazardous situations like intersections, will promote getting you to the scene quickly and returning for the next run.

Related Reports – Topical Relation: Driving: Intersections   

Experience a near miss with another piece of apparatus while responding? Submit your report to www.firefighternearmiss.com today.

Note: The questions posed by the reviewers are designed to generate discussion and thought in the name of promoting firefighter safety. They are not intended to pass judgment on the actions and performance of individuals in the reports.

To Sign up to receive the Near-Miss Report of the Week by email, forward  your request to atippett@iafc.org

Firefighternearmiss.com is funded by a grant from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Assistance to Firefighters Grant program. Founding dollars were also provided by Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company. The project is managed by the International Association of Fire Chiefs and supported by FireFighterCloseCalls.com in mutual dedication to firefighter safety and survival.

We’ve provided some direct links from the ROTW webpage here, but there is a lot more on the firefighternearmiss.com site.

Firefighternearmiss.com

FFNMR – Report of the Week Archives  [Direct Link, HERE]

Page 1 of 7 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
File Title File Size File Description
  • ROTW Binder, Cover and Spine Label
    		•  990 KB Cover and Spine Label to make your own ROTW Binder.
  • 2006 Report of the Week Library
    		•  14.8 MB Complete 2006 Report of the Week Library. ZIP File.
  • ROTW 122107: What’s in your pockets? (07-1116)
    		•  35 KB FF becomes entangled in wires.
  • ROTW 121407: The deafening silence of culture. (07-1142)
    		•  38 KB Safety issues overlooked during emergency response.
  • ROTW 120707: ‘Sun’ and ‘Block’ take on a new meaning. (07-1119)
    		•  36 KB Sunshine fould driver’s vision.
  • ROTW 113007: Use 3D for vacant and burning: distance, defensive, deluge. (05-618)
    		•  49 KB Fighting fire in a vacant structure, concerns addressed.
  • ROTW 111607: Probies are not expendable. (07-776)
    		•  35 KB Aerial stabilizer narrowly misses firefighter.
  • ROTW 110907: Nearly done in by our own kind. (07-1108)
    		•  35 KB Re-opening a roadway requires coordination.
  • ROTW 110207: The importance of using wheel locks and its effects. (06-173)
    		•  37 KB Wildland/urban interface fire reveals personnel/equipment needs.
  • ROTW 102607: Contractor Mishap. (07-1043)
    		•  37 KB Apparatus electrified during test by contractor.
  • ROTW 101907: Asleep at the wheel and no one noticed. (07-752)
    		•  35 KB Driver falls asleep on EMS call.
  • ROTW 101207: Faster than you can call a Mayday… (05-567)
    		•  38 KB Roof collapse ignites bedroom injuring firefighter.
  • ROTW 100507: It’s not ‘just a car fire…’ (07-800)
    		•  28 KB Engine contacts downed powerline at accident scene.
  • ROTW 092807: Intuition adverts danger. (05-553)
    		•  38 KB Structure fire in concealed ceiling causes collapse, nearly trapping interior crews.
  • ROTW 092107: Blowout on the front apron. (07-910)
    		•  34 KB Tire blows following apparatus check.
  • ROTW 091407: Leave your eyes to Z87.1. (07-964)
    		•  35 KB Safety glasses do their job during extrication.
    Page 1 of 7 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  

     For some Program insights, check out the recent posting on CommandSafety.com: National Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System; Untapped Resource

    or go Directly to the Firefighternearmiss.com site, HERE

    Clip from Home Page

     These are some of the Site File Categories;

    National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting System on Facebook, HERE

    For a direct point of contact at the NFFNMRS;

    Rynnel Gibbs, Program Coordinator
    National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System
    4025 Fair Ridge Drive    Fairfax, VA 22033
    P: 703-537-4858     F: 703-273-0920    rgibbs@iafc.org      www.firefighternearmiss.com

    Related Posts with Thumbnails
    Posted by on July 15, 2011 • Filed under: Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, command-leadership, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Crew Management, Fire Fighter Safety, firefighter-safety-health, History Repeating Event, Near-Miss Reporting • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , ,