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Knowledge of Building Construction; Are you Prepared?

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Check out the latest posting at our sister site Commandsafety.com for the latest release of Buildingsonfire.com’s Building Construction Training and Lecture Series for 2010. Recently updated with a series of new seminar and training program topics addressing the emerging training and educational needs of the fire service, these programs provide timely and relevant information and insights on Building Construction, Command Risk Management, Dynamic and Extreme Fire Behavior, Occupancy Situational Awareness, Engineered Structural Systems and Fire Fighter Safety.

These programs also present and integrate cutting edge research and emerging concepts on Tactical Patience, Tactical Entertainment, Command Compression, Structural Anatomy of Buildings, Five Star Command Model, Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling and much more.  You can download the training brochure at the following link also; Building Construction Training Brochure 2010

What’s your level of knowledge, skills and education on Building Construction, Fire Dynamics, Extreme Fire Behavior, Occupancy Profiling and Combat Fire Engagement?

Posted by on July 2, 2010 • Filed under: BECOME SAFE, building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Fire Dynamics, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, Professional Development, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics, training, training-development, training-fire-rescue-topics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Learning the Lessons from the Past

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Today is June 17th, to many of you, today is unlike so many other days. Whether it’s going on or off-shift, going to your “day” job; common rituals and activities define our day and are a part of your typical schedule or routine, activities, occupation, trade, leisure or everyday jobs. On any given day, we expect some fairly simple and basic things; Simple and basic from a firefighter’s perspective that is. Let’s clearly put this discussion into firefighter terms and context. We hope that we have a busy day, for the most part; that the alarms and incidents allow us to practice our skills and do what we do best. Deep down inside, we also hope that we have a good “job” come in that allows us to work the job, to fight the fight and put into practice all that we train and prepare to do, we the bell hits and we are called to duty.

Not that we hope or wish undue miss-fortune, distress or sorrow on anyone, but, IF a fire is going to happen, let it happen on my shift, my tour or while I’m at the firehouse and able to make the first-due. It’s a pretty fundamental hierarchy of need, and it’s what makes us tick at times. Because of who we are and what we do. Right?

But today is much more than that. June 17th marks the anniversary of two significant fire service incidents that resonate with the values, doctrine and philosophy that define the principles and tradition of the Fire Service.

Both of these incidents resulted in firefighter line-of-duty deaths at seemingly routine fires, in relatively ordinary structures and occupancies, each with unusual building construction features and conditions that would contribute to the adverse circumstances of the incident operations, and ultimately contribute to the LODD events.

Hotel Vendome Fire-1972
On June 17th, 1972, a typical routine day was unfolding for the Jakes in the Boston Fire Department. At 14:35 hours, Box 1571 was received at Boston Fire Alarm Office. It would be the first of four alarms required to extinguish an intense fire at the former Hotel Vendome on Commonwealth Avenue at Dartmouth Street, City of Boston, Massachusetts. It took nearly three hours to contain the blaze. The four alarm fire required a compliment of 16 engine companies, 5 ladder companies, 2 aerial towers and 1 heavy rescue company, with all companies operating with a full complement of personnel staffing.

Following extensive and strenuous suppression operations, the BFD commenced routine overhaul operation. Then, at 17:28 hours, without warning, all five floors of a 40 by 45 foot section southeast corner of the building collapsed, burying a ladder truck and 17 firefighters beneath a two-story pile of brick, mortar, plaster, wood and debris.

More than any other event in the three hundred year history of the Boston Fire Department, the Vendome tragedy exemplifies the risk intrinsic to the firefighting profession and the accompanying courage required in the performance of duty. Nine firefighters were killed on that day, eight more injured; eight women widowed, twenty-five children lost their fathers; a shocked city mourned before the sympathetic eyes of the entire nation.

The Hotel Vendome fire and the Nine Line-of-duty deaths, two Company Officers and seven firefighters
• Lieutenant THOMAS J. CARROLL, E-32.
• Lieutenant JOHN E. HANBURY, JR., L-13.
• Firefighter THOMAS W. BECKWITH, E-32.
• Firefighter JOSEPH E. BOUCHER, JR., E-22.
• Firefighter CHARLES E. DOLAN, L-13.
• Firefighter JOHN E. JAMESON, E-22.
• Firefighter RICHARD B. MAGEE, E-33.
• Firefighter PAUL J. MURPHY, E-32.
• Firefighter JOSEPH P. SANIUK, L-13.

Built in 1871 and massively expanded in 1881, the Hotel Vendome was a luxury hotel located in Boston’s Back Bay, just north of Copley Square. During the 1960s, the Vendome suffered four small fires. In 1971, the year of the original building’s centennial, the Vendome was purchased. The new owners opened a restaurant called Cafe Vendome on the first floor, and began renovating the remaining hotel into condominiums and a shopping mall.

Although the cause of the original fire was not known, the subsequent collapse was attributed to the failure of an overloaded seven-inch steel column whose support had been weakened when a new duct had been cut beneath it, exacerbated by the extra weight of water used to fight the fire on the upper floors.

References and Documents
• Boston Fire Department, HERE
• Vendome, Wikipedia, HERE
• Building Photos and the Firefighter’s Memorial, HERE
• Gendisasters, Historical Perspective, HERE
• Boston Globe, HERE
• Boston FD Ladder 15, HERE

FDNY Father’s Day Fire-2001
The relative calm of a quiet Sunday, Father’s Day, June 17th , 2001 was broken at 14:19 hours with a phone call to the FDNY Queens Central Office reporting a fire at 12-22 Astoria Blvd, in the Astoria Section of Queens, New York. For almost 80 years, the Long Island General Supply store has been a fixture in the Long Island City section of Queens serving local contractors and residents with all of their hardware needs. Unfortunately, that included propane tanks and other flammable liquids.

Two structures were involved in this incident. Both buildings were interconnected on the first floors as well as the cellars.

• Both structures were built prior to 1930 of ordinary (Type III) construction, and were two stories in height, each with a full cellar.
• Building 1 measured 2035 square feet and was triangular in shape.
• Building 2 measured 1102 square feet and was rectangular in shape.
• Building 1 and Building 2 shared a common or party wall and were interconnected on the first floor and the cellar.Building to building access in the cellar was through a fire door. The fire door was blocked open to allow free movement between the cellars which were used for storage. The hardware stored occupied the first floor and cellars of both buildings. Building 1 had two apartments on the second floor.

Building 2 had an office and storage space on the second floor. Note: A third uninvolved building was attached to the west side of Building 2. The flat roof system sheathing consisted of 5/8-inch plywood covered by felt paper and rubber roof membrane. The foundation was constructed out of stone and mortar. The support system was a combination of steel masonry posts/lolly columns and wooden support beams.

FDNY Units arrived within 5 minutes of the dispatch and gave the signal for a working fire. Fire fighters were making good progress but at 14:48 hours something went terribly wrong. Witnesses on the scene report hearing a small explosion followed by a huge blast. The shock wave from the blast blew d
own every fire fighter on the street and knocked down the exposure 1 wall onto the sidewalk, right on top of fire fighters venting the building.

As members started sifting through the rubble, the chief ordered a second alarm followed almost immediately by a fourth alarm when a radio transmission was received from FF Brian Fahey from Rescue 4. He was in the basement under tons of collapsed material.

“I’m trapped in the basement by the stairs. Come get me.” This was a battle cry to everyone on the scene. Every capable member frantically began removing debris to try and get to Brian and the others. The chief ordered more help. Numerous special calls were made.

There were 144 pieces of apparatus at the scene: 46 engines, 33 ladders, 16 battalion chiefs, 2 deputy chiefs, all 5 rescues, 7 squads, and many more. In fact, with the exception of the fire boats, the JFK hose wagon, the Decon unit, and the thawing units, every type of special unit was at the scene.

Even with the vast resources of the Department, the task took several hours. The members that were on the sidewalk were quickly recovered.
• Fire fighters Harry Ford (R4) and John Downing (L163) were removed in traumatic arrest and brought to Elmhurst Hospital were they succumbed from their injuries.
• Back at the scene members still were trying to get to Brian while others were trying to put out the smoky fire. The battle went through the afternoon and into the evening.
• The fire was being fueled by some of the flammables in the building.
• After about four hours they finally reached the basement, but again, it was too late. FDNY Firefighter Brian died in the Line-of-duty.

Subsequent investigations revealed that two local kids were in the rear yard of the building when unbeknownst to them they knocked over a can of gasoline. The gasoline ran under the rear door, into the basement eventually finding an ignition source in the form of the water heater.

When the water heater kicked in, it ignited the gasoline. As fire fighters began working in the building the fire caused the explosion of a large propane tank illegally stored in the basement. The resulting blast leveled the building and caused what will be forever known as the worst Father’s Day in FDNY’s history. (Excerpt of the event description published in www.fdnewyork.com).

The supreme sacrifice was made that day by;
• FDNY Firefighter Harry S. Ford, Rescue Co.4
• FDNY Firefighter Brain D. Fahey, Rescue Co. 4
• FDNY Firefighter John Downing, Ladder Co. 163

Take the time to read the NIOSH Report, and learn the lessons from that event

References
NIOSH Report F2001-23, HERE
FDNEWYORK, HERE
Steve Spak, Photos, HERE
The Late, FDNY Firefighter Andy Fredrick’s Account, HERE
Online Service Accounts and Coverage, HERE
Buffalo, NY FD North Division Street Explosion, HERE, HERE and HERE

Note: The Buffalo, NY, Fire Department experienced a similar event on December 27, 1983 in North Division Street Fire and Explosion that resulted in five firefighter line-of-duty deaths.

As BFD firefighters arrived at the scene of a reported propane leak in a three-story radiator warehouse (Type III ordinary construction), a massive explosion occurred, killing five firefighters instantly and injuring nine others, three of them critically. The force of the blast blew BFD Ladder 5’s tiller aerial 35 feet across the street into the front yard of a dwelling. BFD Engine 1’s pumper was also blown across the street with the captain and driver pinned in the cab with burning debris all around them. Engine 32’s engine was blown up against a warehouse across a side street and covered with rubble.

Two civilians were also killed and another 60 to 70 were injured. While operating at the rescue effort, another 19 firefighters were injured. The blast and ensuing fire ignited 14 residences and damaged as many as 130 buildings over a four block area. The explosion occurred when an employee was moving an illegal 500-lb. propane tank with a forklift truck and dropped it, breaking off a valve. The gas leaked out, found an ignition source, and the explosion occurred. Killed in the line of duty were all assigned to Buffalo FD Ladder Company 5; F/F Michael Austin, F/F Michael Catanzaro, F/F Matthew Colpoys, F/F James Lickfield and F/F Anthony Waszkielewicz.

Taking it to the Streets
The adage that the fire service has more recently adopted states; “There are no “routine calls”; referring to the safety consciousness that all responding companies should endeavor to consider when responding to an incident, that all too often appears; upon our arrival to be routine in every sense of the word. Whether it’s an alarm system activation, a report of food on the stove, a report of a smoke detector alarming or a report of a gas odor or leak, we have a tendency to treat a lot of things as equal and very routine based upon the periodicity and frequency of the alarm type and the typical, inconsequential nature of the incident outcome or the commonality of the fire and suppression efforts that routinely are employed by our operating companies.

We seem to do a lot of things at times out of common practice and repetition, you know; “We’ve always done it that way…” syndrome. There’s a resonating theme that is making its way around the fire service dealing with an apparent “culture of extinguishment” and the suggested and inaccurately described “diametrically opposing” fire service safety culture promoted by those on the “Dark Side”

The daily experience, expectations, our comfort zone;
• We’re pretty good at what we do-Regularly….
• We develop profound habits and methods…
• We treat a lot of things as equal in many respects…
• We’ve grown accustomed to certain operational modes..
• We don’t really think anything is going to happen to us, certainly nothing so adverse that I don’t go home after the call.

Nothing is going to happen to YOU; it happens to someone else….
BUT to everyone else-YOU are the other Guy!

On any give day, at any give alarm, the dynamics around us at times may be in or out of our direct control. We may not be able to see what the cards have in store for us, BUT we must ensure we use every fragment of training, fortitude, knowledge, skills, courage, bravery, insights, luck and sometimes (other divine) intervention to get us through.

Take the time today or this evening to visit and download selective reports from the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program. The lessons learned from these reports and the important recommendations that are written as a direct result of the supreme sacrifices made by our brother and sister firefighters that died in the line of duty speaks volumes. In reality, the words written in these reports are the words from our fallen, they convey the messages to correct deficiencies, close gaps and increase and enhance our operations, training, education, administration, management, supervision, resources, equipment, protocols, preparedness, perspectives, culture and values.

When you look over these events over the years, it doesn’t take long to identify that many LODD events share similarities, and that specific incident events, deficiencies, outcomes and recommendations are identical in every way, except for the fire department name and geographical location. In other words, we have History Repeating Events (HRE). Events that resonate with common issues, apparent and contributing causes and operational factors that share legacy issues that the fire service fails to identify, relate to and implement. In other words, we fail a times to learn from the past, or we make a deliberate chose to ignore those lessons due to other internal or external influences, pressures, authority, beliefs, values or viewpoints. We make choices and we determine our direction, path and destiny.

History repeating itself is nothing new to society, it is apparent and self revealing in much of written history and recorded legacies, and as defined by a popular quote states; “Those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it.”

An interesting series of quotes from noted historian Gerda Lerner states the following;
“What we do about history matters. The often repeated saying that those who forget the lessons of history are doomed to repeat them has a lot of truth in it. But what are ‘the lessons of history’? The very attempt at definition furnishes ground for new conflicts. History is not a recipe book; past events are never replicated in the present in quite the same way. Historical events are infinitely variable and their interpretations are a constantly shifting process. There are no certainties to be found in the past.”

She goes on to state; “We can learn from history how past generations thought and acted, how they responded to the demands of their time and how they solved their problems. We can learn by analogy, not by example, for our circumstances will always be different than theirs were. The main thing history can teach us is that human actions have consequences and that certain choices, once made, cannot be undone. They foreclose the possibility of making other choices and thus they determine future events.”

We must learn for the part, so that we limit or eradicate the opportunity for History Repeating events aligning themselves again and providing emergency incident circumstances to lead to another line-of-duty death, injuries or large loss incident.

History Repeating Events share may common and familiar themes. Research exemplifies the following shared commonality causes related to History Repeating Events;
• A lack of pre-incident planning
• Ineffective or lack of risk management
• No Incident action plan• Free-lancing
• Inadequate Training/Skills• Faulted Strategies and/or Tactics
• Deficient Resources/staffing
• Lack of Accountability• Insufficient Fire Suppression versus Fire Loading affect• Ineffective or non-existent Supervisory oversight
• No effective span of control / management
• Not understanding Building Construction
• Not understanding Structural Assemblies and Systems
• Not understanding Construction & Occupancy factors• Not understanding Engineered Building Systems and relationship to Tactics
• Lacking understanding of Fire Behavior and Fire Dynamics
• Ineffective Company level supervision
• Lack of Situational Awareness• Command Dysfunction
• Failure to implement periodic in-situ reassessments

Think about your actions, think about what you can do to make a difference or to alter or change the course of a situation. We sometimes have a greater hand in destiny and how the cards are dealt than we think. Take a look and discuss the HRE causal factors listed above, share these with you officers, with you company level personnel or the department as a whole. Pose the question, “What do these mean to you?” See what the different feedback might illustrate and how they may be viewed from a different set of perspectives, generations or rank and assignments.

Safety Considerations for Operations involving Ordinary or Heavy Timber Type Construction.
In support of the two (2) incident events discussed in this article related to the Hotel Vendome and the Astoria Queens Hardware Store Explosion. Both of these structures were Type III, Ordinary Construction. This is a good opportunity for you to introduce yourself to or refresh yourself on the Safety Considerations for Operations involving Ordinary or Heavy Ti…

A comprehensive power point program is available for download from the Near Miss Reporting System web site, HERE

An accompanying narrative report and its alignment with a Near Miss Report related to a type III occupancy and incident response and close call support the power point presentation, HERE

Don’t forget, the Near Miss Reporting System, HERE, has exemplary resources, case studies, close calls and lessons to be learned and institutionalized. The same is true about the resources at the NFFF Everyone Goes Home Program, HERE and the IAFC Fire/EMS Safety week web site HERE.

Take the time to learn something about Ordinary or Heavy Timber Type Construction. As I continue to advocate;  Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety. No more History Repeating Events!
Here’s a closing quote from the late Senator Robert F. Kennedy;“Few will have the greatness to bend history itself; but each of us can work to change a small portion of events, and in the total of all those acts will be written the history of this generation.”

Be safe, have a great tour or stay at the firehouse today or this evening.

Orginally published during  2009 Safety Health and Survival Week.

Posted by on June 17, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Collapse, FDNY, Fire Dynamics, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, LODD, major-incidents, NIOSH Reports, Occupancies, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

From Waldbaum’s to Hackensack- Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety

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6-15-2009 7-39-58 PM

From Waldbaum’s to Hackensack- Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety

“From Waldbaum’s to Hackensack- Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety”; I still find it surprising during my travels around the country lecturing and presenting programs on building construction, that when the audience was asked, “What do the Walbaum’s Fire and Hackensack fire share in common?”, the response typically were blank stares. The more seasoned and experienced veterans (translation; Older firefighters) when present, were able to convey some information on the subject. But yet, the true essence of the basic incident particulars and the lessons learned fail to be fully conveyed. We’re not remembering the past!

I’ve spoken on numerous occasions about History Repeating Events (HRE), and the common themes related to LODD. Events that resonate with common issues, apparent and contributing causes and operational factors that share legacy issues that the fire service fails to identify, relate to and implement. In other words, we fail a times to learn from the past, or we make a deliberate choice to ignore those lessons due to other internal or external influences, pressures, authority, beliefs, values or viewpoints. We make choices and we determine our direction, path and destiny.

When you look over these LODD events over the years (NIOSH, NFPA, USFA Reports), it doesn’t take long to identify that many LODD events share similarities, and that specific incident events, deficiencies, outcomes and recommendations are identical in every way, except for the fire department name and geographical location. In other words, we have History Repeating Events (HRE).

What have we learned from the past? What is it that we’re passing down to each incoming recruit class and probationary firefighter? What are Company and Commanding Officers recalling and considering in their dynamic risk assessment, size-up and decision-making (IAP) process when looking at a particular building, occupancy and fire? Are mission critical operational elements & HRE factors being recollected? (Naturalistic/ Recognition-Prime Decision-making).

Are the fire service legacies of the past and the lessons learned from those incidents and the sacrifices that were made transcending time? Or are they lost in the immediacy of day to day challenges, issues and operations. Or are these events, lessons and operations issues dismissed and disregarded as a result of their “time and place” not being relevant to “today’s” operations and modern fire service advancements.

The reality is, we, the present generation of veteran firefighters and officers at times neglect or fail to recognize the importance of passing along the lessons of our life’s journey through our fire service careers, the events of our day and the profound tough lessons and sacrifices learned the hard way. We sometimes need a receptive, sympathetic and compassionate audience that is willing to listen, hear and comprehend the messages conveyed. There needs to be a high degree of empathy related to these past History Repeating Events. For each event, each and every line of duty death has a message and a Legacy of Operational Safety.

Throughout the past thirty-three years (1977-2010), over 4,000 firefighters have lost their lives in the course and conduct of their duties as firefighters and officers within the fire service. Although there are numerous LODD fire incidents and events that could be discussed, all distinguished and exemplified by heroism, nobility, cause and fortitude. There are four that stand out when related to the lessons learned and the significance and impact each LODD incident had at the time to the national fire service.

Each of these incidents also have significance as they relate to the building, occupancy, use, construction features, inherent structural systems, fire behavior and fire dynamics; coupled with interrelated elements of strategic and tactical fire suppression operations and incident management . Again, “Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety”.

The Waldbaum’s Supermarket Fire: Brooklyn, New York August 3, 1978
Six LODD
Six FDNY firefighters died at this fire when the wood bowstring truss roof collapsed, 34 were injured. The fire started at 8:40 hrs. in Waldbaum’s Supermarket, Ave. Y and Ocean Ave., Sheepshead Bay, Brooklyn, NY. Nearly 23 electricians, plumbers etc ., were in the process of renovating the building, while it was still open and operating when the fire started in the mezzanine area. An All hands was transmitted at 08:49 hrs. the 2nd alarm at 09:02 hrs. Shortly after 09:20 hrs., with 20 firefighters on the roof a crackling sound was heard and the center portion of the bow string trussed roof fell into the smoke and flames. A total of 12 firefighters fell into the inferno, six were rescued, six died in the line of duty.

Honor and Remembrance
• Lt. James Cutillo, 33rd Battalion
• Firefighter Charles Bouton, Ladder Co. 156
• Firefighter William O’Conner, Ladder Co. 156
• Firefighter James P McManus, Ladder Co. 153
• Firefighter George Rice, Ladder Co. 153
• Firefighter Harold F. Hastings, Ladder Co.153

Hackensack Ford: Hackensack, New Jersey July 1, 1988
Five LODD
Five fire fighters from the Hackensack, New Jersey Fire Department were killed in the line-of duty while they were engaged in interior fire suppression efforts at an automobile dealership when portions of the building’s wood bowstring truss roof collapsed.

Honor and Remembrance
• Captain Richard Williams
• Lt. Richard Reinhogen
• Firefighter William Krejsa
• Firefighter Leonard Radumski
• Firefighter Stephen Ennis

Note: The 1988 Hackensack Ford Fire occurred almost ten years to the date of the Waldbaum’s FDNY Fire in 1978. (History Repeating Event…we forgot something along the way regarding bow string trussed roof systems and fire impingement…)

As a result of this incident passage of a NJ State law mandating the clear demarcation of truss roofs and other structural hazards with warning signs (placards) on building with truss roofs was. In 1991 NJ State law required the State Bureau of Fire Safety to investigate all fires in which a firefighter dies or is seriously injured. See National Truss Placarding.

The Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Fire: Worcester, Massachusetts, December 3, 1999
Six LODD
On December 3, 1999, the vacant, six-story Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Co. building in Worcester, Massachusetts, was set ablaze by two homeless people knocking a lighted candle into a pile of ragged clothes. The Worcester Fire Department responded at 6:13 p.m. to Box Alarm 1438. The Rescue 1 team of Firefighter Paul Brotherton and Firefighter Jerry Lucey entered the building searching for occupants. Fire conditions worsened in the building at an alarmingly unexpected rate. Paul and Jerry, on the fifth floor, became disoriented in the smoke-filled building. Lost, and running low on air, they called for help. Several teams began searching for the lost fire fighters.

Two teams reaching the fifth floor also found themselves disoriented in the smoke and trapped by the maze of interior walls — Lieutenant Tom Spencer and Firefighter Tim Jackson from Ladder 2, and Firefighter Jay Lyons and Firefighter Joe McGuirk from Engine 3. Though many more brave fire fighters attempted to locate their missing brothers, their efforts proved futile. Their deaths marked the worst loss of fire fighters’ lives in more than 20 years in a building fire in America, and the third worst fire in Massachusetts’ history. Six days after they died, a memorial service drew 30,000 fire fighters and 10,000 civilians in what was believed to have been the largest such service for fire fighters killed on duty.

Honor and Remembrance
• Firefighter Paul A Brotherton, Rescue Co.1
• Firefighter Timothy P. Jackson, Ladder Co.2
• Firefighter Jeremiah M. Lucey, Rescue Co.1
• Firefighter James F. “Jay” Lyons III, Engine Co. 3
• Firefighter Joseph T. McGuirk , Engine Co. 3
• Lt. Thomas E. Spencer, Ladder Co.2

Sofa Superstore Fire: Charleston, South Carolina, June 18, 2007
Nine LODD
On the evening of June 18, 2007, units from the Charleston Fire Department responded to a fire at the Sofa Super Store, a large retail furniture outlet in the West Ashley district of the city. Within less than 40 minutes, the fire claimed the lives of nine firefighters. The highly flammable characteristics of the materials that were stored in the loading dock and throughout the premises provided an ample supply of fuel and caused the fire to spread rapidly, affecting the building’s structural integrity and adversely affecting manual fire suppression activities.

Honor and Remembrance
• Bradford Rodney “Brad” Baity – Engineer 19
• Theodore Michael Benke – Captain 16
• Melvin Edward Champaign – Firefighter 16
• James “Earl” Allen Drayton – Firefighter 19
• Michael Jonathon Alan French – Engineer 5
• William H. “Billy” Hutchinson, III – Captain 19
• Mark Wesley Kelsey – Captain 5
• Louis Mark Mulkey – Captain 15
• Brandon Kenyon Thompson – Firefighter 5

Commemorate and Remembrance
On the evening of June 18, 2007, units from the Charleston Fire Department responded to a fire at the Sofa Super Store, a large retail furniture outlet in the West Ashley district of the city. Within less than 40 minutes, the fire claimed the lives of nine firefighters.

The Executive Summary of the FIREFIGHTER FATALITY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT Sofa Super Store Fire, Phase II Report issued MAY 15, 2008 provided critical insights into the apparent and contributing causes that culminated in the event. The Sofa Super Store was a large property that incorporated a very significant potential for a major fire to occur. It’s appropriate at this time to revisit those key factors described within the report in order for provide the opportunity for departments or agencies to recognize or identify similar gaps that exist, and take the necessary corrective actions. These gaps may be precursors to potentially significant or serious future events and extend in operational, training, administrative, managerial, construction, prevention and regulatory and codes.

• The fire risk factors associated with the Sofa Super Store exceeded the limits prescribed by the applicable building and fire codes. An automatic sprinkler system should have been installed to reduce the level of fire risk or the buildings should have been divided into manageable fire compartments by a system of fire walls.
• If a sprinkler system had been installed, the fire probably would likely have been controlled within the loading dock area.
• If effective fire walls had been provided, the fire probably would not have spread beyond the loading dock.
• The highly flammable characteristics of the materials that were stored in the loading dock and throughout the premises provided an ample supply of fuel and caused the fire to spread rapidly. The burning contents released copious quantities of heat and toxic smoke.
• Significant quantities of flammable and combustible liquids that were stored in the loading dock likely contributed to the severity and rapid spread of the fire.
• The fire had extended to the loading dock when firefighters arrived.
• Charleston Fire Department members attempted to fight the fire by initiating an offensive interior attack into the loading dock.
• The offensive attack was launched from two directions. One attack line entered the loading dock from the exterior, while a second line was stretched through the showrooms and into the loading dock.
• The offensive attack failed to control the fire. The fire extended into adjoining areas on three sides of the loading dock.
• At least 16 firefighters, who were operating deep inside the showrooms, became enveloped in heavy smoke.
• Conditions inside the showrooms became critical as the fire began to involve this part of the building. Several firefighters became disoriented and were running short of air. Radio messages requesting assistance were not heard.
• Seven firefighters managed to find their way out of the showrooms. The nine deceased firefighters were unable to find their way out as the fire spread rapidly from the rear of the building to the front.
• The size and layout of the building, inadequate exits, and the highly flammable nature of the contents likely contributed to the inability of the lost firefighters to escape from the building. Rescue efforts were attempted when the situation inside the showrooms was recognized. In spite of valiant efforts, it was too late to save the missing firefighters before the store became fully involved in flames.

The analysis of operations conducted by the Charleston Fire Department includes the following observations and findings:

• Fire fighting operations at the Sofa Super Store did not comply with Federal occupational safety and health regulations, recommended safety standards, or accepted fire service practices.
• The Charleston Fire Department failed to provide adequate direction, supervision, and coordination over the operations that were conducted.
• The documented duties and responsibilities of an Incident Commander were not performed and risk management guidelines were not adequately applied to the situation.
• The culture of the Charleston Fire Department promoted aggressive offensive tactics that exposed firefighters to excessive and avoidable risks and failed to apply basic firefighter safety practices.
• Insufficient training, inadequate staffing, obsolete equipment and outdated tactics all contributed to an ineffective effort to control the fire with offensive tactics during the early stages of the incident.
• The Charleston Fire Department continued to apply offensive tactics after the situation had evolved to a point where risk management guidelines called for defensive strategy.
• Factors that should have caused firefighters to be removed from interior tactical (offensive) positions were not recognized.
• There was a lack of accountability for the location and function of firefighters who were operating inside the building. The Charleston Fire Department did not have appropriate Mayday procedures to be followed by firefighters in distress, for dispatchers, or for command officers on the scene.

All of the listed factors and many others were analyzed and discussed in detail within the body of the issued report. If you haven’t found the time or reason to read the report, do so; it would make for a good task activity for Safety Week. The report document presented the dedicated and conscientious efforts of the review team to honor the nine fallen firefighters by making every possible effort to learn from their sacrifice. The operative question is this; “What factors or attributes are comparable to situations or conditions that presently exist within your Department, Organization or community? What are you going to proactively do to address these issues or conditions in a timely manner?

Understanding the Building Profile and Risk
The Sofa Super Store occupied a complex of interconnected structures that had been constructed in several phases. The showroom building, facing Savannah Highway, was actually an assembly of three separate structures. The front wall was a façade, with a parapet extending above the roof line, creating the appearance of one large building when viewed from Savannah Highway. (Refer to the Report for diagrams, plans and photographs)
• The front wall, including the parapet, was approximately 23 feet tall, while the roof behind the parapet varied from 12 to 14 feet above grade.
• The main showroom was originally constructed as a grocery store, probably during the 1950s or 60s. The original building was approximately 125 feet in width and 130 feet deep, with a rectangular extension in the southwest corner (right-rear facing the building from Savannah Highway).
• The front wall was brick construction with large storefront windows, while the side and rear walls were constructed of concrete block.
• The original structure had a flat metal deck roof, supported by lightweight steel bar joists (trusses), spanning from east to west across the store. The side walls supported the ends of the bar joists, while two rows of steel beams and columns provided intermediate support.
• A suspended ceiling was installed below the roof trusses.

After the property was converted to a furniture store, two pre-engineered metal buildings were added-on to the original structure to expand the showroom area. Each showroom addition was approximately 60 feet in width and 120 feet deep. The first showroom addition was constructed on the west side of the original building in 1994 and the second was added on the east side in 1995. (The add-on structures are referred to as the east and west showrooms in this report, while the original structure is identified as the main showroom.) Six large openings in the concrete block side walls, three on each side of the original building, provided connections between the showroom areas; their combined floor area was in excess of 31,000 square feet. An additional pre-engineered metal structure was erected at the rear of the property in 1996 to serve as a warehouse. This structure was approximately 120 feet wide by 130 feet deep and 29 feet tall. Furniture was stored on steel racks, 20 feet in height, inside the warehouse.

Going Forward: The Structural Anatomy of Building Construction
The following are quotes from Fire Chief Anthony Aiellos (ret) Hackensack (NJ) Fire Department
Fire Chief during the Hackensack Ford Fire, July, 1988

“If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner.”

“This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die, it’s that simple, it’s that obvious”.

Risk Based Response Assignments
The buildings, structures and occupancies that comprise typical response districts pose unique and consistent challenges during structural fire attack. The variety of occupancies and building characteristics establish varying degrees of risk potential, with defined and recognizable strategic and tactical measures to be taken-sometimes uniquely to each occupancy type. Although each occupancy type presents variables that dictate how a particular incident is handled, most company operations evolve from basic principles rooted in past performance and operations at similar structures. This is based on what I define as; “predictability of performance.”

When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future. Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis. We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a given duration of time, that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system.

We used to know with a measured degree of predictability, how our buildings would perform, react and fail under most fire conditions. This is what our years of fireground experience provided us, and how we ultimately would predict, assess, plan and implement our incident action plans and ultimately deploy our companies-based upon the predictable performance expected. Conventional Construction Structures (CCS) had this “predictably of performance.” You know, that typical residential structure, the 2-1/2 story wood frame, the three story brick and joist type III occupancy, the four story frame multiple occupancy, etc., etc. Unlike Engineered System Structures (ESS) whose predictability is rooted in the fact that they are unpredictable.

The emerging fire service issues affecting buildings, occupancies and structural systems related to ESS is only beginning to take hold a prominent role and level of significance that is long overdue. The fire service has been dealing with the operational issues and line-of-duty deaths related to ESS since the 1980s and now in 2009, we’re finally raising these ESS issues to a dialog point that is influencing firefighter safety, survival and operations. ( Refer to the Underwriters Laboratory’s (UL) UL University on-line training module for a state-of-the art presentation on Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions and performance results that correlate towards redefining fire suppression operations)

The fire service is beginning to fully recognize the merits in adjusting, altering, and changing our strategic and tactical ways of doing business in the streets. It’s becoming self evident in the fire service that it’s no longer acceptable to think that ESS buildings and occupancies will perform in the same manner as CCS buildings and occupancies and that tactics deployed in both CCS and ESS buildings and occupancies will react under similar strategic and tactical plans and tasks. These unique and inherent factors within the ESS profiles must give us a new standard for operational deployment; strategies and tactics that are defined by the risk profile of the building, its engineered structural systems, materials and methods of construction and the fire loading present.

Considerations for changing fire flow rates, the sizing of hose line and the adequacies for fire flow demand and application rates, staffing needs for safe operations, considerations for defensive positioning and defensive operating postures must be considered, and it warrants repeating again; Reckless-Aggressive firefighting must be redefined in the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environment- with determined, effective and proactive firefighting.

Risk-Preferring and Self-indulging Firefighting
Don’t mistake determined, effective and proactive firefighting with that of reckless, baseless and risk-preferring and self-indulging firefighting. There is a difference, a big difference. When we address relationships of Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Fire Fighter Safety with the occupancy and structural environment, all personnel, regardless of rank, need to equate the occupancy risk with strategic and tactical incident action plans. These safely compliment the identified firefighting operation risk, with the projected building risk profile and interface appropriate behavioral characteristics in the task level firefighting activities. Again, equating building, occupancy risk profiles with determined, effective and proactive firefighting.

The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics MUST not only be questioned, they need to be adjusted and modified; risk assessment, risk-benefit analysis, safety and survivability profiling, operational value and firefighter injury and LODD reduction must be further institutionalized to become a recognized part of modern firefighting operations.

It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations. Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments. Consider the following definitions as they relate to defining structural combat fire suppression operations.

Aggressive and Measured Approach.
Aggressive: Assertive, bold, and energetic, forceful, determined, confident, marked by driving forceful energy or initiative, marked by combative readiness, assured, direct, dominate…

Measured: Calculated; deliberate, careful; restrained, think, considered, confident, alternatives, reasoned actions, in control, self assured, calm…

You be the judge as to what should be appropriately defining interior fire suppression operations.

It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management. This is what it’s going to take to truly provide a means for “everyone to go home”.

Occupancy Risk not Occupancy Type
Many of today’s incident commanders, company officers and firefighters lack the clarity of understanding and comprehension that correlate to the inherent characteristics of today’s buildings, construction and occupancies. We assume that the redundancy of our operations and incident responses equates with predictability and diminished risk to our firefighting personnel.

Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction, therefore risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. You need to gain the knowledge and insights and to change and adjust your operating profile in order to safe guard your companies, personnel and team compositions. Again strategic firefighting operations; Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type.
With this being stated, another primary consideration that must be deliberated and changed as it relates to firefighting and the built environment is the long held fire service tradition and practice of Structural Fire Alarm Response (resources) Assignments being based upon the Occupancy Type. Sending the two Engine Companies and one Truck Company assignment with a Battalion Chief and a RIT team to a reported structure fire in an occupied single family residential structure; is not acceptable.

As previously stated; the rules for structural fire engagement have changed. Structural Fire Alarm Response (resources) Assignments should be based upon the Risk Profile the occupancy has related to Building construction, systems and projected or determined fire loading. Sending the four Engine Companies, two Truck Companies, a manpower Heavy Rescue Company, two additional Battalion Chiefs, a Safety Officer and support staff assignment with the assigned Battalion Chief on the alarm assignment to a reported structure fire in an occupied single family residential structure, that happens to be 5000 square feet in size with ESS components; IS Acceptable.

• There is an acute understanding and corollary of technical knowledge and inter reliance on occupancies, construction, strategy, tactics, risk, safety, physics, engineering and fire suppression theory, This is a fact.
• Previous, historical parameters and Building/Structural Performance always provides a postulated measurement to gauge operational tasks and form the basis for the Incident Action Plan. These parameters must be recognized and integrated
• There is a need to integrate performance based incident indicators derived from engineering, physics, fire dynamics, historical and statistical basis
• Basic Size-Up is Antiquated for Firefighting and the Built Environment. – Start Thinking in terms of Dynamic Risk Assessment and Command Risk Management
• USFA Annual Report on Firefighter Fatalities in the United States; “More firefighters using an aggressive interior attack in enclosed structures die more often, in greater numbers, and with greater multiple line-of-duty deaths than those using the same tactical approach in opened structure fires.”

Start integrating an understating of Fire Dynamics and Fire Behavior and the impact on structural integrity and operational deployment

Situational Awareness and Risk Assessment
Situation Awareness related to Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Firefighter Safety is another mission critical element. Situation Awareness (SA) is the perception of environmental elements within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future. It is also a field of study concerned with perception of the environment critical to decision-makers in complex, dynamic situations and incidents. Both the 2006 and 2007 Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System Annual Reports identified a lack of situational awareness as the highest contributing factor to near misses reported.

Situation Awareness involves being aware of what is happening around you at an incident scene to understand how information, events, and your own actions will impact operational goals and incident objectives, both now and in the near future. Lacking SA or having inadequate SA has been identified as one of the primary factors in accidents attributed to human error (Hartel, Smith, & Prince, 1991) (Nullmeyer, Stella, Montijo, & Harden, 2005). Situation Awareness becomes especially important in the structural fire suppression and firefighter domains where the information flow can be quite high and poor decisions can lead to serious consequences. Dynamic Risk Assessment is commonly used to describe a process of risk assessment being carried out in a changing or evolving environment, where what is being assessed is developing as the process itself is being undertaken. This is further problematical for the Incident Commander when confronted with competing or conflicting incident priorities, demands or distractions before a complete appreciation of all mission critical or essential information and data has been obtained. The dynamic management of risk is all about effective, informed and decisive decision making during all phases of an incident at a structural fire.

To the Incident Commander, fire officer or firefighter, knowing what’s going on around you, in and around the building structure and understanding the consequences of building, construction, assembly, fire load and fire development and growth is mission critical to incident stabilization and mitigation and profoundly crucial in terms of personnel safety.The integration of Situational Awareness and Dynamic Risk Assessment related to the building and occupancy is a mission critical element in managing structural fires and in the strategic command management and company level tactical operations as we go forward into the next decade. Traditional phased incident scene size-up and monitoring is antiquated and no longer appropriate or applicable to modern fire service operations.Situational awareness is a combination of attitudes, previously learned knowledge and new information gained from the incident scene and environment that enables the strategic commanders, decision-makers and tactical companies to gather the information they need to make effective decisions that will keep their firefighters and resources out of harm’s way, reducing the likelihood of adverse or detrimental effects.

Command and company officers and firefighters MUST understand the building, the occupancy features and the inherent impact of fire within and on the structure, AND be able to identify, communicate and take actions necessary to support the incident action and battle plans, mitigate incident conditions and provide for continuous safety protection to themselves, their team, their company and the entire alarm assignment operating at the incident scene.

It’s Not about Our Entertainment Value
When we focus our attention on the interdependent functional domains of Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Fire Fighter Safety and the essence of combat structural fires; Structural firefighting is what it’s all about, is it not? The reason we have such veneration for firefighting and the fire service and all it entails; has a lot to do with going into burning buildings and fighting fire. We enjoy it tremendously; because of who we are and what we do-as firefighters. But, firefighting has its adverse consequences, with all too familiar costs, in the form of injuries, debilitating accidents and line of duty deaths.

As a firefighter, to say that we love firefighting would be an understatement, but one issue that we need to address is the fact that there are many individual firefighters, companies and organizations that employ fireground operational practices that promote the “enjoyment and entertainment” of working a good job within the occupancy compartment of a structural fire in the building environment.-Staying too long in the wrong place, operating tactically in an adverse environment with known hazards that does not have value, for nothing other than the enjoyment of nozzle time and operating time in the fire.

Fire suppression tactics must be adjusted for the rapidly changing methods and materials impacting all forms of building construction, occupancies and structures. The need to redefine the art and science of firefighting is nearly upon us. Some things do stand the test of time, others need to adjust, evolve and change. Not for the sake of change only, but for the emerging and evolving buildings, structures and occupancies being built, developed or renovated in our communities.

If the fire service can significantly increase proficiencies in building knowledge and equate that to other fundamental operational aspect in structural fire operations, then there would be a direct enhancement to firefighter safety, through injury and LODD reduction. If we understand buildings, occupancies and construction, and balance this with our understanding of fire dynamics and orchestrate it with appropriate strategies, tactics and command management, then we made the new safety equation work; Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S). It’s all about the Structural Anatomy of Buildings.

Posted by on May 21, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, firefighter-safety-health, Occupancies, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Are You Prepared to PREVENT a Line of Duty Death?

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MemorialPower is the ability to command or apply force.

Authority is the right to command and expend resources.

A leader is one who can generate effective individual and group action to accomplish agency goals.

The fire service is a dynamic profession that is richly steeped in tradition, noble in deeds and calling. We know the fire service to be constant – yet ever changing in today’s society. We have built this profession upon man and machinery in opposition with an uncontrolled force known as fire. The last fifteen years has shown a shift from traditional fire service missions to encompass a wide scope of service deliveries that is ever expanding. We are challenged daily on the way we do business.
These changes have affected not only the fire service as a whole but also each level
within. The importance of competencies for fire officers in skills, knowledge and training is of the essence in today’s fire service. Fire officer cultural and attitudinal changes are the crucial links that will ultimately determine the future of our business.
Each year the American fire service experiences an average of over 100 line of duty deaths each year. Further we know that the amount of working fires are down approximately 66% of what they were in the mid 1970’s. So what is the score card saying? Why do we continue to know the causes of line of duty deaths and do nothing to change? Summed up it is nothing more than attitudes. We need to change our attitudes. There is no where in the corporate world that you could come in and give an annual report that stated we had a good year, we only lost 100 employees that you would not be escorted out the door before you could get your personal items in a box. Ron Siarnicki of the national Fallen Fire Fighters Foundation (NFFF) made this statement in one of there program. Guess what…HE IS CORRECT! Why do we as leaders in this business continue to allow these issues to occur? Why do we continue to deem it an honor to die in the line of duty? Why are we so resistant to change? We call it tradition! Well as a fire chief and a fire service member I have to say, “GET OVER OLD and BAD TRADITIONS, START A SAFE NEW ONE!” Ok, if I stepped on some toes here, GOOD, they probably needed it. We cannot afford to continue allowing the same mistakes over and over again to occur. At some point we have to start saying it is not acceptable to have injuries and Line of Duty Deaths (LODD). We must change this culture and the time is now and it starts with YOU!
A few years ago I was shuttled to the airport following the New York Chief’s Conference in Lake George, New York. I was able to spend that time talking with a Bulgarian student who was asking many questions about the culture of the fire service. I asked me how many people get hurt or are killed doing this job as he had seen T-Shirts this week about this. I was ashamed to say we kill usually more than 100 firefighters a year. He then asked why. Boy did this hit home! We know why and how firefighters die in the line of duty but what are we doing to prevent them? In 2005we had  eighty seven (87)line of duty deaths. My question is just how many of these could have been prevented? One area that we know we can control the environment and have good chances of not having a line of duty death is training. But in 2005 we had 10 line of duty deaths in training. This equates to 10% of the total line of duty deaths for that year. Secondly responding to and returning from alarms accounted for 26 line of duty deaths or 59%. Deaths in crashes continue to account for a significant portion of the annual fatalities. How many of these could have been prevented? How many were not wearing their seat belts? How many was speed a contributing factor? To answer the last two questions is far too many. This can be corrected with an attitude adjustment.

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Let’s look at how we can reduce these numbers. We need to first address our culture and make attitude changes. These changes need to be at all levels. We can begin this change today without problems by changing the thought process as new firefighters enter the academies across the United States. We can further push with the existing firefighters. We have to hit the dinosaurs hard because they take the new recruits freshly in the field and create dinosaur eggs that then develop into dinosaurs themselves. The year 2009 we saw a reduction in the line of duty deaths to below 100 again. Are we lucky or are we truly focusing on what the issues are. Thus the culture revolves in a vicious cycle. Ok there is the start but what do we do to impact the fire service?
We need to develop and require Comprehensive Health and Wellness Programs. These programs need to include physical conditioning, medical evaluations, and mental conditioning. With more and more firefighters perishing due to heart attacks and strokes (44 in 2005) we need to make sure that we are in the physical condition to do this job. I further think that the statistics are some what skewed. When we see LODDs of fire service personnel 65 years old or older who die after responses who did not engage in suppression activities it is being question as to where or not these individuals would have had a heart attack even if they were not on scene within that 24 hours. How many departments are providing and requiring comprehensive medical evaluations (NFPA 1582) for all of their members? If you are not, you need to look for a way to make this happen. So many times I hear of how certain medical evaluations have found members of the fire service with health issues they never knew existed. These physicals need to be annually. I recently was running a portion of our physical conditioning program which was a job performance physical agility test. I found one of our more experience personnel to be hypertensive (elevated blood pressure). I refused to let him test and sent him for medical evaluation. Guess what…he is alive today and has begun taking on life style changes and has medication to assist in controlling this issue. He had no symptoms of this condition and was at the potential levels for major problems. Simply as your grandmother would say, “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.”
Further we need to evaluate and support physical conditioning (NFPA 1583). These need to set personal goals as each individual is different, department goals and standards as to show everyone who performs must be able to perform at a set level.

 Lastly, we must have qualitative and quantitative testing of physical conditioning. Not as punishment but as a teaching tool. How many of your members can tell you exactly how long an SCBA will last when they are working at full capacity. As command officers this is important information as we work on scenes and strive to complete accountability of our personnel. More importantly it will keep our personnel safer.
We know this is one of the most stressful jobs anywhere you could travel. So just how well do we condition our folks mentally. Have you ever heard “suck it up it’s your job?” Sitting and talking with some professionals from an FDNY Engine Company they talked about and exhibited significant signs of Critical Incident Stress. This, I am sure, is compounded several times over from the events that affect the lives of these firefighters, but hey lets face facts here. These brothers are hurting and hurting bad. But have we addressed any of this, how about there families? I bet they are hurting too! So what do we do to help this problem? We must provide good Critical Incident Stress (CIS) education and coping techniques not only to the firefighters but also for their families. I know that I have done multiple programs on the east coast about this same issue, addressing firefighters and families together both the firehouse family and our true families all at the table together. This program is titled “Hearts and Sirens” and it explores CIS as it affects both the emergency services working and the family we leave at home when duty calls. My wife tells here heart felt stories of the situations she has had to live through and what helped. Basically we provide education, coping techniques and skills to deal with CIS for families. Let’s face it tough guys, even the hard core folks, struggle with all we face in this job at some point. As they face repetitive issues it becomes cumulative and eventually the levels will build up to the eruption point. This can be prevented and enhance our quality of life with just a little education and swallowing of pride on our part. Face it we are not super human, as much as we wish we were.
Training is the paramount. We must continue to enhance our training in every aspect. This includes going back to the basics. We often see in NIOSH reports where basic and routine components of our job are not performed or are contributing factors to LODD and injuries. So why can’t we do the basics? We have the mentality of hey I been there done that, I don’t need to do that anymore, I have got that down. Ok are you sure? If so show me! If you got it should not be hard or lengthy. Next we need to focus on realism. What are we truly going to face. I deal with the mentality of that wouldn’t happen to us or that’s the big city stuff it’s not going to happen here. Well, last time I checked fire did not discriminate. It does matter who you are or where you are from. Reality check… who would have thought that an aircraft with terrorists on board would crash in rural Pennsylvania. That should prove this point with enough said. We must train hard, train realistically and train often. By doing this we stoke our tool boxes with the right tools for the job.
As we train we as leaders and trainers must make every effort to pull out the stops. We must not accept or condone any type of training environment or attitude that compromises the safety of any firefighter. We must cease pushing the envelope with cowboy tactics that only prove that you can show boat. If this is you I have a message…Your Dangerous and you need to change. We do not need to hurt or kill firefighters to have good quality training. In fact good quality training starts with no injuries and especially no deaths. In research of training line of duty deaths almost every incident could have been prevented.
In closing we must have to courage to say NO and the courage to be safe. It often is not a popular personality folks want to see, but again is it worth dieing for…Most times not! Come on folks, let’s face it, we are not doing everything correct here. We need to change and we need to change NOW!!! Do your self, your firefighters and their families a favor. Help prevent a line of duty death, change the attitudes and culture in your departments and have the courage to be safe! The families at home depend on you to be a leader and an officer. If you are not willing to do as much as possible to help with the change of the culture, do the fire service a favor, RETIRE or QUIT or RESIGN BEING AN OFFICER because you are part of the problem not part of the solution. Help us support the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation and the fire service quest of “EVERYONE GOES HOME”.

Posted by on May 17, 2010 • Filed under: administration-leadership, command-leadership, company officer, Doug Cline, firefighter-safety-health, Leaderhip, line-of-duty, LODD, Risk Assessment, Situational Awareness, training-development • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , ,

Multi-Family / High Rise Structure Fires

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highrise2In multi-story multifamily structures there is a lot more to consider than in single family structures. The population density increases significantly, the size of the structure increases and in high rise operations you have to be concerned with the rapid spread of heat, smoke, toxic gases and fire upward through the structure. The fact that the structural design is significantly different as the size if focused on going vertical verses horizontal.

These structures have a high life hazard at regardless the time of day. This proposes unique problems as occupant evacuation often hampers fire department suppression operations. With this fact being in place it also changes the focus of operations due to the potential need for evacuation or rescue efforts. Many of these building were constructed with fire escapes on the exterior of the building. These are often in disrepair and become involved in fire as the fire has vented out of a window and prevents the use of the exterior fire escape. Many structures have limited internal stairwells. Often these internal stairwells are not secure from the effects of smoke and heat. These prevent for safe evacuation. It is important to also consider the age of the tenants. The elder population that could live in these structures creates a special need for assistance in evacuation or rescue as they are not able to ambulate efficiently enough to travel the potential distances required for evacuating.

These structures require massive amounts of man power to be able to operate. It is recommended that for every position assigned a total of three (3) personnel be committed, one in operations, one in staging and one on deck ready for relief. This alone can make a significant impact on available resources.

Construction features can create a series of fire-control tactical concerns with the stacking of apartments that creates chases that run the entire height of the building. This design feature creates an easy pathway for fire to extend and do so without showing significant signs of fire growth and spread until large quantities of fire exist. This type of feature provides for fast moving fire extension and can compound the loss of life potential.

Larger buildings have design features that bring light and natural ventilation to rooms in the middle of the structure. These light and air shafts pose danger of allowing the fire to extend horizontally across the shaft. This feature allows the fire to sometimes by pass a fire wall or fire stop. This design will also allow fire to extend vertically as the exposures are increased and the ability to extend both via convection and direct flame contact due to lapping out of windows. The design of these windows being directing opposite or directly above each other contributes to the fire extension. One advantage is that there is not roof over these sections which eliminates the mushrooming concept and will slow the spread of fire to the upper floors.

Posted by on April 10, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, company officer, Doug Cline, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, fire-rescue-topics, major-incidents, operations, rescues, Risk Assessment, Situational Awareness • Tagged: , , , , , ,

The Rules for Combat Structural Fire Suppression Have Changed: Did anyone Tell You?

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3-29-2009 12-58-50 PMOur buildings have changed; the structural systems of support, the degree of compartmentation, the characteristics of materials and the magnitude of fire loading. The structural anatomy, predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and the extreme fire behavior; accelerated growth rate and intensively levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term combat fire engagement.

The rules for combat structural fire suppression have changed, but we have yet to write the rule book from which the new games plans must be derived. We seek the elusive “Rosetta stone” that aligns and interprets the emerging and traditionalist acumen related to fire stream effectiveness, flow rates, cooling capacity, extreme fire behavior and fire dynamics, compartment fire theory, propagation and cooling capacity and tactical deployment all relate towards defining an engineering approach to firefighting tactics versus the manual, labor-driven tactics of line deployment and rudiment placement of water on a fuel source within the fire compartment (room).

It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that defines structural fire suppression operations. It begs to suggest that many of today’s incident commanders, company officers and firefighters lack the clarity of understanding and comprehension that correlate to the inherent characteristics of today’s buildings, construction and occupancies and the need for refined engine company operations within the modern building construction setting. We assume that the routiness or successes of our operations and incident responses equates with predictability and diminished risk to our firefighting personnel.

The work of such notable suppression theory pioneers as P. Grimwood, E. Hartin, S. Särdqvist and S. Svennson and the concepts surrounding 3D firefighting, B-SAHF and other emerging research from the NIST and UL are areas that today’s discerning and progressive fire officer and commanders must become well-informed and conversant. The quantitative scientific data and emerging concepts from continuing research and testing such as the NIST’s Wind Drive Fire Studies and UL’s The Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions are providing enlightenment on fire development, fuel controlled and ventilation controlled fire development, operational time-duration parameters and degradation and failure mechanisms related to compromise and structural collapse in occupancies.

Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction, therefore risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of combat structural fire engagement.

  • Building Construction Systems
    • Heritage
      • Pre-1919
    • Legacy
      • 1920-1949
    • Conventional
      • 1950-1979
    • Engineered
      • 1980-2010
    • Hybrid
    • Chameleon

The fundamental compartment that comprised a typical room configuration in terms of area (square footage), volume (height/Width), furnishings (fire load package) and materials of construction (structural anatomy) found within conventional, legacy or heritage construction provided predictability in terms of fire suppression, fire behavior, operational time and survivability (civilian/firefighter). The dramatic changes since the early 1980’s in the evolution of modern building construction and the institutionalization of engineered structural systems (ESS) have created compartment (room) areas in excess 500 SF, volumes that are open and spaciously interconnected to other habitable space, fire load packages that create extreme fire behavior, compromising structural stability in shorter time spans creating decreasing interior operational time and requiring increasing fire flow rates and volume to sustain requisite extinguishment demands.

Commanders and Company Offices need to gain new insights and knowledge related to the modern building occupancy and to modify and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type and must have the combined adequacy of sufficient staffing, fire flow and nozzle appliances orchestrated in a manner that identifies with the fire profiling, predictability of the occupancy profile and accounts for presumed fire behavior. Today’s engine company operations and fire suppression theory has to progress beyond the pragmatic approaches to fire suppression such as “Big Fire-Big Water principle.

When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future. Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis. We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system; in addition to having an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions.

Executing tactical plans based upon faulted or inaccurate strategic insights and indicators has proven to be a common apparent cause in numerous case studies, after action reports and LODD reports. Our years of predictable fireground experience have ultimately embedded and clouded our ability to predict, assess, plan and implement incident action plans and ultimately deploy our companies-based upon the predictable performance expected of modern construction and especially those with engineered structural systems.

If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner, that is no longer acceptable within many of our modern building types, occupancies and structures. This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die, it’s that simple; it’s that obvious.

Considerations for changing fire flow rates, the sizing of hose line and the adequacies for fire flow demand and application rates, staffing needs for safe operations, considerations for defensive positioning and defensive operating postures must be considered, and it warrants repeating again; Reckless-Aggressive firefighting must be redefined in the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments- with determined, effective and proactive firefighting

  • Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement
    • Predictive Strategic Process
    • Tactical Deployment Model
    • Dynamic Tactical Deployment
    • Performance Indicators and Street Aides
      • Fire Dynamics
      • Resistance
      • Resilience
      • Structural Systems
      • Occupancy Hazard Profiles

The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics must not only be questioned, they need to be adjusted and modified; risk assessment, risk-benefit analysis, safety and survivability profiling, operational value and firefighter injury and LODD reduction must be further institutionalized to become a recognized part of modern firefighting operations.

Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments.

Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional or legacy construction and occupancies;

  • Risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement.
  • You need to gain the knowledge and insights and to change and adjust your operating profile in order to safe guard your companies, personnel and team compositions.
  • Again strategic firefighting operations; Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type.

The following are quotes from Fire Chief Anthony Aiellos (ret) Hackensack (NJ) Fire Department, Fire Chief during the Hackensack Ford Fire, July, 1988…

“If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner. This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes”.

As a Company or Command Officer, how have your skill sets as well as your attitudes towards combat fire suppression operations have changed. Are you still thinking in terms of “old school” tactics and operations? (Think carefully before you answer….because there’s more to this reply than you think). I’ve asked this question before: “What do you truly know about building construction, fire dynamics and risk profiling?” Have you spent the time to become knowledgeable on rapid changes that have evolved within the building construction industry? Have you taken a good look around your district? If you haven’t, maybe It’s time…remember you have a company or a contingent of companies that are counting on you to make the right call at that next structural fire incident.

Posted by on April 9, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, christopher naum, company officer, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, KSA, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Take a Good Look Around-This is Your Town

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11-21-2008 11-21-19 AMAs you drive about your response district today, coming back from an alarm, heading to the firehouse tonight or running errands around your community, take a good look around. Ask your self a simple question; “How well do you know the buildings, structures and occupancies in your response jurisdiction?” Be honest, do you really understand how those “older residential” structures were built and understand how fire travels and impacts your fireground operations?

Are your aware of the newest features of engineered structural support systems being constructed within that new set of homes going up in your second-due area? Are you aware, that vacant office building is being converted into a light manufacturing and assembly business? How about those unoccupied store fronts, businesses and vacant homes that have been closed up due to the tough economic times…. any special hazards or operational concerns to your company should you get a dispatch to respond?

Have the senior members of your station or department shared their stories of operations and incidents at various buildings around your district or community? Did you listen to them, or were you quick to dismiss those “old war stories”. There’s a wealth of “pre-planning’ nuggets hidden in those stories. Take the time to listen, remember or postulate.Take a good look around….think about any given building, the one across the street that you’re looking at while you wait for the traffic light to change; Think about a fire in that same building.

Do you really understand how it will truly perform under combat structural fire conditions? What’s the building’s collapse profile, how much operational time will you have, what dynamic risk assessment factors will you have to deal with, how safe is it for you to engage in interior operations upon your arrival? How can this building, its occupancy and structural system hurt, my team, my company, my firefighters, my department, me? Sometimes things aren’t as obvious as them seem. You may have responded and operated at numerous incidents at a wide variety of buildings in your response area, or very few; some routine, others maybe more demanding…the question remains, “What do you Really know about your buildings?” Your life may one day depend on what you actually do know or recollect. Take a good look around ….

Don’t forget to think about issues realted to vacant or unoccupied structures, HERE and HERE

Posted by on March 30, 2010 • Filed under: christopher naum, firefighting-operations, Future, Occupancies, planning, Risk Assessment, Situational Awareness • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Ten Minutes in the Street: Stretchin’ the line on the First-Due Scenario

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Ten Minutes in the StreetHead on over to Firefigher Nation to the Fireground Tactics & Firefighter Safety Forum for a new Ten Minutes in the Street Scenario.

We’ve just posted Ten Minutes in the Street: Stretchin’ the line on the First-Due . Join in on the discussions and dialog on strategies, tactics, command, decision-making and firefighter safety. There’s lots to be gained either by active participation or side-line observations of the postings and view points from a wide lattitude of firefighters, company and command officers from around the United States and abroad. So don’t just sit there, get ready to stretch that line in on the action.

Check out other previously published Ten Minutes in the Street Scenarios HERE 

These scenarios make for great drill topics, table top exercises and discussion points for all ranks and personnel

Posted by on March 27, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, christopher naum, company officer, Crew Integrity, Crew Management, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, Risk Assessment, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics, Ten Minutes in the Street Scenarios • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Shiners, Whiners and Recliners

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     I have heard a lot of Picture3analogies over my career about the fire service like “You can peal one fire department name off the wall and replace it with another one and it would be the same” and “it is the same circus but with different clowns”. The more I hear this type of talk the more I have come to realize that we got some really big issues at hand that need immediate attention. I have witnessed many events and issues over the years and recently listened to a guest speaker at church talk about recent situations he was in and how his staff reacted. The first thought that came to mind was the fire service. I know that many folks are going to say here is a negative attitude about to come out. Well it just might be but it is reality and we have to face that it is what it is! We have three types of folks in the fire service: Shiners, Whiners and Recliners. So which do you fall into? Let’s take a look at all three and see what we can do to identify their characteristics.
      This group known as the shiners in the fire service is the backbone of keeping the fire service moving and getting the work accomplished. These individuals work tirelessly in efforts to make the fire service more professional, safer ad better educated. They work to improve the safety of the community and give of themselves wholly. So why do Shiners get criticized so much. I recently had a department’s Deputy Chief tell me, “the more we do, the more they are going to expect and that will keep us having to do more, we need to coast for a while. We need to slow some of these folks down so we are not expected to do as much.”
     The “Shiners” are self motivated and they are always looking to make the system better. They are team players and truly care about the fire service. This group of personnel is usually only a hand full in your department. This is not always the case as I have witnessed departments that the majority of the personnel were shiners.
      Shiners are driven to find better ways to do their jobs. Even though a firefighter may have pried open a door on a search and rescue assignment, he may spend his time off thinking of a better or faster way of accomplishing the same task. That firefighter may spend time at construction sites or outside training to find out what works and what doesn’t. The whiners would complain that they had to work too hard, they didn’t have enough help, didn’t have the newest piece of equipment and not enough training. However if they had all they were complaining about it would be something else. These individuals are never satisfied and they try to bring everyone else down to be in their misery. The recliners would do just that, they would be hanging back doing nothing and telling everyone just how much they have done.
     Time and success are very important to the shiner. Shiners are never content with the status quo and tend to be highly organized. To the average person, a shiner’s desire to have things in such an orderly fashion and in control could be considered “obsessive-compulsive.” Shiners also tend to be easily bored, which makes them more inclined to find trouble or become productive. Shiners are always trying new ideas, techniques and looking for a better way. Not embracing mediocrity, they believe if it is not broke lets break it, let’s find a better way.
     Whiners would do just that whine that they are always tied up and they are too busy. They have a tendency to always be complaining and not working. The down grade new ideas and believe status quo is good. It has worked for the last twenty years so why do we need to go changing. The whiners like being bored; it gives them something to whine about.
     The recliners believe success is measured in how much time they can be reclined in the lazy boys resting. Recently I have heard firefighters and officers with the mentality that we are here to run calls and fight fires not all this other busy work crap. The public demands us to be in the stations so they know we are ready to respond. Well from the typical position of feet propped up and head laid back position that is what they see. Unfortunately they never make it out of the station to see that the public and the job demands more.
     Shiners, whiners and recliners, all firefighters don’t tend to be loners; they seek out group activities on the job and off the job. It has been said that birds of a feather flock together. Firefighters work and live in a group environment. From their very first day walking into a fire station, recruits learn that the fire service functions in a team environment. Firefighters train in groups, work in groups, live in groups and eat in groups. This close interaction favors people who are trusting, cooperative, dependable and determined. Because firefighters share so much of their lives with each other, they generally will build team values, foster increased team cohesion, and identify each member’s strength and weakness.
      However, some firefighter personality traits may conflict with the team environment. The fire service is generally looking for people who are assertive, upbeat and talkative. Each of these traits can be of benefit to the group, but they also can be a liability to the team. So the shiners are carrying the recliners why the whiners are complaining about the entire situation.
       In an interesting look at how firefighters work together, a study on work injury frequency and duration found that when firefighters cooperated in groups, injury rates were lower than when firefighters didn’t interact with each other. Firefighters who are reluctant to interact with other firefighters may in fact be reluctant to ask for help when they’re in trouble, possibly leaving them at risk of injury. So we can see that the shiners who most likely are always training and learning are our lowest risk to injuries. The whiners are complaining about something and most likely get out of doing it to speed the operation up and the recliners, well they are the ones who end up injured since they have not trained or worked much with the other groups. Heck it is tough getting up out of the recliner and doing something.
      During my 29 years in the fire service, seldom have I witnessed a shiner give up on a task. Shiners will work at all cost to complete a task or assignment, sometimes placing them self at risk for the betterment of the task. A whiner may complete a task but it usually takes double the time as they have to complain about it for one length and then after realizing they are being forced to do the work get it accomplished…whining the entire time about it. The recliners well it may or may not get done and most times it is the shiners who pick up their slack and get it completed for them.
     Failure isn’t in the Shiner’s vocabulary, so when Shiners are faced with a failed mission, they tend to take it very personally. Some administrators may think that a mission was a success without realizing that the shiner may have viewed the mission in a different light. Sometimes the fire chief’s viewpoint and the shiner’s viewpoint aren’t the same, resulting in conflict. The whiner’s failure is in the forefront of their vocabulary as they will be quick to tell you that this will not work and embrace failure. They then blame it on someone else saying that it was stupid to begin with and they knew it would not work from the start. The recliner’s view on this is well…if we sit around long enough someone else will do it or it will go away and we won’t have to deal with it. Problem is…they are correct, a shiner will pick it up of the mission dies due to lack of interest.
      Firefighting isn’t just a job to the shiner; it’s who they are. Shiners strongly identify with the job, as evidenced by the off-duty clothing, homes and vehicles of many. They’re highly dedicated people who love nothing better than a bigger and better challenge. On the flip side, a shiner who loses his or her job because of layoffs, early retirement, disability retirement or regular retirement will lose this identity, which can be personally devastating. Whiners do what they do best they whine but they are in the same boat here as the shiners if they would lose his or her job because of layoffs, early retirement, disability retirement or regular retirement will lose this identity, which can be personally devastating. Why because they like the sense of belonging to have something to whine about. They have to start all over again in some cases. Most whiners are whiners in all aspects of their life so they will transition easier than the shiner. Recliners will embrace this because they get to do more of what they like.
     Another common denominator in many shiners’ personalities is the burning desire to help people. Shiners enjoy helping out people in need. Firefighters are people who will place their own lives in jeopardy in order to save a life. They enter the fire service knowing that the fire service is a high-risk occupation and that they will place their own lives on the line for others. The whiners hold the same desire at a lesser level but like the fact they get to whine about having to do something. The recliners got into this because of the ability to hang out, do nothing and be involved. Shiners in their off-duty time have a tendency for volunteering with local civic groups or raise money for Muscular Dystrophy Association in an effort to help others. You rarely see a whiner or recliner involved in an event like this unless there is something in it for them personally.
     Well what I have described is the shiners, whiners and recliners theory. I know that this is a different piece under leadership, not politically correct and made a bunch of folks mad, but it has value. The value is these are the types of people you are forced to manage and deal with on a daily basis. My advice is to keep the shiners motivated, give the whiners plenty to whine about and the recliners move them to the busiest station where they can’t recline or just get rid of them, they are dead weight.

Posted by on March 17, 2010 • Filed under: administration-leadership, company officer, Crew Management, Doug Cline, Future, Leaderhip, Officer, Situational Awareness, training • Tagged: , , , , , , , ,

Learning from the Past: Five Alarm Church Fire and Collapse leads to two Line of Duty Deaths (LODD) and Twenty-Nine Fire Fighter Injuries three hours into the incident

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200417P1Six years ago on March 13, 2004, two career firefighters with the City of Pittsburg (PA) Fire Bureau were fatally injured during a structural collapse of a bell tower at the Ebenezer Baptist Church fire. Battalion Chief Charles G. Brace (55 years of age) was acting as the Incident Safety Officer and Master Firefighter Richard A. Stefanakis (51 years of age) was performing overhaul, extinguishing remaining hot spots inside the church vestibule when the bell tower collapsed on them and numerous other fire fighters. Twenty-three fire fighters injured during the collapse were transported to area hospitals. A backdraft occurred earlier in the incident that injured an additional six fire fighters. The collapse victims were extricated from the church vestibule several hours after the collapse. The victims were pronounced dead at the scene. A total of twenty-nine other fire fighters were injured during the incident. 

The Structure
The church was a National Historic Landmark that was built in 1875. The building was still in use as a house of worship and school at the time of this incident. The exterior construction was masonry with several courses of red brick covered with stone. The building foundation was approximately 120 x 70 feet and approximately 50 feet to the roof line. The pitched roof was covered with asphalt shingles and supported by heavy timber roof trusses. The stone façade exterior of the structure was added during a renovation in the 1930s. This renovation also included the addition of a 115 foot bell tower capped with four spires. The bell tower was not a stand-alone structure, but was supported by steel I-beams with a brick and stone façade that was connected into the southwest corner of the original church.

The church had four levels. The entry level or ‘Cay Cee Level’ had the main assembly area with a performance stage, a kitchen and two bathrooms. The top floor was the ‘Sanctuary Level’ which contained the pulpit, choir section, baptismal pool, and balcony. The basement or ‘King Level’ had several meeting rooms, three bathrooms, a computer room, a boiler room, and an electrical room. (Note: An unfinished sub-basement was also present with three rooms).

The church had an attached annex added to the eastern side of the original structure in 1994. The annex was approximately 60 x 45 feet in size and the three story addition contained an elevator that served the entire church. The annex was attached to the original structure via hallways on each floor with a central elevator shaft. On the first floor was a chapel, five offices and a bathroom. The second floor had nine meeting rooms. The third floor contained a fellowship hall, a kitchen and bathrooms.

The Fire

The fire occurred on a Saturday morning as parishioners were preparing to have breakfast. The church staff noticed smoke coming from an electrical outlet. When the pastor went to investigate in the electrical room located in the basement, he found heavy smoke. Building occupants called 911 and reported an electrical fire. Building occupants had evacuated the church prior to the arrival of fire fighters.

The origin of the fire was in the basement ceiling located in the front southwest corner of the church within an electrical/computer room. The actual ignition mechanism of the fire was unable to be determined. The fire spread horizontally through the concealed space between the basement ceiling and first floor. The fire then spread vertically via concealed wall spaces to the structural members, framing and interior furnishings.

There were approximately 70 fire fighters and 13 apparatus on scene during the 4th alarm response when the bell tower collapse occurred at 1213 hours.

At 0845 hours, an alarm was received for an electrical fire at a church. The 1st Alarm assignment included three engine companies, a truck company, another engine company to serve as the RIT team, an acting Battalion Chief as the IC, a Battalion Chief as the Incident Safety Officer (ISO), a Mobile Air Truck used to fill SCBA air tanks and a Safety Unit that maintains command status and fire fighter accountability boards.

  • Engine 4 (E4) was the first company on scene at 0850 hours. The apparatus was positioned in front of the church and the crew reported seeing light to moderate smoke inside the church. The church pastor told the crew that the building had been evacuated and that the smoke was coming from the electrical room in the basement.
  • The crew advanced a 1 ¾-in hand line through the front southeast entrance and down the stairs to the basement. Once in the basement, the crew was met with intense heat and thick black smoke. The crew could not see any flame but heard crackling sounds that they localized to the ceiling above them.
  • The crew then attempted to open the ceiling, but heavy plaster and lathe construction hindered their efforts.
  • Truck 4 (T4) also arrived on scene at 0850 hours and positioned the apparatus in the parking lot. The crew was preparing to raise the aerial ladder to the roof and begin ventilation when the IC ordered them to open the floor on the first floor above the fire.
  • Once on the first floor, the crew started using a chainsaw and immediately began to experience problems with the saw stalling. (Note: It is believed that the interior smoke conditions and a lack of oxygen caused the gas-powered saw to stall out rendering it unusable.)
  • The crew switched to axes and started chopping the floor. The E4 crew could hear the axe strikes above them from the basement below.
  • Engine 5 (E5) arrived on scene at 0851 hours and established water supply to E4. The crew advanced another 1 ¾-in hand line to the basement to back up the E4 crew.
  • Engine 10 (E10) arrived on scene at 0852 hours and established a second water supply. The crew advanced a 1 ¾-in hand line to the first floor to back up the T4 crew and assisted in opening the floor.
  • Both crews experienced heavy smoke conditions upon entering the church.

A 2nd Alarm was requested for additional manpower by Victim #1 at 0900 hours and the assignment included two engine companies, a truck company and the Deputy Chief. Prior to the 2nd Alarm being dispatched, the Deputy Chief was already en-route and upon arrival at 0900 hours conducted a size-up and was briefed by Officers. The Deputy Chief assumed IC while the Acting Battalion Chief became the Operations Chief and Chief Brace became the ISO.

A 3rd Alarm was requested by the IC at 0911 hours and the assignment included three additional engine companies and the Assistant Chief. Since the exact seat of the fire was still not located, the IC made a special request for Engine 29 (E29) to bring a thermal imaging camera (TIC) to the scene. (Note: At the time of this incident, the department had only one TIC, a unit that was on loan from the manufacturer.)

At 0919 hours (approximately 30 minutes into the incident), the IC called for an evacuation and an accountability check based on the deteriorating interior conditions.

  • All firefighters on the interior attack crews reported outside to the Safety Unit for the accountability check. After all personnel were accounted for at 0925 hours, the IC continued the interior attack with crews located in the basement and on the first floor.
  • The E12 Officer reported to command that they had located the fire in the basement prior to the accountability check; they were ordered to continue fire suppression with E4 acting as back-up.
  • Both crews re-entered the basement and began to extinguish the fire.
  • The E12 Officer reported that soon after they began to spray water, the basement went “black, totally black, like the fire left.” He immediately yelled for everyone to back out. Some fire fighters reported hearing a “big, loud whistle” followed by a bang.

At 0928 hours, a major backdraft occurred that injured six fire fighters. The E4 Officer who was standing at the top of the stairwell was blown out of the building into the street by the force of the backdraft. The E4 Officer suffered bruises and facial burns. The E12 crew in the basement was beginning to back out when roaring fire rolled over top of them knocking them down.

  • They quickly climbed the steps and exited the church with their bunker gear smoldering. The E12 Officer received burns on his back, hands and face; an E12 fire fighter received hand and facial burns and another E12 fire fighter received facial burns.
  • The E11 Officer and E11 fire fighter were venting windows from a ground ladder against the wall on the western exterior when they saw that smoke was puffing in and out of the windows. They heard a load roar and started to run, but the force of the backdraft blew them across the street.
  • Fire fighters immediately began administering first aid to the injured and the IC ordered an evacuation and accountability check. The accountability check was quickly conducted by the Safety Unit and all fire fighters were accounted for by 0929 hours. Five of the injured fire fighters were transported by ambulance to a metropolitan trauma/burn center.
  • Fire fighters from Truck 14 did not reenter the church but were ordered to set up a positive pressure ventilation fan in a window in the front of the church. (Note: This task was not completed prior to the backdraft.)

A 4th Alarm was requested by the IC at 0931 hours and the assignment included two additional engine companies, the Chief, a Communications Officer, and another Battalion Chief as an additional ISO.

  • For the next several hours, both ISOs were working their sectors and updating the IC with progress reports.
  • At 0948 hours (approximately 1 hour into the incident), heavy smoke was reported throughout the church and the IC changed tactics to a defensive attack and removed all personnel from the building. Numerous master steam appliances and hand lines were operated from all exposure sides in an attempt to extinguish the fire in the church and protect the annex.
  • At 0949 hours, fire was present throughout the western side of the church.
  • At 1007 hours, heavy black smoke was observed in the eastern side and at 1009 hours, fire was breaking through the roof.
  • At 1031 hours, there was heavy fire throughout the church
  • At 1048 hours (approximately 2 hours into the incident), the roof was completely burnt away and companies were continuing with “surround and drown” operations.
  • At 1148 hours, the IC ordered all exterior hose streams shut down. One ISO left the immediate scene as instructed by the Assistant Chief to impound the fire gear of the fire fighters injured in the back draft. The IC met with company officers and discussed overhaul operations to extinguish the remaining pockets of fire.

At 1213 hours (approximately 3½ hours into the incident), the church bell tower collapsed sending large chunks of stone, brick, heavy wooden timbers, and other debris crashing through the vestibule trapping both victims under debris.

  • Other fire fighters operating in the vestibule recall that heavy timbers and wood boards broke through the ceiling and then the entire ceiling came down. Several fire fighters reported narrowly escaping from the collapse. Fire fighters standing outside of the church were showered with falling debris that injured numerous fire fighters.
  • The collapse caused some of the heavy timber roof trusses to fail. Falling roof trusses struck several fire fighters and one fire fighter became trapped. The fire fighters made an urgent radio transmission for assistance and requested rescue equipment. Their call went unanswered due to command being incapacitated.
  • At 1214 hours, an arson Officer radioed to dispatch that a major collapse had occurred and requested a 5th alarm for additional manpower to assist with rescue efforts. The 5th alarm assignment included three additional engines and two additional truck companies. Fire fighters immediately began administering first aid and transporting injured fire fighters to ambulances. Upon hearing of the collapse over the radio, the other ISO returned to the immediate scene from impounding the fire gear from injured fire fighters.
  • The ISO, assisted by an officer of the Safety Unit, conducted an accountability check a short time after the collapse and verified that Victim #1 and Victim #2 were missing. Twenty three fire fighters were injured during the collapse and transported to area hospitals.

According to the NIOSH Report F2004-017 (HERE) investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should perform the following;

  • Ensure that an assessment of the stability and safety of the structure is conducted before entering fire and water-damaged structures for overhaul operations
  • Establish and monitor a collapse zone to ensure that no activities take place within this area during overhaul operations
  • Ensure that the Incident Commander establishes the command post outside of the collapse zone
  • Train fire fighters to recognize conditions that forewarn of a backdraft
  • Ensure consistent use of personal alert safety system (PASS) devices during overhaul operations
  • Ensure that pre-incident planning is performed on structures containing unique features such as bell towers
  • Ensure that Incident Commanders conduct a risk-versus-gain analysis prior to committing fire fighters to an interior operation, and continue to assess risk-versus-gain throughout the operation including overhaul
  • Develop standard operating guidelines (SOGs) to assign additional safety officers during complex incidents
  • Provide interior attack crews with thermal imaging cameras
  • Municipalities should enforce current building codes to improve the safety of occupants and fire fighters

References and follow up;

NIOSH Report F2004-017           March 13, 2004

Career battalion chief and career master fire fighter die and twenty-nine career fire fighters are injured during a five alarm church fire – Pennsylvania

NIOSH REPORT 2009-100: Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program: Leading Recommendations for Preventing Fire Fighter Fatalities, 1998–2005

NIOSH ALERT 2009-146: NIOSH Alert: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters due to Structural Collapse (1999)

 
Ebenezer tragedy scoured for whys of fire, fatalities. Read more: http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/04117/306737-85.stm#ixzz0iM1F6Zep
 
Posted by on March 16, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, christopher naum, Collapse, Crew Management, Fire Suppression, LODD, major-incidents, NIOSH Reports, Occupancies, operations, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics, training, Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Criminal negligence on the part of commanders?

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img_5620South Carolina’s SLED is planning to review records for signs of negligence in the case of the June 18, 2007 Sofa Super Store fire in Charleston, SC. A team of State Law Enforcement Division agents is reviewing records from the Sofa Super Store blaze for signs of criminal negligence on the part of commanders who oversaw the attack on the inferno in which nine firemen died, authorities said.

Ninth Circuit Solicitor Scarlett Wilson requested the review after meeting with relatives of two firefighters who died in the June 18, 2007, inferno. Family members of captains Louis Mulkey and William Hutchinson gave Wilson eight binders of materials they say prove that commanders exposed fire crews to unnecessary and deadly risks with insufficient training and leadership. Randy Hutchinson said his group has found people with crucial accounts of the fire who were never interviewed by police. From what they can tell, police seem to have focused on the cause and origin of the fire while ignoring questions raised about the commanders’ actions, he said.

The city’s own experts concluded the Fire Department’s command system was virtually nonexistent at the blaze, leaving firefighters without supervision or clear instructions and leaving commanders with no idea of who was where and what they were doing. No one was monitoring who was in the building, how long they were inside or how much air they had left in their tanks. Key tasks were left undone and standby rescue teams were never established in the rush to funnel as many people inside as possible, according to the consultants’ report.

For a complete reporting of the leading events go to the Post and Courier article HERE

Posted by on March 15, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, command, command-leadership, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, LODD, major-incidents, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

What do you know about Building Construction?

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BKFFSWhat do you know about Building Construction?
Regardless of your rank or time in your organization or company; what do YOU know about building construction? It’s a loaded question to say the least, since the characteristic replies run the gamete of what one thinks they know versus what they actually know. I had the opportunity to lecture in different regions around the country over the past four weeks doing a series of programs on building construction, command risk management and firefighter safety. I say this to frame into context the following. When discussing strategic and tactical operational issues related to combat structural fire operations in the built environment, the majority of personnel, when asked “what type of formal training or instruction have they received in the areas of building construction?”; the majority of replies was typical- NONE, or in varied instanced; a seminar, maybe a weekend field class, or what they received in recruit school. There were some who indicated they had completed a college level course or some more comprehensive single course delivery.

At the minimum, as a company or command officer you must have a soild and fundamental understanding of building construction in order for you to safely and effectively do your job. It’s that simple, it’s that clear, it’s that important.

This common theme is distressing on a number of levels. First and foremost, do you think that, we as firefighters when tasked with the distinctive job of fighting fires in buildings and occupancies; that we should know intimately how a building is constructed, it’s materials and methods of construction, what systems and assemblies hold it in place. How fire loading, dynamics, behavior, intensity and travel and will affect a structure in terms of impingement, propagation, compromise, integrity and collapse. A solid and well versed knowledge base on building construction is an essential and fundamental element in all operational assignments at fires involving a structure and occupancy. Do you think it is anything less?

Knowledge and proficiencies related to building construction are formulative to all strategic, tactical and task level assignments. Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies; You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”.

Take a look at local, regional or national level training offerings and opportunities. Check out on-line offerings and select from the many seminar programs being offered related to building construction, risk management , structural systems, fire dynamics and fire behavior that integrate construction , strategies, tactics, safety, and operational relevant to today’s fireground risks and operational parameters.

Remember, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

Understanding Buildings, Performance & Fire Operations-Random Thoughts

• There is an acute corollary of technical knowledge and inter reliance on occupancies, construction, strategy, tactics, risk, safety, physics, engineering and fire suppression theory…FACT!

• There are Fundamental Domains that can be applied

• The Rules of Combat Structural Firefighting have changed; Didn’t anyone tell you?

• What about; Structures, Occupancy Types, Construction, Systems, Materials, Size, Height, Dimensions, Volumes, Vintage, Square footage, Resistance, Combustibility, Fire Loadings, Hazards, Occupancy Loads, Compartments, Barriers, Defenses, Protective’s, Inherent, Style, Design, Features, Appearance, Form, Façade, Deceptions, Assumptions, Distance, Proximity, Exposure, Access, Restrictive, Limiting, Vulnerable, Risk, Value, Operations and Safety. What do these mean to you?

• Do you equate the true limitations of time related to occupancy, structure and fire dynamics and fire load? Or is it just stretching the line and getting in…?

• Do you truly integrate occupancy risk with operational deployment and task assignments?

• Does your Incident action plan (IAP) reflect dynamic risk assessment related to the structure and occupancy?

• Modern building construction is no longer predicable; Do you an appreciation of what impact this has on your strategic or tactical operations?

• Command & company officer technical knowledge may be diminished or deficient in the areas of building construction; Does your organization have gaps in this area? If so, what can you do to close those gaps and reduce the risk?

• Technological Advancements in construction and materials have exceeded conventional fire suppression practices, yet we still advocate, train and practice antiquated firefighting principles.

• Some fire suppression tactics are faulted or inappropriate, requiring innovative models and methods.

• Fire Dynamics and Fire Behavior is not considered during fireground size-up and assessment

• Risk Management related to building structure and occupancy is either not practiced or willfully ignored during most incident operations

• Nothing is going to happen to me (us); “we’ve been fighting fires the same way for the past thirty years and we’ve done OK. We don’t need any of this stuff”. Sound familiar; what do you think?

Some additonal insights; HERE, HERE, HERE, HERE and HERE

Posted by on March 13, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, firefighting-operations, Occupancies, Risk Management, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics, training • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Seeing Clearly: Cleaning your “Glasses”

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1110817724023_2Commanders and Company Offices need to gain new insights and knowledge related to the modern building occupancy and to modify and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type and must have the combined adequacy of sufficient staffing, fire flow and nozzle appliances orchestrated in a manner that identifies with the fire profiling, predictability of the occupancy profile and accounts for presumed fire behavior. Today’s engine company operations and fire suppression theory has to progress beyond the pragmatic approaches to fire suppression such as “Big Fire-Big Water principle.

When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future. Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis. We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system; in addition to having an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions.

Executing tactical plans based upon faulted or inaccurate strategic insights and indicators has proven to be a common apparent cause in numerous case studies, after action reports and LODD reports. Our years of predictable fireground experience have at times clouded our ability to predict, assess, plan and implement incident action plans and ultimately deploy our companies-based upon the predictable performance expected of modern construction and especially those with engineered structural systems.

Today’s incident scene and structural fires are unlike those in past decades and will continue to challenge us operationally when confronted with structural fire engagement and combat operations. Operationally, we need to be doing the right thing, for the right reason in the right place to increase our safety and incident survivability.

The built-environments that form and shape our response districts and communities pose unique challenges to the day-to-day responses of fire departments and their subsequent operations during combat structural fire engagement. With the variety of occupancies and building characteristics present, there are definable degrees of risk potential with recognizable strategic and tactical measures that must be taken.

Although each occupancy type presents variables that dictate how a particular incident is handled, most company operations evolve from basic strategic and tactical principles rooted in past performance and operations at similar structures. This basis is based upon Predictability of Performance.

• Modern building construction is no longer predicable, But has defining predictability when taken in the context of structural compromise, integrity and inherent collapse
• Command & company officer technical knowledge may be diminished or deficient in the areas of building construction, fire dynamics and developing fire suppression therory for extreme fire behavior
• Technological Advancements in construction and materials have exceeded conventional fire suppression practices and mehtodologies
• Some fire suppression tactics are faulted or inappropriate, requiring innovative models and methods.
• Fire Dynamics and Fire Behavior is not considered during fireground size-up and assessment
• Risk Management is either not practiced or willfully ignored during most incident operations
• Some departments or officers show and indifference to safety and risk management
• Command & Company Officer dereliction
• Nothing is going to happen to me (us)

Posted by on March 5, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, company officer, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, Risk Management, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Situational Awareness and Risk Assessment

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8Situational Awareness and Risk Assessment
Situation Awareness related to Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Firefighter Safety is another mission critical element. Situation Awareness (SA) is the perception of environmental elements within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future. It is also a field of study concerned with perception of the environment critical to decision-makers in complex, dynamic situations and incidents. Both the 2006 and 2007 Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System Annual Reports identified a lack of situational awareness as the highest contributing factor to near misses reported.

• Situation Awareness involves being aware of what is happening around you at an incident scene to understand how information, events, and your own actions will impact operational goals and incident objectives, both now and in the near future.

• Lacking SA or having inadequate SA has been identified as one of the primary factors in accidents attributed to human error.
• Situation Awareness becomes especially important in the structural fire suppression and firefighter domains where the information flow can be quite high and poor decisions can lead to serious consequences.
• Dynamic Risk Assessment is commonly used to describe a process of risk assessment being carried out in a changing or evolving environment, where what is being assessed is developing as the process itself is being undertaken.
• This is further problematical for the Incident Commander when confronted with competing or conflicting incident priorities, demands or distractions before a complete appreciation of all mission critical or essential information and data has been obtained.
• The dynamic management of risk is all about effective, informed and decisive decision making during all phases of an incident at a structural fire.

The integration of Situational Awareness and Dynamic Risk Assessment related to the building and occupancy is a mission critical element in managing structural fires and in the strategic command management and company level tactical operations as we go forward into the next decade.

• Traditional phased incident scene size-up and monitoring is antiquated and no longer appropriate or applicable to modern fire service operations.
• Situational awareness is a combination of attitudes, previously learned knowledge and new information gained from the incident scene and environment that enables the strategic commanders, decision-makers and tactical companies to gather the information they need to make effective decisions that will keep their firefighters and resources out of harm’s way, reducing the likelihood of adverse or detrimental effects.

Command and company officers and firefighters MUST understand the building, the occupancy features and the inherent impact of fire within and on the structure, AND be able to identify, communicate and take actions necessary to support the incident action and battle plans, mitigate incident conditions and provide for continuous safety protection to themselves, their team, their company and the entire alarm assignment operating at the incident scene.

Everyone on the incident scene MUST stay alert to changing conditions, obvious or latent conditions or escalating factors that require prompt identification, comprehension and appropriate implementation of actions. To the Incident Commander, fire officer or firefighter, knowing what’s going on around you, in and around the building structure and understanding the consequences of building, construction, assembly, fire load and fire development and growth is mission critical to incident stabilization and mitigation and profoundly crucial in terms of personnel safety. Maintain a three-sixty sphere of observation and awareness at all times.

A PDF Activity program is available at the following link HERE, that provides you with a series of incident scene images and questions that can be utilized for enhancing skill sets in the areas of Situational Awareness, Size-up and Risk Assessment and Profiling. It’s attached as a PFD File. If your interested in obtaining an electronic file as a Power Point Program, please submit an email request at; Christopher.naum@gmail.com

Posted by on February 12, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, christopher naum, company officer, Crew Management, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, operations, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics, training

The New Rules of Engagement for Structural Firefighting

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12The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) is committed to reducing firefighter fatalities and injuries. As part of that effort, the IAFC Safety, Health and Survival (SHS) Section has developed DRAFT “Rules of Engagement for Structural Firefighting” to provide guidance to individual firefighters and incident commanders regarding risk and safety issues when operating on the fireground.

The intent is to provide a set of model procedures to be made available by the IAFC to fire departments as a guide for their own standard operating procedures development.

The direction provided to the project team by the Section leadership was to develop rules of engagement with the following conceptual points:

• Rules should be a short, specific set of bullets
• Rules should be easily taught and remembered
• Rules should define critical risk issues
• Rules should define “go” ‐ “no‐go situations
• A champion lesson plan should be provided

Early in development the rules of engagement, it was recognized that two separate rules were needed –one set for the firefighter, and another set for the incident commander. Thus, the two sets of rules of engagement described in this document. Each set has several commonly stated bullets, but the explanations are described somewhat differently based on the level of responsibility (i.e., firefighter vs. incident commanders). The reader may direct comments to Chief Gary Morris, the project lead, at mercurymorris@hotmail.com.

The originating IAFC Rules of Structural Engagement, HERE
IAFC Safety, Health and Survival Section Home Page, HERE

Posted by on February 12, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, christopher naum, command, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, LODD, Occupancies, operations, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Situational Awareness • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Accountability: Errors & Omissions

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RedDiceThis past week on the burgeoning internet call-in radio show Firefighter Netcast.com, HERE, a dynamic discussion developed related to the DeKalb County fatal house fire incident and the apparent questionable  actions purported by the company and command officers and the repercussions that have lead to FD employment terminations and resignations, HERE.

I discussed recently how Company and Command Officers should be highly accountable and highly responsive to the demands and duties that come with that rank and the inherent responsibilities that are intrinsic, fundamental and vital to our sworn duty HERE. The radio call-in discussions revolved around issues dealing with fire department complacency, expectations, accountability and discipline; fundamental responsibilities and actions that are required by companies, their staff and the company officer; as well as those of the incident commander.

The common theme resonated around the fact that nobody could believed that the entire balance of a structural alarm assignment didn’t conduct a more thorough investigation or have a more robust questioning attitude to further validate the assumptions being made at the scene that the alarm was unfounded. The issued FD report HERE stated that no personnel exited their apparatus to investigate any of the occupancies, other than to spot in backing up the trucks. Protocols and standards implemented in an organization will guide and drive operational actions at an incident scene. The deployment and management of that incident scene is predicated and rests squarely with the company and command officers to perform duties and actions aligned with organizational expectations, accountability and responsiveness.

How do you address the influence of error-likely situations in which complacency may creep into an incident scene when there is nothing readily apparent, however there is an indication that something is wrong? How do you maintain the heightened sense of preparedness, safety and readiness when you’ve responded to an alarm activation at the same address numerous times in the past with no events; but on this run you’re confronted with an escalating situation that calls for immediate and prompt fire suppression and rescue actions-but you’re not prepared?

How would you have addressed a similar call to a reported structure fire at a given neighborhood and building address and find nothing showing or evident upon arrival? What level of rigor does your company ( or fire deparment) expect or apply to determine that this incident is unfounded, false or an honest mistake? What are YOUR standards for responsibility and accountably?

Remember this; “Errors and Omissions are VERY unforgiving….”

Posted by on February 5, 2010 • Filed under: christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, company officer, firefighting-operations, Officer, Situational Awareness • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

RACE: Responsibility, Accountability, Complacency, Expectations

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180px-ThinkingMan_RodinBy now many of you may have seen the reports making their way around the internet circuit relating to the regrettable circumstances in DeKalb County, Georgia.  If you haven’t caught up on the incident particulars then check out these links, HERE, HERE and HERE  for starters.

There are some poignant and significant issues that clearly come to light relating to the basic and fundamental premise of Company and Command Officer Responsibility, Accountability and Complacency. Three words that when aligned with an alarm response, based upon caller information, communications dispatch and organizational protocols and procedures; sends a deployment of fire resources to report of a dwelling fire with the expectation that you’ll perform your duties in a prescribed manner based upon your training, knowledge, skills and protocols.  In other words; “You’ve got a run” to a report of a possible structure fire. It’s 01:03 hours in the morning and you’re in the street running the call. The balance of the alarm dispatch arrives; only to find nothing apparent or evident.  How many times has this happened to you and your company? What have been the results, what could have been different?

Think about the numerous instances that you’ve takin’ in a dispatch for a reported condition that ultimately turns into something very predictable, routine- in the sense of frequency with similar outcomes. The repetitiveness and frequency of some alarms has a tendency to lessen an officer’s sensitivity to the circumstances, situational awareness and latent indicators that may be present, but may not be recognized or acted upon. If you’ve found yourself in this situation, then it’s time for a wake-up call. This type of performance is not only unacceptable, it borders on levels of dereliction and negligence.

As in the incident in DeKalb County, Georgia, fire officials launched an investigation into a house fire that occurred early Sunday morning, when firefighters responded twice to the same residence. The first time it was prematurely and ineffectively determined that there was nothing evident immediately following arrival and fire department services were not needed. The second alarm response five hours later resulted in a fully involved residential structure upon arrival, with a resulting occupant death.  It was the actions during the first response that have resulted in four fire department officers; an Officer in Charge, two Captains and a Battalion Chief being place on leave with pay. at the present time.  Here’s more from an article by Jaye Watson from WXIA-TV on the incident and investigation.   DeKalb County fire officials have released their preliminary findings and have issued a report that you can find HERE.  

A dispatch, and arrival; no evidence of fire, no walk-around, no 360, no investigation, no command implementation, no one getting out of their apparatus. Seven minutes elapsed following arrival and companies are returning; incident unfounded, services not required. More than five hours later at 6:40 a.m. neighbors called 911 to report a house engulfed in flames.  

Read it, understand what took place and see what you would have done. I began talking about the fundamental premise of Company and Command Officer Responsibility, Accountability and Complacency. After reading the report, think about these three functional areas of Responsibility, Accountability and Complacency. There certainly shouldn’t be a need for a long dissertation on the meaning and relationships of these words and their relationship to any Company or Command Officer. IF, you understand your job, your duties; responsibilities and accountability to your company, your organization and the citizens you protect, THEN Accountability is a natural extension of everything. Oh, one more thing, let’s add Expectations to the basic mix; fundamental towards carrying out our sworn duties.

So the next time you find yourself “racing” to a scene and “racing” through the motions for what apparently may be a nothing of a call, think about the resulting actions and affects of the DeKalb County call and think about RACE: Responsibility, Accountability, Complacency and Expectations.

Don’t forget your 360 degrees of separation and situational awareness. You’re an Officer; perform like one at each and every call with due diligence and conscientiousness.

Posted by on January 29, 2010 • Filed under: christopher naum, command, command-leadership, company officer, firefighting-operations, Leaderhip, Occupancies, operations, Situational Awareness • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

360 Degrees of Separation

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2-21-2009 8-21-40 AM360 Degrees of Separation. The fireground often has competing or conflicting incident priorities, demands or distractions before a complete appreciation of all mission critical or essential information and data has been obtained. The effective assessment of the incident scene is much more than the three-sided size-up methodology of past fireground practices. In fact the term size-up doesn’t align with the newest directions in firefighter safety and incident command management.

The 360 degree assessment has become the generally accepted standard from which risk assessment is performed and incident action plans derived. The fact that many LODD case studies and reports repeatedly indicate the lack of an effective 360 degree assessment of the incident scene where structural fire engagement is being initiated was a contributing factor or may have contributed to a different incident outcome.

Think about the effectiveness and value that the 360 ◦ Degree assessment brings to the development of an effective and valid incident action plan and the tactics that are driven by those identified and assumed assessment indicators.The question is: Are you conducting a 360 upon arrival, and if not WHY?

Remember: All command and supervisory personal and operating companies must be able to recognize and appreciate the risks which are present at an incident in order to carry out an effective dynamic risk assessment. The 360 Degree assessment is a mission critical element for effective and safety incident operations.

Don’t for a moment think, “it takes too long to perform” or that you don’t have time to conduct, especially from a company officer perspective when you’re deploying and initiating tactical assignments. That extra minute to conduct a “three-sixty” may make all the difference in the world…..There may be three hundred and sixty degrees of safety margin that separate you and your company between injury or death….think about it.

Posted by on January 24, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, Occupancies, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

It’s more than just Size-Up; Situational Awareness and Dynamic Risk Assessment

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FLASHO11Dynamic Risk Assessment is commonly used to describe a process of risk assessment being carried out in a changing or evolving environment, where what is being assessed is developing as the process itself is being undertaken.

This is further problematical for the Incident Commander when confronted with competing or conflicting incident priorities, demands or distractions before a complete appreciation of all mission critical or essential information and data has been obtained. The dynamic management of risk is all about effective, informed and decisive decision making during all phases of an incident.

Situation Awareness, [SA], is the perception of environmental elements within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future. It is also a field of study concerned with perception of the environment critical to decision-makers in complex, dynamic situations and incidents.

Both the 2006 and 2007 Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System Annual Reports identified a lack of situational awareness as the highest contributing factor to near misses reported. Situation Awareness (SA) involves being aware of what is happening around you at an incident to understand how information, events, and your own actions will impact operational goals and incident objectives, both now and in the near future. Lacking SA or having inadequate SA has been identified as one of the primary factors in accidents attributed to human error (Hartel, Smith, & Prince, 1991) (Nullmeyer, Stella, Montijo, & Harden, 2005). Situation Awareness becomes especially important in work related domains where the information flow can be quite high and poor decisions can lead to serious consequences.

To the Incident commander, Fire Officer or firefighter, knowing what’s going on around you, and understanding the consequences is mission critical to incident stabilization and mitigation and profoundly crucial in terms of personnel safety. The integration of Situational Awareness and Dynamic Risk Assessment is a mission critical element in strategic incident command management and company level tactical operations as we go forward into the next decade.

Traditional incident scene size-up is antiquated and no longer appropriate or applicable to modern fire service operations.Situational awareness is a combination of attitudes, previously learned knowledge and new information gained from the incident scene and environment that enables the strategic commanders, decision-makers and tactical companies to gather the information they need to make effective decisions that will keep their firefighters and resources out of harm’s way, reducing the likelihood of adverse or detrimental effects.

According to a 1998 published TriData study report, “Situational Awareness is one of the most difficult skills to master and is a weakness in the fire community. The report goes on to state that “The culture must change so that [personnel] are observing, thinking, and discussing the situation constantly.” It’s all about implementing effective human performance tools; perceptions versus reality, expectations versus realization, comprehension and forecasting, informed decision-making and calculated and formulated risk.

It’s a whole lot more than just “Size-Up”.  What do you think?

Posted by on January 24, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, fires, operations, Risk Assessment, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

True Passion

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True Passion   Good to Great…How many times have you heard that buzz phrase in the last three years. Maybe you never even gave it much thought till now. So let’s take this opportunity to dissect the concept. Good… If you would ask most any company officer or firefighter if they were a good company they would most likely reply yes. If we posed the same question only changing company to department the most common answer would be yes. In general conversation this same group would use the word good in describing most of their collegues. So why do they use good and not great? What does it take to go from Good to Great?

There are a lot of philosophies on what it takes to be great. Here is the only issue, once you set a goal to move you from good to great and it is achieved…are you great or is it the norm now. Basically you should be focused on continual improvement and never satisfied with “Status Quo”. There are many actions, achievements and items that may classify you as good to great, however, we should not forget that we are a service delivery organization and we are only as good / great as we are perceived by our customers. There is not many days that go by that I don’t hear a comment, read an article, get a phone call or email about what a brother or sister firefighter has done in this business. These range from certifications to speaking engagements to articles published. The list could go on and on. The ones that truly touch me are the ones where we the fire service provide what I will call “True Passion” for the business. Each day thousands of these incidents occur where “True Passion” is demonstrated by the fire service worldwide. I would like to take this opportunity to share one of these “True Passion” cases from my home department, High Point Fire Department. Here is the letter written by one of the crew members:

On December 14, 2009 Engine 9 was staffed with FEO Travis Thompson, FF Lamar Sullivan and myself (FF Derek Way). Captain Richard Trexler II was on vacation. On this date Engine 9 responded to a call on 604 Hickory Chapel Road for assistance needed by the police department. Upon arrival Engine 9 found a High Point Police officer at the front door stating that a lady needs help inside the residence. We found an 84 year old female laying face down on the floor beside her bed. The patient stated that she had fallen and had been on the floor for 3 days and that she needed help getting up. Engine 9 assisted the patient with getting up and helped her to a chair in her bedroom. The patient was alert / oriented and stated that she had fallen in the kitchen on Thursday, December 10, 2009, and had to crawl from the kitchen into her room. When the patient fell she was at the refrigerator and the door was left open, so all of the food had spoiled. This lady did not have anything to eat or drink for 3 days, was very weak and sore.

The patient stated that she did not have any food and that she would eat the next day when “Meals on Wheels” brought her something. When the patient said this Acting Captain Travis Thompson immediately asked FF Lamar Sullivan and myself if we minded giving our leftover dinner to this lady. We both agreed and thought it would be a great idea. By this time GCEMS was already on the scene, stated that the lady needed to eat and drink immediately. Acting Captain Travis Thompson told EMS that we had leftover food at the station and that we would like to get this food so that the lady would have food. We returned to the station, picked up the food and returned back the scene and gave it to the lady. By the look on the patient’s face I could tell that she was truly touched by having the food brought to her and was very thankful. I feel that by Acting Captain Travis Thompson offering food to this patient in need, he made the High Point Fire Department shine. This gesture not only touched the patient medically and physically, but personally touched her by knowing that FEO Travis Thompson truly cared about her wellbeing. I know some people are quick to write letters complaining about things but I thought that Acting Captain Travis Thompson’s actions were outstanding and thought that someone should know.

This is a prime example of Good to Great mentality. This is only one example of many that could be shared from fire departments across the world. Sadly the opposite outcome exists. There are companies who would have never put that personal touch into a call.

Captain Trexler:
It is good to see that your leadership carries on even when you are not present. You lead by example and try to do the right things. This attribute is tremendous in the fire service today as we don’t see that as much as we should. I am truly proud of your leadership and teachings to your crew as it shows as your the level of professionalism exemplifies that of a great company officer.

FEO Thompson:
As an acting officer your ability to step up an lead shows a promising future for you. Your ability to carry on the vision and mission set by HPFD and your Captain shows that your focus is on customer service and is sincerely from a caring heart. Your actions and thought process demonstrated the highest level of servantship…giving and caring for those in need

FF Way:
I ability to recognize what is excellent leadership is an outstanding trait. Your humbleness of recognizing a peer who has acted in excellence is one of a true servant and steward to mankind. This trait is the foundation of an excellent leader.

As a member and officer of the fire service for many years I am extremely proud of each and every firefighter and officer who have “True Passion” for your contributions truly make a difference everyday. Thanks for your tireless work and professionalism.
My questions to you:

  • Do you have the “Good to Great” mentality?
  • Do you have “True Passion”?
  • It takes both to be a good Company Officer!

 

Posted by on January 21, 2010 • Filed under: administration-leadership, command-leadership, company officer, Doug Cline, Leaderhip, Mentor, Officer, operations, patient-management, Situational Awareness, Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , ,

Rowhouse Fire Close Call- Fire Behavior Acting Badly

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httpv://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M00Vl7cxuYo

Five Baltimore  City (MD) firefighters were hurt as a powerful fire ball engulfed the front of the dwelling. One firefighter was hospitalized and is reported in stable condition. Two other firefighterrs were hurt during overhaul. The fire in a rowhouse was being worked by companies, when conditions rapidly changed resulting in the extreme fire behavior.

  • As a company or command officer are you maintaining a keen level of situational awareness of fire conditions and observing and predicting fire behavior?
  • When fire behaves badly, there may be little time to react and overcome the severity and magnitude of those self-revealing conditions in a timely manner to preclude injury.
  • Are you monitoring conditions based upon tactical actions and tasks?
  • According to published reports, the early morning fire began in the basement and quickly traveled to the first floor.

 

Posted by on January 15, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Commandsafety.com, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, Occupancies, operations, Risk Assessment, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics, Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Reloaded

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1birdseyelgb“It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations. Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments, while maintaining the values and traditions that defines the fire service.”- Christopher Naum

How does this fit into your “culture, values and philosophy?”

Posted by on January 15, 2010 • Filed under: christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, Leaderhip, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Vacant or Unoccupied: Tactical Risk and Safety

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1-13-2010 5-12-50 PMWe seem to do a lot of things at times out of common practice and repetition, you know; “We’ve always done it that way….” syndrome. There’s a resonating theme that is making its way around the fire service dealing with going to a defensive tactical posture at vacant or unoccupied structure fires.

This command posture leads to limiting interior operating engagement, while promoting a high degree of risk management.With that being said, there are also plenty of opinions on these types of policies as such, since this type of tactical effort may be contrary to the local “culture and traditions” of the responding agencies and may be a hard pill to swallow, since we’re in the job of “ fighting ALL fires..” Please refresh your memories on a past post on Tactical Entertainment HERE and HERE

Here are some basic definitions to keep us all on the same playing field;

Vacant; refers to a building that is not currently in use, but which could be used in the future. The term “vacant” could apply to a property that is for sale or rent, undergoing renovations, or empty of contents in the period between the departure of one tenant and the arrival of another tenant. A vacant building has inherent property value, even though it does not contain valuable contents or human occupants.

Unoccupied; generally refers to a building that is not occupied by any persons at the time an incident occurs. An unoccupied building could be used by a business that is temporarily closed (i.e. overnight or for a weekend). The term unoccupied could also apply to a building that is routinely or periodically occupied; however the occupants are not present at the time an incident occurs. A residential structure could be temporarily unoccupied because the residents are at work or on vacation. A building that is temporarily unoccupied has inherent property value as well as valuable contents.

The question today is this. As a responding company, you arrive at the scene of a vacant or unoccupied structure. The building’s construction features and systems have inherent risk associated with the occupancy, (as is the case with nearly all of our structures and occupancies).

Your company determines that you’re going to go defensive, even though you probably could make a reasonably safe entry and engage in interior structural fire suppression.

Would there be any repercussions in your station, battalion/district/community or organization if you took this tactic? What are YOUR personal thoughts on this form of risk management?

Some insights, HERE and HERE, HERE, HERE and HERE

Posted by on January 13, 2010 • Filed under: Crew Integrity, Fire Suppression, fires, Leaderhip, Officer, operations, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Leading Recommendations for Preventing Fire Fighter Fatalities, 1998–2005

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2009100smNIOSH issues Report on: Leading Recommendations for Preventing Fire Fighter Fatalities, 1998–2005

The United States currently depends on approximately 1.1 million fire fighters to protect its citizens and property from losses caused by fire. Each year in the United States, approximately 100 fire fighters die in the line of duty. Sudden cardiac death is the leading cause of fatalities, followed by trauma. In 1998, Congress appropriated funds to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) for a fire fighter safety initiative. As part of this initiative, NIOSH developed and implemented the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (FFFIPP).

The overall goal of the NIOSH FFFIPP is to reduce the number of fire fighter fatalities. To accomplish this goal, NIOSH conducts investigations of line-of-duty fire fighter deaths to identify contributing factors and to generate recommendations for prevention.

This document is a synthesis of the 1,286 individual recommendations from the 335 FFFIPP investigations conducted from 1998 to 2005. We hope that the fire service will use this document as a resource and catalyst for developing, updating, and implementing effective policies, programs, and training to prevent fatalities among fire fighters.

Executive Summary
The report document summarizes the most frequent recommendations from the first 8 years of the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (FFFIPP). The overall goal of the program is to reduce the number of fire fighter fatalities.

Through 2005, the FFFIPP investigated 335 fatal incidents involving 372 fire fighter fatalities. The investigations encompassed a variety of circumstances such as cardiovascular-related deaths, motor vehicle accidents, structure fires, diving incidents, and electrocutions. Fatalities have been investigated in career, volunteer, and combination departments in both urban and rural settings throughout the United States.

This document shares the most common recommendations from the 335 investigations and more than 1,286 recommendations that were developed by NIOSH investigators. These recommendations were developed using existing fire service standards, guidelines, standard operating procedures, and other relevant resources over the first eight years of the program. Fire departments can use this document when developing, updating, and implementing policies, programs, and training for fire fighter injury prevention efforts.

Download or review the NIOSH Report HERE

Posted by on January 13, 2010 • Filed under: Crew Management, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, in-the-line-of-duty, line-of-duty, LODD, NIOSH Reports, operations, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics, training • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Ten Minutes in the Street Scenarios on FFN

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Arrival with Heavy Fire AlphaTriple Decker Banner

 

 

The bells come in right after your last bite of dinner for a reported fire in multiple-occupancy residential. The building is located on a steep sloping road that you know all too well. The address sounds like it’s in the middle of the block and you start thinking about the other series of large houses located on the street and the exposure issues each provides. It sounds all too familiar, as you’ve “been down this road before”.

Check out the latest; Ten Minutes in the Streets; First-Due Triple Decker Fire Scenario on the Firefighter Nation, HERE. Get involved in the discussions and expand your insights and share your experiences.

Take a look at the othere series of past Ten Minutes in the Street, scenarios in the FFN, Fire Ground Tactics and Firefighter Safety Forums, HERE

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Posted by on January 8, 2010 • Filed under: Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Crew Integrity, Fire Suppression, operations, Risk Assessment, Scenarios, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics, Ten Minutes in the Street Scenarios • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,