BURN is a documentary about Detroit, told through the eyes of Detroit firefighters, who are on the front lines charged with the thankless task of saving a city — and an American Dream — that many have written off as dead. We made a 10-minute trailer. Please SHARE, ASK QUESTIONS, DONATE so we can start production on the film as soon as possible. Take the time to watch the video trailer…..it will speak for itself.
Check out the web site, HERE BURN Trailer from Tremolo Productions on Vimeo.
A Tale of Two House Fires and their operational outcomes. This video from a newscast that Dave Statter did in 2007 provides some basic insights into operational factors related to Conventional Construction and Engineered Structural Systems (ESS).
If you haven’t had the opportunity or time to log onto the Underwriter’s Laboratories (UL) University Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions. This online firefighter training course is the result of a research partnership among UL, the Chicago Fire Department, IAFC, and Michigan State University, funded in part by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This is a self-guided course which focuses on the structural stability of engineered lumber under fire conditions and provides the latest in test data and insights.
Also check out State Farm Insurance’s Fire Training web resource SFSafeTraining.com for informational training offerings to enhance your skill set in the areas of Building Construction and Operational Safety.
Building Performance Awareness on Lightweight Construction during Fires is another exceptional linf to spend some time at the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) site.
In a partnership with the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA), the American Forest and Paper Association (AF&PA) developed a comprehensive Web-based educational program to help the fire service learn more about lightweight construction components and the performance of these building materials during fires to create a safer operational environment for firefighters. These components include trusses, glue laminated beams, I-joists, structural composite lumber, structural insulated panels, and wood structural panels that are replacing dimensional lumber in many applications.
Included in this program is FireFrame, an interactive tool on building construction for the fire service. It was developed with the assistance of several state and local fire training systems. Access the AF&PA Training site HERE
As a Company or Command Officer are you aware and take into consideration operational factors that are unique to tactical assignments within occupancies and building structures of conventional construction versus those that have engineered structural assemblies and systems?
Hackensack (NJ) Ford Fire July 1, 1988
As we approach the July 4th holiday period, two significant LODD incidents previously occurred during this time frame that hold a number of lessons learned related to command management, operations, building construction principles and building performance, fire behavior and the ever present dangers of the job. Take the opportunity to learn more about these events, and expand your insights and knowledge base. Take a moment to reflect upon the supreme sacrifice made by these heroic firefighters and the messages that lay within the pages of the incident case studies, reports and summaries.
There’s a lot of practical safety and operational information on these events along with a tremendous volume of information in the various text books on strategy and tactics, incident command and building construction.
Learn from the past so we don’t repeat it. Remember- NO MORE HISTORY REPEATING EVENTS!
The Hackensack Ford Fire & Collapse occurred nearly ten years AFTER another tragic LODD event involving a bowstring truss roof collapse; the August 2nd, 1978 FDNY Waldbaum’s Fire, Brooklyn, New York that took the lives of six FDNY firefighters.
Street Smarts for Safety and Survival…………Stay safe.
Additional Relevant Safety considerations, HERE and HERE
Twenty-Two Year Anniversary Hackensack Ford Fire and Truss roof collapse, Hackensack Fire Department. July 1st, 1988
Pause to remember our brothers who made the ultimate sacrifice twenty-one years ago, on July 1st, 1988 and the lessons learned from this event.
On July 1, 1988 Hackensack’s Captain RICHARD L. WILLIAMS, Lieutenant RICHARD REINHAGEN, Firefighter WILLIAM KREJSA, firefighter LEONARD RADUMSKI, and Firefighter STEPHEN ENNIS lost their lives at Hackensack Ford when a bowstring arch truss collapsed entrapping them in the area below. The five firefighters were in the structure, a bowstring truss building, when the roof suddenly collapsed a 60-foot square section of the building’s wood bowstring truss roof collapsed, and an intense fire immediately engulfed the area. Williams, Kresja and Radumski were killed instantly, and four other firefighters escaped. Reinhagen and Ennis survived the initial collapse and found refuge in a tool room where they spent the next 13 minutes calling for help.. . despite heroic rescue attempts, succumbed to carbon monoxide poisoning. Approximately 90 minutes after the collapse, firefighters located the bodies of their fallen comrades.
Three (3) building factors contributed to the collapse of this bowstring trussed roof:
• Alterations that consisted of a heavy ceiling of cementitious material on wire lathe;
• Auto parts storage in the attic; and
• The Fire burned for a significant length of time and was well advanced prior to detection.
• This roof collapsed 35 Minutes after the initial units arrived.
Remember:
• CAPT. RICHARD L. WILLIAMS, Engine Co. No. 304
• LIEUT. RICHARD REINHAGEN, Engine Co. No. 302
• F/F WILLIAM KREJSA, Engine Co. No. 301
• F/F LEONARD RADUMSKI, Engine Co. No. 302
• F/F STEPHEN ENNIS, Rescue Co. No. 308
NFPA SUMMARY
Hackensack, New Jersey Fire Fighter Fatalities July 1, 1988
Five fire fighters from the Hackensack, New Jersey Fire Department were killed while they were engaged in interior fire suppression efforts at an automobile dealership when portions of the building’s wood bowstring truss roof suddenly collapsed. The incident occurred on Friday, July 1, 1988, at approximately 3:00 p.m., when the fire department began to receive the first of a series of telephone calls reporting “flames and smoke” coming from the roof of the Hackensack Ford Dealership.
Two engines, a ladder company, and a battalion chief responded to the first alarm assignment. The first arriving fire fighters observed a “heavy smoke condition” at the roof area of the building. Engine company crews investigated the source of the smoke inside the building while the truck company crew assessed conditions on the roof. For the next 20 minutes, the focus of the suppression effort was concentrated on these initial tactics.
During this time, however, little headway appeared to have been made by the initial suppression efforts, and the magnitude of the fire continued to grow. The overall fire ground tactics were shifted to a more “defensive” posture (exterior operation) and the battalion chief gave the order to “back your lines out.” However, before suppression crews could exit form the interior, a sudden partial collapse of the truss roof occurred, trapping six fire fighters. An intense fire immediately engulfed the area of the collapse. One trapped fire fighter was able to escape through an opening in the debris. The other five died as a result of the collapse. This incident and several others before and since, provide important lessons to the fire service regarding the fire ground hazards of wood truss roof assemblies.
This NFPA Summary may be reproduced in whole or in part for fire safety educational purposes as long as the meaning of the summary is not altered, credit is given to NFPA and the copyright of the NFPA is protected.
Following is an excerpt from the New York Times article:
Demers contended that Chief Williams, primarily because of the volume of fire on the rooftop, should have ordered nine firefighters out of the garage within 7 minutes of his arrival. The order to pull out was given at 3:34 p.m., about 30 minutes after his arrival, the report said.
The roof collapsed at 3:36 p.m. Three firefighters were hit by burning debris and killed, four escaped, and two, Lieut. Richard R. Reinhagen and Stephen Ennis, took refuge in the tool room.
In one of the major communications flaws cited by Mr. Demers at the fire scene, all departmental communications were transmitted on a single channel, or frequency. Consequently, Lieutenant Reinhagen’s appeals for help were intermingled with orders for deploying men and hoses and instructions to arriving companies.
Headquarters then radioed to Chief Williams: “Expedite on that, they’re running out of air.” The transcript did not show any response from Chief Williams.Over the next 6 minutes, through 3:48 p.m., Lieutenant Reinhagen made 10 more calls. None was answered. For three of the minutes, bells indicating depletion of his air tanks’ supply were ringing repeatedly. At one point, a civilian who overheard the ringing on a radio scanner called fire headquarters to tell officials of the noise.
At 3:49 p.m., the Lieutenant radioed: “Chief, this is Lieutenant Reinhagen. I’m still stuck back in the right rear of the building in the closet. We are out of air in a closet. We’re out of air.”
“What’s your location?” Chief Williams said. The response was inaudible and the Chief began ordering water from a truck.
At 3:50 p.m., the Lieutenant got the Chief directly and repeated that they were “stuck in a closet” and “out of air.”
Twelve seconds later, the Chief Williams asked: “Where you at?”
The Lieutenant was asked if he was on the first or second floor. “First floor, underneath the collapsed ceiling,” the Lieutenant said at 3:52 p.m. It was his last transmission. Firemen eventually punched a hole through an exterior wall about 10 feet from the tool room, but saw only a mass of flame, Mr. Demers said. The burning timbers were leaning against the tool room, he said, but neither fireman was burned.
Learn from the past so we don’t repeat it. Remember- NO MORE HISTORY REPEATING EVENTS!
Some Open Questions;
Additional References:
NFPA REPORT, HERE
Dave STATter’s 2008 Coverage, HERE
Fire Rescue Magazine Article, A Failure in Command; HERE
Lessons Learned from Tim Sendelbach, Editor-in-Chief, FireRescue magazine, HERE
Other Resource Links:
http://www.wusa9.com/news/columnist/blogs/2008/06/hackensack-ford-20-years-later.html
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940DE3D6143FF931A357…
http://www3.gendisasters.com/new-jersey/6534/hackensack-nj-fire-aut…
http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=442&itemID=18676&;…;…
Memorial Park, Hackensack, NJ (http://www.cyberonic.net/~mikef6/p0000120.htm)
Three Firefighters and Three Sisters Killed in Gloucester City, New Jersey Building Collapse during Fire Attack, Rescue Operation, July 4th, 2002
Gloucester City (NJ) Collapse 2002
On July 4th, 2002 at 0136 hrs.,The Gloucester City Fire Department was dispatched to 200 North Broadway for a reported house fire. Responding units were advised that occupants may be trapped. First arriving units were on location in less than three minutes.
They found heavy fire on all exposures of a three-story multi-family dwelling and initiated a search for entrapped occupants. (Various reports from bystanders were at times conflicting regarding the number and location of victims). While providing an aggressive interior attack and rescue operation, an occupant was rescued from the dwelling. Due to the severity of their injuries they were unable to give direction regarding the whereabouts of any other occupants.
While all hands were operating by continuing an aggressive interior attack and rescue, a partial collapse of the structure occurred. An emergency evacuation signal was sounded and while that was commencing a further and much more substantial collapse occurred trapping eight firefighters inside the burning debris.
Additional specialized collapse rescue resources were requested, firefighter accountability was initiated and rescue efforts were intensified. Five of the eight trapped firefighters were rescued. Three of the eight gave the ultimate sacrifice in service to their fellow man. Unfortunately these three children did not survive. A total of nine victims were transported to area hospitals, one civilian and eight firefighters.
Remember:
• James Sylvester
Fire Chief, Mount Ephraim Fire Department
Sylvester, 31, a 17 year veteran, was survived by his wife, who was pregnant with the couple’s first child
• John West
Deputy Chief, Mount Ephraim Fire Department
West, 40, a 23-year veteran, was survived by his wife and three children
• Thomas G. Stewart III
Paid Firefighter, Gloucester City Fire Department
Stewart, 30, a 13 year veteran, was survived by his fiancée and their son. Stewart publicly proposed to his girlfriend, hours before the fire while they watched the city’s fireworks from high atop a fire truck ladder at Gloucester City High School.
NIOSH REPORT: Structural Collapse at Residential Fire Claims Lives of Two Volunteer Fire Chiefs and One Career Fire Fighter – New Jersey, HERE
Philadelphia Inquirer Posting, HERE
Everyone Goes Home Newsletter Article by Chris Collier, HERE
New Jersey Division of Fire Safety LODD Report, HERE
SUMMARY
On July 4, 2002, a 30-year-old male volunteer fire chief, a 40-year-old male volunteer deputy fire chief, and a 30-year-old male career fire fighter died when a residential structure collapsed, trapping them, along with four fire fighters and an officer who survived. At 0136 hours, a combination fire department and a mutual-aid volunteer fire department were dispatched to a structure fire. Local law enforcement radioed Central Dispatch reporting a fully involved structure with three children trapped on the second floor. The first officer on the scene assumed incident command and reported to Central Dispatch that the incident site was a three-story structure with fire showing and that people could be seen at the windows. Note: The female resident (survivor) was the person seen in the window.
The three children that were reported as being trapped did not survive and were later found in the debris. Additional units were requested, including a mutual-aid ladder company from a career department. Crews were on the scene searching for occupants and fighting the fire for approximately 27 minutes when the building collapsed.
NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar incidents, fire departments should;
• Ensure that the department’s structural fire fighting standard operating guidelines (SOGs) are followed and refresher training is provided
• Ensure that the Incident Commander (IC) formulates and establishes a strategic plan for offensive and defensive operations
• Ensure that the incident commander (IC) continuously evaluates the risk versus gain during operations at an incident
• Ensure that a separate Incident Safety Officer, independent from the Incident Commander, is appointed
• Ensure that fire fighters conducting interior operations (e.g., search and rescue, initial attack, etc.) provide progress reports to the IC
• Ensure that accountability for all personnel at the fire scene is maintained
• Ensure that a Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) is established and in position
• Ensure that the officer in charge of an incident recognize factors (e.g., structural defects, large body of fire in an old structure, etc.) when analyzing potential building collapse
• Ensure, when feasible, that fire fighters should respond together, in one emergency vehicle, as a crew
Additionally, municipalities should consider
• Establishing and maintaining regional mutual-aid radio channels to coordinate and communicate activities involving units from multiple jurisdictions
In order to minimize the risk of similar incidents, the New Jersey Division of Fire Safety identified key issues that must be addressed and remedies that should be implemented within all departments.
1. FACTOR: There appears to be a disconnect between career and volunteer personnel in the Gloucester City Fire Department (GCFD). Many personnel expressed the concern that the GCFD operated as separate fire departments rather than as one.
REMEDY: It is essential that all firefighters put individual differences aside in order to work together successfully as a team to achieve their common goal of saving lives and property.
2. FACTOR: The GCFD, faces a common dilemma associated with combination fire departments: staffing levels may be unpredictable depending on how many volunteers are available to respond to any one incident. This unpredictability can result in insufficient staff to perform required tasks until additional staff arrives.
REMEDY: Elected or appointed municipal officials need to make a commitment to the adequate staffing of the fire department and staffing levels must allow for compliance with the two-in / two-out provisions of the Public Employees Occupational Safety and Health (PEOSH) Standard 29CFR1910.134. The New Jersey Division of Fire Safety can provide assistance to the municipalities and provide examples of how this can be accomplished
3. FACTOR: Due to the limited number of firefighting personnel who arrived at this incident, all initial efforts were focused on the rescue of occupants. This postponed fire suppression operations until additional resources arrived. Because rescue and fire suppression operations were performed sequentially rather than simultaneously, the fire may have spread more quickly resulting in the early failure of the structure.
REMEDY: Sufficient personnel are critical to ensure that all necessary operations can be performed at the appropriate time. Furthermore, a continual size-up assessment must be maintained so that the Incident Commander (IC) can be kept aware of the conditions as the incident progresses. This continual size-up will allow the IC to modify the strategy and / or tactics as deemed necessary.
4. FACTOR: Although the GCFD was equipped with a thermal imaging camera (TIC), firefighters failed to utilize it for the initial search for victims. The TIC was also not used properly to analyze the scope of the incident and determine what tactics to employ.
REMEDY: Fire departments that possess TIC units should use them regularly during routine operations such as training, scene size up, search and rescue and structural fire fighting.
5. FACTOR: From the onset of operations, the Incident Management System (IMS) was not properly expanded as the incident progressed. Given the scale of this incident, the span of control quickly became too large for the IC to effectively manage and additional functions were not delegated to subordinates. Critical tasks such as safety and accountability were not effectively implemented.
REMEDY: N.J.A.C. 5:75 mandates that all fire departments utilize an IMS. It is a modular system, which allows the IC to apply only those elements that are necessary at a particular incident, and allows elements to be activated or deactivated as incidents escalate or decline. Fire departments are required to adopt written plans, or Standard Operating Guidelines (SOG’s) based on the IMS, to address different types of incidents. The NJ Division of Fire Safety distributed suggested SOGs upon adoption of this regulation and they continue to be available to all fire departments.
6. FACTOR: The GCFD did not assign a dedicated safety officer (SO) to observe operations and terminate potentially unsafe actions.
REMEDY: IMS regulations under N.J.A.C. 5:75 mandate the use of safety officers (SO’s) at all incidents. An SO is required to observe operations on the fire scene, identify next steps and order the correction of safety hazards to personnel. Given the scope of this incident, the IC should have assigned at least one SO.
7. FACTOR: The GCFD did not designate accountability officers to monitor each area of entry into the structure. Nor was a Personal Accountability Report (PAR) or roll sheet utilized to track personnel and monitor their functions. Therefore, the concept of accountability of personnel location, function, and time failed.
REMEDY: Although not enforceable at the time of this incident, the regulations for the NJ Personal Accountability System (NJPAS) under N.J.A.C 5:75 now require that fire departments utilize an accountability system. This system includes the designation of accountability officers and the use of PAR’s / roll calls, all within the framework of the IMS that is required to be utilized at all incidents. The NJ Division of Fire Safety is in the process of finalizing suggested SOGs and will distribute them to all fire departments when complete.
8. FACTOR: Although firefighters Sylvester and Stewart were equipped with Personal Alert Safety System (PASS) devices, they did not activate them prior to entering the structure. It should be further noted that their PASS devices were not automated; they had to be manually activated by the user. Firefighter West was not equipped with a PASS device.
REMEDY: PASS devices must be provided, used, and maintained in accordance with PEOSH regulations under N.J.A.C. 12:100-10 et seq. Although many departments still rely on PASS devices that must be activated manually, – devices that are acceptable by PEOSH regulations – they are not ideal because the firefighter must remember to activate the PASS device. For this reason, fire departments should strongly consider upgrading their SCBA to those employing automatic activating PASS devices.
9. FACTOR: The GCFD did not specifically designate the required personnel for the rescue of distressed firefighters through the establishment of Rapid Intervention Teams (RIT) or Firefighter Assist and Search Teams (FAST). Consequently, when the building collapsed, there was not a properly equipped team in place for immediate rescue operations.
REMEDY: IMS regulations under N.J.A.C. 5:75 require that fire departments utilize RIT or FAST to rescue distressed firefighters when operating in a hazardous atmosphere. The IC should request a RIT or FAST as soon as possible after dispatch to allow the team to arrive quickly.
10. FACTOR: Not all fire departments operating on the fire ground were communicating on the same radio frequency, which resulted in communication failures. Although, the Camden Fire Department (CFD) did have the capability to communicate on the GCFD “Fire 5” frequency they chose not to.
REMEDY: IMS regulations under N.J.A.C. 5:75 require that a communication system allow for inter-agency communication during mutual aid responses by providing a direct communication link between companies. Fire departments should work with other departments that are used routinely for mutual aid to ensure radio interoperability.
11. FACTOR: An emergency evacuation signal was sounded upon reports of a firefighter missing inside the structure before the impending collapse, however, the signal was never sounded at any other time prior to the collapse, nor was it sounded immediately after the collapse.
REMEDY: In the event an emergency evacuation becomes necessary and an emergency signal is required, N.J.A.C. 5:75 requires that fire departments utilize an emergency evacuation signal that is easily recognizable and distinguishable from all other fireground noises. The signal must be utilized when conditions on the fireground indicate an imminent and extreme risk to firefighters. At this time NJ DFS is finalizing a proposal that would establish a statewide emergency evacuation signal.
12. FACTOR: During this incident, fireground conditions were not properly analyzed, which led to the failure to recognize an impending building collapse.
REMEDY: Firefighters and officers need to learn the warning signs and causes of building collapses. Often following a collapse, as was the case with this incident, personnel on the scene report that the structure collapsed “without warning”. However, this is usually not the case; the reality is that the IC and firefighters simply failed to identify the indicators that were present prior to the collapse.
13. FACTOR: After removal of all victims, the remaining structure was demolished and the incident scene was cleared of all debris within 48 hours of law enforcement concluding their origin and cause investigation. This prevented a thorough assessment of the remaining structure in order to identify the cause and contributing factors of the collapse.
REMEDY: A protocol should be adopted to ensure that fire scenes are secured in a manner that not only allows for public safety, but also prevents immediate demolition. This will provide agencies with an opportunity to conduct any investigations that may be necessary.
14. FACTOR It was difficult to gauge the amount of training for all GCFD personnel due to insufficient record keeping. Although it was determined that the GCFD firefighters and officers met the minimum regulatory training requirements, many members did not possess a great deal of supplemental training with regard to structural firefighting. Additionally, the volunteer firefighters and officers often did not attend the scheduled departmental drills and rarely trained with the career personnel despite having frequent opportunities to participate.
REMEDY: Standards such as NFPA 1500 recommend that fire departments establish a regular training and education program that is commensurate with the duties and functions that firefighters are expected to perform. Additionally, proper record keeping is essential to certify that all personnel have received both required and supplemental training or education.
15. FACTOR: Qualifications of volunteer officers were difficult to judge and there were serious concerns voiced by the career members of the department regarding the suitability of some of the volunteer officers. This resulted in a lack of confidence by several career personnel in the volunteer officers and reluctance to take direction from them.
REMEDY: In addition to the NJ DFS requirement that all fire service supervisors obtain incident management certification; municipal officials need to establish uniform minimum qualifications for fire officers in order to ensure the effective provision of fire suppression services to the public. The NJ DFS recently adopted voluntary fire officer standards and will be developing a training curriculum to meet those standards.
16. FACTOR: It was not possible to determine if a smoke detector inspection was conducted in the building after a change in occupancy in October of 2001 as required by the NJ Uniform Fire Code. The city’s housing department, who has the responsibility for these inspections, was unable to provide documentation of such an inspection to either the Division of Fire Safety or to the Camden County Prosecutor’s Office. It was not clear whether smoke detectors were activated during this fire incident.
REMEDY: It is recommended that the responsibility for smoke detector inspections be transferred to the fire department to ensure complete and documented inspections.
Discovery Channel Special on the Gloucester City Incident. A must see for all Company and Command Officers…
The NIST Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiements was issued this morning. A copy of the report is at CommandSafety.com HERE and is also available for download at the NIST, HERE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Both the increasing demands on the fire service – such as the growing number of Emergency Medical Services (EMS) responses, challenges from natural disasters, hazardous materials incidents, and acts of terrorism—and previous research point to the need for scientifically based studies of the effect of different crew sizes and firefighter arrival times on the effectiveness of the fire service to protect lives and property.
To meet this need, a research partnership of the Commission on Fire Accreditation International (CFAI), International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), International Association of Firefighters (IAFF), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI) was formed to conduct a multiphase study of the deployment of resources as it affects firefighter and occupant safety. Starting in FY 2005, funding was provided through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) / Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Grant Program Directorate for Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program—Fire Prevention and Safety Grants. In addition to the low-hazard residential fireground experiments described in this report, the multiple phases of the overall research effort include development of a conceptual model for community risk assessment and deployment of resources, implementation of a general sizable department incident survey, and delivery of a software tool to quantify the effects of deployment decisions on resultant firefighter and civilian injuries and on property losses.
The first phase of the project was an extensive survey of more than 400 career and combination (both career and volunteer) fire departments in the United States with the objective of optimizing a fire service leader’s capability to deploy resources to prevent or mitigate adverse events that occur in risk- and hazard-filled environments. The results of this survey are not documented in this report, which is limited to the experimental phase of the project. The survey results will constitute significant input into the development of a future software tool to quantify the effects of community risks and associated deployment decisions on resultant firefighter and civilian injuries and property losses.
The following research questions guided the experimental design of the low-hazard residential fireground experiments documented in this report:
Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments. NFPA 1710 is the consensus standard for career firefighter deployment, including requirements for fire department arrival time, staffing levels, and fireground responsibilities. Limitations of the study include firefighters’ advance knowledge of the burn prop, invariable number of apparatus, and lack of experiments in elevated outdoor temperatures or at night. Further, the applicability of the conclusions from this report to commercial structure fires, high rise fires, outside fires, terrorism/natural disaster response, HAZMAT or other technical responses has not been assessed and should not be extrapolated from this report.
Primary Findings
Overall Scene Time:
Time to Water on Fire:
Ground Ladders and Ventilation:
Primary Search:
Hose Stretch Time:
Industry Standard Achieved:
Occupant Rescue:
Conclusion:
More than 60 full-scale fire experiments were conducted to determine the impact of crew size, first-due engine arrival time, and subsequent apparatus arrival times on firefighter safety and effectiveness at a low-hazard residential structure fire.
Additionally, the results provide tenability measures associated with a range of modeled fires.Future research should extend the findings of this report in order to quantify the effects of crew size and apparatus arrival times for moderate- and high-hazard events, such as fires in high-rise buildings, commercial properties, certain factories, or warehouse facilities, responses to large-scale non-fire incidents, or technical rescue operations.
Addition project information and insights, Go to CommandSafety.com HERE and HERE
As we embark deep into the millennium and a new decade, changes are sure to occur. The fire service will surely see many of these changes. The place that we need to make changes initially is within ourselves as officers. We must be prepared to meet these new challenges and a new decade with a set of fully charged batteries. The task of change is extremely hard, as we are often times nostalgic. However, we must strive to reach new levels in service through education and training. The first taste of leadership in recruit academies is seen by trainees through the instructors and officers they have. As a young officer one of my mentors told me this little secret, “A true instructor is a leader of the future”. With that I had to ask how? My answer was, “you shape the minds and careers of many firefighters through education. By doing so you are leading the fire service of tomorrow.” It was not until much later that I could truly understood what this great leader was talking about. I have found it to be true that you lead tomorrow’s firefighters through instruction today.
An officer / instructor profile needs to encompass several areas to be able to meet these challenges and changes that we will face. First, we must find new motivation. Motivation that exceeds all levels previous. We must bring newfound excitement to the instructional programs we deliver. The excitement level that comes with the officer carries over and motivates the student to the same level or higher. We as instructors must enter the education setting that instruction is to take place with a true teaching attitude not one of just doing the minimum. Officers need to develop the right attitude about instructing. Attitude starts with evaluating whether you are meeting the mission statement of the fire service and your department through the training that you are performing. Secondly, you must evaluate whether your training is realistic. That is, realistic for your operations and equipment. Higher levels of training are great and have their place, but are we meeting the needs of the departments we serve. If not, we need to reevaluate what and how we are teaching. We must find new ways to deliver quality training in a society where budgets are being slashed to below acceptable levels. This will require you as the officer / instructor to be innovative if you are faced with a substandard budget. There are many resources that are available to a department and an officer if we just look for and cease the opportunities that are available. One opportunity that is not utilized by the fire service to the level that it could be is the National Fire Academy and the Learning Resource Center located there. The quality of education provided by the Fire Academy provides for one of the ultimate learning experiences you could encounter. Finally is your training current or out dated. I know that this is a big argument in every department. “We have done it this way for 30 years”, that is well and good. However, is there a more current, more progressive or better way?
The officer / instructor for this millennium is a three-part process that starts with the instructor as I have shown above. It does have two other key components, such as leaders and students. Leaders must take a more proactive role rather than the typical reactive role. Change is easier when affected from the top down rather than from the bottom up. As a leader of a department you must ask yourself several questions; Are we prepared for the changes of tomorrow? Are we currently meeting our training needs? Are we ready for what we are destined to face in the near future? Are we, as a group, willing to change to meet these new demands?
These are some key questions that not only leaders must ask of themselves, but each department and its members must also do this. Remember talk is cheap and your actions will speak louder than words. These actions may be the spark that starts or revitalizes motivation in the organization.
The students also play an interracial part in the training process. A student today must recognize that changes are imminent and concur. This starts with the willingness of a student to be motivated to new levels by their officers, their peers and by themselves. Motivation is the starting point for change. This motivation should bring new or revived energy. This new energy should be focused towards learning new ideas, concepts and techniques. This will require the student to explore new realms of the fire service and the knowledge that is directly associated. Exploration often times means traveling to different areas of the state, region or nation to find new information and ideas. Large symposiums and conferences like FDIC,
FIREHOUSE Expo and others are excellent examples of this travel where you can meet and learn from individuals worldwide. Travel can occur and you never leave the station. When fire journals arrive, do more than just look at the pictures. The availability of information on the World Wide Web is only a simple search away. Read and study how different departments handle responses and situations. Read the articles for more than just leisure reading. Once in these setting you must be willing as a student to explore new ideas. We often forget as instructors that we are also students. Each time you teach, you should be learning. All of these concepts are important, but without discipline to recognize and participate, change will not occur.
As officer / instructors you have an obligation to provide quality education. The future of the fire service depends on the utilization of our talents as educators. You see, the attributes of good instructors coincide very closely with good leaders. Company officers are the true leaders of the fire service.
Knowledge is power, share it!
Six years ago on March 13, 2004, two career firefighters with the City of Pittsburg (PA) Fire Bureau were fatally injured during a structural collapse of a bell tower at the Ebenezer Baptist Church fire. Battalion Chief Charles G. Brace (55 years of age) was acting as the Incident Safety Officer and Master Firefighter Richard A. Stefanakis (51 years of age) was performing overhaul, extinguishing remaining hot spots inside the church vestibule when the bell tower collapsed on them and numerous other fire fighters. Twenty-three fire fighters injured during the collapse were transported to area hospitals. A backdraft occurred earlier in the incident that injured an additional six fire fighters. The collapse victims were extricated from the church vestibule several hours after the collapse. The victims were pronounced dead at the scene. A total of twenty-nine other fire fighters were injured during the incident.
The Structure
The church was a National Historic Landmark that was built in 1875. The building was still in use as a house of worship and school at the time of this incident. The exterior construction was masonry with several courses of red brick covered with stone. The building foundation was approximately 120 x 70 feet and approximately 50 feet to the roof line. The pitched roof was covered with asphalt shingles and supported by heavy timber roof trusses. The stone façade exterior of the structure was added during a renovation in the 1930s. This renovation also included the addition of a 115 foot bell tower capped with four spires. The bell tower was not a stand-alone structure, but was supported by steel I-beams with a brick and stone façade that was connected into the southwest corner of the original church.
The church had four levels. The entry level or ‘Cay Cee Level’ had the main assembly area with a performance stage, a kitchen and two bathrooms. The top floor was the ‘Sanctuary Level’ which contained the pulpit, choir section, baptismal pool, and balcony. The basement or ‘King Level’ had several meeting rooms, three bathrooms, a computer room, a boiler room, and an electrical room. (Note: An unfinished sub-basement was also present with three rooms).
The church had an attached annex added to the eastern side of the original structure in 1994. The annex was approximately 60 x 45 feet in size and the three story addition contained an elevator that served the entire church. The annex was attached to the original structure via hallways on each floor with a central elevator shaft. On the first floor was a chapel, five offices and a bathroom. The second floor had nine meeting rooms. The third floor contained a fellowship hall, a kitchen and bathrooms.
The Fire
The fire occurred on a Saturday morning as parishioners were preparing to have breakfast. The church staff noticed smoke coming from an electrical outlet. When the pastor went to investigate in the electrical room located in the basement, he found heavy smoke. Building occupants called 911 and reported an electrical fire. Building occupants had evacuated the church prior to the arrival of fire fighters.
The origin of the fire was in the basement ceiling located in the front southwest corner of the church within an electrical/computer room. The actual ignition mechanism of the fire was unable to be determined. The fire spread horizontally through the concealed space between the basement ceiling and first floor. The fire then spread vertically via concealed wall spaces to the structural members, framing and interior furnishings.
There were approximately 70 fire fighters and 13 apparatus on scene during the 4th alarm response when the bell tower collapse occurred at 1213 hours.
At 0845 hours, an alarm was received for an electrical fire at a church. The 1st Alarm assignment included three engine companies, a truck company, another engine company to serve as the RIT team, an acting Battalion Chief as the IC, a Battalion Chief as the Incident Safety Officer (ISO), a Mobile Air Truck used to fill SCBA air tanks and a Safety Unit that maintains command status and fire fighter accountability boards.
A 2nd Alarm was requested for additional manpower by Victim #1 at 0900 hours and the assignment included two engine companies, a truck company and the Deputy Chief. Prior to the 2nd Alarm being dispatched, the Deputy Chief was already en-route and upon arrival at 0900 hours conducted a size-up and was briefed by Officers. The Deputy Chief assumed IC while the Acting Battalion Chief became the Operations Chief and Chief Brace became the ISO.
A 3rd Alarm was requested by the IC at 0911 hours and the assignment included three additional engine companies and the Assistant Chief. Since the exact seat of the fire was still not located, the IC made a special request for Engine 29 (E29) to bring a thermal imaging camera (TIC) to the scene. (Note: At the time of this incident, the department had only one TIC, a unit that was on loan from the manufacturer.)
At 0919 hours (approximately 30 minutes into the incident), the IC called for an evacuation and an accountability check based on the deteriorating interior conditions.
At 0928 hours, a major backdraft occurred that injured six fire fighters. The E4 Officer who was standing at the top of the stairwell was blown out of the building into the street by the force of the backdraft. The E4 Officer suffered bruises and facial burns. The E12 crew in the basement was beginning to back out when roaring fire rolled over top of them knocking them down.
A 4th Alarm was requested by the IC at 0931 hours and the assignment included two additional engine companies, the Chief, a Communications Officer, and another Battalion Chief as an additional ISO.
At 1213 hours (approximately 3½ hours into the incident), the church bell tower collapsed sending large chunks of stone, brick, heavy wooden timbers, and other debris crashing through the vestibule trapping both victims under debris.
According to the NIOSH Report F2004-017 (HERE) investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should perform the following;
References and follow up;
NIOSH Report F2004-017 March 13, 2004
Career battalion chief and career master fire fighter die and twenty-nine career fire fighters are injured during a five alarm church fire – Pennsylvania
NIOSH REPORT 2009-100: Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program: Leading Recommendations for Preventing Fire Fighter Fatalities, 1998–2005
NIOSH ALERT 2009-146: NIOSH Alert: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters due to Structural Collapse (1999)
Being a leader does not mean you have to be the Chief Brunacini in your fire department. In fact trying to be some type of leader you are not can get you into deep trouble. It is important to develop your own styles and type. In the 1980’s Dr. Warren Bennis of the University of California conducted a 5 year research study that look specifically at various styles of effective leaders. It is interesting to see that the results found that although each leader had his or her distinctive leadership style, they all shared four leadership competencies. These have been identified as the keys to successful leadership and Dr. Bennis identified them as: Management of Attention, Management of meaning, Management of Trust, Management of Self.
• Management of Attention – This component is described as the ability to draw others to themselves through an intense focus of attention. Individuals who possess this ability have routinely been able to get others to enroll in their own visions. This has even been to the point that they have adopted the vision as their own. Leaders always keep their intentions in clear evidence.
• Management of Meaning – This is the ability to communicate visions, dreams, and ideas effectively to others. These leaders do more than use words they use their entire person to communicate this message. These leaders know talk is cheap and that actions and appearances are the effective ways to communicate.
• Management of Trust – This is an essential aspect of leadership. This section is about constancy and focus. I am sure you have heard individuals say “you know where they are coming from and what they stand for”. If you want to be a successful leader, your people have to trust you in order to follow you. They want a leader they can count on, even if they disagree with them rather than one they agree with but changes position constantly.
• Management of Self – This is the ability to know one’s own skills and limitations and to get the most out of them. If you don’t have this trait you can do more harm than good. Leaders concentrate on positive goals and do not focus on risks. Here you must reject the idea of failure. Here you need to be able to display total confidence and not worry about mistakes.
These leadership skills can be learned and used as company officers. Leadership, more than anything else, is a role the Company Officer must effectively fill. Often what we are seeing in today’s society is the “GAP”. That GAP is that the company officer is failing to assume this role and it is critical in the operations and safety of today’s fire service.
I hear this phrase from fire officers across the United States, “You just can’t find good people today. They just aren’t like we were at their age.” So what does this mean? Some may say that the future isn’t too bright looking at the current generation. Others may say, “What is wrong with us?” I say if you asked the officers who trained us, they said the same thing about us, “You just can’t find good people today. They just aren’t like we were at their age.” So is the fire service really that bad now? I say no, we aren’t that bad but we could always improve what we are doing and I believe succession training is the key. Teach others from our mistakes and victories.
A successful leader must have a well defined vision of where the organization is going. Often times you can measure vision as it is in direct proportion to accomplishment. As we begin to develop the future generation of fire service personnel we must navigate that road with vision. Vision is like a navigational system guiding you precisely from point “A” to point “B”. With vision we must be focused on the mission as well. Like vision, the mission gives a successful leader a sense of direction and purpose. This same mission gives personnel and future leaders the same sense of direction and purpose.
As we navigate our pathways of development we must learn not to utilize a “shoot from the hip” philosophy. We must learn to set SMART Goals. SMART is an acronym standing for specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time dimension. As we set goals we must set specific or well defined goals that can be measured. Measured is usually specific to statistics or set time tables. The realism is often the area leaders fail in. They either set the goals out of reach and they fail or set them too easy and never excel. Setting realistic goals means to set them where you have to stretch yourself but not fail in doing so. Without a time frame, the goal becomes merely a wish or dream.
As officers and leaders we are faced with developing the future leaders of the fire service. I often look around and see officers not setting a very good example in all aspects of the fire service. If you picture an individual you consider to be a great leader, like Dennis Compton, I can promise you will find one trait that they will exhibit…That is they will show integrity in all that they do! To have integrity you must have strong values like innovation, honesty, a positive attitude, team work, mercy and many more. But most of all you must take responsibility for your actions. I far too often see officer’s sell their subordinates down the road for their mistake.
Here is a responsibility check:
Depending on how you answer these questions will determine if you are willing to take responsibility for your own and others actions.
So we are at a point in the article where I ask myself: “Do I take you down the road to bashing you or do I take the high road?” Well if I want to commit leadership suicide I begin blaming you. But I want to take the high road here. So what do we do to correct the old saying, “You just can’t find good people today. They just aren’t like we were at their age.” You begin by promoting education and innovation. The more training and education the next generation can receive the better they will be. The problem is some of us old guys are just not the most willing to give up that information. We are afraid that we may not be the leader anymore. I got news for everyone out there, sooner or later you won’t be the leader, and so does it really matter? Besides if we utilize the knowledge the younger generation has and add it to our already gained knowledge, I don’t think we will get over run before our time.
Allow for mistakes. This is a hard one. But look at it this way, when they make mistakes they have learned one more way that doesn’t work, they didn’t fail. If you allow for mistakes I will promise you they will soar on wings like eagles.
Be adaptable and proactive to change. A lot of the problem with the younger generation is not them – it is us! Ouch that hurt didn’t it. That’s correct I just bashed us. We are so set in our ways that many of us can’t change or adapt to something new. I had a firefighter tell me that he had been on the job for 25 years and a few little changes had him so confused that he did know what to do. This is a prime example of the inability to be adaptable to change. These changes put this firefighter outside of their comfort zone and he was not willing to adapt. Change is inevitable. You better get ready because it is going to happen whether you are ready or not.
Listen to understand. As leaders we commit suicide by not actively listening. Wise people will listen and learn more. By not listening we are not truly communicating. So as a leader how many times have we not truly listened to our youth and we just blame it on their ethics. Maybe if we would slow up and open our ears we may hear what the true message is: “Help me and teach me in a way I can understand.” Ouch, hit another nerve. That’s correct we have to adapt to their way of learning and educate them so we can create a bright future. The way we learned is not how they learn today. We didn’t wear breathing apparatus in the 70’s either, but does that make it correct today?
Link recognition and rewards to their performance. By making these visible we enhance their egos and everyone has an ego to some degree. I was taught that you need to clearly define the goals and expectations, make it sincere, meaningful and unique and accept nothing less. As these goals and expectations are met recognize them and give a reward. Think about it, what motivates you?
Finally promote win-win thinking. This will set the stage for many things to come. So how many toes are hurting right now? Well I know one person who just got their toes stepped on…ME!
It is far too easy to fall into the old mind set and forget about being proactive, setting SMART goals or even giving the true effort to develop our future. As an officer and a leader we are charged with many duties, the failure to focus on our future is a critical failure that has catastrophic consequences. We must step up to the plate. As the leaders of the fire service, we must have to have the Guts to Do More. We must set a precedent for the future. We begin that precedent with the instructor in the mirror. We have an obligation of dedication and commitment to educating the future of the fire service.
Good to Great…How many times have you heard that buzz phrase in the last three years. Maybe you never even gave it much thought till now. So let’s take this opportunity to dissect the concept. Good… If you would ask most any company officer or firefighter if they were a good company they would most likely reply yes. If we posed the same question only changing company to department the most common answer would be yes. In general conversation this same group would use the word good in describing most of their collegues. So why do they use good and not great? What does it take to go from Good to Great?There are a lot of philosophies on what it takes to be great. Here is the only issue, once you set a goal to move you from good to great and it is achieved…are you great or is it the norm now. Basically you should be focused on continual improvement and never satisfied with “Status Quo”. There are many actions, achievements and items that may classify you as good to great, however, we should not forget that we are a service delivery organization and we are only as good / great as we are perceived by our customers. There is not many days that go by that I don’t hear a comment, read an article, get a phone call or email about what a brother or sister firefighter has done in this business. These range from certifications to speaking engagements to articles published. The list could go on and on. The ones that truly touch me are the ones where we the fire service provide what I will call “True Passion” for the business. Each day thousands of these incidents occur where “True Passion” is demonstrated by the fire service worldwide. I would like to take this opportunity to share one of these “True Passion” cases from my home department, High Point Fire Department. Here is the letter written by one of the crew members:
On December 14, 2009 Engine 9 was staffed with FEO Travis Thompson, FF Lamar Sullivan and myself (FF Derek Way). Captain Richard Trexler II was on vacation. On this date Engine 9 responded to a call on 604 Hickory Chapel Road for assistance needed by the police department. Upon arrival Engine 9 found a High Point Police officer at the front door stating that a lady needs help inside the residence. We found an 84 year old female laying face down on the floor beside her bed. The patient stated that she had fallen and had been on the floor for 3 days and that she needed help getting up. Engine 9 assisted the patient with getting up and helped her to a chair in her bedroom. The patient was alert / oriented and stated that she had fallen in the kitchen on Thursday, December 10, 2009, and had to crawl from the kitchen into her room. When the patient fell she was at the refrigerator and the door was left open, so all of the food had spoiled. This lady did not have anything to eat or drink for 3 days, was very weak and sore.
The patient stated that she did not have any food and that she would eat the next day when “Meals on Wheels” brought her something. When the patient said this Acting Captain Travis Thompson immediately asked FF Lamar Sullivan and myself if we minded giving our leftover dinner to this lady. We both agreed and thought it would be a great idea. By this time GCEMS was already on the scene, stated that the lady needed to eat and drink immediately. Acting Captain Travis Thompson told EMS that we had leftover food at the station and that we would like to get this food so that the lady would have food. We returned to the station, picked up the food and returned back the scene and gave it to the lady. By the look on the patient’s face I could tell that she was truly touched by having the food brought to her and was very thankful. I feel that by Acting Captain Travis Thompson offering food to this patient in need, he made the High Point Fire Department shine. This gesture not only touched the patient medically and physically, but personally touched her by knowing that FEO Travis Thompson truly cared about her wellbeing. I know some people are quick to write letters complaining about things but I thought that Acting Captain Travis Thompson’s actions were outstanding and thought that someone should know.
This is a prime example of Good to Great mentality. This is only one example of many that could be shared from fire departments across the world. Sadly the opposite outcome exists. There are companies who would have never put that personal touch into a call.
Captain Trexler:
It is good to see that your leadership carries on even when you are not present. You lead by example and try to do the right things. This attribute is tremendous in the fire service today as we don’t see that as much as we should. I am truly proud of your leadership and teachings to your crew as it shows as your the level of professionalism exemplifies that of a great company officer.
FEO Thompson:
As an acting officer your ability to step up an lead shows a promising future for you. Your ability to carry on the vision and mission set by HPFD and your Captain shows that your focus is on customer service and is sincerely from a caring heart. Your actions and thought process demonstrated the highest level of servantship…giving and caring for those in need
FF Way:
I ability to recognize what is excellent leadership is an outstanding trait. Your humbleness of recognizing a peer who has acted in excellence is one of a true servant and steward to mankind. This trait is the foundation of an excellent leader.
As a member and officer of the fire service for many years I am extremely proud of each and every firefighter and officer who have “True Passion” for your contributions truly make a difference everyday. Thanks for your tireless work and professionalism.
My questions to you:
httpv://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M00Vl7cxuYo
Five Baltimore City (MD) firefighters were hurt as a powerful fire ball engulfed the front of the dwelling. One firefighter was hospitalized and is reported in stable condition. Two other firefighterrs were hurt during overhaul. The fire in a rowhouse was being worked by companies, when conditions rapidly changed resulting in the extreme fire behavior.
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