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Auto Parts Store Roof Collapse Double LODD 1996

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Roof Collapse Chesapeake VA 1996 Double LODD

OVERVIEW

On March 18, 1996, two firefighters were killed in Chesapeake, Virginia when they became trapped by a rapidly spreading fire in an auto parts store and a pre-engineered wood truss roof assembly collapsed on them. The cause of the fire was an electrical short created when a power company truck working in the rear of the building drove away with its boom in an elevated position, accidentally pulling an electrical feed line from the main breaker panel at the rear of the store.

Post-incident investigations indicate that the electrical fault may have sparked multiple points of fire origin throughout the roof structure of the building, due to improperly grounded wiring. At the time of the report issuance, this was exemplified as another incident illustrating the rapid failure of lightweight construction systems when key support components are involved in a fire. The report pointed out the importance of prefire planning and accurate size up by fire companies to determine the risk factors associated with a fire in this type of construction.

Lessons regarding importance of initial company actions, constant re-evaluation of action plans, strong command and coordination of units on the fireground, and recognition of signs of impending structural failure were also reinforced.

Reading through any number of NIOSH, USFA or NFPA reports, similar issues, challenges and operational factors resonate and continue to shape and challenge today’s fire ground operations.

It is without exception that the knowledge and insights being gained by the continuing efforts from the UL and NIST Research Studies coupled with the recommendations, from the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (HERE) will provide increased awareness and understanding of buildings, fire dynamics and the effectives of fire within the compartment, building and the manner in which fire departments engage in fire suppression operations.

Today’s fire ground is changing at a very rapid pace as it relates to the continued evolution, transition of engineered structural components and systems (ESS).

Are you prepared, knowledgeable and understand that new strategic and tactical approaches are required?

One of the most significant actions initiated by the Chesapeake Fire Department was the implementation of a Truss Identification Program (TIP).

Take a look at a past posting on CommandSafety.com where we published on an overview a few years ago of truss and engineering component systems across the United States HERE.

City of Chesapeake (VA) Truss ID Program, HERE

The following are excerpts and narrative from the USFA Technical Report Series TR-087 and NIOSH Report 96-17

Aerail Overview on Complex today

 

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

Staffing : The first alarm response provided a small attack force with limited capabilities. The full response brought only 10 personnel.

Size-up : The first arriving company officer was not able to determine the location and extent of the hidden fire.

Pre-fire plan information: This complex required a pre-fire plan due to the complex arrangement, multiple occupancies, mixed construction, lack of fixed protection, limited access and difficult water supply problems. The first-due company did carry a pre-fire plan that showed the layout of the shopping center and the floor plan for the auto parts store, but the prefire plan was not referenced by the crew during the fire.

Delayed response: The first arriving company was on the scene alone for several minutes with only 3 personnel. The back-up companies had long response times. The lack of evidence of a working fire prompted the initial incident commander to return some of the responding units, resulting in even longer response times.

Water supply: The first-in company did not establish a water supply. This required the second engine company to be committed to this task.

Incident command: The battalion chief was faced with a complicated and rapidly changing situation. He was not able to effectively transfer command from the initial officer and direct the operations of widely separated units.

Operational risk management:The officers involved in the initial part of the operation had to make critical risk management decisions with limited information.

Accountability: Accountability for the personnel operating in the hazardous area was not established prior to the structural collapse. As the situation became critical, no one realized that a crew was still inside the building.

Rapid intervention crew: Additional crews did not arrive in time to assist the crew that was in trouble inside the building.

Radio communications: The lack of a clear radio channel for fire ground communications caused serious problems with command and control of the incident, including the failure to maintain communications with the crew inside and the failure to hear their request for assistance.

Lightweight construction: The roof collapsed quickly and with very little warning. This should be anticipated with a lightweight wood truss roof assembly. This hazard was not recognized by the crews on the scene.

BUILDING DESCRIPTION – Construction and History

The fire occurred in a modern, lightweight construction building that was added to an existing strip mall in 1984. The older mall on exposure side four was separated from the fire building by a masonry fire wall and was constructed with masonry walls and a steel bar-joist roof structure. The exposures on side two consisted of additional stores that were similar in construction to the auto parts store. There were no exposures on sides one and three.

The auto parts store was constructed with two masonry exterior walls and two wood frame exterior walls, with a lightweight wood truss roof assembly. It was approximately 120 feet deep and 50 feet wide, providing about 6,000 square feet of open display and storage space. The roof assembly was a pre-engineered lightweight wood truss assembled from 2 x 6 top and bottom chords, with 2 x 4 web members held together with metal gusset plates.

  • There were no interior bearing walls or supports for the roof structure. At one end, the trusses were supported by a wood plate that was bolted to a metal beam.
  • The other end rested on top of the concrete block wall. Each truss was separated by 24 inches and they were covered with 1/2 inch CDX plywood sheathing under a two-ply rubber membrane.
  • A drywall ceiling was attached to the underside of the trusses, creating a truss void space (truss loft) 24 to 36 inches above the ceiling.
  • A sheet rock divider was located in the middle of the truss void as a draft stop. The roof had a slight pitch.
  • Three air handling units were on the roof of the building, with an estimated combined weight of 3,000 pounds. It is not known when these units were installed and they may have represented an unanticipated dead load on the roof assembly.
  • There was no indication that the trusses had been reinforced to support the extra weight of these units.
  • The original truss roof structure collapsed during the construction of the building, injuring three workers.
  • Most of the trusses were damaged and had to be replaced at the time. The fire building was occupied by Advance Auto Parts, a chain distributor of automobile part and lubricants. The store was designed with an open retail area containing display racks for goods.
  • A long counter ran from front to back behind which was shelving for additional auto parts. Waste oil and batteries were kept in a rear storage area separated from the front of the store by a drywall wall.
  • The southwest corner of the building contained employee restrooms which had a small water heater located in the ceiling space just above them. The main entrance to the store was through two large glass doors at the front of the building. A delivery and service entrance was located in the rear and a 40 foot trailer was parked behind the building and used for additional storage.

THE FIRE

At approximately 11:00 a.m. on March 18, 1996, a power company employee set up a service truck at the rear of the Indian River Shopping Center in Chesapeake, Virginia. The worker was going to disconnect the electrical power to a customer who had not paid an electrical bill. The customer, a cocktail lounge and bar, was located adjacent to Advance Auto Parts. In preparing to disconnect service, the power company worker elevated the articulating boom on his truck to roof level. Faced with the immediate loss of power, an employee of the lounge paid the electrical bill while the power company employee was beginning work, and went to the back of the store to show the receipt.

A stamped receipt indicates the bill was paid at 11:16 a.m. at a supermarket also located in the shopping center. The power company employee, working from the bucket of the articulating boom, lowered the boom and verified the receipt. Although the bucket had been lowered, the hinged elbow of the articulating boom remained elevated. The employee then radioed his supervisor from the cab of his truck, and received instructions not to disconnect power.

The power company employee then attempted to drive the service truck away, forgetting to secure the boom, which snagged on a power line feeding the meter at the rear of the Advance Auto Parts Store. This caused a phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground arcing fault at the store’s electrical meter, starting the fire. The power company employee immediately stopped, exited his truck, and cut the remaining power connections to the meter at the rear of Advance Auto Parts.

Initial Actions Prior to Calling 911

After cutting the power line to the building, the power company employee removed the meter, noticed smoke coming from the meter base, notified his office and requested that another power company crew and a supervisor come and assist him.

  • An employee of the Advance Auto Parts Store came to the rear of the building and met the power company employee, telling him that the store had lost electrical power and that a fire was being extinguished inside the building.
  • Another Advance Auto Parts employee discharged a dry chemical fire extinguisher on the spot fire that had started near the hot water heater above the employee restrooms.
  • All believed the fire had been extinguished at this time.
  • At 11:29 a.m., the Chesapeake Fire and Police Emergency Operations Center received a 911 call from Advance Auto Parts reporting a problem with the fuse box in the store.
  • The Chesapeake Fire Department was dispatched to a report of a fuse box sparking at 4345 Indian River Road at the Advance Auto Parts store.

Emergency Response

  • Initial response consisted of two engines, a ladder company, and a battalion chief, for a total of 10 personnel.
  • Engine 3 was the first due arriving company, responding from quarters. Engine 1 and Ladder 2 also responded.
  • Battalion 1 was dispatched as the command officer, but requested that Battalion 2 cover the assignment, since he was out of position.
  • Battalion 2 acknowledged the request, and he responded with the first alarm companies.
  • Engine 3’s crew consisted of three personnel: a driver/pump operator; Firefighter- Specialist John Hudgins, serving as Acting Lieutenant for the shift; and Firefighter- Specialist Frank Young, detailed to the station for the day, was riding in the jump seat. Engine 3 was responding in a reserve engine that had a 500 gallon water tank.

 

Initial Size-Up and Company Actions

At approximately 11:35 a.m., about five and a half minutes after dispatch, Engine 3 arrived on the scene at the front of the strip mall.

  • Hudgins reported “a single-story commercial structure, nothing showing from the front. Engine 3 is in command.”
  • Engine 3 took a position in front of the Advance Auto Parts Store. Hudgins and Young entered the structure from the front of the building to investigate.
  • Conditions were clear in the store, and there was no visible smoke or flames showing. They discovered light smoke near the electrical panel in the rear of the building, and radioed to Battalion 2 that they had a fire and were checking for extension.
  • Acting Lieutenant Hudgins then radioed for Engine 3’s driver to reposition the apparatus to the rear of the building.
  • Hudgins then radioed to Battalion 2, who had not yet arrived on the scene, that Engine 3 and Ladder 2 could handle the incident. Battalion 2 and Engine 1, the second due engine company, both went in service.

Engine 3 Reports They Are Trapped, Roof Collapses

At approximately 11:49 a.m., almost 20 minutes after the initial dispatch time, Hudgins radioed that he and Young could not get out of the building. Battalion 2 radioed back that he could not understand their transmission. Hudgins then radioed that they needed someone to come to the front of the building and get them out. Again unable to understand their transmission, Battalion 2 radioed for any unit on the fireground to advise him if they heard the message that was transmitted.

  • Engine 4 responded that they were unable to copy the transmission.
  • Engine 14 then marked on the scene and was instructed by Battalion 2 to lay a supply line to the front of the building. Battalion 1, enroute to the fire on the second alarm, radioed to Battalion 2 that it sounded like someone was trapped inside.
  • Battalion 3, also enroute, radioed that he would be on the scene momentarily and would assist.

At this time, Ladder 2’s crew was setting the outriggers and preparing to elevate their aerial ladder for defensive operations.

  • In the short time it took to accomplish the stabilization of the ladder truck, the front of the store became fully involved, the building contents ignited, and the roof collapsed.
  • Due to the radiant heat, Ladder 2 was forced to retract their outriggers and reposition to a safer defensive position on side one of the structure, and set up the aerial again.
  • Ladder 2’s crew did not hear Engine 3’s transmission that they were trapped.
  • Simultaneously, Engine 1 ran out of supply line about 200 feet short of the hydrant. Engine 2, responding on the second alarm, picked up the hydrant that Engine 1 was attempting to reach and laid a supply line to side one.
  • The driver of Engine 1 attempted to contact his officer by radio to advise that he could not reach the hydrant, but could not get through due to heavy radio traffic.
  • He parked the engine in the roadway, donned his SCBA, and went to the rear of the building to report to his Captain and rejoin his crew.
  • Battalion 3 arrived on side one about this time and radioed for all companies to switch to channel two, an alternate fireground tactical frequency.

Driven by the northerly wind and the draft created by the burning contents of the structure, the fire at the rear had grown in such intensity that personnel were forced to move Engine 3. Assisted by employees of the power company, Engine 3 was moved back away from the rear of the building. At 11:55 a.m., about 26 minutes after dispatch, the Captain of Engine 1, with his crew at the rear of the building, confirmed to Battalion 2 that “I got men on the inside from Engine 3, and the lines have been burned. I do not know their status, and we still have no water to go in after them.”

Battalion 3 met with Battalion 2 and discussed that they may have lost a crew inside. Battalion 3 assumed command and Battalion 2 went to the rear of the building to coordinate rescue efforts. There, Battalion 2 met with the Captain from Engine 1.

By this time, the building was fully involved and no rescue efforts could be mounted until the fire was knocked down. Officers at the front and the rear attempted to conduct a personnel accountability report (PAR) to determine who was missing and where they might be located.

  • An engine company responding on mutual aid from the Virginia Beach Fire Department was flagged down, connected to Engine 1’s supply line, and completed the water supply to a hydrant behind the shopping center within the City of Virginia Beach. Engine 3 was forced to move back once again, and the supply line was disconnected from Engine 3 and used to supply water to Engine 4, a telesquirt that was positioned for defensive operations at the rear.

Extinguishment and Body Recovery

The fire spread to the attic of the exposures on side two and was held in check by the fire wall on side four of the building. The fire was brought under control as the contents of the auto parts store burned off and several aerial streams were put into operation. After the fire was extinguished, a search for the missing firefighters was initiated. After the bodies of the firefighters were located, they were removed from the fire building by members of the Virginia Beach Fire Department, and transferred by members of the Chesapeake Fire Department to medic units.

The body recovery was supervised by the Chesapeake Fire Department Fire Marshal’s Office and documented. An investigation was immediately started by the Chesapeake Fire Department Fire Marshal.

ANALYSIS

Fire Cause and Flame Spread

  • The fire was caused by the electrical short created when the power company truck struck the power line to the building. Investigation by the City of Chesapeake Electrical Inspector after the fire revealed that the meter contained wiring that appeared to have been tampered with and did not comply with the electrical code.
  • Several connections at the meter had been double-lugged, connecting multiple wires to single terminals. Additional investigation by Virginia Power revealed that the building may have been improperly grounded, leading to numerous hot connections when the short circuit occurred. The main fuse did not trip at the breaker panel and the wiring on all three air handling units had been fused. This probably resulted in the ignition of multiple spot fires in the truss loft above the store.
  • It appears that the fires in the truss loft were still relatively minor when Engine 3 arrived, but the fire spread rapidly throughout the space due to the light wood construction.
  • The wind drawn from the open doors at the front of the building also promoted rapid fire growth. This would have created a tremendous hidden fire in the wood truss loft area despite clear conditions inside the structure.
  • Reports of heavy smoke and fire conditions on the roof at the same time Engine 3’s crew was calling for pike poles and personnel to come inside are indications towards this scenario.
  • The interior of the auto parts store contained racks of auto parts and supplies, including oil, lubricants, rubber, and plastic parts. The contents were packed closely together and stored in tall racks near the ceiling.
  • Once the fire had broken through the ceiling in the rear of the building, these contents would have quickly reached their ignition temperatures, creating flashover conditions in the rear of the store as the fire progressed, trapping the firefighters and forcing them to seek an exit at the front of the store.

Roof Collapse

  • The collapse of the pre-engineered truss roof occurred approximately 21 minutes after the time of dispatch, and within 35 minutes of the initial accident, that caused the electrical short.
  • The structure appears to have collapsed within 10 to 12 minutes after the truss space became heavily involved.
  • The collapse of similar truss assemblies under fire conditions within this time period has been well documented.
  • Post-incident investigations indicate that this truss assembly may have been weakened by deficiencies in the connection of the trusses to the beam on the east side of the building.
  • Also, the dead load of the three air conditioning units may have contributed to the rapid failure of the roof.
  • Reports from firefighters on the scene indicate that a partial failure of the truss assembly may have occurred in the rear of the building, followed shortly by the failure of the entire roof assembly.
  • It is possible that the crew of Engine 3 was trapped by the partial collapse of the roof in the rear, or by the collapse of racks containing auto parts in the building, or by the rapid spread of the fire and smoke which had broken through the ceiling.
  • It is also possible that a combination of these events occurred simultaneously. The failure of the entire roof assembly and complete involvement of the interior of the building with fire took place within one minute after the firefighters radioed for help, before any reaction to assist them could take place.

Fire Operations

 

Initial Response - The first alarm assignment was overwhelmed by the situation, the circumstances, and the unusual sequence of events that occurred at this incident. It is evident that a larger force would have been needed to initiate an effective offensive or defensive operation for a working fire in a 6,000 square foot commercial occupancy, with attached exposures on two sides, with or without the unusual complications.

  • The response of two engine companies, one ladder company and a battalion chief, provided a total of 25 only 10 personnel on the initial assignment.
  • The individual companies, which responded with three person crews, had limited capabilities to perform tasks independently.
  • This incident generated only a single call to 9-1-1 reporting an electrical problem.

 

LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED

1. RISK ASSESSMENT is the primary responsibility of the incident commander.

This incident presented a very high risk to the firefighters who were attempting to make an interior attack. However, the risk factors were not recognized and the interior crew was not directed to abandon the building. Risk assessment should be a continual process, particularly when a situation is changing very quickly.

2. ACCOUNTABILITY is an essential function of the Incident Command System.

The location and operation of the initial attack crew was not tracked according to the incident command system that was in effect at the time of the fire. The system must keep track of the location, function, status, and assignment of every individual unit or company operating at the scene of an emergency incident. In order to be effective, the accountability process must be routinely initiated at the beginning of every incident and updated as the incident progresses and units are reassigned to different tasks.

3. TACTICAL RADIO CHANNELS are essential for firefighter safety.

The fireground operations were conducted on the same radio channel as the routine dispatch and transfer of additional units, hampering the fireground communications during the important early stages of the incident. Designated radio channels should be set aside specifically for communications between the incident commander and the units operating at the scene of an incident. The exchange of information, orders, instructions, warnings, and progress reports is essential to support safe and effective operations. Tactical channels should be assigned early and routinely to avoid the confusion that occurs when units that are already working are directed to switch to a different radio channel.

4. FIRE OPERATIONS must be limited to those functions that can be performed safely with the number of personnel that are available at the scene of an incident.

The initial response to this incident did not provide enough resources to safely initiate an effective interior attack for the situation that was encountered. The first arriving company initiated interior operations that could not be adequately performed or supported with the limited number of personnel at the scene or responding. The delayed arrival of back-up companies increased the risk exposure of the first due company. The situation called for a more conservative initial attack plan and/or an early retreat when the magnitude of the fire became evident.

5. WATER SUPPLY is a critical component of a safe and successful operation.

The failed attempt to establish an adequate and reliable water supply for the interior attack was a critical problem at this incident. This task occupied the second due engine company which was needed to provide either a back-up hose line to support the interior attack or a rapid intervention crew.

6. LIGHTWEIGHT WOOD TRUSS CONSTRUCTION is prone to rapid failure under fire conditions.

If the construction of the building had been known or recognized, the early failure of the roof structure should have been anticipated and the interior crew should have been withdrawn. This requires pre-fire planning to identify high risk properties and a reliable system to label the building or to inform the responding units of the risk factors of the building. It is usually difficult or impossible to make this determination when the building is burning.

Aerial View of the Current Auto Parts Store 2010

 

USFA Technical Report Series Incident Report: Tr-087 NFPA 1996 Report Summary Sheet: NFPAChesapeake

Posted by on March 18, 2013 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Collapse, Commandsafety.com, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, in-the-line-of-duty, NIOSH Reports, Occupancies, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics, Structural Collapse • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Chicago Fire Captain Herbie Johnson remembered for his kindness, humor, bravery

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Captain Herbie Johnson, CFD

 

Photo By Tim Olk (all rights reserved)
http://olkee.smugmug.com/Mabas-Division-9-City-Of/CFD-Funerals/Chicago-Detment/26417819_vPkW9J#!i=2203991836&k=XDgP8TT

 

  • Chicago Tribune Photos, HERE
  • Tim Olk Photos, HERE
  • Chicago Tribune, HERE
  • “We could not be prouder of you,”  brother of fallen firefighter says Sun-Times HERE
  • See CommandSafety.com for a complete accounting of the event, HERE

  • Family of fallen firefighter: ‘A hero for our city’ from the Chicago Tribune, HERE

  • Related
  • Deadly fire on Chicago's South Side
  • PHOTOS:  Deadly fire on Chicago’s South Side

 

 

 

Photo: E. Jason Wambsgans/Chicago Tribune

 

What will define you as a Firefigher, as an Officer…as a person?

 

 

Posted by on November 9, 2012 • Filed under: christopher naum, command-leadership, company officer, Fire Fighter Safety, Fire Fighting, firefighting-operations, in-the-line-of-duty, line-of-duty, LODD, Tradition • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

“You don’t need a last name for Herbie. Everybody knew Herbie”; Chicago Fire Capt. Herbie Johnson

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Chicago firefighter Herbert Johnson, left, poses with Chicago Fire Commissioner Jose Santiago, right, after Johnson was promoted to the rank of captain. Johnson died from injuries sustained while fighting a house fire on the South Side. — Chicago Fire Department

 ”You don’t need a last name for Herbie. Everybody knew Herbie”.   A beloved firefighter, Fire officer, father and husband died in the line of duty on Friday November 2, in the City of Chicago protecting the citizens of his city working with the companies assigned to the structure fire alarm.

Chicago Captain Herbert Johnson, 54, suffered second- and third-degree burns during fire suppression operations being conducted in the attic of the residential house at 2315 West 50th Place, according to Chicago FD officials and published media reports. The 32-year veteran of the Chicago Fire Department died Friday night after he and another firefighter were injured in a blaze that spread quickly through the 2-1/2 story wood frame house. A second firefighter, FF Brian Woods was also injured and was reported in good condition at Advocate Christ Medical Center in Oak Lawn, according to a department spokeswoman, and was subsequently released. Chicago fire investigators are considering the possibility that a malfunctioning water heater sparked the fire that killed Capt. Herbert Johnson, a Fire Department spokesman said Saturday.

  • See CommandSafety.com for a complete accounting of the event, HERE

  • Family of fallen firefighter: ‘A hero for our city’ from the Chicago Tribune, HERE

Captain Johnson, was promoted from lieutenant this summer and was assigned to Engine Co. 123 in Back of the Yards Section of Chicago for the night tour but normally worked all around the City of Chicago.

Capt. Johnson from a 2006 Sun-Times photo

The following exerpt from the Chicago Tribune helps define the type of firefighter Capt. Johnson was:

http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/ct-met-firefighter-killed-folo-20121104,0,5331508.story

Johnson’s influence on everyone he met was visible Saturday, with shrines at the site of his death and trees in his family’s Morgan Park neighborhood decorated with purple and black bows.

A 32-year veteran of the department, Johnson volunteered in 2001 to help with rescue efforts in New York after the 9/11 attacks. As a lieutenant in 2007, he received a Medal of Honor for outstanding bravery or heroism, the state’s highest accolade for firefighters — the result, his family said, of helping rescue children the year before from a burning building on the South Side.

Friends and family remembered him mostly for his jovial personality and tender heart, a burly man with a beaming smile who once took a sewing class so he could make a First Communion dress for his daughter.

Johnson and his sister, Julie, even went to clown school together, said their brother John Johnson, a Chicago police officer. That sister, a former police officer who is now a nurse, celebrated her birthday Friday, the day of Johnson’s death, family members said.

Their father worked for the city in the Streets and Sanitation Department, John Johnson said, and their grandfathers were Chicago police officers.

The eldest of eight children, Johnson always knew he wanted to be a firefighter, said his family members, many of whom are also in public service.

“He lived for it,” brother-in-law McMahon, said.

“He died for it,” John Johnson added.

 From the Chicago Tribune (HERE);

Just like every little boy that’s grown up in the last 20 years wanted to be Michael Jordan or Brian Urlacher, every firefighter that worked with him wanted to be Herbie,” said Tim O’Brien, a spokesman with Chicago Fire Fighters Union Local 2. “You aspired to be more like him in every way of life.”

Colleagues said Johnson spent the last several years working as an instructor at the Fire Academy. Generous and kind, he never missed a Fire Department fundraising event, they said. His helpful nature also extended beyond the firehouse, friends said, through coaching youth sports and volunteering at his church parish.

He always had a funny story and often left fellow firefighters in stitches, sometimes through his own distinctive belly laugh, colleagues said.

From The Chicago Sun-Times (HERE):

“He was always a hero to us and now he’s a hero for our city,” McMahon said. “Herbie never wanted glory or notoriety. Instead, all he wanted was to make Chicago a safer place for other members of the city. So please, in Herbie’s honor, check your smoke detectors right now, give your kids a hug.”

Johnson was an easy man to know and love, said friend Tom Taff, who runs a camp for burn victims that Johnson helped support. The recently promoted captain personified joie de vivre, a man with a big laugh who drove fire engines in parades, cooked for charity ­— left an impression in the many places he offered his service.

 

Readings and Learnings

Additional Coverage and Links

  • From Chicago WGNTV, HERE
  • From the Chicago Tribune, HERE and HERE
  • From the Chicago Sun Times, HERE
  • Photo Gallery from the Sun-Times, HERE
  • Photo Gallery from the Chicago Tribune, HERE
  • Aerial Fireground Operations, Chicago ABC 7 News, HERE
  • Google Maps; StreetView Images, HERE
  • Chicago CBS, HERE
  • 2007 Illinois Fallen Firefighter Memorial and Firefighting Medal of Honor Ceremony, HERE
  • Remembering Capt. Herbie Johnson: “To Know Him, Was to Love Him” HERE

 

 

Photo Credit: Tim Olk
https://www.facebook.com/tim.olk.75
http://olkee.smugmug.com/

VISITATION: Wednesday, November 7, 2012 at St. Rita High School, 7740 S. Western from 3-9 PM.
FUNERAL MASS: Thursday, November 8, 2012 at St. Rita High School at 11:00 AM

 

 

 

Family, friends gather to mourn fallen firefighter Herbert Johnson, Chicago Sun-Times Additional Video HERE

 

Posted by on November 4, 2012 • Filed under: christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Crew Management, Fire Fighting, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, fires, in-the-line-of-duty, line-of-duty, LODD, thecompanyofficer.com • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

The Ides of March: Learning and Remembrance

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Operational Safety

Here are five (5) NIOSH Firefighter LODD Event report summaries for incidents that occurred in the March 4th through the 8th time frame in the years 1998, 2001, 2002, 2008.

Take the time to look over the event summaries, discuss and comment on the factors that lead to the events and the recommendations formulated from the subsequent investigations.

Take the opportunity to identify the common themes and apparent causes that were identified and discuss with your company, team or station, relevant considerations that may have a direct or indirect relationship to your organization, past incident calls or district risk profile.

What are your capabilities?

What are your gaps?

How can you prevent a similar situation from occurring?

Promote questions and dialog related to operational issues such as these;

  • Coordinated multi-company operations; how “coordinated” is your incident scene?
  • Do rapidly changing incident conditions get identified promptly and communicated to Command in rapid succession for actions?
  • How effective is the base line knowledge and skill set of company and command officers in “reading the building”?
  • What is the adequacy of your training for conducting operations above the fire floor?
  • When was the last time you “tested” the effectiveness of your RIT/FAST Team? Can they truly perform under the most demanding of incident conditions?
  • When was the last time you trained or drilled on Fire Behavior or on Building Construction?
  • Are you training on calling the mayday and personal survival techniques?
  • Have you implemented and trained on procedures for rapid and efficient transition in operational modes on the fireground?
  • Do you implement a 360 when applicable and delegate when needed?
  • What parameters are you operating under when assuming risk on the fireground?
  • What drives your incident operations: Are they Tactically Drive or Risk Managed?

Down load the complete NIOSH Reports and expand on the lessons learners and their applicably to your organization and capabilities.

Manlius, New York

Floor Collapse and Fire Conditions:
On March 7, 2002, a 28-year-old male volunteer fire fighter and a 41-year-old male career fire fighter died after becoming trapped in the basement. One firefighter manned the nozzle while second firefighter provided backup on the handline as they entered the house. After entering the structure, the floor collapsed, trapping both victims in the basement.

A career fire fighter captain joining the fire fighters near the time of the collapse was injured trying to rescue one of the fire fighters. Crew members responded immediately and attempted to rescue the victims; however, the heat and flames overcame both victims and eliminated any rescue efforts from the garage entrance.

NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should;

  • Ensure that the Incident Commander is clearly identified as the only individual responsible for the overall coordination and direction of all activities at an incident
  • Ensure that the Incident Commander conveys strategic decisions to all suppression crews on the fireground and continually reevaluates the fire condition
  • Ensure that Incident Command conducts an initial size-up of the incident before initiating fire fighting efforts and continually evaluates the risk versus gain during operations at an incident
  • Ensure that fire fighters from the ventilation crew and the attack crew coordinate their efforts
  • Ensure that fire fighters report conditions and hazards encountered to their team leader or Incident Commander
  • Ensure fire fighters are trained to recognize the danger of operating above a fire

NIOSH REPORT: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200206.html

Wall Collapse and Fire Conditions
On March 7, 2008, two male career fire fighters, aged 40 and 19 were killed when they were trapped by rapidly deteriorating fire conditions inside a millwork facility in North Carolina. The captain of the hose line crew was also injured, receiving serious burn injuries.

The victims were members of a crew of four fire fighters operating a hose line protecting a firewall in an attempt to contain the fire to the burning office area and keep it from spreading into the production and warehouse areas. The captain attempted to radio for assistance as the conditions deteriorated but fire fighters on the outside did not initially hear his Mayday. Once it was realized that the crew was in trouble, multiple rescue attempts were made into the burning warehouse in an effort to reach the trapped crew as conditions deteriorated further.

Three members of a rapid intervention team (RIT) were hurt rescuing the injured captain. One firefighter was located and removed during the fifth rescue attempt. The second firefighter could not be reached until the fire was brought under control.

The fourth crew member had safely exited the burning warehouse prior to the deteriorating conditions that trapped his fellow crew members. Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include radio communication problems (unintelligible transmissions in and out of the fire structure that may have led to misunderstanding of operational fireground communications), inadequate size up and incomplete pre-plan information, a deep-seated fire burning within the floor of the office area that was able to spread into the production and warehouse facility, the procedures used in which operational modes were repeatedly changed from offensive to defensive, lack of crew integrity at a critical moment in the event, and weather which restricted fireground visibility.

NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:

  • Ensure that detailed pre-incident plan information is collected and available when needed, especially in high risk structures
  • Limit interior offensive operations in well-involved structures that are not equipped with sprinkler systems and where there are no known civilians in need of rescue
  • Develop, implement, and enforce clear procedures for operational modes. Changes in modes must be coordinated between the Incident Command, the command staff and fire fighters
  • Ensure that Rapid Intervention Crews (RIC) / Rapid Intervention Teams (RIT) have at least one charged hose line in place before entering hazardous environments for rescue operations
  • Ensure that the incident commander establishes the incident command post in an area that provides a good visual view of the fire building and enhances overall fireground communication
  • Ensure that crew integrity is maintained during fire suppression operations
  • Encourage local building code authorities to adopt code requirements for automatic protection (sprinkler) systems in buildings with heavy fire loads.

NIOSH REPORT http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200807.html

Floor Collapses in Residential Fire - North Carolina

 

Floor Collapse
On March 4, 2002, a 22-year-old male career fire fighter was injured and subsequently died and a 25-year-old male Captain was injured when the floor collapsed while they were fighting a residential fire.

The Captain was transported by ambulance to an area hospital where he was admitted overnight for first- and second-degree burns. The victim was conscious and was transported by medical helicopter to a State medical center where he died 2 days later.

NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should;

  • Ensure that each Incident Commander conducts a size-up of the incident before initiating fire-fighting efforts, after command is transferred, and continually evaluates the risk versus gain during operations at an incident
  • Ensure fire fighters are trained to recognize the dangers of searching above a fire
  • Ensure that an Incident Safety Officer, independent from the Incident Commander, is appointed
  • Ensure that ventilation is closely coordinated with fire attack
  • Ensure that a Rapid Intervention Team is established and in position immediately upon arrival
  • Ensure that adequate numbers of staff are available to operate safely and effectively

NIOSH REPORT http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200211.html

 

Fall Through Floor Fighting a Structure Fire at a Local Residence - Ohio

 

Floor Collapse
On March 8, 2001, a 38-year-old male career fire fighter fell through the floor while fighting a structure fire, and died 12 days later from his injuries. At 1231 hours, Central Dispatch notified the career department of a structure fire with reports of the occupants still inside. The Assistant Chief arrived on the scene along with Engine 70 and assumed Incident Command (IC).

The IC immediately called for the second alarm, began conducting the initial size-up of the structure, and confirmed heavy fire in the left front section. At that time, the neighbors approached the IC and informed him that the occupants were trapped inside. The IC ordered the fire fighters on scene to commence search and rescue efforts, and then verified the stability of the structure through radio and face-to-face communications.

Engine 68 arrived on the scene at approximately 1250 hours with an Assistant Chief and the victim. The Assistant Chief provided tactical command of the fire ground, and along with the victim, conducted search and rescue operations. Other crews conducted searches with a thermal imaging camera of the first floor and basement level of the residence with no sign of any occupants. During these searches the stability of the structure was diminishing due to the intense fire that was now venting through the roof.

Fire fighter #3 and the victim were at the front entrance conducting a defensive attack as the third emergency evacuation signal was sounded. The neighbors were still insisting to the IC and fire fighters that the occupants were trapped inside, and one of the occupants was handicapped. The victim and one other fire fighter conducted another search of the structure.

The heat and flames were now extending from the basement level to the first floor when the fire fighter’s low air alarm sounded. The victim and the fire fighter were backing out of the structure when the floor beneath the victim gave way, causing him to fall through the floor and become trapped in the basement.

Attempts were made from the first floor to rescue the victim by utilizing a handline and an attic ladder, but they were unsuccessful due to the intense heat and flames. Two Rapid Intervention Teams (RIT #1 & RIT #2) were deployed simultaneously from separate entrances into the basement to perform a search and rescue operation for the downed fire fighter. The RITs were able to locate and remove the victim on their initial entry. He sustained third degree burns to over half of his body and died 12 days later.

NIOSH investigators concluded that to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should;

  • Ensure that Incident Command continually evaluates the risk versus gain during operations at an incident
  • Ensure that a separate Incident Safety Officer independent from the Incident Commander is appointed
  • Ensure that fire fighters are trained in the tactics of defensive search
  • Ensure that fire fighters performing fire fighting operations under or above trusses are evacuated as soon as it is determined that the trusses are exposed to fire
  • Ensure consistent use of Personal Alert Safety System (PASS) devices at all incidents and consider providing fire fighters with a PASS integrated into their Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus which provides for automatic operation
  • Ensure that personnel equipped with a radio, position the radio to receive and respond to radio transmissions

NIOSH REPORT: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200116.html

 

Roof Collapse and Fire Conditions
On March 8, 1998, one male fire fighter, the Captain on Engine 57, died while trying to exit a commercial structure after his egress was cut off by the wooden trussed roof that collapsed. Task Force 66 was the first on scene and reported light smoke showing from a one-story commercial building. A ventilation team from Truck 66 proceeded to the roof of the building and commenced roof ventilation. Forcible entry into the building required about 7 ½ to 9 ½ minutes from arrival on scene to force open the two metal security doors in the front. While fire companies waited for the security doors to be opened, fire conditions changed dramatically on the roof.

Fire was coming from the ventilation holes opened by the ventilation crew. As soon as the security doors were opened, three engine crews (Engine 66, Engine 57, and Engine 46) advanced hand lines through the front door in an attempt to determine the origin of the fire. Approximately 15 feet inside the front door, the fire fighters encountered heavy smoke with near zero visibility conditions. The engine crews advanced their hose lines approximately 30 to 40 feet inside the building.

As conditions continued to deteriorate inside the building, the members from the four engine companies involved in the fire attack began to withdraw. During this time the victim became separated from his crew and remained in the building. The victim was subsequently located by the Rapid Intervention Team and cardiopulmonary resuscitation was performed immediately and en-route to the hospital, where the victim was pronounced dead.

NIOSH investigators conclude that, to prevent similar occurrences, fire departments should:

  • Ensure that incident command conducts an initial size up of the incident before initiating fire fighting efforts, and continually evaluate the risk versus gain during operation at an incident
  • Ensure that incident command always maintains close accountability for all personnel at the fire scene
  • Ensure communications are established between the interior and exterior attack crews, e.g., the ventilation crew and the interior fire attack crew should communicate conditions among themselves and back to incident command
  • Ensure that Rapid Intervention Teams are in place before conditions become unsafe
  • Ensure that some type of tone or alert that is recognized by all fire fighters be transmitted immediately when conditions become unsafe for fire fighters
  • Ensure sufficient personnel are available and properly functioning communications equipment are available to adequately support the volume of radio traffic at multiple-responder fire scenes
  • Consider placing a bright, narrow-beamed light at the entry portal to a structure to assist lost or disoriented fire fighters in emergency egress.

NIOSH REPORT: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face9807.html

 

Taking it to the Streets on Firefighternetcast.com

Taking it to the StreetsTM

Download the program from March 16th, 2011  Program

Featured a two part program on Near Miss Firefighter Reporting with Lt. Steve Mormino, FDNY (ret) and Capt. CJ Haberkorn, Denver (CO) Fire Department and  special guest, Captain Michael Long, who provided a personal Near-Miss Event account you won’t want to miss.

Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.

  • Download the program from March 16th, 2011  Program on Firefighternetcast.com HERE
  • Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE

Taking it to the StreetsTM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by Christopher Naum and is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production, © 2010-2012 All Rights Reserved

Posted by on March 7, 2012 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, command-leadership, company officer, Fire Fighter Safety, firefighting-operations, Health and Safety, History Repeating Event, Near-Miss Reporting, NIOSH Reports • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Multiple Alarm Operations with Wind Driven Fire

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The five alarm fire that ran through a seven story multiple occupancy (MO) apartment building in the Flatbush Section in the Borough of Brooklyn (NYC) this weekend considerably challenged operating companies of the FDNY as the fire was fueled and spread in rapid success due to significant wind conditions compounded by news reports that a door to the fire compartment was left open, thus allowing the developing fire conditions to intensify and escalate due to the wind driven conditions that were impacting the building, the fire compartment and initial operating companies.     

Aerial View of the Apartment Building

The seven-story MO Apartment building at 346 East 29th Street is reported to have had 70 apartments and was located midway in the city block. Arriving companies reported a fire on the number four floor and quickly deployed handlines and initiated primary search and rescue and other tactical assignments.   

Street View

First-due operations, from the initial alarm assignment’s arrival, the transmission of size-up communications and the accurate and timely deployment of companies to task assignments is mission critical to an evolving incident.     

The introduction of other challenges such as confronted by FDNY at this alarm further magnify the importance of effective command risk assessment, building size-up, effective and efficient company assignments and deployments with adequate resources (staffing and companies) to intervene with the fire dynamics and growth of an initial developing room and contents to an extending and escalating structure fire.      

       

YouTube Preview Image       

   

Take a few minutes to listen to the radio transmissions on the audio file attached, paying particular attention to the exchange of dispatch communications, first-due size-up and actions, command transmissions and subsequent rapid transmittal of greater alarms, as fire ground operational conditions deteriorated due to the wind driven fire, fire extension, civilian’s in distress and rescue operations.   

Think about the way you would react, interface or address similar conditions and challenges at an alarm in your jurisdiction or department.   

  • Do you have the necessary skills and experience to address timely actions required of company and command officers at a wind drive fire incident?
    • Are you capable of addressing a large single family dwelling, or a large low rise MO apartment building? How about a townhouse or garden apartment complex building?
    • How familiar are you with strategic and tactical considerations wind drive fire incidents?
    • Are you aware of the recent research and operational factors and considerations coming out of emerging research from the NIST and UL?
    • How effective are your capabilities for operating at large scale multiple alarm incidents with your department’s resources, or with mutual aid or external agencies?
    • Have you trained and prepared to manage multiple alarm incidents?

      

Take some to time to gain some insights from this alarm; the communications and the challenges and make this a learning opportunity to gain some insights into wind drive fire theory and operational considerations.   

Here’s some mission critical links and references to make you a more effective and capable company and command officer.   

National Fire Academy On-Line Training Program   

Awareness of Command and Control Decision making at Multiple Alarm Incidents (Q297) 1.5 CEUs Enroll Now »  

This course is both a stand-alone course as well as the pre-course for the 6-day residential delivery of the National Fire Academy’s new Command and Control Decision Making at Multi-Alarm Incidents. Anyone interested in applying for the 6-day residential course must pass this pre-course with a score of 85 percent. The topics covered in this pre-course include: classical and naturalistic decision making, strategies for managing safety concerns at expanded emergency incidents, pre-incident preparation, resource allocation, effective use of on-site communications, set-up of an incident command post and post incident analysis.

NIST: Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Fire Conditions: 7-Story Building Experiments. HERE  

 February 2008, a series of 14 experiments were conducted in a 7-story building to evaluate the ability of positive pressure ventilation fans, wind control devices and external water application with floor below nozzles to mitigate the hazards of a wind driven fire in a structure. Each of the 14 experiments started with a fire in a furnished room. The air flow for 12 of the 14 experiments was intensified by a natural or mechanical wind.. Each of the tactics were evaluated individually and in conjunction with each other to assess the benefit to fire fighters, as well as occupants in the structure. The results of the experiments provide a baseline for the hazards associated with a wind driven fire and the impact of pressure, ventilation and flow paths within a structure. Wind created conditions that rapidly caused the environment in the structure to deteriorate by forcing fire gases through the apartment of origin and into the public corridor and stairwell. These conditions would be untenable for advancing fire fighters. Each of the tactics were able to reduce the thermal hazard created by the wind driven fire. Multiple tactics used in conjunction with each other were very effective at improving conditions for fire fighter operations and occupant egress. Fire departments that wish to implement the tactics used in this study will need to develop training and determine appropriate methods for deploying these tactics. Variations in the methods of deployment may be required due to differences in staffing, equipment, building stock, typical weather conditions, etc. There is uniformity however, in the physics behind the wind driven fire condition and the principles of the tactics examined. The data from this research will help provide the science to identify methods and promulgation of improved standard operating guidelines (SOG) for the fire service to enhance firefighter safety, fire ground operations, and use of equipment. The experiments were conducted by the National Institute of standards and Technology (NIST), the Fire Department of New York City (FDNY), and the Polytechnic Institute of New York University with the support of the Department of Homeland security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Assistance to Firefighters Research and Development Grant Program and the United States Fire Administration.  

pdf icon Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Fire Conditions: 7-Story Building Experiments. (58118 K)
Kerber, S. I.; Madrzykowski, D.  

NIST Wind Driven Fires Studies, HERE  

Smoke and heat spreading through the corridors and the stairs of a building during a fire can limit building occupants’ ability to escape and can limit fire fighters’ ability to rescue them.  Changes in the building’s ventilation or presence of an external wind can increase the energy release of the fire.  This can also increase the spread of fire gases through the building.  In some cases, such as the Cook County Administration Building fire in October 2003, the fire gas flow, into the corridors and the stairway prevented fire fighters from suppressing the fire from inside the structure.  This fire resulted in 6 building occupant fatalities and fire fighter injuries in the stairway.  The Fire Department of New York City has experienced many wind driven fire incidents which have resulted in fire fighter fatalities and injuries.  

 

Postings from Buildingsonfire.com

 

Direct link to the Wind Driven Fire Research Postings on Buildingsonfire.com  HERE 

NIST Wind Driven Fire Simulation Video

NIST Wind Driven Fire Simulation Video Wind Driven Fires Smoke and heat spreading through the corridors and the stairs of a building during a fire can limit building occupants’ ability to escape and can limit fire fighters’ ability to rescue them.  Changes in the building’s ventilation or presence of an external wind can increase the [...]  

Jan, 29 2011 0 Comments Full Story

Positive Pressure Ventilation Research

Positive Pressure Ventilation The objective of this NIST research is to improve firefighter safety by enabling a better understanding of structural ventilation techniques, including positive pressure ventilation (PPV) and natural ventilation, and to provide a technical basis for improved training in the effects of ventilation on fire behavior by examining structural fire ventilation using full-scale fire experiments with and [...]  

Jan, 14 2011 0 Comments Full Story

NIST Wind Driven Fires Programs

Wind Driven Fires Wind blowing into the broken window of a room on fire can turn a “routine room and contents fire” into a floor-to-ceiling firestorm. Historically, this has led to a significant number of firefighter fatalities and injuries, particularly in high-rise buildings where the fire must be fought from the interior of the structure. [...]  

Jan, 14 2011 0 Comments Full Story

Wind Driven Fires

 A million dollar Baltimore County, Maryland  home was destroyed Sunday December 13, 2009  by a fire that tore through the 4,700-square-foot structure with such intensity that firefighters were forced to battle the flames from the exterior. Shortly after 21:00 hours, Baltimore County Fire Dispatch alerted crews for Fire Box 50-2 at 12607 Nancy Lee Court [...]  

Tactical Patience and the New Considerations of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction  on CommandSafety.com HERE, with insights into the new UL Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction

   

ALARM INFORMATION
FDNY   Brooklyn, N. Y. 02/19/11 @ 18:45 hrs.
Flatbush Section Box 2439 address: 346 East 29th St. between: Ave. “D” & Clarendon Rd.     

2439 @ 18:42
Engs. 255, 281, 217 act. 310
T. Lad. 157, Lad. 147
Batt. 41      

10 – 75 – 2439 @ 18:46
Ladder 113 is designated as the “FAST” Truck
Eng. 249
Rescue Co. #2
Squad Co. #1
Batt. 48
Division 15      

Fire Building:
6 Story Brick 100 x 100 O/M/D ( orig. reported )
7 Story Brick 100 x 100 O/M/D ( actual size up )      

All – Hands:
7 – 5 – 2439 @ 18:48
Batt. 41 reports: All – Hands upon arrival, extra Engine & Truck
Fire 4th floor of a 6 Story Brick occupied multiple dwelling
Engine 250 / Ladder 174 s/c      

“Batt. 41 to Brooklyn, Transmit a 2nd Alarm, We also transmitting a 10-70 ( water relay )      

2nd Alarm:
2 – 2 – 2439 @ 18:53
Engs. 310, 240, 283 ( Eng. 310 designated Water Resource Unit )
T. Lad. 159, Lad. 149
Eng. 284 w/ Satellite 3
Batt. 38 “Safety Officer”
Batt. 33 “Resource Unit Leader”
Rescue battalion / Safety Battalion
Fieldcom 1 / Tactical Support Unit #2      

@ 18:58
Batt. 41 to Brooklyn, We have a “May-Day” transmitted from the Fire Apt. We’re putting the “FAST” Truck to work. Assigned another “FAST” Truck, Tower Ladder 159 is assigned new “FAST” Truck      

@ 19:13
Division 15 reports: “May-Day” member located and removed from Fire Bldg. We have fire on the 4th & 5th floors out the rear.
4 – lines stretched, 4 – lines in operation. Fire’s Doubtful.      

3rd Alarm:
3 – 3 – 2439 @ 19:15
Engs. 309, 323, 257, 330
Lad. 123, T. Lad. 170
Batt. 58
Batt. 44 “Staging Manager”
Air Re-Con Chief “grounded” due to winds
Mask Service Unit #1
Staging Area: Clarendon Rd. & Nostrand Ave.      

@ 19:20
Division 15: Box 2439, We have fire on the 4th; 5th; & 6th floors and into the Cockloft. All members being removed from the upper floors, setting up the Tower Ladders.      

@ 19:27
Special Call ( 2 ) additional Battalion Chief’s
Batt. 40 act. 58, Batt. 32 are s/c      

@ 19:30
Special Call a “High Rise Nozzle Co.” Eng. 254 assigned      

@ 19:36
Special Call ( 2 ) Tower Ladders
Tower Ladder 144 act 153 & Tower Ladder 120 are s/c      

4th Alarm:
4 – 4 – 2439 @ 19:38
Engs. 276, 220, 247, 321
Batt. 57 “Planning Chief”
Eng. 262 w/ Incident Management Vehicle
Car 4: Chief Robert Sweeney “Chief of Operations”      

@ 20:39
Fieldcom 1: Progress Report for the 4th Alarm, Box 2439, Car 4, Chief Sweeney reports:
Fire in a 6 Story Brick occupied multiple dwelling. ( 3 ) Tower Ladders in operation in the rear of the Fire Bldg. ( 1 ) Tower Ladder in operation in the front of the Fire Bldg. Setting up 2nd Tower Ladder in the front of the Fire Bldg. ( 1 ) Stang in operation in the rear. Have ( 3 ) floors of fire out the rear of the Fire Bldg. Doubtful Will Hold.      

@ 20:44
Fieldcom 1: By orders of Chief Kilduff, transmit the 5th Alarm.
Special Call ( 2 ) additional Engines above the 5th Alarm for “Brand Patrol”      

5th Alarm:
5 – 5 – 2439 @ 20:44
Engs. 234, 280, 282, 227
Engs. 290 & 214 s/c for “Brand Patrol”
Car 3: Chief Edward Kilduff “Chief of Department”      

@ 20:58
Fieldcom 1: Progress Report for the 5th Alarm, Box 2439, Car 4, Chief Sweeney reports:
Primary Searches on the 4th floor are negative except for Apt. 4 “adam”      

@ 21:13
Fieldcom 1: Special Call ( 2 ) additional Trucks to the Staging Area.
Ladder 132 & Tower Ladder 111 are s/c      

@ 21:22
Fieldcom 1: At this time, We’re releasing Rescue #2 & Squad #1      

@ 21:26
Fieldcom 1: Progress Report for the 5th Alarm, Box 2439, Car 4, Chief Sweeney reports:
All members have been removed from the Fire Bldg. ( 3 ) Tower Ladders in operation in the front of the Fire Bldg. ( 2 ) Tower Ladders & ( 1 ) Stang in operation in the rear of the Fire Bldg. Still have heavy fire on the 4th; 5th; & 6th floors. This will be a pro long operation. Still Doubtful.      

@ 22:15
Fieldcom 1: Progress Report for the 5th Alarm, Box 2439, Car 3, Chief Kilduff reports:
( 3 ) Tower Ladders in operation in the front of the Fire Bldg.
( 2 ) Tower Ladders and ( 1 ) Multi-Versal in operation in the rear of the Fire Bldg. Fire is darkening down on the 4th & 5th floors in the rear. Fire is Still Doubtful.      

@ 22:58
Fieldcom 1: Progress Report for the 5th Alarm, Box 2439, Car 4, Chief Sweeney reports:
Probably Will Hold
The Bldg. has been changed to a 7 Story Bldg. Fire was on the 5th; 6th; & 7th floors and Cockloft.      

@ 23:10
Fieldcom 1: Special call Eng. 233 with Mobile Command 1      

@ 23:12
Fieldcom 1: Special Call ( 1 ) Division Chief, & ( 3 ) Battalion Chiefs for “relief”
Batt. 4, Batt 31 act. 41, Batt. 49 are s/c
Division 1 s/c      

@ 23:18
Fieldcom 1: Special Call ( 3 ) additional Engine’s, ( 3 ) additional Tower Ladders for “relief”
Engs. 330, 248, 220
T. Lads. 107, T. Lad. 161 act. 157, T. Lad. 15 act. 131      

@ 01:58
Fieldcom 1: By order’s of Division 1, Fire is Under Control.      

(Job Duration: 7 hrs./16 mins.)      

Note: 2 Engines, 2 Trucks, 1 Batt. Chief will be Special Called on intervals to support a “watch line”      

( 1 ) 10-45 Code 1 (deceased was located in the Fire Bldg.)   

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