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Fire Dynamics Simulation of 2011 Baltimore County LODD- 30 Dowling Circle

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Operations at 30 Dowling Circle 01.19.2011 Box 11-09

 On Wednesday, January 19, 2011, a fire occurred in an apartment building located in the Hillendale section of Baltimore County, Maryland. This fire resulted in the line of duty death (LODD) of volunteer firefighter Mark G. Falkenhan, who was operating as the acting lieutenant on Squad 303 . Upon their arrival, FF Falkenhan and a second firefighter from Squad 303 deployed to the upper floors of the apartment building to conduct search and rescue operations. Other fire department units were already involved with both firefighting operations and effecting rescues of trapped civilians.

During these operations, FF Falkenhan and his partner became trapped in a third floor apartment by rapidly spreading fire and smoke conditions. The second firefighter was able to self-egress the building by diving headfirst down a ladder on the front (address side) of the building. FF Falkenhan declared a “MAYDAY” and implemented “MAYDAY” procedures, but was unable to escape or be rescued.

FF Falkenhan was located and removed via a balcony on the third floor in the rear of the building. Resuscitative efforts began immediately upon removal from the balcony, and continued en route to the hospital. FF Falkenhan succumbed to his injuries and was pronounced deceased at the hospital.

Mark Gray Falkenhan had dedicated his life to serving others. He perished in the line of duty on January 19, 2011 while performing search and rescue operations at a multi-alarm apartment fire in Hillendale, Baltimore County (Maryland). He was 43 years old.

 

Firefighter Mark Falkenhan

30 Dowling Circle

 

The Baltimore County (MD) Fire Department published the Line of Duty Death Investgation Report of the 30 Dowling Circle Fire recently.

The report was written by a Line of Duty Death Investigation Team comprised of departmental members, including representatives of the local firefighters’ union and the Baltimore County Volunteer Firemen’s Association.

An overview and executive narrative of the final report (PDF) on the apartment fire where Volunteer Firefighter Mark Falkenhan sustained fatal injuries was posed on CommandSafety.com HERE.

FF Mark Falkenhan

 On Wednesday, January 19, 2011, a fire occurred in an apartment building located in the Hillendale section of Baltimore County, Maryland. This fire resulted in the line of duty death (LODD) of volunteer firefighter Mark G. Falkenhan, who was operating as the acting lieutenant on Squad 303 (for purposes of this report, Mark will be referred to as FF Falkenhan).

Upon their arrival, FF Falkenhan and a second firefighter (FF # 2) from Squad 303 deployed to the upper floors of the apartment building to conduct search and rescue operations. Other fire department units were already involved with both firefighting operations and effecting rescues of trapped civilians.

During these operations, FF Falkenhan and FF # 2 became trapped in a third floor apartment by rapidly spreading fire and smoke conditions. FF # 2 was able to self-egress the building by diving headfirst down a ladder on the front (address side) of the building. FF Falkenhan declared a “MAYDAY” and implemented “MAYDAY” procedures, but was unable to escape or be rescued.

FF Falkenhan was located and removed via a balcony on the third floor in the rear of the building. Resuscitative efforts began immediately upon removal from the balcony, and continued en route to the hospital. FF Falkenhan succumbed to his injuries and was pronounced deceased at the hospital.

The investigating team examined any and all data available, including independent analysis of the self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), turnout gear and autopsy report. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) produced a fire model to assist with evaluating fire behavior. Multiple site inspections were conducted. Extensive interviews were conducted by the team which also attended those conducted by investigators from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). Photographic and audio transcripts were also thoroughly analyzed. A comprehensive timeline of events was developed. All information used to make decisions regarding recommendations was corroborated by at least two sources.

  • In fairness to those units involved in this incident, the investigating team had the advantage of examining this incident over the period of several months. Furthermore, given the size and nature of the event, and the fact that arriving crews were met with serious fire conditions and several residents trapped and in immediate danger, all personnel should be commended for their efforts for performing several rescues which prevented an even greater tragedy.
  • The team did not identify a particular primary reason for FF Falkenhan’s death.
  • What were identified were many secondary issues involving but not limited to crew integrity, incident command, strategy and tactics, and communications.
  • These issues are identified and discussed, and recommendations are made in appropriate sections of the report, as well as in a consolidated format in the Report Appendix.

Some of the issues identified in this report may require some type of change to current practices, policies, procedures or equipment. Most, however, do not. Specifically, the analysis and recommendations regarding Incident Command and Strategy and Tactics show that if current policies and procedures are adhered to, the opportunity for catastrophic problems may be reduced.

  • Mark Falkenhan was a well-respected and experienced firefighter.
  • He died performing his duties during a very complex incident with severe fire conditions and unique fire behavior coupled with the immediate need to perform multiple rescues of victims in imminent danger.
  • It would be easy if one particular failure of the system could be identified as the cause of this tragedy.
  • We could fix it and move on. Unfortunately it is not that simple.
  • No incident is “routine”. Mark’s death and this report reinforce that fact.

On Wednesday, January 19, 2011 at 1816 hours, a call was received at the Baltimore County 911 Center from a female occupant at 30 Dowling Circle in the Hillendale section of Baltimore County. The caller stated that her stove was on fire and the fire was spreading to the surrounding cabinets. Fire box 11-09 was dispatched by Baltimore County Fire Dispatch (Dispatch) at 1818 hours consisting of four engine companies, two truck companies, a floodlight unit, and a battalion chief. All units responded on Talkgroup 1-2.

The location, approximately one mile from the first dispatched engine company, is a three story garden-type apartment complex, with brick construction and a composite shingle, truss supported roof. The fire building contained a total of six apartments divided by a common enclosed stairway in the center with one apartment on the left and one to the right of the stairs.

 

Fire Dynamics Simulation of 2011 Baltimore County LODD- 30 Dowling

Fire Dynamics Analysis and Insights

 

INTRODUCTION:

Assistance from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) Fire Research Laboratory (FRL) was requested for a fire at 30 Dowling Circle by the Baltimore County Fire Investigation Division (FID) through the ATF Baltimore Field Division on the night of January 19, 2011.

ATF Fire Protection Engineers were asked to utilize engineering analysis methods, including computer fire modeling, to assist with determining the route of fire spread and the events that led to the firefighter MAYDAY and subsequent Line of Duty Death.

Download the REPORT HERE

BACKGROUND:

Working closely with the Post Incident Analysis Team, the ATF Fire Research Laboratory created a computer simulation of the garden apartment building using Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS). FDS is a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) modeling program developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).

FDS utilizes mathematical calculations to predict the flow of heat, smoke and other products of fire. Smokeview, a post-processer computer program also produced by NIST, was then used to visualize the mathematical output from FDS. The most current available versions of both programs were used: FDS 5.5.3 and Smokeview 5.6. Below are photographs of the front and rear of the fire building next to an image of the same building constructed in FDS.

Figure 01. 30 Dowling Street

 

Figure 2. FDS representation of the front of 30 Dowling Circle showing the terrace (T), second (A) and third (B) levels.

 

The garden apartment building at 30 Dowling Circle was attached to two similar garden apartment buildings, one on each side. The fire damage was isolated to 30 Dowling Circle, so the exposure buildings were not included in the computer fire model. The entire six unit garden apartment building was modeled in FDS, including the patio and balconies on the rear of the building. FDS works by dividing a space into cubical “grid cells” for calculation purposes. FDS then computes various CFD calculations for each grid cell to predict the movement of mass, energy, momentum and species throughout a three-dimensional space.

The Dowling Circle model consisted of 2,560,000 total grid cells that were each 3.9 inch (10 cm) cubes. The model was used to simulate a total elapsed real time of 27.5 minutes, beginning before the 911 call and ending just after flashover of the third floor and the firefighter MAYDAY.

The model was synchronized in real time with the fireground audio throughout the duration of the fire.

Fiqure 03 and 04

 

FDS has been validated to predict the movement of heat and smoke throughout a compartment, however the accuracy of fire modeling depends on it being used appropriately by a trained user that is aware of its limitations. Due to lack of knowledge about the exact material properties for the various furnishings and other available fuels, a user-specified fire progression was used for this application.

For flame and fire gas movement after consumption of the original burning fuel packages, the fire model calculated smoke and ventilation flow paths through the building and was used to gain a better understanding of the rapid fire growth leading to flashover of the stairwell and third floor.

  • In addition, FDS was utilized to illustrate the complex route of fire spread through the building as verified by witness statements, firefighter interviews, photographs and burn patterns.
  • Input data for the computer model included heat release rate data and video from previous testing conducted by the ATF FRL and NIST.
  • Ambient weather data was also input into the model, including temperature, as well as wind direction and magnitude at the time of the fire. In addition, several alternative compartmentation scenarios were modeled to explore the possible effects of closed stairway apartment entrance doors on the spread of smoke and flames in the stairwell.
  • The statements of each firefighter were reviewed and their individual actions (breaking windows, opening doors, etc.) and observations (fire size, smoke conditions, etc.) were recorded on floor diagrams.

The actions and observations of the firefighters were then associated with specific times in the fireground audio to generate an overall event timeline. All events in the model are based on this master timeline of events. In addition, all photographs were time stamped and synchronized with the model. The Post Incident Analysis Team was consulted throughout the development of the event timeline and the computer fire model to ensure accuracy.

MODELING ANALYSIS:

1. Analysis of Fire Development in the Terrace Level

The fire originated on the stovetop of an occupied apartment on the right (south) side of the terrace level (apartment T2). Flames from a grease fire ignited kitchen cabinets, eventually causing the kitchen to flashover into the attached living room. Upon fire department arrival, a fully developed fire existed in the living room and kitchen of apartment T2. Prior to exiting the apartment, the occupant opened both the rear sliding door and the apartment entrance door in an attempt to ventilate smoke from the apartment.

 

Figure 06. A typical floor plan of the right side apartments at 30 Dowling Circle.

 

An analysis of the ventilation flow path through the apartment with FDS indicated that a significant unidirectional flow path existed up the stairs with an inlet at the rear terrace sliding door and outlet at the front apartment entrance door leading to the stairwell.

Figure 7. Smokeview frame of the rear of the building indicating the fire origin and smoke spread within the T2 apartment. Figure 8. View of smoke flow out of kitchen and open sliding glass door (center of photo) in the rear of apartment T2. Figure 9. Smokeview frame of flashover of the kitchen with flames extending into the living room. Flames also begin to extend out of the rear sliding door and impact the balcony above.

 

Figure 10. Ignition of second level balcony resulting from flame extension from living room.

 

This unidirectional flow path up the stairs is difficult to combat and is often experienced during basement fires as crews attempt to descend interior stairs. The model indicates sustained air temperatures in the stairwell of approximately 600 Fahrenheit (315 Celsius) at velocities of approximately 6 mph (2.7 m/s) from floor to ceiling as crews attempted to descend the stairs. This is consistent with statements from firefighting crews, who experienced extremely high heat conditions and indicated periodically seeing flames in the smoke layer flowing up the stairs.

The elevated air velocity of the stairwell flow path resulted in a high rate of convective energy transfer to the structural firefighting gear and high perceived temperatures as the firefighters attempted to descend the stairs. Firefighting crews flowed a hoseline down the stairs to combat the high temperatures; however no significant cooling was noticed by firefighters because the hose stream could not reach the seat of the fully developed fire in the kitchen area.

The crews were simply cooling the ventilation flow path without cooling the source of the energy in the apartment. It was not until a hose stream was directed through an exterior window and a portion of the fire was extinguished that gas temperatures and velocities began to decrease, allowing firefighters to make entry to the terrace apartment via the stairs.

Figure 12. Smokeview section frame showing unidirectional flow of approximately 600 Fahrenheit (315 Celsius) gases out of the stairwell entrance door

Front photo of unidirectional flow of smoke up stairwell from apartment T2. Note the high volume of smoke from floor to ceiling as the stairwell door serves as the flow path outlet. The ground ladder in the foreground was used to rescue an occupant on the third floor trapped by heavy smoke in the stairwell. (Refer to Figure 014)

Figure 014. Front photo of unidirectional flow of smoke up stairwell from apartment T2. Note the high volume of smoke from floor to ceiling as the stairwell door serves as the flow path outlet.

 

The first arriving engine, E-11, was staffed with a Captain, Lieutenant, Driver/Operator, and a Firefighter. Upon arrival at 1820 hours, the Captain gave a brief initial report describing a three story garden apartment with smoke showing from side Alpha: “The Captain of E-11 will have Command and we are initiating an aggressive interior attack with a 1 ¾” hand line”. Command also instructed the second due engine to bring him a supply line from the hydrant. 

A female resident (victim # 1) appeared in a third floor apartment window, Alpha/Bravo side (Apt. B-1), yelled for assistance, and threatened to jump. Smoke or fire was visible from any of the third floor windows. At 1823 hours, Command advised Dispatch that he had a rescue and that he was establishing Limited Command. Fire Dispatch was in the process of upgrading the response profile to an apartment fire with rescue when the responding Battalion Chief requested that the fire box be upgraded to a fire rescue box. While the Firefighter and Lieutenant prepared for entry into the building, the Captain and Driver/Operator extended a ladder to the 3rd floor apartment window and rescued the resident. The first attempt by the Firefighter and Lieutenant to make entry into the side Alpha entrance was unsuccessful due to the extreme heat and smoke conditions.

The second due engine, E-10, arrived at 1823 with staffing of a Captain, Lieutenant, Driver/Operator, and a Firefighter. At 1823, E-10’s crew brought a 4″ supply line to E-11 from the hydrant at Deanwood Rd. and Dowling Circle and assisted the first-in crew with fire attack.

  • The Captain from E-10 conferred with Command and was instructed to advance a second 1 ¾” hand line.
  • The window to the first floor right apartment (Apt. T-2) was removed, and the second 1 ¾” line was advanced to the building by the crew of E-10.
  • Fire attack was initiated through the removed window. At 1827, Command requested a second alarm.

At this time, heat and smoke conditions just inside the front door improved enough to allow the Firefighter and Lieutenant from E-11 to make entry through the front door and into the stairwell. There they encountered heavy, thick black smoke and high heat conditions coming up the stairs from the terrace level apartment. The Lieutenant reported that the doorway to the first floor apartment was orange with fire and he had to fight his way through heavy heat and smoke conditions to attack the fire in the first floor right apartment (Apt. T-2). Entry was made approximately 3 feet into the doorway when the Firefighter’s low air alarm began to sound, and he exited the building. A member from E-10’s crew replaced the Firefighter from E-11 on the hose line.

At the same time, the Captain from E-11 proceeded to the rear of the structure to complete his initial 360 degree size up. He noted that there was fire emanating from the open sliding doors on the first floor Charlie/Delta apartment (Apt. T-2), extending to the balcony above. E-1, staffed by a Captain, Driver/Operator, and two Firefighters arrived and completed the hookup of the supply line that had been laid to the hydrant by E-10. The rest of Engine 1’s crew grabbed tools and an extension ladder and reported to the Charlie side of the building.

Figure 015 Charlie Side ( Rear) Extension

The Photo above referenced as  Figure 015 shows conditions  from rear of flames in apartment T2 and extension to the balcony above. Note the relative minimal volume of smoke as the sliding door serves as the inlet for ventilation into the apartment. The smoke and heat is flowing in from the rear, through the apartment and up the stairs.

This unidirectional flow path up the stairs is difficult to combat and is often experienced during basement fires as crews attempt to descend interior stairs.

  • The model indicates sustained air temperatures in the stairwell of approximately 600 Fahrenheit (315 Celsius) at velocities of approximately 6 mph (2.7 m/s) from floor to ceiling as crews attempted to descend the stairs.
  • This is consistent with statements from firefighting crews, who experienced extremely high heat conditions and indicated periodically seeing flames in the smoke layer flowing up the stairs.
  • The elevated air velocity of the stairwell flow path resulted in a high rate of convective energy transfer to the structural firefighting gear and high perceived temperatures as the firefighters attempted to descend the stairs.

Firefighting crews flowed a hoseline down the stairs to combat the high temperatures; however no significant cooling was noticed by firefighters because the hose stream could not reach the seat of the fully developed fire in the kitchen area.

The crews were simply cooling the ventilation flow path without cooling the source of the energy in the apartment.

It was not until a hose stream was directed through an exterior window and a portion of the fire was extinguished that gas temperatures and velocities began to decrease, allowing firefighters to make entry to the terrace apartment via the stairs.

Plan view of flow path and temperatures within the apartment. Note the location of the seat of the fire and the location of initial hose stream application down the stairs.

Figure 016

 

Photograph of hoselines being positioned at the stairwell entrance door and front window. Note the heavy smoke venting from all front openings in apartment T2. (Figure 017)

Figure 017 Alpha Side Entry Door

 

Figure 017  Hoselines being positioned at the stairwell entrance door and front window. Rapid Fire Progression Leading to Flashover of the Third LevelFlames extended upwards from the T2 apartment sliding door and ignited the rear balconies of the second and third level apartments above.
 
Fire on the second floor balcony extended into apartment A2 by failing the sliding glass door and igniting vertical plastic slat curtains that were suspended above.As crews searched within the second floor apartment, they noted seeing the burning curtains on the floor with flames extending to a nearby couch (containing polyurethane foam padding) adjacent to the sliding doorway.
 
The fire continued to grow unsuppressed and spread to a second couch as interior firefighting crews were engaged in rescuing two victims from the living room in the second floor apartment.Personnel stated that at this point fire conditions seemed to improve, suggesting that crews were making progress extinguishing the fire. (The first arriving attack crew reported that they were able to see apparatus lights through the sliding doors on Charlie side, which indicated to them that smoke and fire conditions were improving.)Truck 1, a tiller unit staffed by a Lieutenant, two Driver/Operators, and a Firefighter, arrived on side Alpha and immediately began search and rescue operations.
 
Windows on the second floor Alpha/Delta side apartment (Apt. A-2) were vented and ladders were thrown to gain access. T-8 arrived at the alley on side Charlie. E-1 extended a ground ladder to the third floor balcony on the Charlie/Bravo side of the structure (Apt. B-1), and made access to the apartment to search for additional victims.They noted fire venting from the first floor Charlie/Delta apartment (Apt. T-2) out of the sliding glass doors progressing upwards towards the balcony on the second floor.
 
Upon entering the apartment, they conducted a primary search and noted minimal heat with light smoke conditions.The crew accessed the hallway via the apartment entry door and noticed an increase in the temperature and the amount of smoke.They immediately closed the door and exited the apartment via the ground ladder.Upon exiting the apartment, E-1’s crew observed E-292 on the scene with a hand line extending into the apartment of origin, (first floor, Charlie/Delta side, Apt. T-2).
 
The officer on E-1 noted white smoke coming from the unit.Having already laid a supply line from the intersection of the alley and Deanwood Road, E-292’s crew extended a 1 ¾” hand line into the apartment of origin. Moderate fire conditions with zero visibility were encountered, and they reported feeling a great deal of heat on their knees as they crawled through the apartment.The Lieutenant and the Firefighter from Truck-1 entered Apartment A-2 via a second floor bedroom window (Alpha/Delta side) and began a search for additional victims. As they traversed the living room area they found an unconscious male resident (victim #2).
 
At 1836 hours, the Lieutenant notified Command via an urgent transmission that a victim had been located and they needed assistance with evacuation. The Lieutenant and Firefighter noted a small fire in the rear corner near the victim as they exited the room. The crew returned to the bedroom from which they had entered and closed the door behind them. Victim #2 was then evacuated from the apartment via a ground ladder through the bedroom window, and transferred to EMS personnel on side Alpha.
 
Figure 019 Flame extension and suppression efforts at the rear of the structure. Flames caused the second level glass slider to fail and ignite plastic curtains in the doorway located
 

Figure 019

 
 

The middle level apartment (A2) entrance door was opened by a second search crew around the same time as the second couch ignited, creating a ventilation flow path from the second floor balcony, through the apartment, and upwards into the stairwell (third floor). This flow path follows the same general route through the apartment and into the stairwell as was seen in the terrace level apartment below. Squad 303’s crew arrived on scene after the bulk of the fire in the terrace level apartment had been suppressed and appeared to be under control. The crew entered the front stairwell, which had minimal smoke up to the second level and the crew began to systematically search the building.

Squad 303’s crew proceeded to search two apartments before entering the third floor right side apartment to conduct a search, leaving the entrance door open. It should also be noted that carpeting impacted the bottom of the door and prevented the apartment entrance doors on the second and third levels from closing automatically. The entry doors had to be actively pushed closed to overcome the friction of the carpet.

 

Photo depicting building smoke and fire conditions around the arrival of Squad 303.

Note the lack of heavy smoke or fire in the stairwell or terrace level.

There is also no indication of the growing fire in the second (middle) level apartment.

 

 

 

When Squad 303’s crew of two firefighters entered the third level apartment (B2), smoke was banked about halfway down the walls with moderate visibility. The crew could clearly see the floor of the apartment without the need to crawl below the smoke layer to search. Squad 303’s crew was unaware of the flames spreading across the two couches in the second floor apartment below them. The crew split in order to search the apartment faster, with one firefighter searching the front bedrooms and the officer searching the kitchen and living room.

As flames in the second level began to rollover into the apartment entranceway, the smoke layer in the third level quickly dropped to the floor with a rapid increase in temperature. With Squad 303’s crew searching above, flames began to extend into the stairwell, supplied by sufficient ventilation flowing through the apartment. This combination of fuel, heat and oxygen rich fresh air resulted in a rapid increase in heat release rate and flashover of the second level apartment followed by full room involvement.

The open entrance doors on the second and third levels created a ventilation flow path through the second floor apartment, into the sealed stairwell and up through the third floor apartment directly above. The flames followed this flow path and extended from the second floor, through the stairwell and into the living room area of the third floor apartment. Flashover of the third floor occurred approximately 30 seconds after the second floor experienced flashover.

Figure 026 and 027

 

Rollover from the second level apartment into the stairwell.

 

 
 
Flames followed the ventilation flow path and extend into the third floor apartment, resulting in ignition of the couches just inside the doorway.

 

 

    

 

Command sounded the building evacuation tones as flames extended into the hallway and up to the third level apartment.

Two couches just inside the entrance door on the third level ignited, blocking the primary means of egress for both firefighters from Squad 303. Upon hearing the evacuation horns from the trucks, the second firefighter from Squad 303 (searching the front bedrooms) attempted to exit the apartment via the apartment entrance door, however he was blocked by flames in the living room and stairwell.

Trapped in the bedroom, the firefighter bailed out headfirst down a ground ladder on the front side from the third floor. Squad 303 officer’s means of egress through the apartment entrance door was also blocked by the flames in the living room and stairwell. There were no windows located in the rear of the apartment.

The only means of escape was the balcony slider, however the entire balcony was engulfed in flames from the fully involved apartment below. With both escape routes blocked by flames and experiencing extremely high heat conditions, Squad 303’s officer requested assistance and declared a MAYDAY from the rear of the third floor apartment.

Firefighters re-entered the structure to combat the fire and locate the trapped firefighter. The downed firefighter was eventually located on the third level just inside the sliding glass door and was removed to the rear balcony. The firefighter was then extricated in a stokes rescue basket down the aerial ladder of a truck located in the rear, where he was subsequently transported to the hospital.

Effects of Compartmentation on Fire Spread

The Post Incident Analysis Team requested that alternate modeling scenarios be conducted to explore the effects of compartmentation on fire spread throughout the building.

The team specifically wanted to know how the ventilation flow paths through the stairwell would differ if the second or third level apartment entry doors were shut after entering/leaving the apartments. Two alternate computer fire modeling scenarios were conducted.

The first alternative modeling run featured the exact same fire scenario, except the second (middle) level apartment door was closed after the last victim was removed from that apartment. The apartment entry doors from the stairwell were fire-rated doors constructed of solid wood.

  • As soon as the door is shut, the ventilation flow path through the apartment and up the stairwell is blocked.

 

Shutting the second level apartment door blocks the flow path and flame extension into the stairwell. 

Even with the third floor apartment door left open, the model indicates that the stairwell and third floor remain tenable for firefighters. Flames eventually extend from the third floor balcony into the apartment, however the escape routes through the stairwell and the front apartment windows are accessible.           

The model indicates that closing the second level apartment door prevents the flow of smoke, heat and other products of combustion from entering the stairwell, thus preventing flashover of the stairwell and the third level. As long as the second floor entry door remains shut, the model indicated that the conditions within the stairwell and third floor remain tenable for firefighters, even with the third floor apartment door open.

A second alternative modeling scenario was conducted where the third level entrance door was closed after crews made entry to search the apartment.The same fire conditions from the actual model were used.When the door remained closed, the outlet of the ventilation flow path was blocked at the top of the stairs. Without a complete flow path, there wasn’t sufficient oxygen flowing through the second floor apartment to support extended burning in the stairwell.

Consequently after flashover of the second floor, the flames in the stairwell only exist momentarily before consuming all available oxygen and becoming ventilation limited.The fire model indicated that temperatures within the third floor apartment stayed tenable for firefighters, even with a fully developed fire on the second floor and flames in the stairwell.

Flames would eventually extend up the rear balcony to the third level, however they would not block egress through the living room and front windows of the apartment.By closing the apartment door on the third floor and blocking the outlet for fire gases emanating from the second floor apartment, the third floor apartment remains tenable for firefighting crews and the temperatures only briefly spike in the stairwell before the fire becomes ventilation limited.The ventilation flow through the apartments results in an increased burning rate within both the second and third levels, as well as the stairwell.                     

Results of each modeling scenario describing extent of flame spread

Results of each modeling scenario describing extent of flame spread.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Effects of Compartmentation on Fire Damage to the StructureThe impact of compartmentation on fire and smoke spread is evident by examining the post-fire damage throughout the structure. While other factors contributed to the relative fire damage, including fire department overhaul and relative apartment configuration, analyzing the damage to the building and the position of the apartment entry doors provides insight on the benefits of compartmentation.

By closing apartment unit entrance doors and interior hollow core doors, one can slow or even block the ventilation flow path through the structure, thus significantly reducing the rate of fire spread. The photos below represent the post-fire damage in all six apartments within the fire building. Four of the six apartment entry doors were open for the majority of the fire and the relative difference in damage is clearly evident.

Terrace level stairwell landing looking into T1 (left) and T2 (right) apartments.

 

Door Closed……Door Open

 

 

Using doors to compartmentalize and limit fire and smoke spread in a structure is not limited to fire-rated entrance doors. Interior hollow core doors also offer considerable protection for compartmentation purposes.

A search crew utilizing the Vent, Enter and Search (VES) technique through a front window used a hollow core bedroom door to isolate themselves from the developing fire in the living room of apartment A2.

As the crews removed the second victim from the living room to the bedroom, they shut the bedroom hollow core door behind them.

The living room soon experienced flashover followed by full room involvement, however the bedroom remained isolated from the heat and smoke for the duration of the fire. The photos below illustrate this effective use of compartmentation to protect firefighters during a search.

 
Controling the Doors during VES

 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY:
While no fire model will exactly replicate a fire, this model provided insight on the route of fire spread, the rapid fire growth leading to flashover of the second and third level, and the benefits of compartmentation on slowing fire and smoke spread.
  • The unidirectional flow path up the stairs from the terrace level apartment resulted in a high rate of convective heat transfer to the firefighters initially attempting to descend the stairs, making attacking the seat of the fire very difficult.
  • The model then supported the fact that the main stairwell acted as an open channel for fire and smoke spread between the second and third levels, resulting in flashover of the third level in approximately 30 seconds after the second level.
  • This rapid fire growth leading to flashover is supported by photographs, witness statements and fireground audio.
  • The model was then utilized to explore the effects of compartmentation using apartment entrance doors.
  • The FDS model supported the scene observations and indicated that shutting the entrance doors blocked the flow of buoyancy driven fire gases through the structure, ultimately preventing fire extension to the third floor apartment via the stairwell.
  • The FDS model was utilized as part of the overall engineering analysis of this tragic fire and allowed for a better understanding of the events that led to the firefighter MAYDAY and subsequent Line of Duty Death.
  • The model was also used as an educational tool providing insight on potential methods of preventing similar tragedies in the future.
  • The results of this engineering analysis are intended to be reviewed by the Post Incident Analysis Team to assist in the creation of recommendations to mitigate the danger associated with future fire incidents.

References:

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Second Alarm Apartment Fire, VA

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Photo by Maxim Boldin

 
 
 
A second alarm fire occurred in a four-story apartment building in the 20500 block of Reserve Falls Terrace, Loudoun County, VA that took command of over 13 apartment units.
 
The fire was reported at 07:39 hours on Sunday morning November 20, 2011.
 
Arriving companies found heavy fire was coming from the building. Fire crews initiated an offensive attack but were forced to evacuate due to potential structural collapse considerations.
 
A second alarm was activated and a defensive attack was mounted until it was safe for crews to get back inside. Firefighters from Sterling, Lansdowne, Ashburn and Fairfax responded to the fire. Crews remained on the scene for several hours performing overhaul and checking for hot spots.
 
At least 13 units in the building were damaged, displacing over 26 occupants. There were no reported injuries.
 
 

Alpha Division Aerial View-Street Side

 

Bravo Division (note grade change from the Alpha to Charlie sides)

 

Fire Extension thru Roof at Bravo Division Charlie

 

Typical Interior Room Compartments

 
 

Typical Unit Floor Plans

 
 
 
Links
 

 

Operational Considerations at Garden Apartment Complex and Residencies

 Fire ground operations at Garden Apartment Complex and Multiple Occupancy Residencies require due diligence and well-coordinated multiple company operations that have well established operating protocols, clearly defined ( but flexible) company and response duties and an effective and well-practiced and experienced cadre of company and command officers.  

Due to the likely demands and complexities of evolving and expanding incident conditions at fire involving Garden Apartment type buildings and complexes, couple with the civilian life safety concerns due to occupancy density and numbers, immediate and timely resources are necessary to conduct multiple and concurrent functional assignments that demand effectiveness, efficiency and trained company compositions.

Strategy and Tactics at Garden Apartment Complex and Residencies required special instructions, insights and knowledge that goes well beyond the practices and methodologies typically deployed at single family residential fire incidents.

Multiple occupancy dwelling units, occupancy loads, multiple floors, building construction, structural systems and assemblies, construction and material, methods of construction and building and occupancy layouts and configurations results in fast spreading and extreme fire conditions, common avenues for internal and exterior fire travel, congested travel paths and access/egress points, multiple hose line deployment strategies with adequate fire flows, effective building laddering, forcible entry support and concurrent, mobile and skilled search and rescue  capabilities.

The ability to deploy and operate multiple hand lines is mission critical at fires in these multiple occupancy dwellings. As are a number of other strategic and tactical functions; but again, If the fire is controlled and goes out- all the other escalating, concurrent and immediate demands, needs and requests along with highest risk factors for survivability to occupants and firefighter alike diminishes rapidly and can be managed.

 Here are some discussion points to chat about around the kitchen table;

  • Are your engine companies effectively set up and outfitted to stretch out and deploy extended lines, multiple lines on common floors or within various floor elevations?
  • Have you and your company practiced coordinated multiple company search and rescue protocols for multiple occupancy floor areas?
  • Have you considered the needs, impacts and operational deployment for a RIT on a common floor during extreme fire conditions that required interior common hallway access and extraction of a firefighter in distress or incapacitated?
  • Do you have the capability to deploy and implement multiple companies for coordinated roof ventilation operations?  IF so, have they training together in the past?
  • How effective and knowledgably are you and your company in initiating and completing multiple trench, strip or louver roof ventilation cuts?
  • Are you aware of the signs for potential or imminent collapse for the various types of garden apartment buildings in your response area? Did you know there are different considerations based on the vintage, age and construction systems and assemblies utilized?
  • When was the last time you either pre-fire planned any of your garden apartment building or complexes? Or did a company walk-through?
  • Which ones are protected by a fixed sprinkler system?
  • Do you what the water fire flow capabilities are for the hydrants and system in any of these garden apartment building or complexes?
  • Have you done any table top exercises considering a standard alarm assignment fire, or an escalating multiple alarms incident?
  • Do you consider occupancy risk versus occupany type for the buildings you respond to?
  • Are your considering the effects of extreme fire behavior and the potential for wind driven fire conditions in your IAPs?
  • Are you considering the collapse and compromise potential for floor and roof assemblies in your assignments?
  • Are you fully prepared for immediate or multiple RIT needs and deployments?
  • Do you understand how these garden apartment buildings are constructed, configured and will impact your strategic and tactical assignments?
  • Do you have the right skill set for performing safely and effectively in your assigned role and responsibilities? If not, what are you going to do about that gap?

 

Posted by on November 20, 2011 • Filed under: Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Collapse, company officer, Fire Fighter Safety, Fire Fighting, firefighting-operations • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Required Reading: Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction

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Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction

Another must read for all Company and Command Officers: Impact of ventilation on fire behavior in legacy and contemporary residential construction, by Steve Kerber (2011) UL Report. Take some time to increase your proficiencies and compentencies.

Executive Summary

Under the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Assistance to FirefighterGrant Program, Underwriters Laboratories examined fire service ventilation practices as well as the impact of changes in modern house geometries. There has been a steady change in the residential fire environment over the past several decades. These changes include larger homes, more open floor plans and volumes and increased synthetic fuel loads. This series of experiments examine this change in fire behavior and the impact on firefighter ventilation tactics.

This fire research project developed the empirical data that is needed to quantify the fire behavior associated with these scenarios and result in immediately developing the necessary firefighting ventilation practices to reduce firefighter death and injury.

Two houses were constructed in the large fire facility of Underwriters Laboratories inNorthbrook, IL. The first of two houses constructed was a one-story, 1200 ft2, 3 bedroom, 1 bathroom house with 8 total rooms. The second house was a two-story 3200 ft2, 4 bedroom, 2.5 bathroom house with 12 total rooms. The second house featured a modern open floor plan, two story great room and open foyer. Fifteen experiments were conducted varying the ventilation locations and the number of ventilation openings. Ventilation scenarios included ventilating the front door only, opening the front door and a window near and remote from the seat of the fire, opening a window only and ventilating a higher opening in the two-story house. One scenario in each house was conducted in triplicate to examine repeatability.

The results of these experiments provide knowledge for the fire service for them to examine their thought processes, standard operating procedures and training content. Several tactical considerations were developed utilizing the data from the experiments to provide specific examples of changes that can be adopted based on a departments current strategies and tactics.

The tactical considerations addressed include:

  • Stages of fire development: The stages of fire development change when a fire becomes ventilation limited. It is common with today’s fire environment to have a decay period prior to flashover which emphasizes the importance of ventilation.
  • Forcing the front door is ventilation: Forcing entry has to be thought of as ventilation as well. While forcing entry is necessary to fight the fire it must also trigger the thought that air is being fed to the fire and the clock is ticking before either the fire gets extinguished or it grows until an untenable condition exists jeopardizing the safety of everyone in the structure.
  • No smoke showing: A common event during the experiments was that once the fire became ventilation limited the smoke being forced out of the gaps of the houses greatly diminished or stopped all together. No some showing during size-up should increase awareness of the potential conditions inside.
  • Coordination: If you add air to the fire and don’t apply water in the appropriate time frame the fire gets larger and safety decreases. Examining the times to untenability gives the best case scenario of how coordinated the attack needs to be. Taking the average time for every experiment from the time of ventilation to the time of the onset of firefighter untenability conditions yields 100 seconds for the one-story house and 200 seconds for the two-story house. In many of the experiments from the onset of firefighter untenability until flashover was less than 10 seconds. These times should be treated as being very conservative. If a vent location already exists because the homeowner left a window or door open then the fire is going to respond faster to additional ventilation opening because the temperatures in the house are going to be higher. Coordination of fire attack crew is essential for a positive outcome in today’s fire environment.
  • Smoke tunneling and rapid air movement through the front door: Once the front door is opened attention should be given to the flow through the front door. A rapid in rush of air or a tunneling effect could indicate a ventilation limited fire.
  • Vent Enter Search (VES): During a VES operation, primary importance should be given to closing the door to the room. This eliminates the impact of the open vent and increases tenability for potential occupants and firefighters while the smoke ventilates from the now isolated room.
  • Flow paths: Every new ventilation opening provides a new flow path to the fire and vice versa. This could create very dangerous conditions when there is a ventilation limited fire.
  • Can you vent enough?: In the experiments where multiple ventilation locations were made it was not possible to create fuel limited fires. The fire responded to all the additional air provided. That means that even with a ventilation location open the fire is still ventilation limited and will respond just as fast or faster to any additional air. It is more likely that the fire will respond faster because the already open ventilation location is allowing the fire to maintain a higher temperature than if everything was closed. In these cases rapid fire progression if highly probable and coordination of fire attack with ventilation is paramount.
  • Impact of shut door on occupant tenability and firefighter tenability: Conditions in every experiment for the closed bedroom remained tenable for temperature and oxygen concentration thresholds. This means that the act of closing a door between the occupant and the fire or a firefighter and the fire can increase the chance of survivability. During firefighter operations if a firefighter is searching ahead of a hose line or becomes separated from his crew and conditions deteriorate then a good choice of actions would be to get in a room with a closed door until the fire is knocked down or escape out of the room’s window with more time provided by the closed door.
  • Potential impact of open vent already on flashover time: All of these experiments were designed to examine the first ventilation actions by an arriving crew when there are no ventilation openings. It is possible that the fire will fail a window prior to fire department arrival or that a door or window was left open by the occupant while exiting. It is important to understand that an already open ventilation location is providing air to the fire, allowing it to sustain or grow.
  • Pushing fire: There were no temperature spikes in any of the rooms, especially the rooms adjacent to the fire room when water was applied from the outside. It appears that in most cases the fire was slowed down by the water application and that external water application had no negative impacts to occupant survivability. While the fog stream “pushed” steam along the flow path there was no fire “pushed”.
  • No damage to surrounding rooms: Just as the fire triangle depicts, fire needs oxygen to burn. A condition that existed in every experiment was that the fire (living room or family room) grew until oxygen was reduced below levels to sustain it. This means that it decreased the oxygen in the entire house by lowering the oxygen in surrounding rooms and the more remote bedrooms until combustion was not possible. In most cases surrounding rooms such as the dining room and kitchen had no fire in them even when the fire room was fully involved in flames and was ventilating out of the structure.
    UL Report; Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction,

 

 

 

Posted by on October 23, 2011 • Filed under: christopher naum, company officer, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, training-development • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Tonight on Taking it to the Streets: The New Fire Ground and the First-Due

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Tonight on Firefighternetcast.com; Taking it to the Streets-The New Fire Ground and the First-Due

The New Fire Ground and the First-Due

Join in tonight at 9pm ET for another special and exciting program continuing our series discussion on the Emerging Tactical Renaissance in the Fire Service.

Taking it to the StreetsTM, radio program hosted by highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer Christopher Naum, continues to provide provocative insights and dynamic discussions with leading national fire service leaders and guests on important issues affecting the American Fire Service with applications internationally within the tradition and brotherhood of the Fire Service.
This edition of Taking it to the StreetsTM the program will be looking at the New Fire Ground and the First-Due
Joining the program will be two special guests: Division Chief Ed Hadfield (CA) and Deputy Chief Jason Hoevelmann (MO) providing a great opportunity to listen to perspectives from coast to coast and the heartland.

Join in on what is certainly going to be an insightful look and discussion of the New Fire Ground and the issues affecting the First-Due Officer and Command…

Both Divison Chief Ed Hadfield (CA) and Deputy Chief Jason Hoevelmann (MO) are speakers at the Gateway Midwest Fire & Leadership Training Conference brought to you by Go Forward Training and coming to the St. Charles/St.Louis, Missouri metro area on October 21-23. 2011. I also have the honor of lecturing and presenting two programs, one of which one will be co-presented with my good friend and colleague Lt. John Shafer. (The GreenMaltese.com HERE)

  • Conference Direct Link HERE.
  • Go Forward Training HERE

Incorporating and facilitating the latest training delivery concepts and methodologies and integrating current and emerging technology, social media platforms, eMedia and internet based content management material in order to provide unparalleled fire service curricula, training and education, The Command Institute, Buildingsonfire.com and Fire Fighternetcast.com will be integrating content across a number of platforms to provide you with supportive information and training that will ultimately integrate with the direct training deliveries at the conference.

This segment of Taking it to the Streets on FirefighterNetcast.com is the first step in achieving that goal and process. Look for more integrated materials, exercises and eMedia on CommandSafety.com, TheCompanyOfficer.com and Buildingsonfire.com

Grab a cup of coffee and sit down for a special one hour program with Taking it to the Streets on FirefighterNetcast.com where we’ll be discussing developing concepts, methodologies and operational perspectives affecting today’s emerging and evolving fire ground and the new considerations for the First-Due with Christopher Naum and fire service leaders, Division Chief Ed Hadfield and Deputy Chief Jason Hoevelmann.

Join in on the live open discussion with other fire service personnel from around the country.

Taking it to the StreetsTM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by nationally renowned fire service leader Christopher Naum, a 36-year fire service veteran and highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer and the distinguished leading national authority on building construction and fire ground operations. Taking it to the StreetsTM is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production, © 2011 All Rights Reserved

Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.

  • Tune in to the Program Wednesday evening August 17th at 9:00 pm ET, HERE
  • Firefighternetcast.com HERE
  • Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE
  • Buildingsonfire.com, HERE

Gateway Midwest Fire & Leadership Training Conference

Gateway Midwest

Gateway Midwest

October 21 – 23, 2011 | St. Charles, Missouri
Join Us at Our Inaugural Event!
Featuring three packed days of hands-on training, top notch education with big names and fresh faces, pre-conference workshops, social events, open discussions and more.

Liberty Regional

Liberty Regional

November 4-6, 2011 | King of Prussia, PA
Three days of top notch hands-on training, a comprehensive educational program featuring top names and fresh faces, pre-conference workshops, social events, open discussions and more.

JEMS Seminar Series

JEMS Seminar Series

October 21-23, 2011 | St. Charles, Missouri
Bringing the Best in EMS Education to Your Region
We know budgets are tight, we know it can be tough to get approval to attend a conference out of state. The JEMS Seminar Series brings high-quality, high-impact EMS speakers right to you.
Learn, Network, Share & Save!

Posted by on August 17, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Fire Fighting, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, leadership, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics, Taking it to the Streets • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Deployment Decisions: Defining Operations on the First-Due

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First-due company operations are influenced by a number of parameters and factors; some deliberate and dictated, others prescribed and prearranged and yet others subjective, biased, predisposed or at times accidental, casual and emotional. For many of you riding the seat or arriving assuming command; you understand the connotations and implications I’m making here.

Here’s an excellent discussion and debate point to bring up, when time permits today or this evening with your company or personnel; one that leads to a multitude of viewpoints, opinions and divisions.

On the first-due; what are the three or four key parameters when confronted with arrival indications of a fire within a structure that define your deployment and transition into operations?

Now, before everyone gets worked up; we all realize there are numerous variables affecting key decision-points that must be recognized, imputed, synthesized , analyzed and decisions made, assignments formulated and the task deployed; this list can be long – very long.

However, giving a building and occupancy with indications of a fire within, what has your experience provided you with the KEY influencing parameters? Are there key factors, or are there “lists” of factors based upon yet another “list” of conditions. The question is rhetorical the answeres are not.

Is it occupancy type, occupancy risk, fire behavior or fire dynamics, time, risk, communicated information, past performance factors (experience), presumed or known life hazards, predicated building or system performance, crew KSA sets or other factors, etc? Does naturalistic or RPDM decision-making influence; is the deployment tactically driven or predisposed by SOP, SOG or personal attributes and biases? Safety Conscious or aggressively driven? You get the picture…..

Try to distill them down to three or four mission critical key issues (if you can). This is a great exercise to see what everyone else considers the key factors to be or should be when deploying and  going into operations; sometimes it’s more complex than just “pulling the line” or getting in….

Take the time to use some critical thinking and don’t be subjective….think about the responses and ask why?

Posted by on August 9, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, command-leadership, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Crew Integrity, Crew Management, Fire Fighting, firefighting-operations, KSA, leadership • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

The Waldbaum’s Supermarket Fire and Collapse FDNY 1978-2011

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The Waldbaum’s Supermarket Fire and Collapse FDNY 1978  

The Waldbaum Super market fire, Brooklyn, New York occurred on August 2, 1978. Six firefighters died in the line of duty when the roof of a burning Brooklyn supermarket collapsed, plunging 12 firefighters into the flames. The fire began in a hallway near the compressor room as crews were renovating the store, and quickly escalated to a fourth-alarm. Less than an hour after the fire was first reported, nearly 20 firefighters were on the roof when the central portion gave way.  

Read the insights at CommandSafety.com HERE

No more History Repeating Events….

Posted by on August 2, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Collapse, Commandsafety.com, firefighting-operations, LODD, major-incidents • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Texas Captain; 2010 LODD Report Issued with Lessons Learned

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Captain Thomas Araguz III

 

Captain Araguz, a 30 year old, 11-year veteran of the Wharton Volunteer Fire Department made Captain in 2009. He lost his life while battling a multiple alarm fire a the Maxim Egg Farm located at 3307 FM 442, Boling, Texas on July 3, 2010.  The Texas State Fire Marshal’s Office issued the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Report, SFMO Case Number FY10-01 that provides a detailed examination of the incident, operations and yeilds findings and recommendations. A full version of the report is available at the Texas SFMO web site HERE.

 On July 3, 2010, Wharton Volunteer Fire Department Captain Thomas Araguz III was fatally injured during firefighting operations at an egg production and processing facility. At 9:41 PM, Wharton County Sheriff’s Office 911 received a report of a fire at the Maxim Egg Farm located at 3307 FM 442, Boling, Texas. Boling Volunteer Fire Department and the Wharton Volunteer Fire Department responded first, arriving approximately 12 minutes after dispatch. Eventually, more than 30 departments with 100 apparatus and more than 150 personnel responded. Some departments came as far as 60 miles to assist in fighting the fire.

Aerial View

 

The fire involved the egg processing building, including the storage areas holding stacked pallets of foam, plastic, and cardboard egg cartons and boxes. It was a large windowless, limited access structure with large open areas totaling over 58,000 square feet. A mixed construction, it included a two-story business office, the egg processing plant, storage areas, coolers, and shipping docks. It was primarily metal frame construction with metal siding and roofing on a concrete slab foundation with some areas using wood framing for the roof structure.

Captain Araguz responded to the scene from the Wharton Fire Station, approximately 20 miles from the fire scene, arriving to the front, south side main entrance 20 minutes after dispatch. Captain Araguz, Captain Juan Cano, and Firefighter Paul Maldonado advanced a line through the main entrance and along the south, interior wall to doors leading to a storage area at the Southeast corner.

Maldonado fed hose at the entry door as Captains Araguz and Cano advanced through the processing room. Araguz and Cano became separated from the hose line and then each other. Captain Cano found an exterior wall and began kicking and hitting the wall as his air supply ran out. Firefighters cut through the exterior metal wall at the location of the knocking and pulled him out. Several attempts were made to locate Captain Araguz including entering the building through the hole and cutting an additional hole in the exterior wall where Cano believed Araguz was located. Fire conditions eventually drove the rescuers back and defensive firefighting operations were initiated.

Captain Cano was transported to the Gulf Coast Medical Center where he was treated and released. Captain Araguz was recovered at 7:40 AM, the following morning. Initially transported by ambulance to the Wharton Funeral Home then taken to the Travis County Medical Examiner’s Office in Austin, Texas for a post-mortem examination.

Site Plan of Building Complex

Building Structure and Systems

The fire incident building was located on the property of Maxim Egg Farm, located within an unincorporated area of Wharton County. The 911 address is 580 Maxim Drive, Boling, Texas 77420.

Wharton County has no adopted fire codes, or model construction codes, and no designated Fire Marshal on staff that conducts fire safety inspections within their jurisdiction.

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 101, Life Safety Code, 2009 Edition, is adopted by the State Fire Marshal’s Office, and is the applicable standard for fire and life safety inspections in the absence of an adopted fire code within unincorporated areas of a county by an applicable authority. All references regarding evaluation of the incident building in relation to minimum life safety requirements are based on NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, 2009 Edition.

Maxim Farm property includes 23 chicken coops known as layer barns that average 300 feet long and 50 feet wide holding between 15,000 to 25,000 chickens each. These layer barns inter-connect to a central processing building by a series of enclosed conveyor belts transporting over one million eggs daily.

  • The property includes integrated feed silos, water tanks, and waste management facilities. Additional areas on the property include equipment barns, shipping offices, loading docks, coolers, storage areas, and business offices.

 Overall Building Description

The main processing structure was an irregularly shaped mixed construction of metal, concrete block, and wood framing on a concrete slab foundation with approximately 58,000 square feet of space. Three dry-storage rooms connected by a wide hallway lined the east side of the plant. A concrete block (CMU) wall separated the egg processing area from the East Hallway and storage rooms. Coolers were located north of the processing room with the loading docks along the west side of the structure. The loading docks were accessible from the processing room, Cooler 3, and Cooler 2. Cooler 1 was located at the north end of Dry Storage 2. A two-story building housing the business office was attached to the main processing plant at the southwest corner.

Construction Features

The building construction was classified as an NFPA 220, Type II-000 construction with an occupancy classification by the Life Safety Code as Industrial with sub-classification as special-purpose use. The Life Safety Code imposes no minimum construction requirements for this type of occupancy.

The predominant use of the building was to process and package fresh eggs for shipment after arriving by automated conveyor directly from a laying house adjacent to the building. The general floor plan of the building consisted of a large egg processing room, with surrounding areas used for storage of packing materials and two large drive-in coolers for holding packaged eggs prior to shipping.

Building construction consisted of a combination of steel and wood framing with a sheet metal exterior siding and roofing over a low-pitch roof on a concrete slab foundation. Structural elements within the interior of the building were exposed and unprotected with no fire-resistance rated materials applied. The load bearing structural elements consisted of steel beams, and steel pipe columns, with steel open web trusses supporting the roof structure.

  • Wood components were also used as part of the load bearing elements and wall framing.
  • Perimeter walls of the cooler compartments were constructed of concrete masonry units (CMU).
  • The building was not separated between other areas of use by fire-resistance rated assemblies.
  • Ancillary facilities located within the building used for administrative offices and other incidental spaces were constructed of wood framing with a gypsum wallboard finish.

Detailed Construction Features

The front of the structure faced to the south where the main entrance to the processing room and business offices was located approximately 4 feet above the parking lot grade level and accessed by a series of steps. The business office was a two-story wood frame construction with a vinyl exterior siding under a metal roof on a concrete slab foundation. Additional separate, single-story, wood frame structures with offices located to the west of the main business office connected by covered walkways.

Processing Room

The egg processing room was 141 feet along the east and west walls and approximately 100 feet along the north and south walls. The processing room received the eggs transported from the layer barns on the conveyer belt system. The room contained the processing equipment and conveyor systems where eggs were cleaned, graded, packaged and moved to large coolers to await shipment. The construction of the processing room was sheet metal panels embedded into the concrete slab foundation supported by 8-inch wide metal studs. Sheet metal panels lined the exterior and interior sides of the south and west walls with fiberglass insulation sandwiched between.

Main Processing Area

The north wall separated the processing room from Cooler 3 and consisted mainly of interlocking insulated metal panels embedded into the slab locked at the top in metal channels. Their interior surface was polyurethane laminate.

The east wall was mainly of concrete block (CMU) construction. A USDA office and a mechanics room were accessed through doors in the east wall of the processing room. The northeast corner of the processing room extended into the north end of the east hallway, forming an 18 feet by 18 feet area with wood frame construction on a concrete stem wall with fiber cement board (Hardy board) and metal panel siding. A 6-feet wide opening between the processing and dry-storage areas with a vinyl strip door allowed unrestricted access.

Along the south wall of the processing room, a walkway between the processing equipment and exterior wall led to swinging double doors at the southeast corner to enter into Dry Storage 3. Conveyors carried the eggs from the north and south layer barns through openings in the walls of the extension of the processing room. The conveyors from the north and south layer barns entered the building suspended overhead. As the conveyors approached the entrance to the main processing room, they gradually descended to 3.5 feet above floor level and were supported by metal brackets attached to the floor. Electric drive motors attached to the conveyors at several points along their lengths to power their movement.

The roof consisted of steel columns and girders with metal panel roofing attached to metal purlins supported by steel rafters. Wire mesh supported fiberglass insulation under the roof deck. The roof gable was oriented north to south.

 

Dry Storage

The plant included three dry-storage rooms along the eastern side of the building connected by an east hallway. Dry Storage 1 and Dry Storage 2 were located in the northeast corner of the plant under a common sloping metal roof. The dry-storage rooms held pallets of containers including polystyrene egg crates, foam egg cartons, pulp egg cartons, and cardboard boxes.

 

Dry Storage 1 was approximately 123 feet long and 50 feet wide and was 4 feet below the grade of the rest of the plant. It was added to the east side of Dry Storage 2 in 2008. Dry Storage 1 was a concrete slab and 4-feet high concrete half wall topped with wood framing and metal siding. The metal roof sloped from 11 feet high above the west side to 10 feet high above the east wall. The roof attached to 2 inch x 8 inch wood joists supported by two rows of steel support columns and steel girders. The two rows of seven columns were oriented in a north-south direction.

A concrete ramp at the south end facilitated access to the East Hallway and Dry Storage 2 and the main level of the processing room. A concrete ramp at the northeast corner of Dry Storage 1 provided access to the rear loading dock. The rear dock was secured on the interior at the top of the ramp by a wood frame and metal double door with a wooden cross member and a chain and padlock. An additional wood frame and screened double door secured on the interior.

The conveyor belt from the north layer barns ran the length of the west side of Dry Storage 1 where it turned to the west, crossing Dry Storage 2 and the East Hallway into the main processing room.

Dry Storage 1 contained 29 rows of pallets, seven to eight pallets deep, of mainly Styrofoam egg crates stacked between 7 and 10 feet high, depending on their location. Corridors between the rows were maintained to provide access to the pallets with an electric forklift. Fluorescent light fixtures attached to the wood rafters in rows north to south with their conductors in PVC conduit. Skylights spaced evenly above the west side allowed for natural light. Pallets of stock material were single stacked below the locations of the light fixtures to keep clearance and prevent damage.

Dry Storage 2, located west of and 4 feet above Dry Storage 1, stored pallets of flattened cardboard box stock. The room was approximately 81 feet long and 40 feet wide. The south wall was the processing room extension and was approximately 25 feet long. The east side of the room was open to Dry Storage 1 with 4 inch x 4 inch unprotected wood studs spaced unevenly from 4 feet to 9 feet, supporting the metal roof. The west wall was CMU construction and was the exterior wall of Cooler 3. The metal roof sloped from the top of the west wall approximately 12 feet high to approximately 11 feet above the east side.

The room was accessed from the south end at the top of the ramp leading down into Dry Storage 1. Pallets of folded cardboard boxes were stacked along the entire length of the west wall extending 16 to 20 feet to the east. The rows of pallets were without spacing for corridors. One row of six fluorescent light fixtures attached to wood rafters near the north-south centerline.

The East Hallway was approximately 118 feet long and 37 feet wide running along the length of the east side of the processing room. The East Hallway connected Dry Storages 1 and 2 with Dry Storage 3 by a corridor at the south end. The East Hallway allowed access between the storage room areas and into utility rooms including the Boiler Room at the north end and a mechanics room and small utility closet. Pallets of polystyrene egg crates were stored along the east wall in rows of three pallets each. Seven pallets of polystyrene egg crates were stored along the conveyors.

The west wall was concrete block construction (CMU) until it connected to the extension of the processing area constructed of wood frame covered by Hardy board and sheet metal. The east wall was sheet metal embedded in the concrete slab supported by 2 inch x 4 inch wood studs with Hardy board interior. The metal roof sloped from a height at 12 feet at the west wall to 10 feet high at the east wall, supported by 4 inch x 6 inch wood columns and 2 inch x 8 inch wood joists.

Two conveyors entered the south end of the east hallway from Dry Storage 3. The conveyors ran parallel for approximately 80 feet along the west wall and entered the processing room through openings in the extension at the north end of the east hallway. They were 6 feet from the west wall and gradually descended from a height of 9 feet at the south end to 3.5 feet at the north. Each conveyor was 31 inches wide and combined was approximately 7 feet wide. Two compressor machines and a pressure washer were located along the west wall near the south end.

The Boiler Room, located at the northeast corner of the East Hall, housed two propane fired boilers, a water treatment system and two vacuum pumps. It was wood frame construction with metal siding under a metal roof on a combination concrete slab and concrete pier and wood beam foundation. A small utility room with service panels was constructed of concrete block on a concrete slab under a metal roof and was also located along the west wall of the East Hallway. An approximately 10 feet wide corridor connected the East Hallway to Dry Storage 3.

Dry Storage 3 extended south from the main processing room and East Hallway to the south dock area where tractor-trailers parked to unload the pallets of supplies. Two parallel conveyors suspended 9 feet overhead from the roof extended along the length of the east wall where it passed through the south wall toward the south layer houses.

The plant’s main power conductors entered the west wall of Dry Storage 3 from load centers and transformers mounted to the slab outside approximately 15 feet south of the main processing room exterior wall. Stacks of wood pallets were stored in Dry Storage 3. Corridors wide enough for forklifts provided access to the south cargo dock area.

Fire Ground Operations and Tactics

Note: The following sequence of events was developed from radio transmissions and firefighter witness statements. Those events with known times are identified. Events without known times are approximated in the sequence of the events based on firefighter statements regarding their actions and/or observations. A detailed timeline of radio transmissions is included in the appendix.

On July 3, 2010, at 21:41:10, Wharton County Sheriff’s Office 911 received a report of a fire at the Maxim Egg Farm located on County Road 442, south of the city of Boling, Texas. The caller, immediately transferred to the Wharton Police Department Dispatch, advised there was a “big fire” in the warehouse where egg cartons were stored. Boling Volunteer Fire Department was dispatched and immediately requested aid from the Wharton Volunteer Fire Department. Wharton VFD became Command as is the usual practice for this county.

Wharton Assistant Chief Stewart (1102) was returning to the station having been out on a response to a vehicle accident assisting the Boling Volunteer Fire Department when the call came in for the fire. He responded immediately and at 21:50 reported seeing “heavy fire” coming from the roof at the northeast corner of the building as he approached the plant from the east on County Road 442. When he arrived he was eventually directed to the east side of the building (D side) to the rear loading dock. Asst. Chief Stewart worked for several minutes with facility employees to gain access to the fire building before being led to the northeast loading dock.

An employee directed him on the narrow caliche drive behind the layer barns and between the waste ponds to the loading dock. Wharton Engine 1134 followed 1102 to the east side and backed into the drive leading to the loading dock. Asst. Chief Stewart’s immediate actions included assessing the extent of the fire on the interior of the building by looking through the doors at the loading dock to Dry Storage 1. Unable to see the fire through the smoke at the doors of the loading dock, an attack was eventually accomplished by removing a metal panel from the east exterior wall of Dry Storage 1 and using one 1¾”-inch cross lay. After a few minutes, the deck gun on Engine 1134 was utilized, directing water to the roof above the seat of the fire near the south end of Dry Storage 1.

Water supply became an immediate concern and 1102 made efforts to get resources for resupply. Requests for mutual aid to provide water tankers were made to area communities. During the incident, re-supplying tankers included a gravity re-fill from the on-site water supply storage tanks and from fire hydrants in the City of Boling, 3 miles from the scene and the City of Wharton, nearly 11 miles. The City of Boling water tower was nearly emptied during the incident.

The radio recording indicates there were difficulties accessing the location of the fire as apparatus were led around the complex by multiple employees. Heavy rains during the previous week left many roadways muddy and partially covered with water, which added to problems with apparatus access. In addition, fire crews were not familiar with the layout of the facility and there are no records of pre-fire plans. Asst. Chief Stewart worked for several minutes with facility employees to gain access to the fire building before being led to the northeast loading dock.

Wharton Fire Chief Bobby Barnett (1101) arrived on scene at 21:56:14, and ordered incoming apparatus to stage until he could establish an area of operations at the front, south side of the plant (A side). Chief Barnett directed Engine 1130 to position approximately 50 feet from the front main entrance of the plant. At 22:09:16, Chief Barnett (1101) established a command post on A side and became the Incident Commander; 1101 directed radio communications for the fireground to be TAC 2 and called for mutual aid from the Hungerford and El Campo Fire Departments. Chief Barnett described the conditions on side A as smoky with no fire showing. Light winds were from the east, side D, pushing the smoke toward the area of the processing room, and the front, side A, of the building.

Maxim Egg Farm Manager David Copeland, a former Wharton VFD Chief, advised Command and firefighters that the fire was in the area of the Boiler Room and should be accessed by breaching an exterior wall in the employee break area. Chief Barnett ordered Wharton crews to the breach attempt. Captain Thomas Araguz III, Captain John Cano and Firefighter Paul Maldonado were involved with this operation. The crews working in this area were in full structural personnel protective clothing and SCBA.

At 22:10, Command ordered Engine 1130 and Tanker 1160 to set up at the front entrance using Tanker 1160 for portable dump tank operations for water re-supply.

On D side, difficulty accessing the fire from the exterior of the building was reported by Asst. Chief Stewart and the crews. Heavy doors, locked loading dock doors and steel exterior paneling, required the crews to spend extra time forcing entry.

At 22:17:23, Wharton County Chief Deputy Bill Copeland (3122), once a Wharton FD volunteer firefighter, notified Command that the fire was now through the roof over Dry Storage 1.

Chief Barnett noticed smoke conditions improving at the main plant doorway and ordered crews to advance lines into the processor room. Chief Barnett stated he assigned Captain Araguz, Captain Cano and Firefighter Maldonado because they were the most experienced and senior crews available.

Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV) was in place at the main entry door when Captain Cano, Captain Araguz and Firefighter Maldonado entered the structure into the processing room. There are no radio transmissions to verify exact entry times.

Captain Cano stated that an employee had to assist fire crews with entry into the main plant through a door with keypad access. Captain Cano reported the door to processing was held open by a three-ring binder that he jammed under the door after entry. Cano stated there was low visibility and moderate heat overhead. Captain Cano and Captain Araguz made entry on a right-hand wall working their way around numerous obstacles. The line was not yet charged and they returned to the doorway and waited for water. Wharton Engine 1130’s driver reported in his interview that he had difficulty establishing a draft from the portable tank later determined to be a linkage failure on the priming pump. 1160 connected directly to 1130 and drafted from the folding tank.

As the crew entered into the structure through the main entry door, several plant employees began entering into the administration offices through the area of the main entry door to remove files and records. This was reported to Command at 22:23 and after several minutes Chief Barnett ordered employees to stay out of the building and requested assistance from the Sheriff’s Office to maintain scene security.

At 22:31, once the line was charged, the two captains continued into the processor on the right wall leaving Maldonado at the doorway to feed hose. Captain Cano was first with the nozzle and described making it 20 feet into the building.

Cano states in his interview that he advised Command over the radio that there was high heat and low visibility, although the transmission is not recorded. Cano also reported in his interview, he could not walk through the area and had to use a modified duck walk. Cano projected short streams of water towards the ceiling in a “penciling” motion and noted no change in heat or smoke conditions. They advanced until the heat became too great and they retreated towards the center of the processor. Cano stated that they discussed their next tactic and decided to try a left-handed advance.

At 22:33, Chief Barnett advised, “advancing hose streams in main building to try to block it.”

Captain Araguz took the nozzle and Captain Cano advanced with him holding onto Araguz’ bunker gear. The crew advanced along the south wall of the processing room toward the double doors to Dry Storage 3 and lost contact with the hose line.

The investigation found the couplings between the first and second sections of the hose lodged against a threaded floor anchor (see photo) preventing further advancement of the line. How the team lost the hose line remains uncertain.

Captain Cano stated in his interview that Captain Araguz told him to call a Mayday. Captain Cano stated that he was at first confused by the request, but after some time it became apparent they lost the hose line. Captain Cano reported calling Mayday on the radio but never received a reply. Captain Cano now believes he may have inadvertently switched channels at his previous transmission reporting interior conditions. Captain Araguz had a radio but it was too damaged to determine operability. There are no recorded transmissions from Captain Araguz.

At 22:37, Deputy Chief Copeland advised Command that the fire had breached a brick wall and was entering the main packing plant. Command responded that there was a hose team inside.

At 22:42:50, Command radioed “Command to hose team 1, Cano.” This was the first of several attempts to contact Captain Cano and Captain Araguz. At 22:47:17, Command ordered Engine 1130 to sound the evacuation horn. At 22:50:44, Command announced Mayday over the radio, stating “unlocated fireman in the building.”

  • Captain Cano stated in his interview that they made several large circles in an attempt to locate the fire hose.
  • Cano became entangled in wiring, requiring him to doff his SCBA.
  • After re-donning his SCBA, Captain Cano noted he lost his radio, but found a flash light. He remembered that his low air warning was sounding as he and Araguz searched for the hose. Cano stated that they made it to an exterior wall and decided to attempt to breach the wall. Working in near zero visibility,
  • Captain Cano reported losing contact with Captain Araguz while working on breaching the wall.
  • Shortly after he lost contact, Captain Cano ran out of air and removed his mask. Captain Cano continued working to breach the exterior wall until he was exhausted.

At 22:54, crews working on the exterior of the building near the employee break area reported hearing tapping on the wall in the area of the employee break room.

  • Crews mustered tools and began to cut additional holes through the building exterior.
  • After making two openings, Captain Cano was located and removed from the building.
  • Captain Cano reported that Captain Araguz was approximately 15 feet inside of the building ahead of him.
  • Firefighters made entry through the exterior hole but were unsuccessful in locating Captain Araguz. Cano was escorted to the folding water tank and got into the tank to cool down.

Rapid Intervention Crews (RIC) were established using mutual aid members from the Hungerford and El Campo Fire Departments. The first entry made was at the main entry door where Firefighter Maldonado was located. Maldonado was relieved and escorted to the ambulance for rehab. An evacuation horn sounded and the first RIC abandoned the interior search and exited the building.

A rescue entry by a second RIC was through the breached wall of Dry Storage 3. After several minutes inside, the evacuation signal sounded due to the rapidly spreading fire and deteriorating conditions. Two additional RICs entered the structure through the loading dock doors of Dry Storage 3. Chief Barnett states that there were a total of four RICs that made entry after the Mayday. After approximately 45 minutes, all rescue attempts ceased.

As the fire extended south toward Dry Storage 3, smoke conditions became so debilitating that Chief Barnett ordered all crews staged near the front of the building on side A to move back and apparatus to relocate. Command assigned Chief Hafer of the Richmond Fire Department to “A” side operations and defensive operations were established. Captain Cano and Firefighter Maldonado were transported to Gulf Coast Medical Center and treated for smoke inhalation.

Fire ground operations continued through the night. Captain Araguz was recovered at approximately

07:40 AM. Command transferred to the Richmond Fire Department Chief Hafer at approximately

07:56 AM as 1101 and the Wharton units escorted Captain Araguz from the scene. All Wharton units cleared the scene at 08:02 AM.

Captain Araguz was transported to the Travis County Medical Examiner’s Office for autopsy. The Travis County Medical Examiner’s Office performed post mortem examinations on July 4, 2010. Captain Araguz died from thermal injuries and smoke inhalation.

Findings and Recommendations

  • Recommendations are based upon nationally recognized consensus standards and safety practices for the fire service.
  •  
  • All fire department personnel should know and understand nationally recognized consensus standards, and all fire departments should create and maintain SOGs and SOPs to ensure effective, efficient, and safe firefighting operations.

There were several factors that, when combined, may have contributed to the death of Captain Araguz. It is important that we honor him by learning from the incident.

  • Water supply became an immediate concern.
  • Although there are two water storage tanks on the facility with the combined capacity of nearly 44,000 gallons, refilling operations to tankers were slow, accomplished by gravity fill through a 5-inch connection.
  • A fire department connection attached to the plant’s main water supply pump and plant personnel familiar with the system could have sped up the refilling process at the plant.
  • Most tankers were sent to hydrants in the City of Boling 3 miles away, which in turn quickly depleted the city water supply.
  • Other tanker refilling was accomplished at hydrants on the City of Wharton water system, as far as 15 miles away.

Fire protection systems are not required by National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 101, Life Safety Code, 2009 Edition for this classification of facility. Fire sprinkler and smoke control systems may have contained the fire to one area, preventing the spread of fire throughout the plant.

Findings and recommendations from this investigation include:

 

FINDING 1:

There were no lives to save in the building. An inadequate water supply, lack of fire protection systems in the structure to assist in controlling the spread of the smoke and fire, and the heavy fire near the windward side facilitated smoke and fire spread further into the interior and toward “A” side operations. Along with the size of the building, the large fuel load, and the time period from fire discovery, interior firefighters were at increased risk.

Recommendation: Fire departments should develop Standard Operating Guidelines and conduct training involving risk management and risk benefit analysis during an incident according to Incident Management principles required by NFPA 1500 and 1561.

The concept of risk management shall be utilized on the basis of the following principles:

(a)  Activities that present a significant risk to the safety of personnel shall be limited to situations where there is a potential to save endangered lives

(b) Activities that are routinely employed to protect property shall be recognized as inherent risks to the safety of personnel, and actions shall be taken to reduce or avoid these risks.

(c) No risk to the safety of personnel shall be acceptable where there is no possibility to save lives or property.

(d) In situations where the risk to fire department members is excessive, activities shall be limited to defensive operations. NFPA 1500 Chapter 8, 8.3.2

NFPA 1500 ‘Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program’, 2007 ed., and NFPA 1561’Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System’, 2008 ed. Texas Commission on Fire Protection Standards Manual, Chapter 435, Section 435.15

(b)  The Standard operating procedure shall:

(1) Specify an adequate number of personnel to safely conduct emergency scene operations;

(2) limit operations to those that can be safely performed by personnel at the scene;

FINDING 2:

Initial crews failed to perform a 360-degree scene size-up and did not secure the utilities before operations began.

Recommendation: Fire departments should develop Standard Operating Guidelines that require crews to perform a complete scene size-up before beginning operations. A thorough size up will provide a good base for deciding tactics and operations. It provides the IC and on-scene personnel with a general understanding of fire conditions, building construction, and other special considerations such as weather, utilities, and exposures. Without a complete and accurate scene size-up, departments will have difficulty coordinating firefighting efforts.

Fireground Support Operations 1st Edition, IFSTA, Chapter 10 Fundamentals of Firefighting Skills,

NFPA/IAFC, 2004, Chapter 2  

FINDING 3

The Incident Commander failed to maintain an adequate span of control for the type of incident. Safety, personnel accountability, staging of resources, and firefighting operations require additional supervision for the scope of incident. Radio recordings and interview statements indicate the IC performing several functions including: Command, Safety, Staging, Division A Operations, Interior Operations and Scene Security.

Recommendation: Incident Commanders should maintain an appropriate span of control and assign additional personnel to the command structure as needed. Supervisors must be able to adequately supervise and control their subordinates, as well as communicate with and manage all resources under their supervision. In ICS, the span of control of any individual with incident management supervisory responsibility should range from three to seven subordinates, with five being optimal. The type of incident, nature of the tasks, hazards and safety factors, and distances between personnel and resources all influence span-of-control considerations.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security – Federal Emergency Management Agency Incident Command Systems http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/ICSpopup.htm#item5 NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, Chapter 8, 2007 ed.

 

FINDING 4

The interior fire team advanced into the building prior to the establishment of a rapid intervention crew (RIC).

Recommendation: Fire Departments should develop written procedures that comply with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s Final Rule, 29 CFR Section 1910.134 (g) (4) requiring at least two fire protection personnel to remain located outside the IDLH (Immediate Danger to Life or Health) atmosphere to perform rescue of the fire protection personnel inside the IDLH atmosphere. One of the outside fire protection personnel must actively monitor the status of the inside fire protection personnel and not be assigned other duties. NFPA 1500 8.8.7 At least one dedicated RIC shall be standing by with equipment to provide for the rescue of members that are performing special operations or for members that are in positions that present an immediate danger of injury in the event of equipment failure or collapse.

U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration Respiratory Protection Standard, CFR 1910.134 (g) (4); Texas Commission on Fire Protection Standards §435.17 – Procedures for Interior Structure Fire Fighting (2-in/2-out rule) NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, Chapter 8, 2007 ed. NFPA 1720 Standard on Organization and Deployment Fire Suppression Operations by Volunteer Fire Departments, 2004 ed.  

FINDING 5

The interior team and Incident Commander did not verify the correct operation of communications equipment before entering the IDLH atmosphere and subsequently did not maintain communications between the interior crew and Command. Although Chief Barnett stated he communicated with Captain Cano, there was no contact with Captain Araguz.

Recommendation: Fire Departments should develop written policies requiring the verification of the correct operations of communications equipment of each firefighter before crews enter an IDLH atmosphere. Fire Departments should also include training for their members on the operation of communications equipment in zero visibility conditions.

U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration Respiratory Protection Standard, CFR 1910.134(g)(3)(ii) NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, Chapter 8, 2007 ed.

 

FINDING 6

The interior operating crew did not practice effective air management techniques for the size and complexity of the structure. Interviews indicate the crew expended breathing air while attempting to breach an exterior wall for approximately 10 minutes, then advanced a hose line into a 15,000 square feet room without monitoring their air supply. During interviews Captain Cano estimated his consumption limit at 15 – 20 minutes on a 45 minute SCBA.

Recommendation: Crews operating in IDLH atmospheres must monitor their air consumption rates and allot for sufficient evacuation time. Known as the point of no return, it is that time at which the remaining operation time of the SCBA is equal to the time necessary to return safely to a non-hazardous atmosphere. The three basic elements to effective air management are:

  • Know your point of no return (beyond 50 percent of the air supply of the team member with the lowest gauge reading).
  • Know how much air you have at all times.
  • Make a conscious decision to stay or leave when your air is down to 50 percent.

IFSTA [2008]. Essentials of Fire Fighting and Fire Department Operations, 5th ed., Chapter 5, Air Management, page 189 Fundamentals of Firefighter Skills, 2nd edition, NFPA and International Association of Fire Chiefs, Chapter 17, Fire Fighter Survival.

 

Finding 7

Captains Araguz and Cano became separated from their hoseline. While it is unclear as to the reason they became separated from the hose line, interviews with Captain Cano indicate that while he was finding an exterior wall and took actions to alert the exterior by banging and kicking the wall, he lost contact with Captain Araguz.

**Captain Cano credits his survival to the actions he learned from recent Mayday, Firefighter Safety training.

Recommendation: Maintaining contact with the hose line is critical. Losing contact with the hose line meant leaving the only lifeline and pathway to safety. Team integrity provides an increased chance for survival. All firefighters should become familiar with and receive training on techniques for survival and self-rescue.

United States Fire Administration’s National Fire Academy training course “Firefighter Safety: Calling the Mayday” Fundamentals of Firefighter Skills, 2nd edition, NFPA and International Association of Fire Chiefs, Chapter 17, Fire Fighter Survival.

Additional References Related to Surviving the Mayday and RIT operations from 2011 Safety Week at CommandSafety.com;

Day One: Fire/EMS Safety, Health & Survival Week 2011: Day One- Are You Ready?

Day Two: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Two- Building Knowledge = Fire Fighter Safety

Day Three: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Three-The New Rules of Engagement

Day Four: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Four -The New Fire Ground

Day Five: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011: Day Five: Near-Misses, Maydays and Floor Collapses

Day Six: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011, Day Six; From Waldbaum’s to Hackensack-Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety

Day Seven: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011, Day Seven; Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Training and Preparedness

Day Eight Plus One: Mayday and Rapid Intervention Realities: The Phoenix Perspective

188 Days of Opportunity to make a Difference: Surviving the Fire Ground

Other Links:

Posted by on July 4, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Collapse, command-leadership, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Crew Integrity, Crew Management, Fire Fighter Safety, Fire Suppression, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, fires, LODD, NIOSH Reports, Reports, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, thecompanyofficer.com • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Mayday and Rapid Intervention Realities: The Phoenix Perspective

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Southwest Supermarket Fire March 14, 2001

This year’s Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week focused on Surviving the Fire Ground: Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness. One of the major objectives of this year’s theme was addressing a variety of functional areas for the Mayday event. For many of you, the conditions, outcome and lessons learned from the Southwest Supermarket Fire, maydays and the Line of Duty Death of Phoenix (AZ) firefighter Bret Tarver in 2001 are as fresh today as they were ten years ago and certainly as relevant as when many of us first read the Final Report issued by the Phoenix FD.

However, to many others in the Fire Service the Bret Tarver LODD and the Southwest Supermarket fire along with the lessons learned that were identified and the research that was instituted may not have made it onto your radar screen. In this the final days of the 2011 Fire/EMS Safety week, it is very appropriate to provide some insights on this mayday event and more importantly provide you with the opportunty to learn from the past, to understand operational parameters, capabilites, fallacies, misconceptions and limitations when we talk about Mayday, RIT and FAST activities and operational deployments.

Here’s an overview of the event;

On March 14, 2001 the Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department lost firefighter Brett Tarver at the Southwest Supermarket fire.

In that event, it was 5:00 in the afternoon, the grocery store was full of people and fire was extending through the building. Phoenix E14 was assigned to the interior of the structure to complete the search, get any people out, and attempt to confine the rapidly spreading fire to the rear of the structure. Shortly after completing their primary search of the building the Captain decided it was time to get out. Tarver and the other members of Engine 14 were exiting the building when Tarver and his partner got lost.

The engineer (driver) was leading the group following the attack line they had brought into the supermarket fire, followed by Tarver and his partner, with the company officer being the last person to begin the long crawl out of the smoke filled structure. At some point Tarver and his partner got off the hose line and moved deeper in the supermarket fire away from their only exit. Early on during the exit attempt through maze like conditions Tarver and his partner basically turned left instead of right. Not knowing this the company officer continued to crawl out of the building thinking his whole crew was ahead of him on the attack line. Tarver and his partner crawled deeper into the fire occupancy eventually ending up in the butcher shop area where they eventually became separated.

Based on radio reports of deteriorating conditions inside the building from E14 and other companies the Incident Commander (IC) considered a switch to a defensive strategy and started the process of pulling all crews out of the structure. During this process Tarver radioed the IC telling him that he was lost in the back of the building. The IC deployed two companies as Rapid Intervention Crews (RICs) through the front access point to no avail.
Other companies coming to their rescue through the back room area of the supermarket later rescued Tarver’s partner. After several unsuccessful rescue attempts, Tarver succumbed to carbon monoxide poisoning from the acrid smoke and was eventually removed from the building as a full code. Trying to remove the 260-pound firefighter was nearly impossible for rescue team members. Outside, the resuscitation efforts failed.

During the rescue efforts there were more than twelve (12) mayday’s issued by firefighters trying to make the rescue. On this tragic day, one other firefighter (attempting to rescue Tarver) was removed in respiratory arrest and was later resuscitated by fire department paramedics on the scene.

Over the next year (The Recovery), the department systematically reviewed its standard operating procedures and fireground operational activities at the strategic (command), tactical (sector) and task (company) levels of the entire organization in an attempt to prevent such a tragic event from ever happening again to the Phoenix Fire Department. One of the many significant questions that was asked was why didn’t the rapid intervention concept work? Immediately after the fire the Phoenix Fire Department reviewed its Rapid Intervention and Mayday standard operating procedures (SOPs). Based on drills, training and the data acquired through those drills, in the year following the incident the standard concept of a rapid intervention is now being challenged.

It is now evident that rapid intervention isn’t rapid. (Reference: Excerpts from the original article by Steve Kreis and FireTimes.com, LLC. http://www.firetimes.com/printStory.asp?FragID=8399 )

In the wake of the 2001 Southwest Supermarket Fire and LODD of FF Brett Tarver, the Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department issued a comprehensive report of the incident and the lessons learned and research conducted by the FD.

Beyond 2011 Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week; Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Training and Preparedness

  • If you have never heard about the Southwest Supermarket Fire and the Bret Tarver LODD and incident and never read the report;
    • take the time to do so and understand that the concepts of RIT and FAST are made up of far more elements, considerations and more importantly realities of what you think you can do versus what you may actually be able to do.
    • if you’ve read it in the [past], take a few minutes to review and refresh;
    • see where your organization, department and RIT/FAST training and capabilities are today-
    • what are the capabilities of your fire fighters, officers and commanders?
  • Take a look at the NIOSH report and the recommendations contained; how does your deparment stack up today?
  • After reading the reports, take a close look at your organization, your personnel and your training and your capabilities and
  • ask yourself if you are truly able to perform the necessary RIT/FAST operations or
  • do you have a ways to go to better prepare, train and ensure you’re able to undertake the job and address the fireground survival needs when a mayday is called.
  • did you take the time during this safety week to make some progress, identify some new insights, gaps or renewed interests and desire to enhance on your capabilities and strengths?
  • Are your Mayday, RIT and FAST capabilites, skills and knowledge better today in 2011 than they were in 2001?

 

References:

The following is an article piece posted by my good friend Mike Ward and posted a number of years ago from www.thewatchdesk.com written by: Mike Ward

Rapid Intervention Reality – from Phoenix
 

Subject: Rapid Intervention Reality Check By Michael Ward   

The Phoenix Fire Department’s Deployment Committee has a sobering message to their firefighters operating in large buildings, like a 7,500 square foot warehouse: “If you extend an attack line 150′, get 40 feet off the line and then run out of air, it will take us 22 minutes to get you out of the structure.” The lesson to remember is not to get off the fire attack line.  The statement is based on 200 rapid intervention drills conducted by PFD as part of their recovery process after Firefighter/paramedic Brett Tarver  died in the March 14, 2001 Southwest Supermarket fire.

PFD obtained three vacant commercial buildings: a warehouse, a movie theatre and a country-western bar. The RIT drill was for the first alarm companies to respond to a report of two firefighters in trouble. One is disoriented and the other one is unconscious. The buildings were sealed from outside light and the facemasks were obscured to simulate heavy smoke conditions. The RIT teams were equipped and deployed as if this is was a working fire. The department ran through about 200 RIT drills with 1144 PFD firefighters participating. Their activities were monitored and timed. An Arizona State University statistician analyzed the data.

The results show that rapid intervention is not rapid:

  • Rescue crew ready state 2.50 minutes
  • Mayday to RIC entry 3.03 minutes
  • RIC contact with downed firefighter 5.82 minutes
  • Total time inside building for each RIC team 12.33 minutes
  • Total time for rescue 21 minutes

The evolutions also revealed three consistent ratios:

  • It takes 12 firefighters to rescue one
  • One in five RIC members will get into some type of trouble themselves.
  • A 3000-psi SCBA bottle has 18.7 minutes of air (plus or minus 30%)
     

The results of the RIC drills reflects the experience Phoenix had during the efforts to rescue Firefighter/paramedic Brett Tarver. There were a dozen maydays sounded during the rescue effort, and one PFD firefighter was removed from the supermarket in respiratory arrest.

The Phoenix experience is not unique. Houston Fire Chief Chris Connealy participated in a discussion about the Phoenix RIC drills during the 2003 Change in the Fire Service Symposium. On October 13, 2001, Houston Engine 2 Captain Jay Jahnke died on the fifth floor of Four Leaf Towers, a 41 story residential high-rise. During the Houston RIC operation, two heavy rescue company firefighters became disoriented, low on air and had to rescue themselves. An engine company captain and firefighter run out of air and collapsed on the fire floor. Chief Connealy said that the Houston experience is similar to Phoenix.

Phoenix is changing its approach to rapid intervention crews in three procedural ways: increase suppression units assigned to RIC, increased in command officers, and considering a two-part RIC process.

There is a scalar approach to RIC dispatch assignments in Phoenix. For a “3-1 Assignment” (three engines and one ladder), a fourth engine and an ems transport (rescue) is added to the assignment to function as the rapid intervention team. For a 1st alarm assignment, two engines, one ladder, one rescue and a battalion chief are the RIC team. A second alarm includes an additional two engines and ladder for RIC. Beyond a second alarm, the incident commander can call additional companies as needed.

The recovery process also looked at the utilization of company and command officers on the fireground. A company officer core competency is to command a fire company. A core chief officer competency is to command fire companies. It is a function of the fire department hierarchical structure, not of personality.  For example, a captain filling-in as a battalion chief does a better job as a West Sector officer than she would have if she was commanding Engine 2 AND in charge of West Sector. At the sector level of the incident management system, company officers are required to wear two hats. There are too many levels of tasks. Phoenix suggests that it would be more effective to send more command officers to a fire event to function as sector and division commanders and allow the company officers to command their companies. It is a waste of talent and experience to allow command officers to stay in their fire stations while a low-frequency, high risk event like a structure fire is occurring
in the city.

A third change in rapid intervention crews is using a two-phase approach.  Many of the RIC team members ran out of air during the training evolutions.  The drills showed that a 3000-psi SCBA bottle was good for 13.09 to 24.31 minutes of air. The average SCBA time was 18.7 minutes. The average time from mayday to removal was 21 minutes. RIC teams were running out of air during the firefighter removal phase. In addition, it was taking a crew of 12 firefighters to remove one firefighter. Phase one of a RIC response is to send a team in to locate the firefighters in trouble. Once located, a second RIC team enters to remove the firefighter.

You are welcome to share this with everyone. Please include the following: taken from www.thewatchdesk.com written by:
Michael Ward, Fire Science Program Head, Northern Virginia Community College.  

 

 Other recent postings and references from CommandSafety.com

Day One: Fire/EMS Safety, Health & Survival Week 2011: Day One- Are You Ready?

Day Two: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Two- Building Knowledge = Fire Fighter Safety

Day Three: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Three-The New Rules of Engagement

Day Four: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Four -The New Fire Ground

Day Five: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011: Day Five: Near-Misses, Maydays and Floor Collapses

Day Six: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011, Day Six; From Waldbaum’s to Hackensack-Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety

Day Seven: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011, Day Seven; Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Training and Preparedness

Posted by on June 25, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Fire Fighter Safety, Fire Suppression, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, History Repeating Event, leadership, LODD, major-incidents • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011, Days One thru Seven;Training and Preparedness

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Did you remember to participate in the 2011 Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week?

The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) and the International Association of Fire Fighters(IAFF) were formative in developing this year’s  2011 Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week (also known as Safety Week)which commences today, June 19th and ends on June 25th. ( Week of June 19-25, 2011)

The message this year is: Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness

Safety, Health and Survival Week (Safety Week) is a collaborative program sponsored by the IAFC and the IAFF, coordinated by the IAFC’s Safety, Health and Survival Section and the IAFF’s Division of Occupational Health, Safety and Medicine, in partnership with more than 20 national fire and emergency service organizations.

We’ve got a whole lot of resources, links and daily commentary and articles that were posted on each day of SAfety Week over at CommandSafety.com

If you didn’t have a look and read, take some time to do so. If you didn’t do anything during Safety Week, there’s always next week or the week after… find the time and commit to some training, insights, dialog, discussion…Get Prepared.

Day One: Fire/EMS Safety, Health & Survival Week 2011: Day One- Are You Ready?

Day Two: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Two- Building Knowledge = Fire Fighter Safety

Day Three: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Three-The New Rules of Engagement

Day Four: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Four -The New Fire Ground

Day Five: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011: Day Five: Near-Misses, Maydays and Floor Collapses

Day Six: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011, Day Six; From Waldbaum’s to Hackensack-Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety

Day Seven: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011, Day Seven; Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Training and Preparedness

Posted by on June 24, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Fire Fighter Safety, Health and Safety, LODD • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

SFFD Firefighter Memorials and Updates

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More details emerged Monday about last week’s fatal Diamond Heights blaze, as fire officials said an emergency alert accidentally went off on a nearby fire engine about the same time two firefighters’ personal alarms sounded inside the burning building according to published reports.

Lt. Vincent Perez, 48, and firefighter-paramedic Anthony Valerio, 53, of Engine Company 26 both died from injuries they suffered while battling a blaze at a four-story home at 133 Berkeley Way on Thursday morning.

While fighting the fire, one or both of Valerio and Perez’s personal alert safety system devices went off.  Around the same time, a firefighter on Engine Company 20 — which had yet to arrive on the scene — had inadvertently hit the emergency button on the engine.

Firefighter memorials

A joint funeral for fire Lt. Vincent Perez and firefighter-paramedic Anthony Valerio will be held at 12:30 p.m. Friday at St. Mary’s Cathedral, 1111 Gough St. in San Francisco. A vigil for the two men will be held at 7 p.m. Thursday, also at St. Mary’s.

San Francisco Fire Fighters Local 798 has established trust accounts at the San Francisco Fire Credit Union for the families of Perez and Valerio. Donations can be made to SFFCU, 3201 California St., San Francisco, CA 94118.

Condolence messages can be sent to Fire Station 26, 80 Digby St., San Francisco, CA 94131.

Posted by on June 7, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, company officer, Fire Dynamics, Fire Fighting, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, fires, in-the-line-of-duty, LODD, major-incidents, Residential, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

San Francisco FD mourns the loss of a Second Firefighter LODD After Diamond Heights Fire

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SFFD Firefighter Anthony Valerio

It’s being reported that San Francisco Fire Fighter Anthony Valerio passed away this morning as a result of injuries sustained while operating the Diamond Heights fire on Thursday June 2nd. This becomes the second line of duty death from this incident that also resulted in the LODD of Lt. Vincent Perez. Anthony “Tony” Valerio, a 53-year-old firefighter and paramedic critically injured in the Thursday blaze, died at San Francisco General Hospital at about 7:40 a.m., city officials said.

Read more: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/06/04/BA2F1JPNS2.DTL#ixzz1OKjGjnNs

San Francisco firefighter Anthony Valerio is the second firefighter to die from Thursday’s Diamond Heights fire. According to San Francisco Fire Chief Joanne Hayes-White, Valerio had “significant damage to his respiratory system” and burns across his body after Thursday’s fire. Valerio has burns to 12 percent of his body.

WKGO TV ABC7 reports that according to San Francisco Fire Deputy Chief Mike Gardner said most of Fire Fighter Valerio’s burns were from steam and not from fire, adding that the temperature inside the structure was between 500 and 700 degrees.

Previous Coverage, HERE, HERE and HERE

  • Logs show desperate hunt for doomed SF firefighters, HERE

    • 

Read more: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/06/03/BAJG1JPBKV.DTL#ixzz1OKn7vgot

Updated Sunday June 5

  

San Francisco’s fire chief says this is the first time in her 21 years with the department that two firefighters have died in the same fire.

Slowly and silently, Valerio’s body was wheeled to an awaiting van; the silence finally broken by the rain and his family’s tears. The pain hung in the air outside San Francisco General Hospital – a place that became a gathering spot for the hopeful. Valerio’s family and friends had been there around the clock since Thursday. Valerio and Perez were rushed to the hospital after the two were found unresponsive inside a burning house in Diamond Heights – a sudden blast knocked them down. Perez died late Thursday. From Reports published by WKGO-TV ABC 7 ; “It is particularly difficult, you’re mourning the loss of one and then to have another one very close from the same fire is challenging,” said San Francisco Fire Chief Joanne Hayes-White.

Saturday was the first time Valerio’s doctors gave details about the uphill battle the 53-year-old faced – including the fact that he was in cardiac arrest the moment he arrived at SF General.

“Between all the injuries he had from the initial blast, the smoke inhalation, the fact that he had a really bad lung injury, which was precipitated by what happened on the scene, but we try to do everything we can,” said SF General Hospital Dr. Andre Campbell.

But in the end it wasn’t enough. On this day, the firefighter’s two families, his work family at Station 26 and his immediate family – realized Valerio’s 40 hour long fight to survive was over.

The fire department and the families have agreed to have a joint funeral for both Tony Valerio and Lt. Perez on Friday at Saint Mary’s Cathedral.

Lt. Vincent Perez, San Francisco FD
Firefighter Anthony Valerio  

  

From Thursday

Previous postings from Commandsafety.com;

Courtesy Patty Stanton

Courtesy Patty Stanton

Courtesy Patty Stanton

Updates from San Francisco;

Charlie Side

Charlie Side, Fire Extending

Alpha Street Side from Google Streets

Aerial Charlie Side

Coincidentially, we posted a remembrance to the DCFD Cherry Road Townhouse Fire and Double FireFighter LODD from May, 1999 that is worth another look as it has similar connotations related to fire behavior, flashover conditions and multiple floor level construction factors during initial fire suppression operations, HERE

Posted by on June 4, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Crew Integrity, Fire Dynamics, Fire Fighter Safety, Fire Fighting, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, fires, line-of-duty, LODD • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Combat Ready and the Fire Service Warrior on Taking it to the Streets

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Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum

Join in on Tuesday May 17th at 9pm ET for another special and exciting program continuing our series discussion on the Emerging Tactical Renaissance in the Fire Service.

Taking it to the StreetsTM, radio program hosted by highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer Christopher Naum, continues to provide provocative insights and dynamic discussions with leading national fire service leaders and guests on important issues affecting the American Fire Service with applications internationally within the tradition and brotherhood of the Fire Service.
This edition of Taking it to the StreetsTM the program is all about being COMBAT READY and THE FIRE SERVICE WARRIOR
Joining the program will be special guest, Christopher Brennan the author of The Combat Position: Achieving Firefighter Readiness, published by PennWell Books and the author of the notable blogsite, The Fire Service Warrior.

Christopher Brennan

Christopher Brennan is a firefighter in the suburbs outside Chicago; a field instructor for the Illinois Fire Service Institute; and a consultant for local, state, and federal agencies.

He joined the fire service in 1997 as a paid-on-call member of the Calumet Park (IL) Fire Department.

During his career, Chris has worked for the Calumet Park Fire Department, part-time for the Darien-Woodridge (IL) Fire Protection District, and as a career firefighter and engineer with the Harvey (IL) Fire Department.Chris is an active instructor teaching for the Illinois Fire Service Institute, has taught terrorism response training overseas, and has been an instructor for FDIC.

He is a member of the International Association of Fire Fighters, the International Society of Fire Service Instructors, and the Illinois Society of Fire Service Instructors.

He is also the author of numerous articles for fire service magazines, including Fire Engineering.

Join in on what is certainly going to be an insightful look and discussion of the path of the fire service warrior.

Discussions on what is meant by embracing the philosophy of the fire service warrior, and striving for the ready position—the synthesis of physical and mental readiness that allows for suggested optimum fireground performance— and its potential application towards reducing firefighter injuries and fatalities

We’ll further explore how as Christopher Brennan states; “Today’s firefighter must be a warrior who will unflinchingly put his very life in harm’s way to accomplish a mission, but who is also fully informed about the path being chosen”.

LINKS

  • Surviving on the Fireground: Chris Brennan Talks Situational Awareness at FDIC 2011, HERE
  • A Culture of Excellence – Christopher Brennan , HERE
  • The Fire Service Warrior Blog, HERE

The Combat Position

The Combat Position: Achieving Firefighter Readiness, PennWell Books, HERE

Firefighting is combat and should be viewed as a warrior’s calling.

Firefighters put themselves in harm’s way to protect others, a selflessness rooted in the same noble drive as the military warriors who defend our nation.

This book about combat is meant to be a guide for those who seek to follow a warrior’s path, the path of the fire service warrior.

Today’s firefighter must be a warrior who will unflinchingly put his very life in harm’s way to accomplish a mission, but who is also fully informed about the path being chosen.

Embracing the philosophy of the fire service warrior, and striving for the ready position—the synthesis of physical and mental readiness that allows for optimum fireground performance—can reduce firefighter injuries and fatalities.

The Combat Position: Achieving Firefighter Readiness will be an invaluable tool for firefighters, company officers, chief officers, and instructors.

 

Grab a cup of coffee and sit down for a special one hour program with Taking it to the Streets on FirefighterNetcast.com where we’ll be discussing developing concepts, methodologies and operational perspectives affecting today’s emerging and evolving fire ground operation with Christopher Naum and this emerging fire service leader.

Join in on the live open discussion with other fire service personnel from around the country.

Taking it to the StreetsTM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by nationally renowned fire service leader Christopher Naum, a 36-year fire service veteran and highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer and the distinguished leading national authority on building construction and fire ground operations. Taking it to the StreetsTM is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production, © 2011 All Rights Reserved

Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.

  • Tune in to the Program Tuesday evening May 17th at 9:00 pm ET, HERE
  • Firefighternetcast.com HERE
  • Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE
  • Buildingsonfire.com, HERE
Posted by on May 14, 2011 • Filed under: Attitude, christopher naum, command-leadership, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Culture, Fire Fighter Safety, Fire Fighting, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, Fitness, leadership, Professional Development, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Situational Awareness, skills, Strategy and Tactics, Taking it to the Streets, thecompanyofficer.com, Tradition, training, training-development • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Tactical Patience and New Considerations of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction

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Tactical Patience and the New Considerations of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction

UL Ventilation and Fire Behavior Full Scale Testing

 

Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction

For many of you that have been following my writings and perspectives on building construction, firefighting, command risk management and operational excellence for firefighter safety have long recognized that I have been promoting and advocating the fact the fireground is changining, our stratgies and tactics demand change adn does the demand for increased knowledge within the areas of building construction, fire dynamics, while integrating the art and science of firefighting. The most recent release of the testing report from Underwriters Laboratories; Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction and the accompaning emphirical data further validates assumptions and presmises that many of us shared based upon field obervations and first hand incident operations related to the dramatic changes being witnessed as a result of operational challenges in a wide varity of occupanies and building types.

This material is a must read for all emerging and practicing company and command officers ( for starters) to being grasping the magnitude and extent of quantifiable data that supports the premise that combat fire engagement and suppression operations and the rules of engagement are going to change and that change is fast approaching.

 Considerations for Tactical Patience and Adaptive Fireground Management are continued themes I will expand upon in future postings….

Here’s the executive summary of the report and findings from UL. For an download of the entire UL Report, go HERE.

Under the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Assistance to Firefighter Grant Program, Underwriters Laboratories examined fire service ventilation practices as well as the impact of changes in modern house geometries.  There has been a steady change in the residential fire environment over the past several decades.  These changes include larger homes, more open floor plans and volumes and increased synthetic fuel loads.  This series of experiments examine this change in fire behavior and the impact on firefighter ventilation tactics.  This fire research project developed the empirical data that is needed to quantify the fire behavior associated with these scenarios and result in immediately developing the necessary firefighting ventilation practices to reduce firefighter death and injury.

Two houses were constructed in the large fire facility of Underwriters Laboratories in Northbrook, IL.  The first of two houses constructed was a one-story, 1200 ft2, 3 bedroom, 1 bathroom house with 8 total rooms.  The second house was a two-story 3200 ft2, 4 bedroom, 2.5 bathroom house with 12 total rooms.  The second house featured a modern open floor plan, two-story great room and open foyer.   Fifteen experiments were conducted varying the ventilation locations and the number of ventilation openings.  Ventilation scenarios included ventilating the front door only, opening the front door and a window near and remote from the seat of the fire, opening a window only and ventilating a higher opening in the two-story house.  One scenario in each house was conducted in triplicate to examine repeatability.

The results of these experiments provide knowledge for the fire service for them to examine their thought processes, standard operating procedures and training content.  Several tactical considerations were developed utilizing the data from the experiments to provide specific examples of changes that can be adopted based on a departments current strategies and tactics.

Under the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Assistance to Firefighter Grant Program, Underwriters Laboratories examined fire service ventilation practices as well as the impact of changes in modern house geometries.

There has been a steady change in the residential fire environment over the past several decades. These changes include larger homes, more open floor plans and volumes and increased synthetic fuel loads. This series of experiments examine this change in fire behavior and the impact on firefighter ventilation tactics.

This fire research project developed the empirical data that is needed to quantify the fire behavior associated with these scenarios and result in immediately developing the necessary firefighting ventilation practices to reduce firefighter death and injury.

  • Two houses were constructed in the large fire facility of Underwriters Laboratories in Northbrook, IL.
  • The first of two houses constructed was a one-story, 1200 ft2, 3 bedroom, 1 bathroom house with 8 total rooms.
  • The second house was a two-story 3200 ft2, 4 bedroom, and 2.5 bathroom house with 12 total rooms.
  • The second house featured a modern open floor plan, two story great room and open foyer.

 Fifteen experiments were conducted varying the ventilation locations and the number of ventilation openings. Ventilation scenarios included ventilating the front door only, opening the front door and a window near and remote from the seat of the fire, opening a window only and ventilating a higher opening in the two-story house.

One scenario in each house was conducted in triplicate to examine repeatability. The results of these experiments provide knowledge for the fire service for them to examine their thought processes, standard operating procedures and training content. Several tactical considerations were developed utilizing the data from the experiments to provide specific examples of changes that can be adopted based on a departments current strategies and tactics.

The tactical considerations addressed include:

  • Stages of fire development: The stages of fire development change when a fire becomes ventilation limited.
    • It is common with today’s fire environment to have a decay period prior to flashover which emphasizes the importance of ventilatio
  • Forcing the front door is ventilation: Forcing entry has to be thought of as ventilation as well.
    • While forcing entry is necessary to fight the fire it must also trigger the thought that air is being fed to the fire and the clock is ticking before either the fire gets extinguished or it grows until an untenable condition exists jeopardizing the safety of everyone in the structure.
  • No smoke showing: A common event during the experiments was that once the fire became ventilation limited the smoke being forced out of the gaps of the houses greatly diminished or stopped all together.
    • No some showing during size-up should increase awareness of the potential conditions inside.
  • Coordination: If you add air to the fire and don’t apply water in the appropriate time frame the fire gets larger and safety decreases.
    • Examining the times to untenability gives the best case scenario of how coordinated the attack needs to be.
    • Taking the average time for every experiment from the time of ventilation to the time of the onset of firefighter untenability conditions yields 100 seconds for the one-story house and 200 seconds for the two-story house
    • In many of the experiments from the onset of firefighter untenability until flashover was less than 10 seconds.
    • These times should be treated as being very conservative. If a vent location already exists because the homeowner left a window or door open then the fire is going to respond faster to additional ventilation opening because the temperatures in the house are going to be higher.
    • Coordination of fire attack crew is essential for a positive outcome in today’s fire environment.
  • Smoke tunneling and rapid air movement through the front door: Once the front door is opened attention should be given to the flow through the front door.
    • A rapid in rush of air or a tunneling effect could indicate a ventilation limited fire.
  • Vent Enter Search (VES): During a VES operation, primary importance should be given to closing the door to the room.
    • This eliminates the impact of the open vent and increases tenability for potential occupants and firefighters while the smoke ventilates from the now isolated room.
  • Flow paths: Every new ventilation opening provides a new flow path to the fire and vice versa.
    • This could create very dangerous conditions when there is a ventilation limited fire.
  • Can you vent enough?: In the experiments where multiple ventilation locations were made it was not possible to create fuel limited fires.
    • The fire responded to all the additional air provided.
    • That means that even with a ventilation location open the fire is still ventilation limited and will respond just as fast or faster to any additional air.
    • It is more likely that the fire will respond faster because the already open ventilation location is allowing the fire to maintain a higher temperature than if everything was closed. In these cases rapid fire progression if highly probable and coordination of fire attack with ventilation is paramount.
  • Impact of shut door on occupant tenability and firefighter tenability: Conditions in every experiment for the closed bedroom remained tenable for temperature and oxygen concentration thresholds.
    • This means that the act of closing a door between the occupant and the fire or a firefighter and the fire can increase the chance of survivability.
    • During firefighter operations if a firefighter is searching ahead of a hoseline or becomes separated from his crew and conditions deteriorate then a good choice of actions would be to get in a room with a closed door until the fire is knocked down or escape out of the room’s window with more time provided by the closed door
  • Potential impact of open vent already on flashover time: All of these experiments were designed to examine the first ventilation actions by an arriving crew when there are no ventilation openings.
    • It is possible that the fire will fail a window prior to fire department arrival or that a door or window was left open by the occupant while exiting.
    • It is important to understand that an already open ventilation location is providing air to the fire, allowing it to sustain or grow.
  • Pushing fire: There were no temperature spikes in any of the rooms, especially the rooms adjacent to the fire room when water was applied from the outside. It appears that in most cases the fire was slowed down by the water application and that external water application had no negative impacts to occupant survivability.
    • While the fog stream “pushed” steam along the flow path there was no fire “pushed”.
  • No damage to surrounding rooms: Just as the fire triangle depicts, fire needs oxygen to burn.
    • A condition that existed in every experiment was that the fire (living room or family room) grew until oxygen was reduced below levels to sustain it.
    • This means that it decreased the oxygen in the entire house by lowering the oxygen in surrounding rooms and the more remote bedrooms until combustion was not possible.
    • In most cases surrounding rooms such as the dining room and kitchen had no fire in them even when the fire room was fully involved in flames and was ventilating out of the structure.

Online Training Program

In order to make the results of this study more user friendly for the fire service to examine, UL developed an online interactive training module that can be viewed by clicking here.  The program includes a professionally narrated description of all of the experiments, their results and the tactical considerations.  Experimental video is used and graphical data is explained in a way that brings science to the street level firefighter.

UL University On-Line CBT

 

Comparison of Modern and Legacy Home Furnishings

An experiment was conducted with two side by side living room fires.   The purpose was to gain knowledge on the difference between modern and legacy furnishings.  The rooms measured 12 ft by 12 ft, with an 8 ft ceiling and had an 8 ft wide by 7 ft tall opening on the front wall.  Both rooms contained similar amounts of like furnishings.

The modern room was lined with a layer of ½ inch painted gypsum board and the floor was covered with carpet and padding.

  • The furnishings included a microfiber covered polyurethane foam filled sectional sofa, engineered wood coffee table, end table, television stand and book case.
  • The sofa had a polyester throw placed on its right side.  The end table had a lamp with polyester shade on top of it and a wicker basket inside it.
  • The coffee table had six color magazines, a television remote and a synthetic plant on it.
  • The television stand had a color magazine and a 37 inch flat panel television.
  • The book case had two small plastic bins, two picture frames and two glass vases on it.
  • The right rear corner of the room had a plastic toy bin, a plastic toy tub and four stuffed toys.
  • The rear wall had polyester curtains hanging from a metal rod and the side walls had wood framed pictures hung on them.

The legacy room was lined with a layer of ½ inch painted cement board and the floor was covered with unfinished hardwood flooring.

  • The furnishings included a cotton covered, cotton batting filled sectional sofa, solid wood coffee table, two end tables, and television stand.
  • The sofa had a cotton throw placed on its right side.
  • Both end tables had a lamp with polyester shade on top of them.
  • The one on the left side of the sofa had two paperback books on it.
  • A wicker basket was located on the floor in front of the right side of the sofa at the floor level.
  • The coffee table had three hard-covered books, a television remote and a synthetic plant on it.
  • The television stand had a 27 inch tube television.
  • The right front corner of the room had a wood toy bin, and multiple wood toys.
  • The rear wall had cotton curtains hanging from a metal rod and the side walls had wood framed pictures hung on them.

Both rooms were ignited by placing a lit stick candle on the right side of the sofa.  The fires were allowed to grow until flashover.  The modern room transitioned to flashover in 3 minutes and 30 seconds and the legacy room at 29 minutes and 30 seconds.

View the entire video, or you may also download the video:

Posted by on May 1, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Fire Dynamics, Fire Fighter Safety, firefighting-operations, Research • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Survivability Profiling: Taking it to the Streets

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Live Online April 20th at 9pm ET

Live and Online Taking it to the Streets with your host Christopher Naum will present another timely and insightful look at an emerging element of today’s evolving fire ground.
 
 
Join in on Wednesday April 20th at 9pm ET for a very special and exciting program discussing the concepts and theory of Survivability Profiling.
 
Joing the program will be special guest, Captain Stephen Marsar, FDNY assigned to Engine Co. 8 in the Third Division, Manhattan, NYC.
Captain Marsar, FDNY has researched and developed insights into the theory and application of Survivability Profiling.
The Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Fire Administration announced on April 4 that Capt. Stephen Marsar, Engine 8, is one of three fire service executives from across the country who was selected to receive the National Fire Academy’s 2010 Annual Outstanding Research Award.

The award recognizes Executive Fire Officer Program students for exceptional research projects.

Capt. Marsar’s project, titled Can They Be Saved? Utilizing Civilian Survivability Profiling to Enhance Size-Up and Reduce Firefighter Fatalities in the Fire Department, City of New York, was selected as the Executive Leadership Course award winner. The National Fire Academy said it was chosen from among the more than 60 Applied Research Projects submitted this year, the highest number in the program’s 26-year history.

The Executive Fire Officer Program provides senior fire officers with information and education on various facets of fire administration. After a four-year course of study, participants are required to complete an applied research project that attempts to resolve a problem in their own organization.

View Capt. Marsar’s project: http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/pdf/efop/efo44310.pdf

Grab a cup of coffee and sit down for a special one hour program with Taking it to the Streets on FirefighterNetcast.com where we’ll be discussing the concept, research and application of Survivability Profiling with Captain Marsar and the manner in which it might be implemented in today’s emerging and evolving fire ground operational methodologies with Christopher Naum and this outstanding fire service leader.

Capt. Stephen Marsar, FDNY

STEPHEN MARSAR is a captain in the Fire Department of New York, covering in Engine Company 8 in Manhattan. He has previously served in Engine Company 16 and Ladder Companies 7 and 11. An ex-commissioner in the Bellmore (NY) Fire Department, he has certifications as a national and New York State fire instructor, NY instructor coordinator, and NY State Department of Health regional faculty member.

He serves on the adjunct faculty for the Nassau Community College, NY Fire Science Degree Program, and teaches for the FDNY and Nassau County, Long Island, Fire and EMS academies. He has a bachelor’s degree in fire science and emergency services administration and is enrolled in the Executive Fire Officer Program at the National Fire Academy.

Taking it to the StreetsTM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by Christopher Naum and is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production, © 2011 All Rights Reserved

Join in on the live open discussion with other fire service personnel from around the country. Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.

  • Tune in to the Program Wednesday evening April 20th at 9:00 pm ET, HERE
  • Firefighternetcast.com HERE
  • Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE
Posted by on April 16, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Crew Integrity, Crew Management, Fire Fighter Safety, Fire Suppression, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, Research, Risk Assessment, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics, Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Eleven Minutes to Mayday; What You Need to Know

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The Colerain Township (OH) Fire and EMS Department under the leadership of Director and Chief G. Bruce Smith released its final report Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths related to the April 4, 2008 Double Line of Duty Death of a Captain and Firefighter in April 2010 coinciding with the two year anniversary of the event.

This investigative analysis and report, although specific to the events and conditions encountered during the conduct of operation at the residential occupancy at 5708 Squirrelsnest Lane has pertinent and relevant insights, recommendations and factors that all Fire Service personnel, regardless of rank should read.

I recently lectured on this incident and the lessons learned at a regional seminar on occupancy profiling and tactical operations, which resulted in significant discussions and dialog pertaining not only to this event but also to the adverse trend and series of  incidents reported nationally in the later part of 2010 and early into 2011 related to comprised or collapsed floor systems and a number of firefighter close calls. There continues to be a number of prevailing philosphies and points of view related to the level of fire ground aggressiveness, tactical patience and level of preparedness demanded on today’s fire ground. I’ve previously posted some insights on these events and these points of view on our Commandsafety.com site and other eMedia sites.

There still appears to be so much that needs to said; lectured, taught, reinforced or just plain introduced to get company and command officers “insightful” into the operational issues affecting modern fire suppression theory, methodologies, operational safety at basement fires or lower elevation fires, compromise and collapse situational awareness, being combat ready during the response and into arrival sequencing and being able to read the building  and fire more effectively and accurately.

I recently had the honor to facilitated an insightful radio program on Taking it to the Streets related to a close-call resulting from a catastrophic and complete floor system collapse in a residential occpancy(HERE) during fire suppression operations and the lessons learned and insights from that event and its recording in the National Firefigher Near Miss Reporting System. Take the time to read about the event ( NMR Report #10-1072) or download the program.

There are tremendous lessons to be shared and learned from the Colerain Township incident, and its one of the required readings that all command and company officers should have on their radar screen (see Commandsafety.com, HERE)

This is one of those distinctive reports that has influential and critical operational, training and preparedness elements embedded throughout the report. Following my review of the report, having previously read the preliminary report findings, it is apparent there continues to be common threads shared by this and other events and incidents where a single of multiple firefighters have lost their lives due to similarities in the apparent and common cause deficiencies and short comings identified.

All company and command officers should read and comprehend the lessons learned. Then, take these new found insights and see what the gaps are at the personal level (yours or those you supervise) as well as the shift, group, station, battalion, division or department as a whole.

If there are gaps, then identify a way to implement timely changes as necessary so there are No History Repeating (HRE) events. Learn from these events….

Thank you to the firefighters, officers and leadership of the Colerain Township (OH) Fire and EMS Department for the comprehensive insights that this report provides and towards the promise that these lessons-learned may one day help a firefighter, crew, company or fire ground in their combat engagement and mission. Do not take any run or response for granted; be combat ready at all levels.

I have provided a comprehensive synopsis of the report for your review. Take the time to read the entire report, make the time to improve where you need to.  

On Friday, April 4, 2008 at 06:13:02 hours, what began as a routine response for Colerain Township Fire and EMS Engine 102 to investigate a fire alarm activation at 5708 Squirrels nest Lane, Colerain Township, Ohio resulted in the deaths of Colerain Township Captain Robin Broxterman and Firefighter Brian Schira.

Upon their arrival at the scene of the two-story wood framed, residential building working fire conditions existed in the basement. The initial attack team consisted of Broxterman, Schira, and one other firefighter. The team advanced a 1¾-inch attack hose line through the interior of the building for fire control.

Even though, they were provided with some of the most technologically advanced protective clothing for structural firefighting and self-contained breathing apparatus, it appeared that Broxterman and Schira were overwhelmed by severe fire conditions in the basement.

During their attempt to evacuate the building, the main-level family room flooring system in which the two were traveling on collapsed into the basement trapping the firefighters. Eleven minutes elapsed from time of arrival to the catastrophic chain of events.

The investigation of this incident provided a number of findings and recommendations that should be considered by Colerain’s fire department, as well as other fire department organizations. The examination encompassed issues that related to building construction, firefighting tactics, command and control, situational awareness, communications, training, firefighting equipment and the individual responsibility of firefighters of the Colerain Township Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services (Colerain Fire & EMS). In addition, a segment of the examination included a review of the individual and group affects following such an event, and the measures initiated that attempted to ensure individual, family and organizational wellness.

The following factors were believed to have directly contributed to the deaths of Captain Broxterman and Firefighter Schira:

  • A delayed arrival at the incident scene that allowed the fire to progress significantly;
  • A failure to adhere to fundamental firefighting practices; and
  • A failure to abide by fundamental firefighter self-rescue and survival concepts

Although the aforementioned factors were believed to have directly contributed to their deaths, they might have been prevented if:

  • Some personnel had not been complacent or apathetic in their initial approach to this incident;
  • Some personnel were in a proper state of mind that made them more observant of their surroundings and indicators;
  • The initial responding units were provided with all pertinent information in a
  • timely manner relative to the incident;
  • Personnel assigned to Engine 102 possessed a comprehensive knowledge of their first-due response area;
  • A 360-degree size-up of the building accompanied by a risk – benefit analysis
  • was conducted by the company officer prior to initiating interior fire suppression operations;
  • Comprehensive standard operating guidelines specifically related to structural
  • firefighting existed within the department;
  • The communications system users (on-scene firefighters and those monitoring the incident) weren’t all vying for limited radio air time;
  • The communications equipment and accessories utilized were more appropriate for the firefighting environment;
  • Certain tactical-level decisions and actions were based on the specific conditions;
  • Personnel had initiated fundamental measures to engage in if they were to become disoriented or trapped inside a burning building; and
  • Issued personal protective equipment was utilized in the correct manner.

Incident Reported

On Friday, April 4, 2008, at 06:11:23, the Hamilton County Communications Center (HCCC) received notification of an automatic alarm activation (smoke detector and carbon monoxide) at 5708 Squirrels nest Lane (LN).

  • An automatic fire alarm response complement of two engine companies (Engines 102 & 109), one ladder company (Ladder 25), and the Battalion Chief (District 25) were dispatched to investigate at 06:13:02.
  • At 06:13:43, a second notification was received from the female homeowner reporting a fire in the basement of the building.
  • At 06:20:43, a third notification by means of a cellular phone from the female homeowner to HCCC routed through the City of Cincinnati’s Fire and Police Communications Center was received.
  • At 06:22:41, the initial response complement was then upgraded to a building fire, also known as a structure fire response complement to include one additional engine company (Engine 25), one rescue company (Rescue 26), and one basic life support transport unit (Squad 25).

Property and Building Description: The building at 5708 Squirrels nest LN was a single-family residence that set back approximately 450-feet from the street at the end of a private driveway on a heavily wooded lot.

  • The building was two-stories in height, approximately 45-feet wide by 30-feet deep with a finished below-grade (basement) living space and attached two-car garage.
  • For simplicity, the report refers to the living space under the main-level of the building as a basement.
  • From the front (side Alpha), the building was two-stories above grade. The vertical distance between floors was approximately eight-feet. The exterior main entrance was located in the front middle of the building approximately one-foot above grade level.
  • Additional entrances to the first-floor living space were by means of a rear entry door from an upper-level deck area and through the garage area.
  • The interior stairway to the basement was located approximately 15-feet from the front main entry door towards the rear of the building. There were no exposed buildings on the adjacent sides of the fire building.

The building was located approximately 450-feet from the curb and a driveway leading to the front entrance. The nearest fire hydrant was located approximately 500- feet from the front entrance. To provide for uniform identification of locations and operationalforces at the incident scene, the scene was divided geographically into smaller parts, which were designated as sectors. Specific areas of the incident scene were designated as follows:

  • The side of the building that bears the postal address of the location was designated as Side Alpha or front by the Incident Commander;
  • The property sloped downward towards the rear (side Charlie) of the building with an approximate 13-foot elevation difference from side Alpha to Charlie. The
  • Charlie side of the building was three-stories above the rear grade level with the building’s basement floor approximately five-feet above grade level. The exterior entrance to the building’s’ basement area, also known as a walk-out was by means of a stairway that led to a wooden deck on the Charlie side adjacent to the Delta side. A second stairway led to an upper level deck that served the main level of the building.

Initial Fire Attack Operation: Upon arrival at the incident address, Engine 102 (E102), assigned four personnel (one captain, one fire apparatus operator [FAO], and two firefighters) entered and proceeded down the driveway deploying a five-inch supply hose line.

  • With their apparatus positioned in front of the building Captain (Capt.) Broxterman radioed, “Moderate smoke showing. E102 will be Squirrelsnest Command.” at 06:24:01.
  • Verification was made by the E102’s FAO through face-to-face communication with the male homeowner that all occupants were out of the building, which was then relayed to Capt. Broxterman.

District 25 (D25) arrived at the scene at 06:26:35 and assumed Command from Capt. Broxterman. Capt. Broxterman, Firefighter (Ffr.) Schira and E102’s Ffr. #2 advanced a 1¾-inch pre-connected hose line through the front main entrance. The fire was determined to be located in the basement of the building.

  • At 06:27:52, Capt. Broxterman radioed, “E102 making entry into the basement, heavy smoke”.
  • At 06:30:35, E109′s captain radioed, “Command from E109, contact 102,have them pull out of the first floor, redeploy to the back. It’s easy access. Conditions are changing at the front door.”
  • At 06:34:48, Engine 25 (E25), the designated Rapid Assistance Team, had just completed their 360-degree size-up around the building, and encountered E102’s Ffr. #2 in front of the building, whom reported that he had lost contact with his crew.
  • During the time period between 06:29:24 and 06:34:48, the investigation committee believed that one or more catastrophic events occurred including a failure of the main-level flooring system near the Beta – Charlie corner of the building.

 Rescue and Recovery Operations

  • At 06:35:34, the Incident Commander (IC) identified a potential Mayday operation, which indicates a life threatening situation to a firefighter.  
  • RAT25 was deployed at 06:36:48. The actual Mayday operation was initiated by the IC at 06:37:41 followed by a request at 06:37:53 to the HCCC for a second alarm complement of firefighting resources.  
  • At 06:42:01, RAT25 entered the basement from the rear of the building. At 07:00:27, E26’s personnel entered through the front main entrance of the building and into the basement by means of the interior stairway.  
  • Both missing firefighters were located in the basement near the Charlie side wall adjacent to the Beta side following a floor collapse. Capt. Broxterman and Ffr. Schira were obviously deceased as a result of their injuries.

Fire Origin and Cause: Information from the property owners was that the female had smelled an odor in the house. She told her husband, who went to investigate. Neither of them observed any smoke or flames at that time. The husband went to the basement, and located a fire near a cedar wood lined closet used to cultivate orchids in the unfinished utility room. He attempted to extinguish the fire with portable fire extinguishers and pans of water. As the fire alarm activated, the husband had his wife call 9-1-1 to report the fire. The state of Ohio Fire Marshal’s Office Fire and Explosion Investigation Bureau ruled the fire to be accidental in nature. The fire was determined to have originated in the unfinished utility room of the basement level in or near the cedar closet. This area was directly below the family room on the first floor. The probable ignition source for this fire was determined to be at and about a plastic air circulation fan and the associated electrical wiring.

Cause of Deaths

Capt. Broxterman was a 37-year old employee of the Colerain Fire & EMS with approximately 17-years of certified firefighting experience. Capt. Broxterman became trapped in the basement area for a prolonged amount of time following the sudden floor collapse. Capt. Broxterman was found positioned face down over top of Ffr. Schira. The majority of her protective clothing ensemble and equipment were heavily damaged as a result of exposure to heat and direct flame impingement. She was pronounced deceased following her removal from the building. Her body was transported to the Hamilton County Coroner’s Office for autopsy. The Coroner’s report cited the manner of death as “accidental” and the cause of death as “burns and inhalation of smoke and superheated and noxious gases.” Capt. Broxterman sustained burns to 100% of her body surface, which ranged from first to fourth degree in severity as described in the coroner’s autopsy report. Postmortem carboxyhemoglobin (COHb), which is a measure of carbon monoxide exposure, was measured at 22% saturation and soot was observed in portions of her upper and lower respiratory system.

  • Based on the injuries sustained and the damage to Capt. Broxterman’s protective clothing ensemble and equipment, it is likely that she was exposed to a rapid intensification of heat and flames in the building’s basement that overwhelmed her protective ensemble and equipment, exposing her body and respiratory system to intense heat and toxic products of combustion.

Ffr. Schira was a 29-year old employee of Colerain Fire & EMS with approximately 3½-years of certified firefighting experience. He also became trapped in the basement area for a prolonged amount of time following the sudden floor collapse. Ffr. Schira was found positioned on his right side and back, face-up beneath Capt. Broxterman. The majority of his protective clothing ensemble and equipment was heavily damaged as a result of exposure to heat and direct flame impingement. Ffr. Schira was pronounced deceased following his removal from the building. His body was transported to the Hamilton County Coroner’s Office for autopsy. The Coroner’s report cited the manner of death as “accidental” and the cause of death as “burns and inhalation of smoke and superheated and noxious gases”. Ffr. Schira sustained burns to 100% of his body surface, which ranged from first to fourth degree in severity as described in the coroner’s autopsy report. Postmortem COhb was measured at 8% saturation and soot was observed in portions of his upper and lower respiratory system.

  • Based on the injuries sustained and the damage to Ffr. Schira’s protective equipment, it is likely that that he was exposed to a rapid intensification of heat and flames in the building’s basement that overwhelmed his protective ensemble and equipment, exposing his body and respiratory system to intense heat and toxic products of combustion.

Select Findings and Recommendations

Findings, Discussions and Recommendations

FINDING #3.1: The area of fire origin had no finished ceiling, which exposed the floor joists and the underside of the floor decking to direct fire impingement causing rapid deterioration and failure of the flooring system directly underneath the main-level family room.

During this incident, based on communications transcripts (telephone and radio) it’s probable that the fire had advanced from its incipient stage to a free burning stage in approximately 18 to 20-minutes by the time Capt. Broxterman radioed that they were making entry into the basement.

  • As stated in the Incident Overview section, during the time period between 06:29:24 and 06:34:48, it is believed that one or more catastrophic events occurred within the building, which included a failure of the flooring system near the Beta-Charlie corner of the building’s first floor.

It has been widely believed in the firefighting profession that traditional sawn lumber is far superior to some of the more innovative lightweight construction components (e.g., wood I-joist) in use today. With dimensional lumber, two-inch by eight-inch and larger, there is a greater surface to mass ratio to resist the damaging effects of fire and the structural components will maintain their integrity for a longer period of time. While this has traditionally been accurate, this incident clearly shows that this may not always be the case. Heavy charring was evident to structural members in the fire area of origin. Notice the burn damage shows how the wooden floor joists had been burned to and away from the band joist. A band joist is a vertical member that forms the perimeter of a floor system in which the floor joists tie in to. Also known as the rim joist. Early platform framed homes very likely used solid, dimensional lumber and plywood, which provided a reasonable surface to mass ratio. But the later the home was built, the less mass even dimensional lumber has due to the reduction in the actual thickness of solid dimensional lumber provided by the lumber industry through the mid-1900’s. As the years go by, building materials will likely keep getting lighter and lighter and introduce more resins and other chemicals.

Laboratory tests that exposed structural wood components to the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) E119 Assembly Test indicated that a traditional two-inch by ten-inch structural member failed in 12-minutes and six-seconds. ASTM E119 test is the standard test method for evaluating building and construction materials exposed to fire. Unlike the standardized ASTM test fires, it is widely recognized that real building fires are highly variable in their size, rate of growth and intensity. Responding firefighters are unlikely to know when a given fire started, how hot it had been prior to arrival, how long it had been at any given temperature, the design capacity and actual loads on the floors over the fire or the amount of actual damage that the fire may have done to the joists. All of these factors make it impossible to predict the remaining capacity of a floor by even the most knowledgeable, professional fire experts.

RECOMMENDATION #3.1a: Fire departments should ensure that firefighters and incident commanders are aware that unprotected floor and ceiling joist systems, no matter the type, may fail at a faster rate when exposed to direct fire impingement.

Unfinished basement ceilings and other areas that have exposed joists or trusses jeopardize flooring and roof systems unnecessarily during a fire, causing premature failure. Often, a weakened floor and ceiling joist system can be difficult to detect from above as the floor surface above may still appear intact. Firefighters operating on floors above fire-damaged joist systems may fall through a weakened area and become trapped in a fire below. IC’s and firefighters must be aware that these systems can fail rapidly and without warning, and plan interior operations accordingly.

Firefighters must also be aware that while floor sag may be a widely accepted warning of an impending structural failure, floor sag is not always present or visible prior to a catastrophic collapse in a fire, regardless of the joist type, due to floor coverings, the fire’s intensity, the combination of joist spans and loads present, the location of serious structural fire damage or simply because it is too dark and smoky to see a sag in the floor. This is true for all types of structural joists, including materials such as sawn lumber, wood I-joists, and open web wood trusses and noncombustible members such as lightweight steel joists. The floor covering in this area was carpeting that transitioned to ceramic tile. When unprotected, any traditional or lightweight residential floor or ceiling assembly material, either combustible or noncombustible, may fail within several minutes of the fire’s ignition. It makes sense, therefore, that when there is a serious fire beneath a floor, there is no predictable safe amount of time that anyone can remain on that floor. Any floor system protected or not, can fail unpredictably when exposed to a substantial fire beneath.

FINDING # 4.2: E102′s officer failed to properly analyze the scene by not performing a 360-degree scene size-up to determine an overall strategy, and implement safe and effective firefighting tactics.

After the apparatus was positioned in front of the building, E102’s FAO was ordered by Capt. Broxterman to, “Ask the homeowner where the fire [location] was”, which was indicated to be in the basement by the male homeowner. As this was taking place, Capt. Broxterman continued donning her protective clothing ensemble (coat, helmet and self-contained breathing apparatus). Although E102′s officer provided a brief radio report of conditions observed upon arrival, she did not properly evaluate the scene so as to develop a basic strategy for implementation of safe and effective firefighting tactics. Had the officer visually evaluated the Charlie side of the building, the advanced fire conditions may have been noted, and that the lower level fire area was accessible by means of an exterior entry door for a more direct fire attack from the interior unburned side.

This means that firefighters enter a building and position the attack hose line between the fire and the uninvolved portions of the building. This direction of fire attack is preferred because it is likely to contain the fire, protect occupants, and push heat and gases out of the building if ventilation has been performed. On the other hand, danger increases significantly when attacking from the unburned side and is not always practical based on fire location, intensity, and building construction.

It cannot be conclusively known as to why Capt. Broxterman and Ffr. Schira proceeded into the area of the building that eventually collapsed resulting in their deaths. The investigation committee has concluded that the most probable explanation is that E102′s three-person interior team was successful in advancing their uncharged attack hose line into the basement recreation room area; reaching a point approximately 10 to15-feet from the bottom of the basement stairway as shown in the Incident Overview chapter. Once the team reached this area, it was realized they did not have sufficient hose line to continue advancing towards the seat of the fire. The team’s third member (Ffr. #2) reversed his travel and made his way back to the exterior of the building to advance additional hose line. As the team of two waited for additional hose line to be stretched and the hose line to be charged by the pump operator, the interior conditions rapidly deteriorated to a stage that it became untenable for them to hold their position.

The team evacuated back-up the stairway without following the hose line, which by all indications was tight up against the stairway wall and tightly wrapped around the stairway door entry. Once at the top of the stairway, one of the two deceased, if not both were likely in some form of distress; became disoriented and proceeded into the family room in a direction opposite the route of travel from which they entered the building. As the two moved across the family room floor, the flooring system collapsed into the utility room area of the basement. When the third team member re-entered the building, he was unable to locate the other two members.

The inability of Ffr. #2 to locate his team and the loss of radio communications contact with the interior team prompted the IC to declare a Mayday and activation of the RATs. This incident resulted in tragedy primarily due to the concealment of several burned-through floor joists under the carpet covered flooring system, which was nearly impossible to recognize due to heavy smoke conditions inside the burning building.

The following factors are believed to have directly contributed to the deaths that occurred in this incident:

  • The delayed arrival at the incident scene allowed the fire to progress significantly and the hazardous conditions to exponentially increase;
  • The failure to adhere to fundamental firefighting practices (e.g., entry into an enclosed building with obvious working fire conditions without a charged attack hose line)
  • The failure to abide by the fundamental concepts of fire fighter self-rescue and survival (e.g., following of the hose line in the direction of travel back to the building’s entrance or exit).

Although the aforementioned factors are believed to have directly contributed to the deaths reported here, they might have been prevented if:

  • Some personnel had not been complacent or apathetic in their initial approach to this incident which eventually led to being overwhelmed in their response to their initial findings;
  • Some personnel were in a proper state of mind that made them more observant of their surroundings and indicators, and the potential threats and risks that presented themselves;
  • The initial responding units were provided with all pertinent information in a
  • timely manner relative to the incident, especially critical was the information given to the emergency communications center from the homeowners reporting an actual fire
  • Personnel assigned to E102 possessed a comprehensive knowledge of their firstdue response area specifically related to road and street locations, and any particular characteristics related to those areas.
  • A 360-degree size-up of the building accompanied by a risk – benefit analysis was conducted by the company officer prior to initiating interior fire suppression operations; the risk of an action must be weighed against the probable benefit that may be reasonably and realistically expected.
  • Comprehensive standard operating guidelines specifically related to structural firefighting existed within the department;
  • The communications system users (on-scene firefighters and those monitoring the incident) weren’t all vying for limited radio air time. This competition led to missed and distorted messages and less than efficient use of resources, which exacerbated the problems of already taxed communications.
  • The communications equipment and accessories utilized were more appropriate for the firefighting environment;
  • Certain tactical-level decisions and actions were based on the specific conditions as encountered with an emphasis placed on fire ground tactical priorities (i.e., life safety, incident stabilization and property conservation);
  • Personnel had initiated fundamental measures to engage in if they were to become disoriented or trapped inside a burning building; and
  • Issued personal protective equipment was utilized in the correct manner.

In Memory

The Colerain Township (OH) Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services’s report examined the events of April 4th, 2008 with the benefit of hindsight, while seeking to be independent, impartial, and thorough. From the beginning, Colerain Fire & EMS has been committed to share our findings with others in the hope that it may prevent another such event.

The deaths of Captain Robin M. Broxterman and Firefighter Brian Schira had a profound loss not only to their parents, family and this organization, but also to the larger fire service community. In order to prevent these tragic losses in the future, we must first understand how and why our sister and brother firefighters died. We must learn from their incident and take that knowledge forward. If it was possible, what would these firefighters tell us today that might prevent a similar death of a firefighter in the future? What would they want us as firefighters, company officers and chief officers to know about the circumstances that lead to their deaths and the things we (and they) might have done to alter the most tragic of outcomes?

From the information that was made available for review, it was evident that these two individuals were well-loved in life, and greatly missed in death. Every line of duty death of a firefighter in the United States is significant. This investigative analysis document is dedicated to Captain Broxterman and Firefighter Schira, their families, friends and the community whose lives were forever changed. In working to improve the health and safety of all United States firefighters, we have much to learn from the supreme sacrifice of these two individuals, who they were in life and in death. We honor their memories.

 

References

  • Colerain Township Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services, Web Site HERE
  • Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths April, 2010 Full Report HERE
  • NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Report F2008-09| CDC/NIOSH July, 2009, Report HERE
  • WLTW.com news report Summary HERE

 

 

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One Meridian Plaza High Rise Fire: Twenty Years Ago

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Fire Operations One Meridian Plaza

On what began as an uneventful Saturday night twenty years ago, a fire on the 22nd floor of the 38-story Meridian Bank Building, also known as One Meridian Plaza, was reported to the Philadelphia Fire Department on February 23, 1991 at approximately 2040 hours and went on to burned for more than 19 hours. 

The fire caused three firefighter fatalities (LODD) and injuries to 24 firefighters. 

PFD Line of Duty Deaths: 

  • Captain David P. Holcombe, age 52
  • Firefighter Phyllis McAllister, age 43
  • Firefighter James A. Chappell, age 29
  •  
  • The 12-alarms brought 51 engine companies, 15 ladder companies, 11 specialized units, and over 300 firefighters to the scene.
  • It was one of the largest high-rise office building fire in modern American history –completely consuming eight floors of the building –and was controlled only when it reached a floor that was protected by automatic sprinklers.
  • The Fire Department arrived to find a well-developed fire on the 22nd floor, with fire dropping down to the 21st floor through a set of convenience stairs.
  • Heavy smoke had already entered the stairways and the floors immediately above the 22nd.
  • Fire attack was hampered by a complete failure of the building’s electrical system and by inadequate water pressure, caused in part by improperly set pressure reducing valves on standpipe hose outlets.

The USFA published a technical report (USFA-TR-049) on the One Meridian Plaza fire that is still available for download from the USFA web site, HERE. The report clearly defined the need in 1991, for built-in fire protection systems and reiterated the fact that fire departments alone cannot expect or be expected to provide the level of fire protection that modem high-rises demand. That fire protection must be built-in to the structures. This was clearly illustrated in this event when the One Meridian Plaza fire was finally stopped when it reached a floor where automatic sprinklers had been installed.One Meridian Plaza was a 38-story high-rise office building, located in the heart of downtown Philadelphia, in an area of high-rise and mid-rise structures. The building had three underground levels, 36 above ground occupiable floors, two mechanical floors (12 and 38), and two rooftop helipads. The building was rectangular in shape, approximately 243 feet in length by 92 feet in width (approximately 22,400 gross square feet), with roughly 17,000 net usable square feet per floor. Site work for construction began in 1968, and the building was completed and approved for occupancy in 1973. 

Construction was classified by the Philadelphia Department of Licenses and Inspections as equivalent to BOCA Type 1B construction which requires 3-hour fire rated building columns, 2-hour fire rated horizontal beams and floor/ ceiling systems, and l-hour fire rated corridors and tenant separations. Shafts, including stairways, are required to be 2-hour fire rated construction, and roofs must have l-hour fire rated assemblies. 

The building frame was structural steel with concrete floors poured over metal decks. All structural steel and floor assemblies were protected with spray-on fireproofing material. The exterior of the building was covered by granite curtain wall panels with glass windows attached to the perimeter floor girders and spandrels. The building utilized a central core design, although one side of the core is adjacent to the south exterior wall. The core area was approximately 38 feet wide by 124 feet long and contained two stairways, four banks of elevators, two HVAC supply duct shafts, bathroom utility chases, and telephone and electrical risers. 

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES 

  • Origin and Cause: The fire started in a vacant 22nd floor office in a pile of linseed oil-soaked rags left by a contractor. Fire Alarm System The activation of a smoke detector on the 22nd floor was the first notice of a possible fire. Due to incomplete detector coverage, the fire was already well advanced before the detector was activated.
  • Building Staff Response: Building employees did not call the fire department when the alarm was activated. An employee investigating the alarm was trapped when the elevator opened on the fire floor and was rescued when personnel on the ground level activated the manual recall. The Fire Department was not called until the employee had been rescued.
  • Alarm Monitoring Service: The private service which monitors the fire alarm system did not call the Fire Department when the alarm was first activated. A call was made to the building to verify that they were aware of the alarm. The building personnel were already checking the alarm at that time.
  • Electrical Systems: Installation of the primary and secondary electrical power risers in a common unprotected enclosure resulted in a complete power failure when the fire-damaged conductors shorted to ground. The natural gas powered emergency generator also failed.
  • Fire Barriers: Unprotected penetrations in fire-resistance rated assemblies and the absence of fire dampers in ventilation shafts permitted fire and smoke to spread vertically and horizontally.
  • Ventilation openings in the stairway enclosures permitted smoke to migrate into the stairways, complicating firefighting.
  • Unprotected openings in the enclosure walls of 22nd floor electrical closet permitted the fire to impinge on the primary and secondary electrical power risers.
  • Standpipe System and Pressure Reducing Valves (PRVs): Improperly installed standpipe valves provided inadequate pressure for fire department hose streams using 1 3/ 4-inch hose and automatic fog nozzles. Pressure reducing valves were installed to limit standpipe outlet discharge pressures to safe levels. The PRVs were set too low to produce effective hose streams; tools and expertise to adjust the valve settings did not become available until too late.
  • Locked Stairway Doors: For security reasons, stairway doors were locked to prevent reentry except on designated floors. (A building code variance had been granted to approve this arrangement.) This compelled firefighters to use forcible entry tactics to gain access from stairways to floor areas.
  • Fire Department Pre-Fire Planning: Only limited pre-fire plan information was available to the Incident Commander. Building owners provided detailed plans as the fire progressed.
  • Firefighter Fatalities: Three firefighters from Engine Company 11 died on the 28th floor when they became disoriented and ran out of air in their SCBAs.
  • Exterior Fire Spread: “Autoexposure” Exterior vertical fire spread resulted when exterior windows failed. This was a primary means of fire spread.
  • Structural Failures: Fire-resistance rated construction features, particularly floor-ceiling assemblies and shaft enclosures (including stair shafts), failed when exposed to continuous fire of unusual intensity and duration.
  • Interior Fire Suppression Abandoned: After more than 11 hours of uncontrolled fire growth and spread, interior firefighting efforts were abandoned due to the risk of structural collapse.
  • Automatic Sprinklers: The fire was eventually stopped when it reached the fully sprinklered 30th floor. Ten sprinkler heads activated at different points of fire penetration.
  • The three firefighters who died were attempting to ventilate the center stair tower: They radioed a request for help stating that they were on the 30th floor. After extensive search and rescue efforts, their bodies were later found on the 28th floor. They had exhausted all of their air supply and could not escape to reach fresh air. At the time of their deaths, the 28th floor was not burning but had an extremely heavy smoke condition.
  • After the loss of three personnel, hours of unsuccessful attack on the fire, with several floors simultaneously involved in fire, and a risk of structural collapse, the Incident Commander withdrew all personnel from the building due to the uncontrollable risk factors. The fire ultimately spread up to the 30th floor where it was stopped by ten automatic sprinklers.

Take the time to review this report and examine some of similar issues affecting the fire service today in the areas of staffing and resources, construction and materials, building codes, built-in fire suppression systems, training, pre-fire planning, fire load, fire dynamics and the current methodologies on wind-drive fire theory. 

Building Overview NarrativeOne Meridian Plaza was a 38-story high-rise office building in downtown Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Located across from Philadelphia’s City Hall, it was originally constructed in 1972 as the headquarter building for the Girard Bank. By 1991 it housed 27 tenants, and was the regional headquarters for Meridian Bancorp, which occupied eight floors (Menkus 1992). The rectangular building was 243 feet long and 92 feet wide, and contained about 17,000 net usable square feet per floor. Refer to Plan below for a typical floor plan from One Meridian Plaza. The lower two floors of the tower were below grade, floors 12 and 38 housed mechanical equipment, and the roof contained access via two helipads. The building frame was structural steel with composite metal decking, and the structure was also joined on the east side by a connecting link and stairwell to the 34-story Girard Trust Building. In compliance with all codes available in 1972, the building was classified and fireproofed as equivalent to BOCA Type 1B construction (Chubb 1991). The structural steel was protected with spray-on fireproofing, and sprinklers were not required by code, so they were not installed. In 1984 Philadelphia adopted the National Building Code, which required that newly constructed buildings 75 feet high be fully sprinklered. One Meridian Plaza was grandfathered and not required to install sprinklers due to the high installation and retrofit costs (Post March 1991). By 1991, only nine floors of the building had working sprinkler systems. These systems had been installed at the request of the tenants occupying those levels (Mangan 1991). 

Typical Floor Plan (22nd Floor)

Here’s a story posted today at the Phildalphia Daily News with insights on this anniversary 

One Meridian Plaza: 20 years ago, the fire that changed the nation By NATALIE POMPILIO Philadelphia Daily News 

When Jack Bloomer and the other firefighters arrived at One Meridian Plaza that cold February night in 1991, flames were encompassing the building more than 20 stories above, leaping from floor to floor. Smoke poured into the air, and broken glass rained down. 

“It was obvious when we pulled up it was an ugly-looking job,” Bloomer, 61, remembered yesterday. 

He had no idea how bad it would get. 

By the time the 12-alarm fire was declared under control 19 hours later, three firefighters were dead, 12 others were injured and a Center City high-rise was lost. The blaze, 20 years ago today, changed the city’s skyline and the way the nation fights fires. 

“When that fire happened, it was on the news all over the world,” said Chris Jelenewicz, engineering program manager at the Maryland-based Society of Fire Protection Engineers. “The One Meridian fire was one of the most significant fires in the history of high-rise buildings.” 

The fire changed Bloomer, who was driving Engine 11 that night. With him were Capt. David Holcombe and Firefighters Phyllis McAllister and James Chappell. 

Bloomer’s the only one who made it home. Read the entire article HERE 

Jack Bloomer was the only survivor from his platoon. David Holcombe, Phyllis McAllister and James Chappell perished in the Feb. 23 high-rise inferno

  • One Meridian Plaza Photo Slide Show HERE
  • NFPA Summary Report HERE

Other Insights: Good Article related to design, construction and failure issues HERE 

Excerpts: At about 8 p.m. on Saturday, 23 February 1991, linseed oil-soaked rags left behind by a cleaning crew burst into flames on the 22nd floor of the 38-story One Meridian Plaza in downtown Philadelphia. The fire quickly spread, unimpeded by fire sprinklers, throughout the 22nd floor and then upward. Sprinklers were not required by the City’s building code at the time of construction and were being added to the building only as opportunity presented itself. 

The twelve-alarm fire burned for 18 hours. The extreme heat caused window glass and frames to melt and concrete floor slabs and steel beams to buckle and sag dramatically. Large shards of window glass fell from the facade, cutting through fire hoses on the ground around the building. Three firefighters were trapped on a fully engulfed floor, and efforts to rescue them failed. 

The fire would not yield and there were increasing concerns about the stability of the structure. Fire officials called off the attack and allowed the fire to “free burn,” concentrating their efforts on containing the fire to this building. When the fire reached the 30th floor, a tenant-installed fire-sprinkler system was activated, and the worst high-rise fire in U.S. history was finally brought under control. 

Other Notable High-Rise Fires 

First Interstate Bank Building – Los Angeles, California

On May 4, 1998, the 62-story First Interstate Bank Building in Los Angeles, California experienced a devastating fire that damaged five of the building’s floors before it was brought under control. It is thought that the fire was the result of an electrical malfunction, but the cause was actually never determined. The building was in the process of being retrofit with an automatic sprinkler system, which had been installed in about 90 percent of the building, but was not operational at the time of the fire. Security personnel dismissed initial fire and smoke alarms, which delayed the response of the fire department by almost 15 minutes. Also contributing to the spread of the fire was the large quantity of combustible materials on each floor, equipment penetrations and other openings, and a standpipe system that had been shut down due to the sprinkler installation. Firefighters were also forced to battle dangerous conditions that were created by the failure of the glass façade and its subsequent fall to the ground below. The fire was eventually extinguished with the internal standpipe system, but not before one death and over 50 million dollars worth of damage (Routley 1988). 

Schomburg Plaza – New York, New York

The fire at Schomburg Plaza was unusual in the fact that it originated in the upper sections of a trash chute that serviced the 35-story apartment building. The March 22, 1987 fire started somewhere between the 27th and 29th floors, and then traveled up the trash chute and through the walls into surrounding apartments. Investigations following the fire found that sprinklers in the chute either failed to work because they were clogged, or were not actually connected to the piping system. It was also determined that the building was not built according to its plans, and therefore certain areas did not meet the two hour fire rating required by code. A final issue was the initial response to the fire and the misconception that it was a common compactor fire, as had been seen several times before. Neither firefighters, nor dispatchers realized the severity of the fire, and initially believed that it was under control, which created an even more dangerous situation. As a result of this fire, seven people lost their lives (Schaenman 1987). 

High-Rise Condominium – Clearwater, Florida

A more recent high-rise fire occurred on June 28, 2002, in an 11-story condominium building in Clearwater, Florida. The fire originated in the kitchen of a fifth floor apartment, and instead of pulling the fire alarm and alerting the fire department, the tenant tried unsuccessfully to extinguish the fire. This delay allowed the blaze to grow for 17 minutes before the fire department was even notified. As firefighters arrived on the scene they encountered several problems, including radio communication issues, closed standpipe riser valves, and a damaged fire hydrant. Another issue was that some building residents ignored fire alarms and failed to evacuate, believing that it was false alarm. The building was not equipped with an automatic sprinkler system, and therefore several units and the central hallway were heavily damaged by fire, smoke, and water before the blaze was declared under control. In the end two people were killed and many more were injured. The tragedy resulted in one million dollars worth of damage and the installation of an automatic sprinkler system. 

 

Feb. 24, 1991: A Medevac helicopter takes off from 15th Street about 1:30 a.m. Sunday to take urgently needed fresh air bottles to the roof. The bottles were not in time for three of the firefighters. (Mike Levin / Inquirer files)

 

 
 
 
 

 

  

Posted by on February 23, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, Fire Fighter Safety, Fire Fighting, firefighting-operations, High-rise, line-of-duty, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Multiple Alarm Operations with Wind Driven Fire

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The five alarm fire that ran through a seven story multiple occupancy (MO) apartment building in the Flatbush Section in the Borough of Brooklyn (NYC) this weekend considerably challenged operating companies of the FDNY as the fire was fueled and spread in rapid success due to significant wind conditions compounded by news reports that a door to the fire compartment was left open, thus allowing the developing fire conditions to intensify and escalate due to the wind driven conditions that were impacting the building, the fire compartment and initial operating companies.     

Aerial View of the Apartment Building

The seven-story MO Apartment building at 346 East 29th Street is reported to have had 70 apartments and was located midway in the city block. Arriving companies reported a fire on the number four floor and quickly deployed handlines and initiated primary search and rescue and other tactical assignments.   

Street View

First-due operations, from the initial alarm assignment’s arrival, the transmission of size-up communications and the accurate and timely deployment of companies to task assignments is mission critical to an evolving incident.     

The introduction of other challenges such as confronted by FDNY at this alarm further magnify the importance of effective command risk assessment, building size-up, effective and efficient company assignments and deployments with adequate resources (staffing and companies) to intervene with the fire dynamics and growth of an initial developing room and contents to an extending and escalating structure fire.      

       

YouTube Preview Image       

   

Take a few minutes to listen to the radio transmissions on the audio file attached, paying particular attention to the exchange of dispatch communications, first-due size-up and actions, command transmissions and subsequent rapid transmittal of greater alarms, as fire ground operational conditions deteriorated due to the wind driven fire, fire extension, civilian’s in distress and rescue operations.   

Think about the way you would react, interface or address similar conditions and challenges at an alarm in your jurisdiction or department.   

  • Do you have the necessary skills and experience to address timely actions required of company and command officers at a wind drive fire incident?
    • Are you capable of addressing a large single family dwelling, or a large low rise MO apartment building? How about a townhouse or garden apartment complex building?
    • How familiar are you with strategic and tactical considerations wind drive fire incidents?
    • Are you aware of the recent research and operational factors and considerations coming out of emerging research from the NIST and UL?
    • How effective are your capabilities for operating at large scale multiple alarm incidents with your department’s resources, or with mutual aid or external agencies?
    • Have you trained and prepared to manage multiple alarm incidents?

      

Take some to time to gain some insights from this alarm; the communications and the challenges and make this a learning opportunity to gain some insights into wind drive fire theory and operational considerations.   

Here’s some mission critical links and references to make you a more effective and capable company and command officer.   

National Fire Academy On-Line Training Program   

Awareness of Command and Control Decision making at Multiple Alarm Incidents (Q297) 1.5 CEUs Enroll Now »  

This course is both a stand-alone course as well as the pre-course for the 6-day residential delivery of the National Fire Academy’s new Command and Control Decision Making at Multi-Alarm Incidents. Anyone interested in applying for the 6-day residential course must pass this pre-course with a score of 85 percent. The topics covered in this pre-course include: classical and naturalistic decision making, strategies for managing safety concerns at expanded emergency incidents, pre-incident preparation, resource allocation, effective use of on-site communications, set-up of an incident command post and post incident analysis.

NIST: Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Fire Conditions: 7-Story Building Experiments. HERE  

 February 2008, a series of 14 experiments were conducted in a 7-story building to evaluate the ability of positive pressure ventilation fans, wind control devices and external water application with floor below nozzles to mitigate the hazards of a wind driven fire in a structure. Each of the 14 experiments started with a fire in a furnished room. The air flow for 12 of the 14 experiments was intensified by a natural or mechanical wind.. Each of the tactics were evaluated individually and in conjunction with each other to assess the benefit to fire fighters, as well as occupants in the structure. The results of the experiments provide a baseline for the hazards associated with a wind driven fire and the impact of pressure, ventilation and flow paths within a structure. Wind created conditions that rapidly caused the environment in the structure to deteriorate by forcing fire gases through the apartment of origin and into the public corridor and stairwell. These conditions would be untenable for advancing fire fighters. Each of the tactics were able to reduce the thermal hazard created by the wind driven fire. Multiple tactics used in conjunction with each other were very effective at improving conditions for fire fighter operations and occupant egress. Fire departments that wish to implement the tactics used in this study will need to develop training and determine appropriate methods for deploying these tactics. Variations in the methods of deployment may be required due to differences in staffing, equipment, building stock, typical weather conditions, etc. There is uniformity however, in the physics behind the wind driven fire condition and the principles of the tactics examined. The data from this research will help provide the science to identify methods and promulgation of improved standard operating guidelines (SOG) for the fire service to enhance firefighter safety, fire ground operations, and use of equipment. The experiments were conducted by the National Institute of standards and Technology (NIST), the Fire Department of New York City (FDNY), and the Polytechnic Institute of New York University with the support of the Department of Homeland security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Assistance to Firefighters Research and Development Grant Program and the United States Fire Administration.  

pdf icon Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Fire Conditions: 7-Story Building Experiments. (58118 K)
Kerber, S. I.; Madrzykowski, D.  

NIST Wind Driven Fires Studies, HERE  

Smoke and heat spreading through the corridors and the stairs of a building during a fire can limit building occupants’ ability to escape and can limit fire fighters’ ability to rescue them.  Changes in the building’s ventilation or presence of an external wind can increase the energy release of the fire.  This can also increase the spread of fire gases through the building.  In some cases, such as the Cook County Administration Building fire in October 2003, the fire gas flow, into the corridors and the stairway prevented fire fighters from suppressing the fire from inside the structure.  This fire resulted in 6 building occupant fatalities and fire fighter injuries in the stairway.  The Fire Department of New York City has experienced many wind driven fire incidents which have resulted in fire fighter fatalities and injuries.  

 

Postings from Buildingsonfire.com

 

Direct link to the Wind Driven Fire Research Postings on Buildingsonfire.com  HERE 

NIST Wind Driven Fire Simulation Video

NIST Wind Driven Fire Simulation Video Wind Driven Fires Smoke and heat spreading through the corridors and the stairs of a building during a fire can limit building occupants’ ability to escape and can limit fire fighters’ ability to rescue them.  Changes in the building’s ventilation or presence of an external wind can increase the [...]  

Jan, 29 2011 0 Comments Full Story

Positive Pressure Ventilation Research

Positive Pressure Ventilation The objective of this NIST research is to improve firefighter safety by enabling a better understanding of structural ventilation techniques, including positive pressure ventilation (PPV) and natural ventilation, and to provide a technical basis for improved training in the effects of ventilation on fire behavior by examining structural fire ventilation using full-scale fire experiments with and [...]  

Jan, 14 2011 0 Comments Full Story

NIST Wind Driven Fires Programs

Wind Driven Fires Wind blowing into the broken window of a room on fire can turn a “routine room and contents fire” into a floor-to-ceiling firestorm. Historically, this has led to a significant number of firefighter fatalities and injuries, particularly in high-rise buildings where the fire must be fought from the interior of the structure. [...]  

Jan, 14 2011 0 Comments Full Story

Wind Driven Fires

 A million dollar Baltimore County, Maryland  home was destroyed Sunday December 13, 2009  by a fire that tore through the 4,700-square-foot structure with such intensity that firefighters were forced to battle the flames from the exterior. Shortly after 21:00 hours, Baltimore County Fire Dispatch alerted crews for Fire Box 50-2 at 12607 Nancy Lee Court [...]  

Tactical Patience and the New Considerations of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction  on CommandSafety.com HERE, with insights into the new UL Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction

   

ALARM INFORMATION
FDNY   Brooklyn, N. Y. 02/19/11 @ 18:45 hrs.
Flatbush Section Box 2439 address: 346 East 29th St. between: Ave. “D” & Clarendon Rd.     

2439 @ 18:42
Engs. 255, 281, 217 act. 310
T. Lad. 157, Lad. 147
Batt. 41      

10 – 75 – 2439 @ 18:46
Ladder 113 is designated as the “FAST” Truck
Eng. 249
Rescue Co. #2
Squad Co. #1
Batt. 48
Division 15      

Fire Building:
6 Story Brick 100 x 100 O/M/D ( orig. reported )
7 Story Brick 100 x 100 O/M/D ( actual size up )      

All – Hands:
7 – 5 – 2439 @ 18:48
Batt. 41 reports: All – Hands upon arrival, extra Engine & Truck
Fire 4th floor of a 6 Story Brick occupied multiple dwelling
Engine 250 / Ladder 174 s/c      

“Batt. 41 to Brooklyn, Transmit a 2nd Alarm, We also transmitting a 10-70 ( water relay )      

2nd Alarm:
2 – 2 – 2439 @ 18:53
Engs. 310, 240, 283 ( Eng. 310 designated Water Resource Unit )
T. Lad. 159, Lad. 149
Eng. 284 w/ Satellite 3
Batt. 38 “Safety Officer”
Batt. 33 “Resource Unit Leader”
Rescue battalion / Safety Battalion
Fieldcom 1 / Tactical Support Unit #2      

@ 18:58
Batt. 41 to Brooklyn, We have a “May-Day” transmitted from the Fire Apt. We’re putting the “FAST” Truck to work. Assigned another “FAST” Truck, Tower Ladder 159 is assigned new “FAST” Truck      

@ 19:13
Division 15 reports: “May-Day” member located and removed from Fire Bldg. We have fire on the 4th & 5th floors out the rear.
4 – lines stretched, 4 – lines in operation. Fire’s Doubtful.      

3rd Alarm:
3 – 3 – 2439 @ 19:15
Engs. 309, 323, 257, 330
Lad. 123, T. Lad. 170
Batt. 58
Batt. 44 “Staging Manager”
Air Re-Con Chief “grounded” due to winds
Mask Service Unit #1
Staging Area: Clarendon Rd. & Nostrand Ave.      

@ 19:20
Division 15: Box 2439, We have fire on the 4th; 5th; & 6th floors and into the Cockloft. All members being removed from the upper floors, setting up the Tower Ladders.      

@ 19:27
Special Call ( 2 ) additional Battalion Chief’s
Batt. 40 act. 58, Batt. 32 are s/c      

@ 19:30
Special Call a “High Rise Nozzle Co.” Eng. 254 assigned      

@ 19:36
Special Call ( 2 ) Tower Ladders
Tower Ladder 144 act 153 & Tower Ladder 120 are s/c      

4th Alarm:
4 – 4 – 2439 @ 19:38
Engs. 276, 220, 247, 321
Batt. 57 “Planning Chief”
Eng. 262 w/ Incident Management Vehicle
Car 4: Chief Robert Sweeney “Chief of Operations”      

@ 20:39
Fieldcom 1: Progress Report for the 4th Alarm, Box 2439, Car 4, Chief Sweeney reports:
Fire in a 6 Story Brick occupied multiple dwelling. ( 3 ) Tower Ladders in operation in the rear of the Fire Bldg. ( 1 ) Tower Ladder in operation in the front of the Fire Bldg. Setting up 2nd Tower Ladder in the front of the Fire Bldg. ( 1 ) Stang in operation in the rear. Have ( 3 ) floors of fire out the rear of the Fire Bldg. Doubtful Will Hold.      

@ 20:44
Fieldcom 1: By orders of Chief Kilduff, transmit the 5th Alarm.
Special Call ( 2 ) additional Engines above the 5th Alarm for “Brand Patrol”      

5th Alarm:
5 – 5 – 2439 @ 20:44
Engs. 234, 280, 282, 227
Engs. 290 & 214 s/c for “Brand Patrol”
Car 3: Chief Edward Kilduff “Chief of Department”      

@ 20:58
Fieldcom 1: Progress Report for the 5th Alarm, Box 2439, Car 4, Chief Sweeney reports:
Primary Searches on the 4th floor are negative except for Apt. 4 “adam”      

@ 21:13
Fieldcom 1: Special Call ( 2 ) additional Trucks to the Staging Area.
Ladder 132 & Tower Ladder 111 are s/c      

@ 21:22
Fieldcom 1: At this time, We’re releasing Rescue #2 & Squad #1      

@ 21:26
Fieldcom 1: Progress Report for the 5th Alarm, Box 2439, Car 4, Chief Sweeney reports:
All members have been removed from the Fire Bldg. ( 3 ) Tower Ladders in operation in the front of the Fire Bldg. ( 2 ) Tower Ladders & ( 1 ) Stang in operation in the rear of the Fire Bldg. Still have heavy fire on the 4th; 5th; & 6th floors. This will be a pro long operation. Still Doubtful.      

@ 22:15
Fieldcom 1: Progress Report for the 5th Alarm, Box 2439, Car 3, Chief Kilduff reports:
( 3 ) Tower Ladders in operation in the front of the Fire Bldg.
( 2 ) Tower Ladders and ( 1 ) Multi-Versal in operation in the rear of the Fire Bldg. Fire is darkening down on the 4th & 5th floors in the rear. Fire is Still Doubtful.      

@ 22:58
Fieldcom 1: Progress Report for the 5th Alarm, Box 2439, Car 4, Chief Sweeney reports:
Probably Will Hold
The Bldg. has been changed to a 7 Story Bldg. Fire was on the 5th; 6th; & 7th floors and Cockloft.      

@ 23:10
Fieldcom 1: Special call Eng. 233 with Mobile Command 1      

@ 23:12
Fieldcom 1: Special Call ( 1 ) Division Chief, & ( 3 ) Battalion Chiefs for “relief”
Batt. 4, Batt 31 act. 41, Batt. 49 are s/c
Division 1 s/c      

@ 23:18
Fieldcom 1: Special Call ( 3 ) additional Engine’s, ( 3 ) additional Tower Ladders for “relief”
Engs. 330, 248, 220
T. Lads. 107, T. Lad. 161 act. 157, T. Lad. 15 act. 131      

@ 01:58
Fieldcom 1: By order’s of Division 1, Fire is Under Control.      

(Job Duration: 7 hrs./16 mins.)      

Note: 2 Engines, 2 Trucks, 1 Batt. Chief will be Special Called on intervals to support a “watch line”      

( 1 ) 10-45 Code 1 (deceased was located in the Fire Bldg.)   

Posted by on February 21, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Fire Fighting, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, High-rise, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

FDNY Brooklyn Box 4080: 17 Vandalia Avenue 12.18.1998

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Take a moment to look back at an incident: On December 18, 1998, Three FDNY Firefighters died in-the line of duty while conducting suppression and rescue operations at  fire on the tenth floor of 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly.  At 0454 hours Brooklyn transmitted box 4080 for a top floor fire at 17 Vandalia Avenue in the Starrett City development complex. The sprawling complex is located on Brooklyn’s south shore in the Spring Creek section. The 10 story 50 x 200 fireproof building is used as a senior citizen’s residence. Engine 257 and ladder 170, both quartered in Canarsie, were assigned 1st due and arrived within 4 minutes. By that time the fire already could be seen blowing through two windows. Second and 3rd alarms were quickly transmitted.

As the 1st due Ladder Company, L170′s duty is to search the fire floor. Lieutenant Joseph Cavalieri, and fire fighters Christopher Bopp and James Bohan ascended 10 flights of stairs with extinguishers and forcible entry tools. Their mission was to rescue the resident of apartment 10-D who was believed trapped inside.

NIOSH INVESIGATIVE REPORT SUMMARY (F99-01) On December 18, 1998, several fire companies and fire fighters responded at 0454 hours to a reported fire on the tenth floor of a 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. The fire had been burning for 20 to 30 minutes before it was called in because the resident attempted to put the fire out with small pans of water. As the fire fighters approached the building from the rear, an orange glow was observed in the window of Apartment 10D. As the fire fighters were arriving in front of the high-rise, a call was received from Central Dispatch that a female resident in the apartment next door to the fire apartment was trapped in her apartment and needed help. Several fire fighters entered the lobby area, and some took the stairs to the ninth floor, while others took the elevator to the ninth floor. A Lieutenant and two fire fighters on Ladder 170 (the victims), along with the Lieutenant on Engine 290, took the B-stairs from the ninth floor to the tenth floor, and entered the hallway, in search of the fire, while 4 fire fighters on Engine 290 were flaking out the hose line on the ninth floor and in the stairwell between the ninth and tenth floor in preparation for hookup.

During this same time period, other fire fighters had gone to the tenth floor A-stairwell landing to attempt a hose line hookup to the standpipe in the landing. Engine Company 257 fire fighters, who were attempting to make a hook-up on the fire floor landing, experienced trouble with the heat, heavy smoke, and heavy insulation on the standpipe and were forced to abandon this hook-up. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 and the victims, who were on the B-side, were approaching the center smoke doors (see diagram), when the Lieutenant radioed his driver on the outside, and asked, “Where is the fire?”

The driver radioed back, the fire is in the rear, towards exposure 4. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 then left the tenth floor, descended the stairs to the ninth floor and helped his men drag the hose to the A-stairwell, where they met up with fire fighters on Engine 257, who assisted them in stretching their line and hook-up on the ninth floor. The victims proceeded through the center smoke doors in search of the fire. From the information obtained during this investigation, it is believed the victims found the fire apartment, with the door partially opened, allowing smoke and hot gases to enter the hallway. They then opened the door fully, the wind pushed the fire and extreme heat in the apartment into the hallway, and a flashover occurred, exposing the victims to extreme radiant heat that potentially elevated their body core temperature.

The last radio transmission from the victims was a Mayday call. When the victims were found, all were unresponsive, they were treated at the scene and taken to the hospital where they were pronounced dead by the attending physician.

This wind-driven fire event and the lessons-learned contributed directly to the current body of research and new insights on emerging strategies and tactics. The NIOSH Investigative Report HERE.  NIST References on Wind Driven Fire Research HERE . FDNewYork.com HERE. New York Times Archived Articles, HERE and HERE. Photos and legacy, HERE

Take the time to remember FDNY Lt. Joseph Cavaleiri, FF Christopher Bopp and Firefighter James Bohan from Ladder 170

Posted by on December 18, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, High-rise • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

First-Due Arriving Companies; Are You Prepared?

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As the First-Due Fire Company; Officer and crew, Are you prepared to address the fireground variables and occupancy risks upon your arrival and during the initial stages of your deployment and operations? Are you combat ready or passively engaged?  

It seems we’ve struck some interests over past week since we first discussed the First-Due Fire Officer  on the most recent edition of Taking it to the StreetsTM where we had a vibrant and insightful program in which we discussion some of the expansive facets related to the First-Due Fire Officer.     

 The First-Due Fire Office program can be downloaded HERE at Firefighter Netcast.com   

The formulative discussion revolved around a variety of functional elements, traits, responsibilities and duties befalling the First-Due Officer, and was followed up with a post here on Thecompanyoffer.com. We discussed how today’s First-Due Officer must perform smarter with increased perceptions, discernments and acumens with intelligence and wisdom that is drawn from further progressing and collective fire ground response and operational experiences.   

My good friend Captain Willie Wines (aka The Iron Fireman) posted a great follow-up article associated with the radio program on his blog associated with further interpretations of the First-Due Officer. Check out “The First-Due Officer; What are you thinking?”  HERE.   

To further our dialog on the first-due, I’ve added a few series of video clips and images with related links to promote and stimulate your view of the first-due fireground scene as it relates to the variables and personnel perceptions; the need for diligence and cognitive situational awareness and risk assessment and being truly “prepared” both mentally and physically. By way of physically, I mean- is your gear and PPE, functional, operational and adequately in-place?   

  As you can see there are numerous instances where the difference in the incident outcome correlated to the level of PPE protection that was in-place and implemented at the time of adverse conditions or unexpected or unforeseen circumstances.   

 Here’s today’s situations to think about at the station, around the kitchen table, over a cup of coffee in the day room after your next alarm or tonight at the station for a “back step” company drill.    

  • What are the Adverse Conditions that might be encounted upon arrival as the First-Due?
  • Flashover, Backdraft, Compromised or degraded Structural Conditions, Collapsed Conditions, Structural Collapse, Wind Drive Fire Behavior, Extreme Fire Behavior, Pre-Flashover/ Post-Flashover….
  • How Effective are you in Reading the Smoke?
  • How About Reading the Building? Do you understand Occupancy Profiling and Occupancy Risk?
  • Are you Taking the Time to Read the Subtle or Pronounced Fireground Indicators.; Comprehend their meaning or are you just “too engaged in the tactic or task?”
  • Do you have an appreciation for Tactical Patience?
  • Are your operations Tactically Driven by SOP’s and SOGs?
  • What Rules of Engagment are you considering?
  • Have and IAP in mind?
 YouTube Preview Image   

 There have been a lot of articles and postings on adverse conditions as companies are opening up or pushing into the structure on the initial entry. Take a look at the next two series of video clips related to flashover conditions and the impact of that fire behavior on the companies and personnel. In each instance companies were extremely fortunate that the injuries sustained were not more severe than encountered.  

  • What encounters have you or your company experienced?
  • In retrospect how effective was the initial risk assessment and occupancy profile-was the size-up appropriate or were key indicators missed or neglected?
  • Did the fast pace of the initial arrival and subsequent deployment filter or obscure mission critical indicators that should have been identified and acted upon?  
  • Did the tactical assignment and task overshadow tactical patience?
  • Did someone or everyone miss reading the smoke, fire or occupancy risk?
  • Did other tactical assignments contribute toward the unexpected or adverse conditions encountered, such as ventilation induced flashover? ( More on that topic for a later post; See Taking it the Streets November 4, 2010 show

          

Firefighter Will Gregory exits the home with his PPE on fire. Photo by Brian Haney, The Daily Record.

There are a series of photos  from a previous posting at STATter911 HERE that depicts firefighers working to push-in on a fire in a small residential occupancy. The ensuing flashover ignites the PPE of one firefighter. Look at the series of photographs and  take note of the fire and smoke conditions, the size and profile of the occupancy ( remember it’s Occupancy RISK not Occupancy Type).   

  • Think about the sequencing of your initial operations.
  • Think about the mission critical 360;
  • how does that play into your initial incident actions plan (IAP)?

   

The Dynamics of the Fireground in Seconds

Companies were dispatched for an assignment for a house fire. Both E807 and TK807 responded with crews of 4 personnel each. E813 arrived on the scene and reported light smoke showing on side Alpha. Upon arrival on the scene, the crew from TK807 (four staff) made entry to the house. The following series of events led to conditions in the house that presented a flashover environment. The hose line from E813 burst, a backup line was not charged due to no established water supply, and the house was not yet ventilated. Without the protection of a hose line, the crew was committed to the house when the room flashed. One firefighter was apparently far enough in the house to avoid any injury, A second FF received 2nd degree burns to his right shoulder, and a third FF received the full force of the flashover suffering second-third degree burns to his face, hands, and the majority of his torso. (Original incident information posted at the time of the event)   

  •  Photo 1: Firefighters don PPE and SCBA with light smoke visible in this first of four pictures shot by Tony George of PGFD Station 813  
  •  Photo 2: Six seconds later a small amount of fire and darker smoke can be seen at the sliding glass door. 
  •  Photo3: Forty-eight seconds after the initial picture, more fire and darker smoke are apparent. 
  •  Photo 4: Exactly two-minutes after the first picture was shot, flashover occurs with firefighters inside. 

For a complete narrative and futher incident details of this previous STATter911 postings related to this event go HERE, and HERE  

Take a good look at the performance of PPE when utilized and implemented correctly…. 

Don’t ever underestimate the dynamics and uncertainty of the evolving fireground during your operations. The video clip here depicts how quickly operations can change from an investigation to a major mass casualty incident.

For a comprehensive look at this event go here are two links for you to visit, HERE at Commandsafety.com and the NIOSH Report HERE

     

Be prepared for the unexpected and always use extreme caution and heightened situational awareness and fluid risk assessment and reconnaissance processing to stay atop of any undefined and evolving incident. Do not allow the potential lack of severity; of what may have all the indications of an unremarkable/uneventful and common call run such as a gas odor investigation or a natural gas leak cause your companies to have less than a high level of alert, focus and attentive accretions through all phases and deployments of the incident. Don’t become complacent.

In addition, take a look at some information relate to another tragic incident response to a reported gas leak that occurred in December, 1983 that lead to five fire fighter LODD’s in Buffalo, New York. HERE 

  • Archived Report From STATter911, from May, 2009 HERE and recent 2010 update HERE with fireground Audio
  • Prince George’s County (MD) Fire Press Release from May 7, 2009, HERE
  • Slide Show from WUSA9.com HERE 
  • BING mapping Images, HERE

  Here’s a series of Reports worth your time to read related to the First-Due:

  • City of Charleston Post Incident Assessment and Review Team Phase I Report, HERE
  • Routley Final Phase II Report HERE
  • NIOSH Investigative Report, HERE

  • Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE
  • Reference Data HERE
  • The report is also available for download at the NIST, HERE
  • Synopsis HERE

  • Report: Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse1979-2002
  • Colerain Township (OH) Fire and EMS Department Final Report Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels Nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths Incident Overview, HERE; NIOSH Report, HERE; Investigative Report, HERE
    • Posted by on November 23, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, Crew Management, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, Strategy and Tactics, Taking it to the Streets • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Taking it to the Streets; “Redefining the Fire Ground” Rescheduled

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    Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum

    Wednesday Night’s Program has been postponed due to Emergent Server issues at BlogTalkRadio.

    The Program has been rescheduled for Thursday November 4th at 9:00pm EDT

    Turn Out to FireFighter NetCast.com and Taking it to the Streets for; “Redefining the Fire Ground”

    If you missed last month’s program on the Tactical Renaissance of Combat Fire Suppression Operations and the new Rules of Engagement, with Chief Gary Morris (ret) Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department and Dr. Burt Clark from the NFA, then you missed out a some great insights and discussion. This month Taking it to the Streets is looking to further the dialog and look at “Redefining the Fire Ground”. Many would argue that the fire ground doesn’t need to be “redefined”; that the way we do business in the Streets is just fine and that the American Fire Service knows how to get the job done, at any cost.

    The recent release of the NIST Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire – South Carolina, June 18, 2007 has presented compelling data and information that provides further discernments of how our buildings react under fire conditions and how our tactical assumptions and deployments continue to be willfully miscued.  Joining Chris will be Chief Douglas Cline, from the City of High Point FD, North Carolina, a highly regarded national instructor, author, advocate, tactician and incident command.

    Don’t miss out on debating and dialoging the transitional fire ground. It is here and it’s here to stay; you just didn’t know that it was changing. But then again, was anyone paying attention?  Join the live broadcast on Thursday night November 4th at 9:00pm ET, or download the post production podcast from Firefighter NetCast.com.

    • For additional Taking it to the Streets programming, HERE
    • Firefighter NetCast.com HERE
    • Taking it to the Streets for; “Tactical Renaissance and the Rules of Engagement” Show Link, HERE

    Taking it to the StreetsTM On Your Street, In Your City, Across the County, Around the WorldTM ©2010

    Taking it to the Streets is hosted by Christopher Naum and is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Fire Fighter NetCast.com Production.

    Posted by on November 3, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, command-leadership, Commandsafety.com, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, Taking it to the Streets, thecompanyofficer.com • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    NIOSH: Uncoordinated ventilation caused flashover

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    NIOSH: Uncoordinated ventilation caused flashover killing Ill. firefighterInvestigators say crews failed to recognize signs of an imminent flashover; firefighters were between the fire and ventilation points
    By Ken Robinson
    FireRescue1 Associate Editor
    HOMEWOOD, Ill. — Uncoordinated ventilation caused a flashover that killed one firefighter and injured another when both failed to recognize signs of rapidly deteriorating conditions, investigators found.

    Insufficient staffing was also cited as a key contributing factor in the incident, as crews on scene were stretched thin according to a NIOSH report released Tuesday.

    Rookie Homewood Fire Department Firefighter-Paramedic Brian Carey was killed of smoke inhalation on March 30 while assisting in search and rescue of a reported victim trapped in a house fire, the report said.

    Responding to reports of a downed brother, firefighters conducting a search discovered Firefighter-Paramedic Carey entangled in a hoseline and not wearing his helmet or facepiece, and without a hood.

    Firefighter-Paramedic Karra Kopas, who had entered the structure along with him, was injured in the fire and had to be rescued four feet from the front door where she said her gear melted to the living room carpet.

    At the time of the flashover, firefighters performing ventilation were not coordinating with hoseline and search and rescue crews inside the house, according to the investigation.

    Both Firefighters Carey and Kopas were between the fire and the ventilation source.

    “One firefighter accounts heavy, turbulent, black smoke pushing from a window on the B-side after it was broken,” the report said.

    “Shortly after, the house sustained an apparent ventilation-induced flashover.”

    NISOH says the thick, black and heavily pressurized smoke that exited through ventilation should have been acted upon as a warning sign.

    “The IC, and individuals working on the exterior, need to recognize this as a potential for extreme fire behavior and evacuate interior crews,” the report said.

    In addition, investigators recommend training firefighters under realistic conditions to indentify the signs of an imminent flashover.

    “Obtaining proper training and hands-on experience through the use of a flashover simulator may assist interior firefighters in making sound decisions on when to evacuate a structure fire,” the report said.

    The inability to appropriately coordinate fireground operations may have been directly tied to inadequate staffing.

    “Due to short staffing, the ambulance personnel were tasked with fire suppression activities, thus taking them out-of-service as a medical unit,” the report said.

    The incident commander, a Lieutenant, was also required to ride and operate as the officer of an Engine Crew due to short staffing.

    “This removed him from his command response vehicle which would have allowed him to command at a tactical level versus having to potentially perform tasks,” the report said.

    Investigators also found an accountability system was never put in place and a personnel accountability report was never conducted following the incident.

    As a result of the incident, NIOSH made the following key recommendations for fire departments to follow:

    • Ensure that a complete 360-degree situational size-up is conducted on dwelling fires and others where it is physically possible and ensure that a risk-versus-gain analysis and a survivability profile for trapped occupants is conducted prior to committing to interior firefighting operations.

     

    • Ensure that interior fire suppression crews attack the fire effectively to include appropriate fire flow for the given fire load and structure, use of fire streams, appropriate hose and nozzle selection, and adequate personnel to operate the hose line.

     

    • Ensure that firefighters maintain crew integrity when operating on the fireground, especially when performing interior fire suppression activities.

     

    • Ensure that firefighters and officers have a sound understanding of fire behavior and the ability to recognize indicators of fire development and the potential for extreme fire behavior
      Ensure that incident commanders and firefighters understand the influence of ventilation on fire behavior and effectively coordinate ventilation with suppression techniques to release smoke and heat.

    • Ensure that firefighters use their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures.
    Posted by on September 30, 2010 • Filed under: command-leadership, company officer, Crew Management, Culture, Doug Cline, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , ,

    Remembrance FDNY; Brooklyn Box 3300 August 2, 1978

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    FDNY Waldbaum Fire August 2, 1978

    The Waldbaum’s Supermarket Fire and Collapse FDNY 1978 

    The Waldbaum Super market fire, Brooklyn, New York occurred on August 2, 1978, thirty two years ago. Six firefighters died in the line of duty when the roof of a burning Brooklyn supermarket collapsed, plunging 12 firefighters into the flames. The fire began in a hallway near the compressor room as crews were renovating the store, and quickly escalated to a fourth-alarm. Less than an hour after the fire was first reported, nearly 20 firefighters were on the roof when the central portion gave way. 

    Thirty-four firefighters, one emergency medical technician and one Emergency Services police officer were injured in the fire and the tragedy is remembered as one of the worst disasters in the New York City Fire Department’s 143-year history.  

    The FDNY members killed in the Waldbaum’s fire included:
    • Lt. James E. Cutillo, Battalion 33
    • Firefighter Charles S. Bouton, Ladder Company 156
    • Firefighter Harold F. Hastings, Battalion 42
    • Firefighter James P. McManus, Ladder Company 153
    • Firefighter William O’Connor, Ladder Company 156
    • Firefighter George S. Rice, Ladder Company 153

    Take the time to head over to Commandsafety.com for the complete posting with incident details, photos, a memorial video clip and diagrams.

    The following are a series of photographs of the incident and operations.

    Check out the Waldbaum Fire Facebook page, HERE with numerous photos and recollections honoring those that lost their lives and those that operated at FDNY Brooklyn Box 3300.
     

     
    Posted by on August 1, 2010 • Filed under: Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Fire Fighting, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, History Repeating Event, major-incidents, Strategy and Tactics, Structural Collapse, thecompanyofficer.com, Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    3*4*3 Reports

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    I recently posted an article on CommandSafety.com that addressed a series of Major Influencing Fire Service Reports, Issues and Focus areas that should be on your radar screen. This was also the theme at the premiere of Taking it to the Streets on Fire Fighter Netcast.com . As an emerging, practicing or upward mobile fire officer, commander or leader; those are but a few key ares that you must be  knowledgeable in, have insights and proficiency based technical skills to function with a level of competencies demanded of, in today’s  fire service.

    After a recent training program, we discussed in a smaller group setting common, contributing and apparent causes related to three prominent fire incidents and reports that were shared both within the lecture program and also within the CS post. Based upon that dialog, the dynamic and passionate discussion and the frank, straight forward opinions I’m suggesting you take the time; three hours to read three reports and focus on the lesson learned, the gaps that were identified and the recommendations AND actions that were implemented to limit, if not eliminate the likely hood that a similar event could happen in that organization.

    The continuing challenge is not allowing the circumstances and situations that were present at those events, cause you and your organization to have a History Repeating Event (HRE).

    Set aside three hours for three reports; invest the time appropriately and focus your undivided attention. Think about those firefighters who answered that call, in the same manner and fashion as all of us do, when we board the apparatus and the company rolls out of quarters on the way to the alarm. The only difference…..they didn’t come home- you did. Learn, understand, comprehend, relate and apply.

    Then take the time to share your insights with those within your inner circle and start recognizing that there’s likely something that you can go in your house or station, or organization that honors the sacrifices made by those LODD events your read about, so those lessons can be moved forward to make the job, a little bit safer.

    Three for Three (343)

    Prince William County (VA) Fire Rescue Kyle Wilson LODD Report

    • The Prince William County (VA) Department of Fire and Rescue published a comprehensive line of duty death report for Technician I Kyle R. Wilson on Saturday, January 26, 2008. Technician I Wilson was the first line of duty death in the Department’s 41-year history. The Department is sharing the LODD Investigative Report to honor Kyle, and in an effort to reduce and prevent firefighter line of duty deaths at the local, region, state, and national levels.
    • Technician Kyle Robert Wilson was 24-years old and was born in Olney, Maryland. He grew up in Prince William County and graduated from Hylton High School and George Mason University. He was an avid baseball and softball player. Technician Wilson joined the Prince William County Department of Fire and Rescue on January 23, 2006. Technician Kyle Wilson died in the line of duty on April 16, 2007 while performing search and rescue operations at a house fire on Marsh Overlook Drive, located in the Woodbridge area of Prince William County. On that day, Technician Wilson was part of the firefighter staffing on Tower 512 which responded to the house fire that was dispatched at 0603 hours. The Prince William County area was under a high wind advisory as a nor’eastern storm moved through the area. Sustained winds of 25 mph with gusts up to 48 mph were prevalent in the area at the time of the fire dispatch to Marsh Overlook Drive.
    • Initial arriving units reported heavy fire on the exterior of two sides of the single family house and crews suspected that the occupants were still inside the house sleeping because of the early morning hour. A search of the upstairs bedroom commenced for the possible victims. A rapid and catastrophic change of fire and smoke conditions occurred in the interior of the house within minutes of Tower 512’s crew entering the structure.
    • Technician Wilson became trapped and was unable to locate an immediate exit out of the hostile environment. Mayday radio transmissions were made by crews and by Technician Kyle Wilson of the life-threatening situation. Valiant and repeated rescue attempts to locate and remove Technician Wilson were made by the firefighting crews during extreme fire, heat and smoke conditions. Firefighters were forced from the structure as the house began to collapse on them and intense fire, heat and smoke conditions developed. Technician Wilson succumbed to the fire and the cause of death was reported by the medical examiner to be thermal and inhalation injuries.
    • The Department of Fire and Rescue immediately formed a multi-dimensional investigation team following the incident. The investigation team was comprised of five Department of Fire and Rescue uniform personnel and two external members from area fire departments. For eight months, the team thoroughly examined the events that occurred at the Marsh Overlook fire incident and identify the factors involved with the line of duty death of Technician I Kyle Wilson. The resulting report represents thousands of hours of effort to analyze fire and rescue operations and is a factual representation of the events that occurred. The report also provides a frame work for organizational level improvements.
    • The major factors in the line of duty death of Technician I Wilson were determined to be:
      • The initial arriving fire suppression force size.
      • The size up of fire development and spread.
      • The impact of high winds on fire development and spread.
      • The large structure size and lightweight construction and materials.
      • The rapid intervention and firefighter rescue efforts.
      • The incident control and management.
      • The Marsh Overlook fire incident was an immense fire fueled by extremely flammable building material products and a vicious wind. It was an environment where information gathering and decision making had to be performed in the time measurement of seconds. During the chain of events that occurred and under severe circumstances, fire and rescue personnel performed at exceptional levels.
    • During the repeated attempts to reach and rescue Technician I Wilson, personnel displayed heroic efforts and jeopardized their own safety. The Department will never forget the sacrifice that Technician Wilson made in an attempt to ensure others were safe. By sharing the knowledge gained from this very tragic and painful incident, the Department will ensure his sacrifice was not in vain and hope that other fire and rescue departments can avoid another similar occurrence.
    • Resources and Report

    Loudoun County (VA) Fire Rescue  Significant Near Miss Event Report

    • On May 25, 2008, fire and rescue personnel from Loudoun County responded to a structure fire at 43238 Meadowood Court in Leesburg, Virginia. During the course of the incident, seven responders were injured. Of those injured, four firefighters received significant burn injuries, two firefighters sustained orthopedic injuries, and one EMS provider was treated for minor respiratory distress. To date, five of the injured personnel have returned to duty. Two firefighters continue to recover from their injuries, including one who was severely burned.
    • Given the severity of the injuries and magnitude of the event, an independent Investigative Team was assembled to review the incident. The Team was comprised of four Loudoun County personnel, three external members from area fire departments, and two resource/support personnel. The Team was tasked with reviewing “the events leading up to the incident, the incident operation(s), the firefighter MAYDAY(s), and incident mitigation.”
    • For three months, the Team thoroughly examined the events surrounding the Meadowood Court fire incident and identified the factors associated with the injury of personnel.
    • The Report contains the results of the Investigative Team’s comprehensive review and analysis.
    • Fact Sheet, HERE
    • SIGNIFICANT INJURY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT 43238 MEADOWOOD COURT MAY 25, 2008 Report HERE

    Colerain Township (OH) Fire and EMS Department Final Report Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels Nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths

    • The Colerain Township (OH) Fire and EMS Department under the leadership of Director and Chief G. Bruce Smith recently released its final report Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths related to the April 4, 2008 Double Line of Duty Death of a Captain and Firefighter.  This investigative analysis and report, although specific to the events and conditions encountered during the conduct of operation at the residential occupancy at 5708 Squirrels nest Lane has pertinent and relevant insights, recommendations and factors that all Fire Service personnel, regardless of rank should read.
    • Incident Overview, HERE
    • NIOSH Report, HERE
    • Investigative Report, HERE
    Posted by on July 24, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Education, Fire Fighting, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, History Repeating Event, LODD, major-incidents, NIOSH Reports, Risk Assessment, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics, Taking it to the Streets, thecompanyofficer.com, training-development • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    A Tale of Two House (Fires)

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    YouTube Preview ImageA Tale of Two House Fires and their operational outcomes. This video from a newscast that Dave Statter did in 2007 provides some basic insights into operational factors related to Conventional Construction and Engineered Structural Systems (ESS).

    If you haven’t had the opportunity or time to log onto the Underwriter’s Laboratories (UL) University Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions. This online firefighter training course is the result of a research partnership among UL, the Chicago Fire Department, IAFC, and Michigan State University, funded in part by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This is a self-guided course which focuses on the structural stability of engineered lumber under fire conditions and provides the latest in test data and insights.

    UL Assembly Testing

    Also check out State Farm Insurance’s Fire Training web resource SFSafeTraining.com for informational training offerings to enhance your skill set in the areas of Building Construction and Operational Safety.

    Building Performance Awareness on Lightweight Construction during Fires is another exceptional linf to spend some time at the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) site.

    In a partnership with the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA), the American Forest and Paper Association (AF&PA) developed a comprehensive Web-based educational program to help the fire service learn more about lightweight construction components and the performance of these building materials during fires to create a safer operational environment for firefighters. These components include trusses, glue laminated beams, I-joists, structural composite lumber, structural insulated panels, and wood structural panels that are replacing dimensional lumber in many applications.

    Included in this program is FireFrame, an interactive tool on building construction for the fire service. It was developed with the assistance of several state and local fire training systems. Access the AF&PA Training site HERE

    As a Company or Command Officer are you aware and take into consideration operational factors that are unique to tactical assignments within occupancies and building structures of conventional construction versus those that have engineered structural assemblies and systems?

    • Each has defined time spans for safe operational deployment with mission crucial situational awareness considerations.
    • Are you aware of them and how they affect the overall integrity and safety of operating companies?
    • Remember;  Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety

    Posted by on July 3, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Collapse, company officer, Education, Fire Fighting, firefighting-operations, Risk Assessment, Strategy and Tactics, Structural Collapse, training, Uncategorized, USFA • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Remembering Hackensack and Gloucester City

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    Hackensack (NJ) Ford Fire July 1, 1988

     As we approach the July 4th holiday period, two significant LODD incidents previously occurred during this time frame that hold a number of lessons learned related to command management, operations, building construction principles and building performance, fire behavior and the ever present dangers of the job. Take the opportunity to learn more about these events, and expand your insights and knowledge base. Take a moment to reflect upon the supreme sacrifice made by these heroic firefighters and the messages that lay within the pages of the incident case studies, reports and summaries. 

    There’s a lot of practical safety and operational information on these events along with a tremendous volume of information in the various text books on strategy and tactics, incident command and building construction. 

    Learn from the past so we don’t repeat it. Remember- NO MORE HISTORY REPEATING EVENTS! 

    The Hackensack Ford Fire & Collapse occurred nearly ten years AFTER another tragic LODD event involving a bowstring truss roof collapse; the August 2nd, 1978 FDNY Waldbaum’s Fire, Brooklyn, New York that took the lives of six FDNY firefighters. 

    Street Smarts for Safety and Survival…………Stay safe.
    Additional Relevant Safety considerations, HERE and HERE 

    Twenty-Two Year Anniversary Hackensack Ford Fire and Truss roof collapse, Hackensack Fire Department. July 1st, 1988 

    Pause to remember our brothers who made the ultimate sacrifice twenty-one years ago, on July 1st, 1988 and the lessons learned from this event. 

    On July 1, 1988 Hackensack’s Captain RICHARD L. WILLIAMS, Lieutenant RICHARD REINHAGEN, Firefighter WILLIAM KREJSA, firefighter LEONARD RADUMSKI, and Firefighter STEPHEN ENNIS lost their lives at Hackensack Ford when a bowstring arch truss collapsed entrapping them in the area below. The five firefighters were in the structure, a bowstring truss building, when the roof suddenly collapsed a 60-foot square section of the building’s wood bowstring truss roof collapsed, and an intense fire immediately engulfed the area. Williams, Kresja and Radumski were killed instantly, and four other firefighters escaped. Reinhagen and Ennis survived the initial collapse and found refuge in a tool room where they spent the next 13 minutes calling for help.. . despite heroic rescue attempts, succumbed to carbon monoxide poisoning. Approximately 90 minutes after the collapse, firefighters located the bodies of their fallen comrades. 

    Three (3) building factors contributed to the collapse of this bowstring trussed roof: 

    • Alterations that consisted of a heavy ceiling of cementitious material on wire lathe;
    • Auto parts storage in the attic; and
    • The Fire burned for a significant length of time and was well advanced prior to detection.
    • This roof collapsed 35 Minutes after the initial units arrived. 

    Remember:
    • CAPT. RICHARD L. WILLIAMS, Engine Co. No. 304
    • LIEUT. RICHARD REINHAGEN, Engine Co. No. 302
    • F/F WILLIAM KREJSA, Engine Co. No. 301
    • F/F LEONARD RADUMSKI, Engine Co. No. 302
    • F/F STEPHEN ENNIS, Rescue Co. No. 308     

    NFPA SUMMARY
    Hackensack, New Jersey Fire Fighter Fatalities July 1, 1988 

    Five fire fighters from the Hackensack, New Jersey Fire Department were killed while they were engaged in interior fire suppression efforts at an automobile dealership when portions of the building’s wood bowstring truss roof suddenly collapsed. The incident occurred on Friday, July 1, 1988, at approximately 3:00 p.m., when the fire department began to receive the first of a series of telephone calls reporting “flames and smoke” coming from the roof of the Hackensack Ford Dealership. 

    Two engines, a ladder company, and a battalion chief responded to the first alarm assignment. The first arriving fire fighters observed a “heavy smoke condition” at the roof area of the building. Engine company crews investigated the source of the smoke inside the building while the truck company crew assessed conditions on the roof. For the next 20 minutes, the focus of the suppression effort was concentrated on these initial tactics. 

    During this time, however, little headway appeared to have been made by the initial suppression efforts, and the magnitude of the fire continued to grow. The overall fire ground tactics were shifted to a more “defensive” posture (exterior operation) and the battalion chief gave the order to “back your lines out.” However, before suppression crews could exit form the interior, a sudden partial collapse of the truss roof occurred, trapping six fire fighters. An intense fire immediately engulfed the area of the collapse. One trapped fire fighter was able to escape through an opening in the debris. The other five died as a result of the collapse. This incident and several others before and since, provide important lessons to the fire service regarding the fire ground hazards of wood truss roof assemblies. 

    This NFPA Summary may be reproduced in whole or in part for fire safety educational purposes as long as the meaning of the summary is not altered, credit is given to NFPA and the copyright of the NFPA is protected. 

    Following is an excerpt from the New York Times article:
    Demers contended that Chief Williams, primarily because of the volume of fire on the rooftop, should have ordered nine firefighters out of the garage within 7 minutes of his arrival. The order to pull out was given at 3:34 p.m., about 30 minutes after his arrival, the report said. 

    • “This radio message was not acknowledged by any companies,” the report said.

    The roof collapsed at 3:36 p.m. Three firefighters were hit by burning debris and killed, four escaped, and two, Lieut. Richard R. Reinhagen and Stephen Ennis, took refuge in the tool room. 

    • At 3:39 p.m., Lieutenant Reinhagen began to radio his location and appeal for help, the report said.

    In one of the major communications flaws cited by Mr. Demers at the fire scene, all departmental communications were transmitted on a single channel, or frequency. Consequently, Lieutenant Reinhagen’s appeals for help were intermingled with orders for deploying men and hoses and instructions to arriving companies. 

    • “You have to hurry, we’re running out of air,” Lieutenant Reinhagen said at 3:42 p.m.

    Headquarters then radioed to Chief Williams: “Expedite on that, they’re running out of air.” The transcript did not show any response from Chief Williams.Over the next 6 minutes, through 3:48 p.m., Lieutenant Reinhagen made 10 more calls. None was answered. For three of the minutes, bells indicating depletion of his air tanks’ supply were ringing repeatedly. At one point, a civilian who overheard the ringing on a radio scanner called fire headquarters to tell officials of the noise. 

    At 3:49 p.m., the Lieutenant radioed: “Chief, this is Lieutenant Reinhagen. I’m still stuck back in the right rear of the building in the closet. We are out of air in a closet. We’re out of air.”
    “What’s your location?” Chief Williams said. The response was inaudible and the Chief began ordering water from a truck. 

    At 3:50 p.m., the Lieutenant got the Chief directly and repeated that they were “stuck in a closet” and “out of air.” 

    • “Stuck in a closet?” Chief Williams asked.

    Twelve seconds later, the Chief Williams asked: “Where you at?” 

    • “Right there in the closet,” came the response.
    • Fourteen seconds later, Lieutenant Reinhagen radioed again: “Help. The right rear. Out of air. Anybody out there? Stuck in the closet, right rear. No air. Help.”

    The Lieutenant was asked if he was on the first or second floor. “First floor, underneath the collapsed ceiling,” the Lieutenant said at 3:52 p.m. It was his last transmission. Firemen eventually punched a hole through an exterior wall about 10 feet from the tool room, but saw only a mass of flame, Mr. Demers said. The burning timbers were leaning against the tool room, he said, but neither fireman was burned. 

    Learn from the past so we don’t repeat it. Remember- NO MORE HISTORY REPEATING EVENTS!  

    Some Open Questions; 

    • What impact did the Hackensack Ford Fire & Collapse have upon you in your career?
    • Were you aware of this event and its lessons learned prior to this posting?
    • What do you feel you need to learn related to Building Construction, Fire Behavior or Strategy and Tactics related to various occupancies and construction types?
    • What is you knowledge base on Truss Construction related to Timber Bow String or Engineered Structural Systems?

    Additional References:
    NFPA REPORT, HERE 

    Dave STATter’s 2008 Coverage, HERE 

    Fire Rescue Magazine  Article, A Failure in Command;  HERE 

    Lessons Learned from Tim Sendelbach, Editor-in-Chief, FireRescue magazine, HERE 

    Other Resource Links:
    http://www.wusa9.com/news/columnist/blogs/2008/06/hackensack-ford-20-years-later.html
    http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940DE3D6143FF931A357…
    http://www3.gendisasters.com/new-jersey/6534/hackensack-nj-fire-aut…
    http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=442&itemID=18676&;…;… 

    Memorial Park, Hackensack, NJ (http://www.cyberonic.net/~mikef6/p0000120.htm) 

    Three Firefighters and Three Sisters Killed in Gloucester City, New Jersey Building Collapse during Fire Attack, Rescue Operation, July 4th, 2002 

    Gloucester City (NJ) Collapse 2002

    On July 4th, 2002 at 0136 hrs.,The Gloucester City Fire Department was dispatched to 200 North Broadway for a reported house fire. Responding units were advised that occupants may be trapped. First arriving units were on location in less than three minutes. 

    They found heavy fire on all exposures of a three-story multi-family dwelling and initiated a search for entrapped occupants. (Various reports from bystanders were at times conflicting regarding the number and location of victims). While providing an aggressive interior attack and rescue operation, an occupant was rescued from the dwelling. Due to the severity of their injuries they were unable to give direction regarding the whereabouts of any other occupants. 

    While all hands were operating by continuing an aggressive interior attack and rescue, a partial collapse of the structure occurred. An emergency evacuation signal was sounded and while that was commencing a further and much more substantial collapse occurred trapping eight firefighters inside the burning debris. 

    Additional specialized collapse rescue resources were requested, firefighter accountability was initiated and rescue efforts were intensified. Five of the eight trapped firefighters were rescued. Three of the eight gave the ultimate sacrifice in service to their fellow man. Unfortunately these three children did not survive. A total of nine victims were transported to area hospitals, one civilian and eight firefighters. 

    Remember:
    • James Sylvester
    Fire Chief, Mount Ephraim Fire Department
    Sylvester, 31, a 17 year veteran, was survived by his wife, who was pregnant with the couple’s first child
    • John West
    Deputy Chief, Mount Ephraim Fire Department
    West, 40, a 23-year veteran, was survived by his wife and three children
    • Thomas G. Stewart III
    Paid Firefighter, Gloucester City Fire Department
    Stewart, 30, a 13 year veteran, was survived by his fiancée and their son. Stewart publicly proposed to his girlfriend, hours before the fire while they watched the city’s fireworks from high atop a fire truck ladder at Gloucester City High School. 

    NIOSH REPORT: Structural Collapse at Residential Fire Claims Lives of Two Volunteer Fire Chiefs and One Career Fire Fighter – New Jersey, HERE 

    Philadelphia Inquirer Posting, HERE 

    Everyone Goes Home Newsletter Article by Chris Collier, HERE 

    New Jersey Division of Fire Safety LODD Report, HERE 

    SUMMARY
    On July 4, 2002, a 30-year-old male volunteer fire chief, a 40-year-old male volunteer deputy fire chief, and a 30-year-old male career fire fighter died when a residential structure collapsed, trapping them, along with four fire fighters and an officer who survived. At 0136 hours, a combination fire department and a mutual-aid volunteer fire department were dispatched to a structure fire. Local law enforcement radioed Central Dispatch reporting a fully involved structure with three children trapped on the second floor. The first officer on the scene assumed incident command and reported to Central Dispatch that the incident site was a three-story structure with fire showing and that people could be seen at the windows. Note: The female resident (survivor) was the person seen in the window. 

    The three children that were reported as being trapped did not survive and were later found in the debris. Additional units were requested, including a mutual-aid ladder company from a career department. Crews were on the scene searching for occupants and fighting the fire for approximately 27 minutes when the building collapsed. 

    NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar incidents, fire departments should;
    • Ensure that the department’s structural fire fighting standard operating guidelines (SOGs) are followed and refresher training is provided
    • Ensure that the Incident Commander (IC) formulates and establishes a strategic plan for offensive and defensive operations
    • Ensure that the incident commander (IC) continuously evaluates the risk versus gain during operations at an incident
    • Ensure that a separate Incident Safety Officer, independent from the Incident Commander, is appointed
    • Ensure that fire fighters conducting interior operations (e.g., search and rescue, initial attack, etc.) provide progress reports to the IC
    • Ensure that accountability for all personnel at the fire scene is maintained
    • Ensure that a Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) is established and in position
    • Ensure that the officer in charge of an incident recognize factors (e.g., structural defects, large body of fire in an old structure, etc.) when analyzing potential building collapse
    • Ensure, when feasible, that fire fighters should respond together, in one emergency vehicle, as a crew
    Additionally, municipalities should consider
    • Establishing and maintaining regional mutual-aid radio channels to coordinate and communicate activities involving units from multiple jurisdictions 

    In order to minimize the risk of similar incidents, the New Jersey Division of Fire Safety identified key issues that must be addressed and remedies that should be implemented within all departments.  

    1. FACTOR: There appears to be a disconnect between career and volunteer personnel in the Gloucester City Fire Department (GCFD). Many personnel expressed the concern that the GCFD operated as separate fire departments rather than as one. 

    REMEDY: It is essential that all firefighters put individual differences aside in order to work together successfully as a team to achieve their common goal of saving lives and property. 

     2. FACTOR: The GCFD, faces a common dilemma associated with combination fire departments: staffing levels may be unpredictable depending on how many volunteers are available to respond to any one incident. This unpredictability can result in insufficient staff to perform required tasks until additional staff arrives. 

    REMEDY: Elected or appointed municipal officials need to make a commitment to the adequate staffing of the fire department and staffing levels must allow for compliance with the two-in / two-out provisions of the Public Employees Occupational Safety and Health (PEOSH) Standard 29CFR1910.134. The New Jersey Division of Fire Safety can provide assistance to the municipalities and provide examples of how this can be accomplished 

    3. FACTOR: Due to the limited number of firefighting personnel who arrived at this incident, all initial efforts were focused on the rescue of occupants. This postponed fire suppression operations until additional resources arrived. Because rescue and fire suppression operations were performed sequentially rather than simultaneously, the fire may have spread more quickly resulting in the early failure of the structure. 

    REMEDY: Sufficient personnel are critical to ensure that all necessary operations can be performed at the appropriate time. Furthermore, a continual size-up assessment must be maintained so that the Incident Commander (IC) can be kept aware of the conditions as the incident progresses. This continual size-up will allow the IC to modify the strategy and / or tactics as deemed necessary. 

    4. FACTOR: Although the GCFD was equipped with a thermal imaging camera (TIC), firefighters failed to utilize it for the initial search for victims. The TIC was also not used properly to analyze the scope of the incident and determine what tactics to employ. 

    REMEDY: Fire departments that possess TIC units should use them regularly during routine operations such as training, scene size up, search and rescue and structural fire fighting. 

    5. FACTOR: From the onset of operations, the Incident Management System (IMS) was not properly expanded as the incident progressed. Given the scale of this incident, the span of control quickly became too large for the IC to effectively manage and additional functions were not delegated to subordinates. Critical tasks such as safety and accountability were not effectively implemented. 

    REMEDY: N.J.A.C. 5:75 mandates that all fire departments utilize an IMS. It is a modular system, which allows the IC to apply only those elements that are necessary at a particular incident, and allows elements to be activated or deactivated as incidents escalate or decline. Fire departments are required to adopt written plans, or Standard Operating Guidelines (SOG’s) based on the IMS, to address different types of incidents. The NJ Division of Fire Safety distributed suggested SOGs upon adoption of this regulation and they continue to be available to all fire departments. 

    6. FACTOR: The GCFD did not assign a dedicated safety officer (SO) to observe operations and terminate potentially unsafe actions. 

    REMEDY: IMS regulations under N.J.A.C. 5:75 mandate the use of safety officers (SO’s) at all incidents. An SO is required to observe operations on the fire scene, identify next steps and order the correction of safety hazards to personnel. Given the scope of this incident, the IC should have assigned at least one SO. 

    7. FACTOR: The GCFD did not designate accountability officers to monitor each area of entry into the structure. Nor was a Personal Accountability Report (PAR) or roll sheet utilized to track personnel and monitor their functions. Therefore, the concept of accountability of personnel location, function, and time failed. 

    REMEDY: Although not enforceable at the time of this incident, the regulations for the NJ Personal Accountability System (NJPAS) under N.J.A.C 5:75 now require that fire departments utilize an accountability system. This system includes the designation of accountability officers and the use of PAR’s / roll calls, all within the framework of the IMS that is required to be utilized at all incidents. The NJ Division of Fire Safety is in the process of finalizing suggested SOGs and will distribute them to all fire departments when complete. 

    8. FACTOR: Although firefighters Sylvester and Stewart were equipped with Personal Alert Safety System (PASS) devices, they did not activate them prior to entering the structure. It should be further noted that their PASS devices were not automated; they had to be manually activated by the user. Firefighter West was not equipped with a PASS device. 

    REMEDY: PASS devices must be provided, used, and maintained in accordance with PEOSH regulations under N.J.A.C. 12:100-10 et seq. Although many departments still rely on PASS devices that must be activated manually, – devices that are acceptable by PEOSH regulations – they are not ideal because the firefighter must remember to activate the PASS device. For this reason, fire departments should strongly consider upgrading their SCBA to those employing automatic activating PASS devices. 

    9. FACTOR: The GCFD did not specifically designate the required personnel for the rescue of distressed firefighters through the establishment of Rapid Intervention Teams (RIT) or Firefighter Assist and Search Teams (FAST). Consequently, when the building collapsed, there was not a properly equipped team in place for immediate rescue operations. 

    REMEDY: IMS regulations under N.J.A.C. 5:75 require that fire departments utilize RIT or FAST to rescue distressed firefighters when operating in a hazardous atmosphere. The IC should request a RIT or FAST as soon as possible after dispatch to allow the team to arrive quickly. 

    10. FACTOR: Not all fire departments operating on the fire ground were communicating on the same radio frequency, which resulted in communication failures. Although, the Camden Fire Department (CFD) did have the capability to communicate on the GCFD “Fire 5” frequency they chose not to. 

    REMEDY: IMS regulations under N.J.A.C. 5:75 require that a communication system allow for inter-agency communication during mutual aid responses by providing a direct communication link between companies. Fire departments should work with other departments that are used routinely for mutual aid to ensure radio interoperability. 

    11. FACTOR: An emergency evacuation signal was sounded upon reports of a firefighter missing inside the structure before the impending collapse, however, the signal was never sounded at any other time prior to the collapse, nor was it sounded immediately after the collapse. 

    REMEDY: In the event an emergency evacuation becomes necessary and an emergency signal is required, N.J.A.C. 5:75 requires that fire departments utilize an emergency evacuation signal that is easily recognizable and distinguishable from all other fireground noises. The signal must be utilized when conditions on the fireground indicate an imminent and extreme risk to firefighters. At this time NJ DFS is finalizing a proposal that would establish a statewide emergency evacuation signal. 

    12. FACTOR: During this incident, fireground conditions were not properly analyzed, which led to the failure to recognize an impending building collapse. 

    REMEDY: Firefighters and officers need to learn the warning signs and causes of building collapses. Often following a collapse, as was the case with this incident, personnel on the scene report that the structure collapsed “without warning”. However, this is usually not the case; the reality is that the IC and firefighters simply failed to identify the indicators that were present prior to the collapse. 

    13. FACTOR: After removal of all victims, the remaining structure was demolished and the incident scene was cleared of all debris within 48 hours of law enforcement concluding their origin and cause investigation. This prevented a thorough assessment of the remaining structure in order to identify the cause and contributing factors of the collapse. 

    REMEDY: A protocol should be adopted to ensure that fire scenes are secured in a manner that not only allows for public safety, but also prevents immediate demolition. This will provide agencies with an opportunity to conduct any investigations that may be necessary. 

    14. FACTOR It was difficult to gauge the amount of training for all GCFD personnel due to insufficient record keeping. Although it was determined that the GCFD firefighters and officers met the minimum regulatory training requirements, many members did not possess a great deal of supplemental training with regard to structural firefighting. Additionally, the volunteer firefighters and officers often did not attend the scheduled departmental drills and rarely trained with the career personnel despite having frequent opportunities to participate. 

    REMEDY: Standards such as NFPA 1500 recommend that fire departments establish a regular training and education program that is commensurate with the duties and functions that firefighters are expected to perform. Additionally, proper record keeping is essential to certify that all personnel have received both required and supplemental training or education. 

    15. FACTOR: Qualifications of volunteer officers were difficult to judge and there were serious concerns voiced by the career members of the department regarding the suitability of some of the volunteer officers. This resulted in a lack of confidence by several career personnel in the volunteer officers and reluctance to take direction from them. 

    REMEDY: In addition to the NJ DFS requirement that all fire service supervisors obtain incident management certification; municipal officials need to establish uniform minimum qualifications for fire officers in order to ensure the effective provision of fire suppression services to the public. The NJ DFS recently adopted voluntary fire officer standards and will be developing a training curriculum to meet those standards. 

    16. FACTOR: It was not possible to determine if a smoke detector inspection was conducted in the building after a change in occupancy in October of 2001 as required by the NJ Uniform Fire Code. The city’s housing department, who has the responsibility for these inspections, was unable to provide documentation of such an inspection to either the Division of Fire Safety or to the Camden County Prosecutor’s Office. It was not clear whether smoke detectors were activated during this fire incident. 

    REMEDY: It is recommended that the responsibility for smoke detector inspections be transferred to the fire department to ensure complete and documented inspections. 

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    Discovery Channel Special on the Gloucester City Incident. A must see for all Company and Command Officers…

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