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Taking it to the Streets: Vacant, unoccupied, abandoned

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What at the Projected Operational Risks? Do they Matter? Photo:CJ Naum, 2013

 
Taking it to the Streets
Vacant, unoccupied, abandoned and derelict buildings continue to challenge emergency response companies at incidents. It’s the buildings of Heritage – masonry construction with Heavy Timber, Mill, Semi-Mill or Ordinary Construction systems of three to six to eight story heights that create the most significant risks to operations, mitigation, safety and integrity.

Do you know what the inherent characteristics and risks are for each system and occupancy condition?

Do you train on when and how to establish collapse management zones (CMZ), how to manage them and what indicators to monitor and track?
 
The identification, establishment and control of collapse management zones continues to be a leading Fireground performance deficient area requiring greater Fire
Service attention, training and rigor.
 
Understand the Difference between Occupancy Risk versus Occupancy Type?
 
Take a look at the building presented in the photo: discuss what the possible building construction features and systems are and why.
  • What type of Collapse Management Zones (CMZ) can be expected both interior and perimeter?
  • What would the expected fire flow requirements be with heavy fire involvement and extension?
  • What are other operational risks to operational companies and personnel?
  • How and when would Collapse Management Zones (CMZ) be established?
  • Who would manage them and how?
  • Is there a problem controlling Collapse Zones?
  • And the obvious question: How does the buildings’s assumed condition:Vacant, unoccupied, abandoned and derelict buildings affect your Incident Action Plan, Strategies and Tactics? Or is it not a factor…..How do you determine when and how to commit to interior operations?

For incident deployments to a report of a structure fire, the single most important attribute that defines all phases of subsequent operations and incident management; is that of understanding the building. 

An officer or commander’s skill set, comprehension and intellect in their ability to read a building is paramount towards identifying risks, conducting fluid assessment, probability, predictability and recognizing intrinsic characteristics of the building and its expected performance under fire conditions, which are essential toward development of an integrated and adaptive fire management model and flexible incident action plan.

If you don’t know and understand the building, how can you identify and select appropriate strategies and tactics and have an integrate IAP suitable for the building and occupancy risks and predictability of performance? 

It’s much more than just arriving on location, identifying a single family wood frame residential, a three story brick or a five story fireproof or single URM commercial and stretching in and going to work.

 

NIOSH: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires HERE

 

Posted by on April 13, 2013 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Collapse, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, Occupancies, operations, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Strategy and Tactics, Structural Collapse, training • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

The First-Due and Buildings on fire

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The First-Due and Buildings on fire

The First-Due and Buildings on fire
The ability for the first-arriving company, company officer or commander to perform an accurate identification of building type and classification are formulative toward anticipating variables in structural integrity and resiliency to the effects of extreme fire behavior, accelerated fire load package growth rates and intensity levels typically encountered in today’s composition and arrangement of buildings and their associated construction systems during initial and sustained fire suppression.

Arriving companies and personnel at a structure fire must be able to rapidly and accurately identify key elements of a building, process that data based on a widening field of variables present on today’s evolving Fireground and implement timely actions that address prioritized actions requiring intervention.

Building Performance

The identification, assessment, probability, predictability and intrinsic characteristics of the building and its expected performance under fire conditions must be identified, assessed and integrated into an adaptive fire management model and flexible incident action plan.

In other words, arriving companies and personnel at a structure fire need to be able to rapidly and accurately identify key elements of a building, process that data based upon a widening field of variables present on today’s evolving fireground and implement timely actions that address prioritized actions requiring intervention.   Deterministic fireground models for size-up and suppression have to give way to a more expandable stochastic model of assessment. Key to this is having a broad and well developed foundation of building knowledge.

  • Link to recent article, HERE
Posted by on April 13, 2013 • Filed under: Commandsafety.com, company officer, Fire Fighting, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, fires, Officer, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Taking it to the Streets: “All Companies Stand-By”: Transmitting the Box for….Your Street on this Day

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Transmitting the Box

Taking it to the Streets: “All units stand-by: Transmitting the Box for….Your Street on this DayThe importance of knowing your first-due, surrounding response districts, as well as greater alarm, mutual and automatic aid response areas …is fundamental towards achieving operational excellence and maintaining firefighter safety.

The fact that at times, our surroundings do become a blur and fade into the background does occur and should be recognized as a gap and corrected.

Company and Command Officer Responsibilities demand that you know your buildings intimately and have the knowledge base and experience to put Building Construction, Occupancy, Fire in the Compartment and Strategies & Tactics together in an orchestrated manner consistent with risk, demands and requirements dictated by the evolving incident.You know that quiet street you pass daily on your way to “other runs”, or that may not have necessarily required agency service in a while; have you looked at the construction and building features before you’re now showing up first-due with heavy fire showing, and multiple incident priorities all demanding immediate attention?

Take a look at the images from our past post and this one; run through your head what the street looks like (pre-event) and what parameters and factors you’re seeing. Do the same with the fire incident scene and see if you can match pre-incident situational awareness and pre-fire planning insights with what you might be confronting from the front seat or riding backwards….Understand and Know your world….it’s just a matter of time before those bells will be going off and the radio will be crackling….Engine 21 respond to…. For a report of a structure fire.

  • Checkout other interactions on Buildingsonfire on Facebook HERE and don’t forget to to LIKE and pass the link along
Posted by on March 26, 2013 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Fire Dynamics, Fire Fighting, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, Officer, operations, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics, Taking it to the Streets • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Taking it to the Streets: Your Street on any given Day

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Are you Aware of your Surroundings?

 
Taking it to the Streets: Your Street on any given Day
At times, our surroundings become a blur and fade into the fabric that defines our response district, our first-due, our neighborhood, community, city or town. We tend to focus on thos…e areas that have an immediacy or frequency that defines day-to –day operations, shifts or alarm dispatches and transmission of “those” box alarms. You know; the ones that have a particular address that always grab our attention.

Company and Command Officers MUST be intensely aware of your area’s fabric, its state and condition, the subtle changes as well as those that a times result in what seems like major changes, renovations or construction that pops up literally overnight or in a matter of weeks. Individually, you should be running scenario through your head as to the “what ifs” for a particular building, structure or occupancy. Share these insights and option plays with your company, station, battalion or group…Invest in the opportunity to game plan and know your world; before the alarms go off and the bell hits and you’re in the street….

Understand how your buildings co-exist with each other, what defines their characteristics, features, profile, hazards and challenges…

This is Part One of a Two Part Post….”All units standby: transmitting the box for….”

  • Checkout other interactions on Buildingsonfire on Facebook HERE and don’t forget to to LIKE and pass the link along
Posted by on March 25, 2013 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Fire Suppression, Occupancies, Officer, operations, Risk Management, Scenarios, Strategy and Tactics, Taking it to the Streets, thecompanyofficer.com • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Occupancy Risk and Performance

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What’s the Occupancy Risk? Photo courtesy of Buildingsonfire.com

Occupancy Risk and Operational Concerns

Take a look at this interior shot of the following occupancy:
Discuss this with your company, officers or station to identify the;
  • Suggested Building Construction Type,
  • Suggested Occupancy Type,
  • Construction System,
  • Operational Risks and Hazards, 
  • Fireground concerns if there was a fire in this Compartment/Building
  • What is Obvious?
  • What needs to be further assessed or identified?
  • What Inherent Building Profile and Performance Concerns area there?
  • What does the Company Officer need to know abouth this Building | Occupancy | Construction System | Compartment?
  • Are there unique tactical operational concerns for Engine |Ladder/Truck | Rescue |Support?
  • What about Command operational concerns?

Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety

Know your World

Follow Buildingsonfire on Facebook

 

Posted by on November 10, 2012 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, company officer • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Near-Miss, with RIT Deployment at Structural Collapse: Canada

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A rapid and fast moving early morning fire in downtown Trenton, Ontario Canada resulted in the subsequent collapse of a three story mixed use commerical and apartment occupancy structure. Published media reports indicated the building was over 130 years of age and was in operation as an adult entertainment establishment on the lower level with multiple occupancy use apartments on the upper floors. The fire displaced 12 residents. The commercial portion of  the building on the number one floor was not operating at the time of the alarm.

For a complete overview of the general fire, refer to the links below for the media links.

Two firefighters were nearly trapped while engaged in primary search and rescue operations as the fire conditions deteriorated and compromise and collapse  conditions began to collapse the wood frame structure.

Pre-incident images clearly depict the typical building profile of a heritage type structure of the late 1880′s vintage with it’s sloping roof profile and window treatments that are evident on both the bravo and delta divisions (many with window mounted air conditioning units that constitute a collapse risk to operating companies on the ground perimeter) . As with many buildings in urban areas, the exterior envelope has been renovated in a manner that added an exterior metal clad panel system that is typically mechanically fastened directly to the facade or to a sub-assembly fastening system. This in effect covers the buildings originating facade, building materials and structural and cosmetic conditions.

Common to original building construction and layouts, the alpha division shows the manner in which the first floor wall has been modified with no indication of window locations and conditions in the upper floors. Common to this renovation technique is the placement of the metal facade directly over existing window openings and framing systems, resulting in either boarded and elimination of the window or the fames and glass still present within the interior room compartments compounding search and rescue assignments.

Sherwood Forest Inn, Image from Google Street View

 The metal exterior cladding masks the ability for arriving companies to identify if the structure is wood frame Type V, ordinary Type III or Brace Frame construction.  The profile and charactoristics of this building profile suggests a buidling of Type III Ordinary construction ( Brick and jost) with load bearing masony construction. This is not the case in this structure as fireground photos further depicted. The various fireground photos suggest that this was a wood frame structure with wood exterior sheathing with some brick masonry features applied to the alpha division. The building envelope is encased in a sheet metal panel cladding system attached the perimeter facade.

 

Delta Division, Google Street View Image

  

Image above shows the degree of interior fire involvement and smoke density. The sheet metal cladding that was applied to the surface facade masks the ability to monitor wall degradation and compromise, retains heat within the building envelope and has independent collapse considerations based upon the manner it is atached to the outer facade further compounding the structural integrity of the buildings wall envelope. Photo by Step Crosier.

In incidents taht have building profiles such as this, conservative risk management, establishment of primary and secondary collapse perimeters along the various divisions is imperative for firefighter safety and apparatus operabilty.

Collapse and failure of the primary structural support systems affecting both interior and exterior structural and infill systems. Photo by Marc Venema

The image above shows the extent of collapse. Look at the various construction features consisting of the original wood plank sheathing, brick facade work, wood framing system and the retrofitted metal paneling facade.  

  • How would you Read the Building based upon the pre incident photos shown at the being of this post?
  • Would you assume the building was a type III or IV structure or a wood frame or brace frame structure?
  • Does each building system have a different bearing on fireground operations, strategies, tactics and operational integrity and company and personnal safety?
  • How much operatoinal time do you have for a primary search and rescue assignment or for deployment and effective location of a fire seat and application of hose streams before you developing compromising conditions with the interior compartments?

 

Look at the brick veneer added to the wood sheathing covered by the metal panels in this image. Photo by Steph Crosier

 

 

 

   

 

Posted by on November 5, 2012 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Collapse, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Fire Suppression, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, fires, Near-Miss Reporting, operations, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Three Firefighters Injured in Residential Collapse

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Cherokee County Fire and Emergency Services

 

Cherokee County Fire and Emergency Services

Cherokee County (GA) Fire and Emergency Services and Woodstock (GA) Fire Department personnel responded to a structure fire at 811 Commons Court, located in the Kingston Square Subdivision, off Highway 92, just east of Woodstock (GA) sunday night for a reported fire in a residential structure; with reports of trapped occupants. During suppression operations, three Cherokee County firefighters were trapped in the basement for a short period of time due the catastrophic collapse of a front wall-floor assembly resulting in the collapse of the entry porch floor system on the alpha division.

Cherokee County 911 received the call of the fire at 1:30 Sunday regarding a structure fire with possible entrapment. Firefighters quickly responded to the scene to find the house fully involved and began a defensive attack. Two Cherokee County firefighters and one Woodstock firefighters were standing on the porch of the structure when it collapsed. The three firefighters were pulled from the burning structure and were later taken by ambulance to Marietta’s Kennestone Hospital.

According to information posted on the Cherokee County Fire and Emergency Services web site and other published media reports,  two Cherokee County Firefighters were treated and released and one firefighter  is still in ICU at a local hospital, struggling to survive; with smoke inhalation and lung injuries resulting from the falling bricks that struck him during the collapse.

According to one report, the three engine company firefighters were operating a handline for an exended period of time on the porch of the home  (Alpha side) when the floor and wall assembly gave way beneath them, sending them tumbling into the basement below. The adjacent wall and canopy fell on top of the firefighters after falling into the area below.  An aerial view of the residence shows a raised ranch style structure with a garage and basement configuration below the main floor. According to public records, the single family wood frame house was built in 1986 and was comprised of 1,910 square feet of occupied space, with three bredrooms.

Aerial View of the Residential Occupancy (Bing)

Unfortunately due to the degree of fire involvment and susequent collapse, firefighters were unable to reach the elderly couple, a 78 year old man and his 77 year old wife, who perished in the early morning fire. The couple’s daughter and her 25 year old son were also living with the couple and they escaped without injury.

We posted some extensive information over at CommandSafety.com related to two past LODD events from 2006 and 2009 along with a number of pertainent informational links realted to floor collapse, firefighter near miss events involving floor compromise and collapse.

Take some time to link over to our sister site and check out the information. (HERE)

We’ll follow up on this event to see if we can gain further insights related to the structural conditions, construction features and contributing factors that lead to the floor collapse.

 
 
 
 

 

Posted by on August 30, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Collapse, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, Near-Miss Reporting • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Ten Minutes in the Street: The First-Due

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Ten Minutes in the Street with Christopher Naum

First-due company operations have a wide variation of considerations and demands that must be readily identified, rapidly assessed and effectively acted upon through concise and direct orders. 

 

 Arrivals and subsequent deployments during night time periods pose ever increasing challenges to arriving officers in the ability to ascertain and recognize factors that will have a direct or ancillary affect in the developing incident action plan, tactics and task assignments.

 

Night time operations at structure fires, especially those with heavy fire involvement upon arrival can mask or conceal critical operational or safety considerations, developing or progressing smoke conditions that may be missed due to darkness as well as other occupancy risk profiling considerations or civilians in distress or entrapment.  

  

Rapidly escalating or deteriorating conditions coupled with conflicting or concurrent operational demands (rescue and suppression) with limitations imposed due to staffing levels further exasperates the need for the company or command officer to maintain acute situational awareness, implement effective scene scanning , recon, the 360 and assimilate all available information and presumptions that can be made into orders and assignments.

 

This edition of Ten Minutes in the Street TM is looking at the considerations for the first-due engine company upon arrival at a well involved single family residential house fire. Take a look at the physical layout and arrangement of the incident scene and the primary house fire and exposures.

 

Take some time to look at the accompanying video clip. The video clip was compliments of our good friend FF David Stacy an intern with the IAFC and a member of College Park Station 12 (MD).

This scenario makes use of [the] fireground video clip and subsequent pictorials for representive example purposes only and are not intended to recreate or critique the events depicted in this video or in the operations shown.

 

Here are some considerations to talk and discuss in a group setting. Deliberate and debate the operational issues, roles and responsibilities, safety considerations, as well as tactical deployment demands and incident priorities.  Address through your discussions the requirements that are imposed upon your selected or suggested actions based on your company, departments or agency SOP/SOG or expectations.

 

You can discuss this event using the following criteria in any combination;

 

Building:              Single Family Residential, two stories

Profile:                 Built: 1986, wood frame with some engineered structural floor components, wood siding, full basement

Size:                      1,764 square feet, three bedroom, 2.5 baths, large sun room and pool on Division 3

Occupancy:         Occupied at the time of fire discovery

District:               (You select) Fully hydrant water supply or limited

 

Deployment:    

  •  Arrival with Engine and Truck Company: Staffing four each
  •  Arrival with Engine Company only with staffing of four (or based upon your staffing levels)
  •  Arrival with two Engine companies: Staffing based upon your staffing levels

 

 

Street Side from the curb (Google Street View)Division Alpha view

 

   

 

  

 

 

Discussion Points and Questions;

  • What are the immediate priorities and operational considerations?
  • What are the primary considerations that the company officer must consider and why?
  • What factors must be identified and considered in order to implement your IAP?
  • What can be expected as the incident progresses in the next ten minutes of elapsed time?
  • What is the Building and Occupancy Profile?
  • Should a 360 be implemented:  if so why and by whom?
  • What is mission critical upon arrival at a well involved structure fire especially when it involves a residential structure at night?
  • What impact on tactical operations will time of night have on the IAP?
  • Based upon your staffing levels what can be realistically assigned? Why?
  • Identify some of the operational safety concerns evident or assumed that must be recognized and considered?
  • What affect will the building structure and degree of fire involvement have on incident operations?
  • What are the expected (sustained) fire flow rates that will be required?
  • What are the resource needs; now or later?
  • What should be considered if there are escalating exposure issues or extension?

Download the PDF File Version for use around the Kitchen Table, a drill or as a Training Aide: http://thecompanyofficer.com/files/2011/08/Vol11NO8.pdf

 

These are but a few questions that can be posed, think about other questions or considerations based upon local operational considerations, risk, or limitations.

 

 

Posted by on August 25, 2011 • Filed under: christopher naum, command-leadership, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Fire Fighter Safety, Fire Fighting, firefighting-operations, Scenarios, Ten Minutes in the Street Scenarios, thecompanyofficer.com • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Ten Minutes in the Street: Report of Smoke in the Area

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It always starts out this way…..a quiet Saturday afternoon.

The shift tour has been fairly quiet or you just happened to stop into the fire station for a cup of coffee and some kitchen table talk in the day room.

The bells/tones come in for a report of smoke coming from a building located in your outer first-due area. The address is for a multi-use occupancy that houses a number of storage, distribution and office businesses.

  • The structure is two stories and is approximately 45 feet wide x 450 feet in length.
  • It was originally constructed in 1924 with significant modifications, additions, renovations, alterations and add-ons.
  •  It stated out as Type III Ordinary Construction but has some Type V Wood Frame and Type II, Non-Combustible features added over the years. It’s generally in good shape, but does show its age and wear.
  • There is a mixed staff of warehouse, office and maintenance personnel working on premises this morning. (assumption ~ 12 employees)
  • The call originates from a passerby and is quickly followed up by a report from a loading dock employee reporting smoke present at the far end of a product storage area
  • Weather conditions are unremarkable, slight breeze, moderate temperatures, clear skies…
  • Your resources ( personnel and apparatus) are what you typically would have in your jurisdiction.
  • The building does not have a fixed suppression system
  • The area does have hydrants at both ends of the street coming in on the Alpha side.

You have a seven minute response time.

Let’s take these operations thru the first ten minutes of operations;

  1. Take a role; First-Engine Company OR First-Due Chief Officer…..
  2. What are your Risk Assessment and Size-Up Considerations?
  3. What do you Know?
  4. What are you assuming, What do you need to know?
  5. What is the Building and Occupancy Profile suggesting to you?
  6. Incident Action Plan thoughts?
  7. What do you need now, (that’s hopefully enroute), that needs to be requested or that you’re hoping is available?
  8. Where can this incident end up going?
  9. What’s the Safety Profile?
  10. What is the projected fire flow needs for this incident?
  11. What’s projected for the first ten minutes..?

Aerial Overview of the property and structures

Aerial Over View of the Building

Overview of the Occupancy Structure Alpha View

Overview of the Occupancy Structure Alpha View

Alpha/Bravo Conditions

Alpha/Bravo Conditions

Alpha Side Smoke Showing Upon Arrival

Alpha Side Smoke Showing Upon Arrival

Posted by on August 13, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, christopher naum, Fire Fighter Safety, firefighting-operations, Scenarios, Situational Awareness, Ten Minutes in the Street Scenarios, thecompanyofficer.com • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Fire Department Officers Liable in Double Firefighter LODD

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Double Firefighter LODD Residential House Fire 2002

Lawsuit revived against fire departments in firefighter’s death in 2002 house fire

A New York State appeals court has reinstated a lawsuit against the Manlius (NY) and Pompey Hill (NY) fire departments in the death of a volunteer firefighter battling a Pompey house fire in 2002.

The state Supreme Court Appellate Division in Rochester – in a 4-1 split decision – concluded the law granting personal immunity to volunteer firefighters does not apply to the fire departments themselves or to department officials.

The lawsuit stems from the death of Fayetteville (NY) Firefighter Timothy Lynch in a fire March 7, 2002, at a home on Sweet Road in Pompey. Manlius (NY) Firefighter John Ginocchetti also died in that blaze.

Lynch’s widow, Donna Prince Lynch, sued Onondaga County, New York  and then county Fire Coordinator Mike Waters in 2003. The county responded to that lawsuit by suing the Pompey Hill Fire District, the Pompey Hill Fire Department, Assistant Chiefs Richard Abbott and Mark Kovalewski, the village of Manlius, the Manlius Fire Department, Deputy Chief Raymond Dill and homeowner Joseph Messina.

State Supreme Court Justice Donald Greenwood dismissed the claims against the fire departments and the chiefs in 2009 based on the immunity argument.

But the Rochester appellate court ruled last week that Greenwood erred. The majority concluded the section of state General Municipal Law granting immunity to volunteer firefighters in the performance of their duty did not apply to the fire departments or the department officials.

The plain language of the statute reflects the Legislature’s purpose in enacting that law was “first, to immunize volunteer firefighters from civil liability for ordinary negligence and, second, to shift liability for such negligence to the fire districts that employ them,” the majority wrote.

The court rejected the fire departments’ contention – and Greenwood’s earlier decision – that the law only allows fire departments to be held liable for volunteer firefighters’ negligent operation of motor vehicles. The court concluded the Legislature – in enacting the statute in 1934 – meant to expand, not restrict, the liability of fire districts.

“In other words, the Legislature sought to assure that there would be some liability on the part of the fire districts where previously there had been some doubt,” the majority wrote.

Justice Eugene Fahey, in a lone dissent, agreed with Greenwood that the immunity law applied to the departments and their officials as well as the volunteer firefighters. He concluded the fact the Legislature carved out a motor vehicle exception indicated the lawmakers’ intent was to grant immunity to the fire districts in the first place.

This is the second time Greenwood’s rulings in the case have been modified or overturned on appeal.

In 2007, Greenwood dismissed outright the Lynch lawsuit. But in February 2008, the appellate division reinstated the part that charged a violation of General Municipal Law and accused Waters of failing to comply with the state’s emergency command and control system.

The appellate court concluded then that there was an issue for trial as to whether Waters had a supervisory role at the fire scene.

The county responded to that ruling by suing the fire departments and their officials. The county contends that if there was any negligence on Waters’ part, it was less than that of the fire departments and their officials and those defendants should pay any damages.

Because there was no appeal of Greenwood’s separate decision dropping the case against Dill, he remains out of the lawsuit under the appellate court ruling.

NIOSH REPORT SUMMARY

First-Floor Collapse During Residential Basement Fire Claims the Life of Two Fire Fighters (Career and Volunteer) and Injures a Career Fire Fighter Captain – New York

SUMMARY

On March 7, 2002, a 28-year-old male volunteer fire fighter (Victim #1) and a 41-year-old male career fire fighter (Victim #2) died after becoming trapped in the basement. Victim #1 manned the nozzle while Victim #2 provided backup on the handline as they entered the house. After entering the structure, the floor collapsed, trapping both victims in the basement. A career fire fighter captain joining the fire fighters near the time of the collapse was injured trying to rescue one of the fire fighters. Crew members responded immediately and attempted to rescue the victims; however, the heat and flames overcame both victims and eliminated any rescue efforts from the garage entrance. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should

  • ensure that the Incident Commander is clearly identified as the only individual responsible for the overall coordination and direction of all activities at an inciden
  • ensure that the Incident Commander conveys strategic decisions to all suppression crews on the fireground and continually reevaluates the fire condition
  • ensure that Incident Command conducts an initial size-up of the incident before initiating fire fighting efforts and continually evaluates the risk versus gain during operations at an incident
  • ensure that fire fighters from the ventilation crew and the attack crew coordinate their efforts
  • ensure that fire fighters report conditions and hazards encountered to their team leader or Incident Commander
  • ensure fire fighters are trained to recognize the danger of operating above a fire

A report from the New York State Department Of Labor details several problems that happened the night of a fire that claimed the lives of firefighters John Ginochetti and Timothy Lynch. The Pompey Hill Fire Department was issued three citations for problems with training, equipment, and communication.

Included in the report was a detailed listing of the events that happened on the night of March 7, 2002.

7:10 p.m.: 911 receives call about a fire in the basement of a home at 2841 Sweet Road, Pompey Hill.
7:20 p.m.: Manlius Fire Department responds to the fire.
7:28 p.m.: The assistant fire chief on scene reports that smoke is showing in the first floor of the building and that the fire is in the basement.
7:30 p.m.: Firefighters enter the building through the basement and garage.
7:37 p.m.: Fire has burned for 25 minutes.
7:45 p.m.: Gino Ginochetti and TJ Lynch start to ventilate the roof. The assistant fire chief says, “Hang tight, the fire is pretty well knocked down.”
7:47 p.m.: Command refuses 700 gallons of water offered.
7:51 p.m.: Onondaga County Fire Coordinator Mike Waters arrives on scene. Waters broke out the windows on the east side of the building.
7:53 p.m.: A team enters the basement, then discovers that there is no water pressure in their water hoses. The pump operator discovers that the valve system has failed and water will not flow.
7:58 p.m.: Fire has been burning for 48 minutes with no water being directed on it.
7:59 p.m.: Waters orders three firefighters, including Ginochetti and Lynch into the building through the garage and onto the first floor. At this time, both Ginochetti and Lynch fall through the floor and into the basement. The third firefighter, Brian Stevens, tried to pull Ginochetti from the basement. He then had to back away from the fire, which had flashed over. Stevens received burns to the face. Mike Waters entered the building to try and rescue the men, but had to be pulled out when the entire garage went up in flames. Crews outside started to direct water into the area of the collapse.

The report also notes that there were several violations with:

-respiratory protection standards

-number of training hours for the Incident Commander

The direct cause of deaths for Ginochetti and Lynch was found to be a combination of a ten foot fall into the basement and the smoke and heat exposure to both men.

Indirect causes included:

-Command at the fire scene did not maintain communication with attack teams assigned to do interior attack. The team assigned to the back of the building did not maintain communication.

-Command refused the 700 gallons of water offered, and instead said that the fire was under control.

-Communication problems between the teams meant that one group didn’t know whether or not the other had entered the building.

-Command gave orders without knowledge of the fire or the building, although the home owner was on scene to provide the information.

-Pompey Hill Fire Department procedures were deficient, including backup and rescue teams.

Posted by on January 6, 2011 • Filed under: command-leadership, Crew Integrity, Fire Fighting, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, LODD, NIOSH Reports, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics, Structural Collapse • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Situational Awareness and The Three Sixty

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Situational Awareness Combat Operations

The fireground often has competing or conflicting incident priorities, demands or distractions before a complete appreciation of all mission-critical or essential information and data has been obtained. The effective assessment of the incident scene is much more than the three-sided size-up methodology of past fireground practices. In fact the term size-up doesn’t align with the newest directions in firefighter safety and incident command management.

The 360 degree assessment has become the generally accepted standard from which risk assessment is performed and incident action plans derived. The fact that many LODD case studies and reports repeatedly indicate the lack of an effective 360 degree assessment of the incident scene where structural fire engagement is being initiated was a contributing factor or may have contributed to a different incident outcome. Think about the effectiveness and value that the 360 ◦ Degree assessment brings to the development of an effective and valid incident action plan and the tactics that are driven by those identified and assumed assessment indicators. The question is: Are you conducting a 360 upon arrival, and if not WHY?

All command and supervisory personal and operating companies must be able to recognize and appreciate the risks which are present at an incident in order to carry out an effective dynamic risk assessment. The 360 Degree assessment is a mission critical element for effective and safety incident operations. Don’t for a moment think, “it takes too long to perform” or that you don’t have time to conduct, especially from a company officer perspective when you’re deploying and initiating tactical assignments. That extra minute to conduct a “three-sixty” may make all the difference in the world…..There may be three hundred and sixty degrees of safety margin that separate you and your company between injury or death….think about it.

Situational Awareness and Risk Assessment

Situation Awareness related to Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Firefighter Safety is another mission critical element. Situation Awareness (SA) is the perception of environmental elements within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future. It is also a field of study concerned with perception of the environment critical to decision-makers in complex, dynamic situations and incidents. Both the 2006 and 2007 Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System Annual Reports identified a lack of situational awareness as the highest contributing factor to near misses reported.• Situation Awareness involves being aware of what is happening around you at an incident scene to understand how information, events, and your own actions will impact operational goals and incident objectives, both now and in the near future.

  • Lacking SA or having inadequate SA has been identified as one of the primary factors in accidents attributed to human error.
  • Situation Awareness becomes especially important in the structural fire suppression and firefighter domains where the information flow can be quite high and poor decisions can lead to serious consequences.
  • Dynamic Risk Assessment is commonly used to describe a process of risk assessment being carried out in a changing or evolving environment, where what is being assessed is developing as the process itself is being undertaken.
  • This is further problematical for the Incident Commander when confronted with competing or conflicting incident priorities, demands or distractions before a complete appreciation of all mission critical or essential information and data has been obtained.
  • The dynamic management of risk is all about effective, informed and decisive decision making during all phases of an incident at a structural fire.

The integration of Situational Awareness and Dynamic Risk Assessment related to the building and occupancy is a mission critical element in managing structural fires and in the strategic command management and company level tactical operations as we go forward into the next decade.

  • Traditional phased incident scene size-up and monitoring is antiquated and no longer appropriate or applicable to modern fire service operations.
  • Situational awareness is a combination of attitudes, previously learned knowledge and new information gained from the incident scene and environment that enables the strategic commanders, decision-makers and tactical companies to gather the information they need to make effective decisions that will keep their firefighters and resources out of harm’s way, reducing the likelihood of adverse or detrimental effects.
  • Command and company officers and firefighters MUST understand the building, the occupancy features and the inherent impact of fire within and on the structure, AND be able to identify, communicate and take actions necessary to support the incident action and battle plans, mitigate incident conditions and provide for continuous safety protection to themselves, their team, their company and the entire alarm assignment operating at the incident scene.

Everyone on the incident scene MUST stay alert to changing conditions, obvious or latent conditions or escalating factors that require prompt identification, comprehension and appropriate implementation of actions. To the Incident Commander, fire officer or firefighter, knowing what’s going on around you, in and around the building structure and understanding the consequences of building, construction, assembly, fire load and fire development and growth is mission critical to incident stabilization and mitigation and profoundly crucial in terms of personnel safety. Maintain a three-sixty sphere of observation and awareness at all times.

Some addtional References; HERE, HERE and HERE, HERE

Posted by on November 14, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Fire Fighter Safety, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Situational Awareness • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

The Predictability of Occupancy Performance and Tactical Patience

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Today’s incident demands on the fireground are unlike those of the recent past, requiring incident commanders and commanding officers to have increased technical knowledge of building construction with a heightened sensitivity to fire behavior, a focus on operational structural stability and considerations related to occupancy risk versus the occupancy type.

There is an immediate need for today’s emerging and operating command and company officers to increase their foundation of knowledge and insights related to the modern building occupancy, building construction and fire protection engineering and to adjust and modify traditional and conventional strategic operating profiles in order to safeguard companies, personnel and team compositions.

Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk, not occupancy type, and must have the combined adequacy of sufficient staffing, fire flow and tactical patience orchestrated in a manner that identifies with the fire profiling, predictability of the occupancy profile and accounts for presumptive fire behavior.

The dramatic changes in buildings and occupancies over the past ten years have resulted inadequate fire suppression methodologies based upon conventional practices that do not align with the manner in which we used to discern with a measured degree of predictability how buildings would perform, react and fail under most fire conditions.

We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system and given an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions, we can safely and effectively mitigate a structural fire situation in any  given building type and occupancy.

Past operational experiences, both favorable and negative; gave us experiences that define and determine how the fireground is assessed, react and how we expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future; this formed the basis for the naturalistic decision-making process.

Implementing fundamentals of firefighting operations built upon nine decades of time-tested and experience-proven strategies and tactics continues to be the model of suppression operations. These same fundamental strategies continue to drive methodologies and curriculums in our current training programs and academies of instructions.

Are you aware of the defining changes in structural systems and support, the degree of compartmentation, the characteristics of materials and the magnitude of the fire-loading package in today’s buildings and occupancies? When was the last time you were out in the street with the companies, or spent some time doing a walk-through of construction or renovations site? Have you asked you commanding officers, division or battalion chief or your company officers for insights into what operational demands and risks are being imposed upon them while operating in the street and within the buildings, occupancies and structures that comprise your jurisdiction?

The structural anatomy, predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and the extreme fire behavior; accelerated growth rate and intensively levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term combat fire engagement.

The rules for combat structural fire suppression have changed; but no one has told us. The IAFC Safety, Health & Survival Section (SH&S) spent that past year refining and updating The IAFC Ten Rules of Structural Fire Engagement. First published in 2001, the original Ten Rules of Engagement for Structural Fire Fighting provided a set of principles and parameters that incident commanders, commanding and company officers could utilize and implement during incident operations to decrease operations risk, increase and amplify personnel safety of operating companies.

The section moved to develop rules of engagement for structural firefighting to serve as nationally developed model procedures (SOPs) offered by the IAFC. These new Rules of Engagement for Structural Fire Fighting have been posted on the IAFC SH&S web page and were officially rolled out the Fire Rescue International in Chicago this past August.

The Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival and The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety will provide a crucial link towards integrating occupancy risk considerations with more educated and informed understandings of buildings, occupancies, and the behavior of fire with a structure.

It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations, although any seasoned command and company officer knows that at times. It’s what gets the job done under the most arduous and demanding of circumstances.

However, from a methodical and disciplined perspective; aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal-oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed strategic processes that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments.

The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrated with intelligent tactical deployments and operations recognizing the risk problematically and not fatalistically, resulting in safety conscious strategies and tactics. Today’s incident commanders need to think about the Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling, while implementing Tactical Patience.

Think about the following;

  • Read, comprehend and implement the new IAFC The Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival and The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety
  • Take a tour of your response area, district, community or city. Take a good look around and begin to recognize the apparent or subtle changes that are affecting your incident operations; Take note and think about what needs to be adjusted, modified or changed in your operations.
  • Read up on the latest research and technical literature on wind driven fires, extreme fire behavior, structural ability of engineered lumber systems, fire loading and suppression theory
  • Take the time to personally read a series of the latest NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program LODD reports and relate them to your organizations operations and jurisdictional risks.
  • Start thinking in terms of Occupancy Risks versus Occupancy Type an align your operations and deployments to match those risks
  • Increase your situational awareness of today’s fireground and refine your strategic and tactical modeling
  • Implement both Strategic and Tactical Patience; Slow down and allow the building to react and stabilize, for fire behavior to stop behaving badly and for your companies to increase survivability ratios while meeting the demands of  conducting fire service operations
  • Reprogram your assumptions and presumptions and options on building construction and firefighting operations; the buildings have changed, our firefighting has not; what are you going todo about that gap?

If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner that is no longer acceptable within many of our modern building types, occupancies and structures. This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at risk. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die, it’s that simple; it’s that obvious.

Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company-level supervision and task-level competencies … You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”.

It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, equating to Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

Posted by on October 13, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Fire Fighter Safety, Fire Fighting, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, NIOSH Reports, Occupancies, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics, Taking it to the Streets, thecompanyofficer.com • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

NIOSH: Uncoordinated ventilation caused flashover

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NIOSH: Uncoordinated ventilation caused flashover killing Ill. firefighterInvestigators say crews failed to recognize signs of an imminent flashover; firefighters were between the fire and ventilation points
By Ken Robinson
FireRescue1 Associate Editor
HOMEWOOD, Ill. — Uncoordinated ventilation caused a flashover that killed one firefighter and injured another when both failed to recognize signs of rapidly deteriorating conditions, investigators found.

Insufficient staffing was also cited as a key contributing factor in the incident, as crews on scene were stretched thin according to a NIOSH report released Tuesday.

Rookie Homewood Fire Department Firefighter-Paramedic Brian Carey was killed of smoke inhalation on March 30 while assisting in search and rescue of a reported victim trapped in a house fire, the report said.

Responding to reports of a downed brother, firefighters conducting a search discovered Firefighter-Paramedic Carey entangled in a hoseline and not wearing his helmet or facepiece, and without a hood.

Firefighter-Paramedic Karra Kopas, who had entered the structure along with him, was injured in the fire and had to be rescued four feet from the front door where she said her gear melted to the living room carpet.

At the time of the flashover, firefighters performing ventilation were not coordinating with hoseline and search and rescue crews inside the house, according to the investigation.

Both Firefighters Carey and Kopas were between the fire and the ventilation source.

“One firefighter accounts heavy, turbulent, black smoke pushing from a window on the B-side after it was broken,” the report said.

“Shortly after, the house sustained an apparent ventilation-induced flashover.”

NISOH says the thick, black and heavily pressurized smoke that exited through ventilation should have been acted upon as a warning sign.

“The IC, and individuals working on the exterior, need to recognize this as a potential for extreme fire behavior and evacuate interior crews,” the report said.

In addition, investigators recommend training firefighters under realistic conditions to indentify the signs of an imminent flashover.

“Obtaining proper training and hands-on experience through the use of a flashover simulator may assist interior firefighters in making sound decisions on when to evacuate a structure fire,” the report said.

The inability to appropriately coordinate fireground operations may have been directly tied to inadequate staffing.

“Due to short staffing, the ambulance personnel were tasked with fire suppression activities, thus taking them out-of-service as a medical unit,” the report said.

The incident commander, a Lieutenant, was also required to ride and operate as the officer of an Engine Crew due to short staffing.

“This removed him from his command response vehicle which would have allowed him to command at a tactical level versus having to potentially perform tasks,” the report said.

Investigators also found an accountability system was never put in place and a personnel accountability report was never conducted following the incident.

As a result of the incident, NIOSH made the following key recommendations for fire departments to follow:

  • Ensure that a complete 360-degree situational size-up is conducted on dwelling fires and others where it is physically possible and ensure that a risk-versus-gain analysis and a survivability profile for trapped occupants is conducted prior to committing to interior firefighting operations.

 

  • Ensure that interior fire suppression crews attack the fire effectively to include appropriate fire flow for the given fire load and structure, use of fire streams, appropriate hose and nozzle selection, and adequate personnel to operate the hose line.

 

  • Ensure that firefighters maintain crew integrity when operating on the fireground, especially when performing interior fire suppression activities.

 

  • Ensure that firefighters and officers have a sound understanding of fire behavior and the ability to recognize indicators of fire development and the potential for extreme fire behavior
    Ensure that incident commanders and firefighters understand the influence of ventilation on fire behavior and effectively coordinate ventilation with suppression techniques to release smoke and heat.

  • Ensure that firefighters use their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures.
Posted by on September 30, 2010 • Filed under: command-leadership, company officer, Crew Management, Culture, Doug Cline, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , ,

Six Detroit Firefighters Injured at Taxpayer Fire from Wall Collapse

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Detroit News

Six Detroit firefighters were injured during operations at a two alarm fire at a commercial taxpayer fire on the city’s east side. Initial reports indicate a roof collapse and subsequent compromise and further collapse occurred on the alpha side of operations with additional reports of an explosion preceding the collapse. Additional information provided by the Detroit Fire Department indicated the building structure had sustained some degree of damage from fire operations a few hours earlier and that during the suppression operations  at 07:00 hours, while companies were operating, a facade collapse of the perimeter brick wall occured.
The brick facade collapse trapped a number of firefighters under the debris pile requiring extrication and removal. Published report indicate that the following Detroit Firefighters were injured as a result of the collapsing facade wall;

• Lt. Gerald Rutkowski, 46; 23 years with department

• Shane Raxter, 32; 9 years with department.

• Brian Baulch, 31; 9 years with department.

• Jeron Whitehorn 30; 8 years with department.

• Eric Jurmo, 31; 11 years with department.

• Brendan Milewski, 31; 11 years with department

It appears the two story brick structure located at the corner block had commercial occupancies on the number one floor, with the second floor boarded up, evidenced by the coverings over the windows.
The facade collapse of the alpha side in the predominate location of perimeter windows is typically the least stable of areas in buildings of type III ordinary construction. Lacking any significant mass and increased wythe, non-bearing walls have less mass and require stability of the adjacent floor systems and load bearing lintels and beams to maintain structural stability and integrity. Gravity affects unstable brick veneer and in-fill walls greatly as does other imposed loads, hose and master streams impacts.  We’ll post more building construction insights and safety aides to increase your operational awareness on these type of building structures.
 
Here are the links to the lastest information forthcoming;
  • Detroit News, HERE
  • Firegeezer Coverage, HERE
  • Detroit Fox News, HERE
  • Latest news on FireFighter Nation, HERE
  • Statter911.com, Here
  • The Detroit Free Press, Here
  • Photo Gallery, Here
Here’s a link to a PPT program that’s available on the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting System site on Operational Safety Considerations at Buildings of Ordinary and Heavy Timber Construction; Type III and IV Structures. An accompanying narrative is available on the same NMRS Resource page that I posted in 2009.
 
 
Some recent NIOSH Reports related to Commercial Building Occupancy Fires and their lessons;
  • Career Lieutenant Dies Following Floor Collapse into Basement Fire and a Career Fire Fighter Dies Attempting to Rescue the Career Lieutenant – New York,  HERE
  • Floor Collapse at Commercial Structure Fire Claims the Lives of One Career Lieutenant and One Career Fire Fighter – New York, Here
  • Hardware Store Explosion Claims the Lives of Three Career Fire Fighters-New York, Here
  • Volunteer Fire Chief Killed when Buried by Brick Parapet Wall Collapse – Texas, Here
  • Commercial Structure Fire Claims the Life of One Firefighter-California, Here
  • Partial roof collapse in commercial structure fire claims the lives of two career fire fighters – Tennessee, Here
Additionally here are some images pulled from various online sources depicting the building, it’s construction, layout and configuration.

Detroit New Photo


Posted by on August 13, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, christopher naum, Collapse, company officer, firefighting-operations, mass-casualty-incident, NIOSH Reports, Occupancies, Strategy and Tactics, Structural Collapse • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

BURN

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BURN is a documentary about Detroit, told through the eyes of Detroit firefighters, who are on the front lines charged with the thankless task of saving a city — and an American Dream — that many have written off as dead. We made a 10-minute trailer. Please SHARE, ASK QUESTIONS, DONATE so we can start production on the film as soon as possible. Take the time to watch the video trailer…..it will speak for itself.

Check out the web site, HERE   BURN Trailer from Tremolo Productions on Vimeo.

Posted by on July 20, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Fire Fighting, Fire Suppression, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, History Repeating Event, operations, Professional Development, Situational Awareness, Taking it to the Streets, thecompanyofficer.com, Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Ten Minutes in the Street: “A Little Smoke Showin’ with your Coffee?”

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New Scenario Posted

Ten Minutes in the Street

A Buildingsonfire.com Series

Interactive Scenarios, Where YOU Make the Call

Ten Minutes in the Street is back, bringing you insightful and provoking street scenarios for the discriminating and perspective Firefighter, Officer and Commander; where you make the call. You don’t have to have any special rank to participate in this interactive forum, just the desire to learn and expand you knowledge, skills and abilities in order to better yourself, create new insights, while sharing your experience and perspectives to help you and others in the street in making the right call; so everyone has the opportunity of going home.

Ten Minutes in the Street: “A Little Smoke Showin’ with your Coffee?”

Volume 10, Number 8

The recruit firefighters just finished brewing a fresh pot of coffee and you’re about to have your first cup this morning when the tones and bells alert the station of a report of smoke coming from a house across the street from the caller. The communications center advises that the caller doesn’t know if anyone is home, but they are certain there’s smoke coming from the house, even though a slight morning fog layer is beginning to burn off. OK, so much for that coffee. You’re the acting chief this morning, so instead of riding the engine company, you’ve got the chief’s SUV. As you get ready to head out the door, you can hear the engine company fire up a bay over signaling you a driver is in the house and a crew is assembling and preparing to roll out shortly. Go to FireFighter Nation.com for the full scenario and interaction….

Here’s the download PDF for use in the station or for a drill. Vol10NO08

Posted by on July 10, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, christopher naum, Fire Dynamics, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, leadership, Professional Development, Risk Management, Scenarios, Taking it to the Streets, thecompanyofficer.com • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Multi-Family / High Rise Structure Fires

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highrise2In multi-story multifamily structures there is a lot more to consider than in single family structures. The population density increases significantly, the size of the structure increases and in high rise operations you have to be concerned with the rapid spread of heat, smoke, toxic gases and fire upward through the structure. The fact that the structural design is significantly different as the size if focused on going vertical verses horizontal.

These structures have a high life hazard at regardless the time of day. This proposes unique problems as occupant evacuation often hampers fire department suppression operations. With this fact being in place it also changes the focus of operations due to the potential need for evacuation or rescue efforts. Many of these building were constructed with fire escapes on the exterior of the building. These are often in disrepair and become involved in fire as the fire has vented out of a window and prevents the use of the exterior fire escape. Many structures have limited internal stairwells. Often these internal stairwells are not secure from the effects of smoke and heat. These prevent for safe evacuation. It is important to also consider the age of the tenants. The elder population that could live in these structures creates a special need for assistance in evacuation or rescue as they are not able to ambulate efficiently enough to travel the potential distances required for evacuating.

These structures require massive amounts of man power to be able to operate. It is recommended that for every position assigned a total of three (3) personnel be committed, one in operations, one in staging and one on deck ready for relief. This alone can make a significant impact on available resources.

Construction features can create a series of fire-control tactical concerns with the stacking of apartments that creates chases that run the entire height of the building. This design feature creates an easy pathway for fire to extend and do so without showing significant signs of fire growth and spread until large quantities of fire exist. This type of feature provides for fast moving fire extension and can compound the loss of life potential.

Larger buildings have design features that bring light and natural ventilation to rooms in the middle of the structure. These light and air shafts pose danger of allowing the fire to extend horizontally across the shaft. This feature allows the fire to sometimes by pass a fire wall or fire stop. This design will also allow fire to extend vertically as the exposures are increased and the ability to extend both via convection and direct flame contact due to lapping out of windows. The design of these windows being directing opposite or directly above each other contributes to the fire extension. One advantage is that there is not roof over these sections which eliminates the mushrooming concept and will slow the spread of fire to the upper floors.

Posted by on April 10, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, company officer, Doug Cline, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, fire-rescue-topics, major-incidents, operations, rescues, Risk Assessment, Situational Awareness • Tagged: , , , , , ,

The Rules for Combat Structural Fire Suppression Have Changed: Did anyone Tell You?

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3-29-2009 12-58-50 PMOur buildings have changed; the structural systems of support, the degree of compartmentation, the characteristics of materials and the magnitude of fire loading. The structural anatomy, predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and the extreme fire behavior; accelerated growth rate and intensively levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term combat fire engagement.

The rules for combat structural fire suppression have changed, but we have yet to write the rule book from which the new games plans must be derived. We seek the elusive “Rosetta stone” that aligns and interprets the emerging and traditionalist acumen related to fire stream effectiveness, flow rates, cooling capacity, extreme fire behavior and fire dynamics, compartment fire theory, propagation and cooling capacity and tactical deployment all relate towards defining an engineering approach to firefighting tactics versus the manual, labor-driven tactics of line deployment and rudiment placement of water on a fuel source within the fire compartment (room).

It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that defines structural fire suppression operations. It begs to suggest that many of today’s incident commanders, company officers and firefighters lack the clarity of understanding and comprehension that correlate to the inherent characteristics of today’s buildings, construction and occupancies and the need for refined engine company operations within the modern building construction setting. We assume that the routiness or successes of our operations and incident responses equates with predictability and diminished risk to our firefighting personnel.

The work of such notable suppression theory pioneers as P. Grimwood, E. Hartin, S. Särdqvist and S. Svennson and the concepts surrounding 3D firefighting, B-SAHF and other emerging research from the NIST and UL are areas that today’s discerning and progressive fire officer and commanders must become well-informed and conversant. The quantitative scientific data and emerging concepts from continuing research and testing such as the NIST’s Wind Drive Fire Studies and UL’s The Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions are providing enlightenment on fire development, fuel controlled and ventilation controlled fire development, operational time-duration parameters and degradation and failure mechanisms related to compromise and structural collapse in occupancies.

Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction, therefore risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of combat structural fire engagement.

  • Building Construction Systems
    • Heritage
      • Pre-1919
    • Legacy
      • 1920-1949
    • Conventional
      • 1950-1979
    • Engineered
      • 1980-2010
    • Hybrid
    • Chameleon

The fundamental compartment that comprised a typical room configuration in terms of area (square footage), volume (height/Width), furnishings (fire load package) and materials of construction (structural anatomy) found within conventional, legacy or heritage construction provided predictability in terms of fire suppression, fire behavior, operational time and survivability (civilian/firefighter). The dramatic changes since the early 1980’s in the evolution of modern building construction and the institutionalization of engineered structural systems (ESS) have created compartment (room) areas in excess 500 SF, volumes that are open and spaciously interconnected to other habitable space, fire load packages that create extreme fire behavior, compromising structural stability in shorter time spans creating decreasing interior operational time and requiring increasing fire flow rates and volume to sustain requisite extinguishment demands.

Commanders and Company Offices need to gain new insights and knowledge related to the modern building occupancy and to modify and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type and must have the combined adequacy of sufficient staffing, fire flow and nozzle appliances orchestrated in a manner that identifies with the fire profiling, predictability of the occupancy profile and accounts for presumed fire behavior. Today’s engine company operations and fire suppression theory has to progress beyond the pragmatic approaches to fire suppression such as “Big Fire-Big Water principle.

When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future. Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis. We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system; in addition to having an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions.

Executing tactical plans based upon faulted or inaccurate strategic insights and indicators has proven to be a common apparent cause in numerous case studies, after action reports and LODD reports. Our years of predictable fireground experience have ultimately embedded and clouded our ability to predict, assess, plan and implement incident action plans and ultimately deploy our companies-based upon the predictable performance expected of modern construction and especially those with engineered structural systems.

If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner, that is no longer acceptable within many of our modern building types, occupancies and structures. This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die, it’s that simple; it’s that obvious.

Considerations for changing fire flow rates, the sizing of hose line and the adequacies for fire flow demand and application rates, staffing needs for safe operations, considerations for defensive positioning and defensive operating postures must be considered, and it warrants repeating again; Reckless-Aggressive firefighting must be redefined in the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments- with determined, effective and proactive firefighting

  • Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement
    • Predictive Strategic Process
    • Tactical Deployment Model
    • Dynamic Tactical Deployment
    • Performance Indicators and Street Aides
      • Fire Dynamics
      • Resistance
      • Resilience
      • Structural Systems
      • Occupancy Hazard Profiles

The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics must not only be questioned, they need to be adjusted and modified; risk assessment, risk-benefit analysis, safety and survivability profiling, operational value and firefighter injury and LODD reduction must be further institutionalized to become a recognized part of modern firefighting operations.

Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments.

Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional or legacy construction and occupancies;

  • Risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement.
  • You need to gain the knowledge and insights and to change and adjust your operating profile in order to safe guard your companies, personnel and team compositions.
  • Again strategic firefighting operations; Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type.

The following are quotes from Fire Chief Anthony Aiellos (ret) Hackensack (NJ) Fire Department, Fire Chief during the Hackensack Ford Fire, July, 1988…

“If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner. This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes”.

As a Company or Command Officer, how have your skill sets as well as your attitudes towards combat fire suppression operations have changed. Are you still thinking in terms of “old school” tactics and operations? (Think carefully before you answer….because there’s more to this reply than you think). I’ve asked this question before: “What do you truly know about building construction, fire dynamics and risk profiling?” Have you spent the time to become knowledgeable on rapid changes that have evolved within the building construction industry? Have you taken a good look around your district? If you haven’t, maybe It’s time…remember you have a company or a contingent of companies that are counting on you to make the right call at that next structural fire incident.

Posted by on April 9, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, christopher naum, company officer, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, KSA, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

360 DEGREES OF SEPARATION

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2-21-2009 8-21-40 AMThe fireground often has competing or conflicting incident priorities, demands or distractions before a complete appreciation of all mission critical or essentialinformation and data has been obtained. The effective assessment of the incident scene is much more than the three-sided size-up methodology of past fireground practices. In fact the term size-up doesn’t align with the newest directions in firefighter safety and incident command management.

The 360 degree assessment has become the generally accepted standard from which risk assessment is performed and incident action plans derived. The fact that many LODD case studies and reports repeatedly indicate the lack of an effective 360 degree assessment of the incident scene where structural fire engagement is being initiated was a contributing factor or may have contributed to a different incident outcome. Think about the effectiveness and value that the 360 ◦ Degree assessment brings to the development of an effective and valid incident action plan and the tactics that are driven by those identified and assumed assessment indicators. The question is: Are you conducting a 360 upon arrival, and if not WHY?

Posted by on March 5, 2010 • Filed under: christopher naum, Occupancies, operations, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Accountability: Errors & Omissions

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RedDiceThis past week on the burgeoning internet call-in radio show Firefighter Netcast.com, HERE, a dynamic discussion developed related to the DeKalb County fatal house fire incident and the apparent questionable  actions purported by the company and command officers and the repercussions that have lead to FD employment terminations and resignations, HERE.

I discussed recently how Company and Command Officers should be highly accountable and highly responsive to the demands and duties that come with that rank and the inherent responsibilities that are intrinsic, fundamental and vital to our sworn duty HERE. The radio call-in discussions revolved around issues dealing with fire department complacency, expectations, accountability and discipline; fundamental responsibilities and actions that are required by companies, their staff and the company officer; as well as those of the incident commander.

The common theme resonated around the fact that nobody could believed that the entire balance of a structural alarm assignment didn’t conduct a more thorough investigation or have a more robust questioning attitude to further validate the assumptions being made at the scene that the alarm was unfounded. The issued FD report HERE stated that no personnel exited their apparatus to investigate any of the occupancies, other than to spot in backing up the trucks. Protocols and standards implemented in an organization will guide and drive operational actions at an incident scene. The deployment and management of that incident scene is predicated and rests squarely with the company and command officers to perform duties and actions aligned with organizational expectations, accountability and responsiveness.

How do you address the influence of error-likely situations in which complacency may creep into an incident scene when there is nothing readily apparent, however there is an indication that something is wrong? How do you maintain the heightened sense of preparedness, safety and readiness when you’ve responded to an alarm activation at the same address numerous times in the past with no events; but on this run you’re confronted with an escalating situation that calls for immediate and prompt fire suppression and rescue actions-but you’re not prepared?

How would you have addressed a similar call to a reported structure fire at a given neighborhood and building address and find nothing showing or evident upon arrival? What level of rigor does your company ( or fire deparment) expect or apply to determine that this incident is unfounded, false or an honest mistake? What are YOUR standards for responsibility and accountably?

Remember this; “Errors and Omissions are VERY unforgiving….”

Posted by on February 5, 2010 • Filed under: christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, company officer, firefighting-operations, Officer, Situational Awareness • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

RACE: Responsibility, Accountability, Complacency, Expectations

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180px-ThinkingMan_RodinBy now many of you may have seen the reports making their way around the internet circuit relating to the regrettable circumstances in DeKalb County, Georgia.  If you haven’t caught up on the incident particulars then check out these links, HERE, HERE and HERE  for starters.

There are some poignant and significant issues that clearly come to light relating to the basic and fundamental premise of Company and Command Officer Responsibility, Accountability and Complacency. Three words that when aligned with an alarm response, based upon caller information, communications dispatch and organizational protocols and procedures; sends a deployment of fire resources to report of a dwelling fire with the expectation that you’ll perform your duties in a prescribed manner based upon your training, knowledge, skills and protocols.  In other words; “You’ve got a run” to a report of a possible structure fire. It’s 01:03 hours in the morning and you’re in the street running the call. The balance of the alarm dispatch arrives; only to find nothing apparent or evident.  How many times has this happened to you and your company? What have been the results, what could have been different?

Think about the numerous instances that you’ve takin’ in a dispatch for a reported condition that ultimately turns into something very predictable, routine- in the sense of frequency with similar outcomes. The repetitiveness and frequency of some alarms has a tendency to lessen an officer’s sensitivity to the circumstances, situational awareness and latent indicators that may be present, but may not be recognized or acted upon. If you’ve found yourself in this situation, then it’s time for a wake-up call. This type of performance is not only unacceptable, it borders on levels of dereliction and negligence.

As in the incident in DeKalb County, Georgia, fire officials launched an investigation into a house fire that occurred early Sunday morning, when firefighters responded twice to the same residence. The first time it was prematurely and ineffectively determined that there was nothing evident immediately following arrival and fire department services were not needed. The second alarm response five hours later resulted in a fully involved residential structure upon arrival, with a resulting occupant death.  It was the actions during the first response that have resulted in four fire department officers; an Officer in Charge, two Captains and a Battalion Chief being place on leave with pay. at the present time.  Here’s more from an article by Jaye Watson from WXIA-TV on the incident and investigation.   DeKalb County fire officials have released their preliminary findings and have issued a report that you can find HERE.  

A dispatch, and arrival; no evidence of fire, no walk-around, no 360, no investigation, no command implementation, no one getting out of their apparatus. Seven minutes elapsed following arrival and companies are returning; incident unfounded, services not required. More than five hours later at 6:40 a.m. neighbors called 911 to report a house engulfed in flames.  

Read it, understand what took place and see what you would have done. I began talking about the fundamental premise of Company and Command Officer Responsibility, Accountability and Complacency. After reading the report, think about these three functional areas of Responsibility, Accountability and Complacency. There certainly shouldn’t be a need for a long dissertation on the meaning and relationships of these words and their relationship to any Company or Command Officer. IF, you understand your job, your duties; responsibilities and accountability to your company, your organization and the citizens you protect, THEN Accountability is a natural extension of everything. Oh, one more thing, let’s add Expectations to the basic mix; fundamental towards carrying out our sworn duties.

So the next time you find yourself “racing” to a scene and “racing” through the motions for what apparently may be a nothing of a call, think about the resulting actions and affects of the DeKalb County call and think about RACE: Responsibility, Accountability, Complacency and Expectations.

Don’t forget your 360 degrees of separation and situational awareness. You’re an Officer; perform like one at each and every call with due diligence and conscientiousness.

Posted by on January 29, 2010 • Filed under: christopher naum, command, command-leadership, company officer, firefighting-operations, Leaderhip, Occupancies, operations, Situational Awareness • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

360 Degrees of Separation

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2-21-2009 8-21-40 AM360 Degrees of Separation. The fireground often has competing or conflicting incident priorities, demands or distractions before a complete appreciation of all mission critical or essential information and data has been obtained. The effective assessment of the incident scene is much more than the three-sided size-up methodology of past fireground practices. In fact the term size-up doesn’t align with the newest directions in firefighter safety and incident command management.

The 360 degree assessment has become the generally accepted standard from which risk assessment is performed and incident action plans derived. The fact that many LODD case studies and reports repeatedly indicate the lack of an effective 360 degree assessment of the incident scene where structural fire engagement is being initiated was a contributing factor or may have contributed to a different incident outcome.

Think about the effectiveness and value that the 360 ◦ Degree assessment brings to the development of an effective and valid incident action plan and the tactics that are driven by those identified and assumed assessment indicators.The question is: Are you conducting a 360 upon arrival, and if not WHY?

Remember: All command and supervisory personal and operating companies must be able to recognize and appreciate the risks which are present at an incident in order to carry out an effective dynamic risk assessment. The 360 Degree assessment is a mission critical element for effective and safety incident operations.

Don’t for a moment think, “it takes too long to perform” or that you don’t have time to conduct, especially from a company officer perspective when you’re deploying and initiating tactical assignments. That extra minute to conduct a “three-sixty” may make all the difference in the world…..There may be three hundred and sixty degrees of safety margin that separate you and your company between injury or death….think about it.

Posted by on January 24, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, Occupancies, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

It’s more than just Size-Up; Situational Awareness and Dynamic Risk Assessment

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FLASHO11Dynamic Risk Assessment is commonly used to describe a process of risk assessment being carried out in a changing or evolving environment, where what is being assessed is developing as the process itself is being undertaken.

This is further problematical for the Incident Commander when confronted with competing or conflicting incident priorities, demands or distractions before a complete appreciation of all mission critical or essential information and data has been obtained. The dynamic management of risk is all about effective, informed and decisive decision making during all phases of an incident.

Situation Awareness, [SA], is the perception of environmental elements within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future. It is also a field of study concerned with perception of the environment critical to decision-makers in complex, dynamic situations and incidents.

Both the 2006 and 2007 Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System Annual Reports identified a lack of situational awareness as the highest contributing factor to near misses reported. Situation Awareness (SA) involves being aware of what is happening around you at an incident to understand how information, events, and your own actions will impact operational goals and incident objectives, both now and in the near future. Lacking SA or having inadequate SA has been identified as one of the primary factors in accidents attributed to human error (Hartel, Smith, & Prince, 1991) (Nullmeyer, Stella, Montijo, & Harden, 2005). Situation Awareness becomes especially important in work related domains where the information flow can be quite high and poor decisions can lead to serious consequences.

To the Incident commander, Fire Officer or firefighter, knowing what’s going on around you, and understanding the consequences is mission critical to incident stabilization and mitigation and profoundly crucial in terms of personnel safety. The integration of Situational Awareness and Dynamic Risk Assessment is a mission critical element in strategic incident command management and company level tactical operations as we go forward into the next decade.

Traditional incident scene size-up is antiquated and no longer appropriate or applicable to modern fire service operations.Situational awareness is a combination of attitudes, previously learned knowledge and new information gained from the incident scene and environment that enables the strategic commanders, decision-makers and tactical companies to gather the information they need to make effective decisions that will keep their firefighters and resources out of harm’s way, reducing the likelihood of adverse or detrimental effects.

According to a 1998 published TriData study report, “Situational Awareness is one of the most difficult skills to master and is a weakness in the fire community. The report goes on to state that “The culture must change so that [personnel] are observing, thinking, and discussing the situation constantly.” It’s all about implementing effective human performance tools; perceptions versus reality, expectations versus realization, comprehension and forecasting, informed decision-making and calculated and formulated risk.

It’s a whole lot more than just “Size-Up”.  What do you think?

Posted by on January 24, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, fires, operations, Risk Assessment, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Rowhouse Fire Close Call- Fire Behavior Acting Badly

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httpv://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M00Vl7cxuYo

Five Baltimore  City (MD) firefighters were hurt as a powerful fire ball engulfed the front of the dwelling. One firefighter was hospitalized and is reported in stable condition. Two other firefighterrs were hurt during overhaul. The fire in a rowhouse was being worked by companies, when conditions rapidly changed resulting in the extreme fire behavior.

  • As a company or command officer are you maintaining a keen level of situational awareness of fire conditions and observing and predicting fire behavior?
  • When fire behaves badly, there may be little time to react and overcome the severity and magnitude of those self-revealing conditions in a timely manner to preclude injury.
  • Are you monitoring conditions based upon tactical actions and tasks?
  • According to published reports, the early morning fire began in the basement and quickly traveled to the first floor.

 

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Posted by on January 15, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Commandsafety.com, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, Occupancies, operations, Risk Assessment, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics, Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,