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Operations at 30 Dowling Circle 01.19.2011 Box 11-09

On Wednesday, January 19, 2011, a fire occurred in an apartment building located in the Hillendale section of Baltimore County, Maryland. This fire resulted in the line of duty death (LODD) of volunteer firefighter Mark G. Falkenhan, who was operating as the acting lieutenant on Squad 303 . Upon their arrival, FF Falkenhan and a second firefighter from Squad 303 deployed to the upper floors of the apartment building to conduct search and rescue operations. Other fire department units were already involved with both firefighting operations and effecting rescues of trapped civilians.

During these operations, FF Falkenhan and his partner became trapped in a third floor apartment by rapidly spreading fire and smoke conditions. The second firefighter was able to self-egress the building by diving headfirst down a ladder on the front (address side) of the building. FF Falkenhan declared a “MAYDAY” and implemented “MAYDAY” procedures, but was unable to escape or be rescued.

FF Falkenhan was located and removed via a balcony on the third floor in the rear of the building. Resuscitative efforts began immediately upon removal from the balcony, and continued en route to the hospital. FF Falkenhan succumbed to his injuries and was pronounced deceased at the hospital.

Mark Gray Falkenhan had dedicated his life to serving others. He perished in the line of duty on January 19, 2011 while performing search and rescue operations at a multi-alarm apartment fire in Hillendale, Baltimore County (Maryland). He was 43 years old.

Firefighter Mark Falkenhan

30 Dowling Circle

The Baltimore County (MD) Fire Department published the Line of Duty Death Investgation Report of the 30 Dowling Circle Fire recently.

The report was written by a Line of Duty Death Investigation Team comprised of departmental members, including representatives of the local firefighters’ union and the Baltimore County Volunteer Firemen’s Association.

An overview and executive narrative of the final report (PDF) on the apartment fire where Volunteer Firefighter Mark Falkenhan sustained fatal injuries was posed on CommandSafety.com HERE.

CommandSafety.com: Baltimore County (MD) Firefighter Falkenhan Line of Duty Death Report Issued
The entire report can be downloaded HERE .
Baltimore County (MD) Fire Department web site HERE

FF Mark Falkenhan

On Wednesday, January 19, 2011, a fire occurred in an apartment building located in the Hillendale section of Baltimore County, Maryland. This fire resulted in the line of duty death (LODD) of volunteer firefighter Mark G. Falkenhan, who was operating as the acting lieutenant on Squad 303 (for purposes of this report, Mark will be referred to as FF Falkenhan).

Upon their arrival, FF Falkenhan and a second firefighter (FF # 2) from Squad 303 deployed to the upper floors of the apartment building to conduct search and rescue operations. Other fire department units were already involved with both firefighting operations and effecting rescues of trapped civilians.

During these operations, FF Falkenhan and FF # 2 became trapped in a third floor apartment by rapidly spreading fire and smoke conditions. FF # 2 was able to self-egress the building by diving headfirst down a ladder on the front (address side) of the building. FF Falkenhan declared a “MAYDAY” and implemented “MAYDAY” procedures, but was unable to escape or be rescued.

The investigating team examined any and all data available, including independent analysis of the self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), turnout gear and autopsy report. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) produced a fire model to assist with evaluating fire behavior. Multiple site inspections were conducted. Extensive interviews were conducted by the team which also attended those conducted by investigators from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). Photographic and audio transcripts were also thoroughly analyzed. A comprehensive timeline of events was developed. All information used to make decisions regarding recommendations was corroborated by at least two sources.

In fairness to those units involved in this incident, the investigating team had the advantage of examining this incident over the period of several months. Furthermore, given the size and nature of the event, and the fact that arriving crews were met with serious fire conditions and several residents trapped and in immediate danger, all personnel should be commended for their efforts for performing several rescues which prevented an even greater tragedy.
The team did not identify a particular primary reason for FF Falkenhan’s death.
What were identified were many secondary issues involving but not limited to crew integrity, incident command, strategy and tactics, and communications.
These issues are identified and discussed, and recommendations are made in appropriate sections of the report, as well as in a consolidated format in the Report Appendix.

Some of the issues identified in this report may require some type of change to current practices, policies, procedures or equipment. Most, however, do not. Specifically, the analysis and recommendations regarding Incident Command and Strategy and Tactics show that if current policies and procedures are adhered to, the opportunity for catastrophic problems may be reduced.

Mark Falkenhan was a well-respected and experienced firefighter.
He died performing his duties during a very complex incident with severe fire conditions and unique fire behavior coupled with the immediate need to perform multiple rescues of victims in imminent danger.
It would be easy if one particular failure of the system could be identified as the cause of this tragedy.
We could fix it and move on. Unfortunately it is not that simple.
No incident is “routine”. Mark’s death and this report reinforce that fact.

On Wednesday, January 19, 2011 at 1816 hours, a call was received at the Baltimore County 911 Center from a female occupant at 30 Dowling Circle in the Hillendale section of Baltimore County. The caller stated that her stove was on fire and the fire was spreading to the surrounding cabinets. Fire box 11-09 was dispatched by Baltimore County Fire Dispatch (Dispatch) at 1818 hours consisting of four engine companies, two truck companies, a floodlight unit, and a battalion chief. All units responded on Talkgroup 1-2.

The location, approximately one mile from the first dispatched engine company, is a three story garden-type apartment complex, with brick construction and a composite shingle, truss supported roof. The fire building contained a total of six apartments divided by a common enclosed stairway in the center with one apartment on the left and one to the right of the stairs.

Fire Dynamics Simulation of 2011 Baltimore County LODD- 30 Dowling

Fire Dynamics Analysis and Insights

INTRODUCTION:

Assistance from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) Fire Research Laboratory (FRL) was requested for a fire at 30 Dowling Circle by the Baltimore County Fire Investigation Division (FID) through the ATF Baltimore Field Division on the night of January 19, 2011.

ATF Fire Protection Engineers were asked to utilize engineering analysis methods, including computer fire modeling, to assist with determining the route of fire spread and the events that led to the firefighter MAYDAY and subsequent Line of Duty Death.

Download the REPORT HERE

BACKGROUND:

Working closely with the Post Incident Analysis Team, the ATF Fire Research Laboratory created a computer simulation of the garden apartment building using Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS). FDS is a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) modeling program developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).

FDS utilizes mathematical calculations to predict the flow of heat, smoke and other products of fire. Smokeview, a post-processer computer program also produced by NIST, was then used to visualize the mathematical output from FDS. The most current available versions of both programs were used: FDS 5.5.3 and Smokeview 5.6. Below are photographs of the front and rear of the fire building next to an image of the same building constructed in FDS.

Figure 01. 30 Dowling Street

Figure 2. FDS representation of the front of 30 Dowling Circle showing the terrace (T), second (A) and third (B) levels.

The garden apartment building at 30 Dowling Circle was attached to two similar garden apartment buildings, one on each side. The fire damage was isolated to 30 Dowling Circle, so the exposure buildings were not included in the computer fire model. The entire six unit garden apartment building was modeled in FDS, including the patio and balconies on the rear of the building. FDS works by dividing a space into cubical “grid cells” for calculation purposes. FDS then computes various CFD calculations for each grid cell to predict the movement of mass, energy, momentum and species throughout a three-dimensional space.

The Dowling Circle model consisted of 2,560,000 total grid cells that were each 3.9 inch (10 cm) cubes. The model was used to simulate a total elapsed real time of 27.5 minutes, beginning before the 911 call and ending just after flashover of the third floor and the firefighter MAYDAY.

The model was synchronized in real time with the fireground audio throughout the duration of the fire.

: Fiqure 03 and 04

FDS has been validated to predict the movement of heat and smoke throughout a compartment, however the accuracy of fire modeling depends on it being used appropriately by a trained user that is aware of its limitations. Due to lack of knowledge about the exact material properties for the various furnishings and other available fuels, a user-specified fire progression was used for this application.

For flame and fire gas movement after consumption of the original burning fuel packages, the fire model calculated smoke and ventilation flow paths through the building and was used to gain a better understanding of the rapid fire growth leading to flashover of the stairwell and third floor.

In addition, FDS was utilized to illustrate the complex route of fire spread through the building as verified by witness statements, firefighter interviews, photographs and burn patterns.
Input data for the computer model included heat release rate data and video from previous testing conducted by the ATF FRL and NIST.
Ambient weather data was also input into the model, including temperature, as well as wind direction and magnitude at the time of the fire. In addition, several alternative compartmentation scenarios were modeled to explore the possible effects of closed stairway apartment entrance doors on the spread of smoke and flames in the stairwell.
The statements of each firefighter were reviewed and their individual actions (breaking windows, opening doors, etc.) and observations (fire size, smoke conditions, etc.) were recorded on floor diagrams.

The actions and observations of the firefighters were then associated with specific times in the fireground audio to generate an overall event timeline. All events in the model are based on this master timeline of events. In addition, all photographs were time stamped and synchronized with the model. The Post Incident Analysis Team was consulted throughout the development of the event timeline and the computer fire model to ensure accuracy.

MODELING ANALYSIS:

1. Analysis of Fire Development in the Terrace Level

The fire originated on the stovetop of an occupied apartment on the right (south) side of the terrace level (apartment T2). Flames from a grease fire ignited kitchen cabinets, eventually causing the kitchen to flashover into the attached living room. Upon fire department arrival, a fully developed fire existed in the living room and kitchen of apartment T2. Prior to exiting the apartment, the occupant opened both the rear sliding door and the apartment entrance door in an attempt to ventilate smoke from the apartment.

Figure 06. A typical floor plan of the right side apartments at 30 Dowling Circle.

An analysis of the ventilation flow path through the apartment with FDS indicated that a significant unidirectional flow path existed up the stairs with an inlet at the rear terrace sliding door and outlet at the front apartment entrance door leading to the stairwell.

Figure 7. Smokeview frame of the rear of the building indicating the fire origin and smoke spread within the T2 apartment. Figure 8. View of smoke flow out of kitchen and open sliding glass door (center of photo) in the rear of apartment T2. Figure 9. Smokeview frame of flashover of the kitchen with flames extending into the living room. Flames also begin to extend out of the rear sliding door and impact the balcony above.

Figure 10. Ignition of second level balcony resulting from flame extension from living room.

This unidirectional flow path up the stairs is difficult to combat and is often experienced during basement fires as crews attempt to descend interior stairs. The model indicates sustained air temperatures in the stairwell of approximately 600 Fahrenheit (315 Celsius) at velocities of approximately 6 mph (2.7 m/s) from floor to ceiling as crews attempted to descend the stairs. This is consistent with statements from firefighting crews, who experienced extremely high heat conditions and indicated periodically seeing flames in the smoke layer flowing up the stairs.

The elevated air velocity of the stairwell flow path resulted in a high rate of convective energy transfer to the structural firefighting gear and high perceived temperatures as the firefighters attempted to descend the stairs. Firefighting crews flowed a hoseline down the stairs to combat the high temperatures; however no significant cooling was noticed by firefighters because the hose stream could not reach the seat of the fully developed fire in the kitchen area.

The crews were simply cooling the ventilation flow path without cooling the source of the energy in the apartment. It was not until a hose stream was directed through an exterior window and a portion of the fire was extinguished that gas temperatures and velocities began to decrease, allowing firefighters to make entry to the terrace apartment via the stairs.

: Figure 12. Smokeview section frame showing unidirectional flow of approximately 600 Fahrenheit (315 Celsius) gases out of the stairwell entrance door

Front photo of unidirectional flow of smoke up stairwell from apartment T2. Note the high volume of smoke from floor to ceiling as the stairwell door serves as the flow path outlet. The ground ladder in the foreground was used to rescue an occupant on the third floor trapped by heavy smoke in the stairwell. (Refer to Figure 014)

: Figure 014. Front photo of unidirectional flow of smoke up stairwell from apartment T2. Note the high volume of smoke from floor to ceiling as the stairwell door serves as the flow path outlet.

The first arriving engine, E-11, was staffed with a Captain, Lieutenant, Driver/Operator, and a Firefighter. Upon arrival at 1820 hours, the Captain gave a brief initial report describing a three story garden apartment with smoke showing from side Alpha: “The Captain of E-11 will have Command and we are initiating an aggressive interior attack with a 1 ¾” hand line”. Command also instructed the second due engine to bring him a supply line from the hydrant.

A female resident (victim # 1) appeared in a third floor apartment window, Alpha/Bravo side (Apt. B-1), yelled for assistance, and threatened to jump. Smoke or fire was visible from any of the third floor windows. At 1823 hours, Command advised Dispatch that he had a rescue and that he was establishing Limited Command. Fire Dispatch was in the process of upgrading the response profile to an apartment fire with rescue when the responding Battalion Chief requested that the fire box be upgraded to a fire rescue box. While the Firefighter and Lieutenant prepared for entry into the building, the Captain and Driver/Operator extended a ladder to the 3rd floor apartment window and rescued the resident. The first attempt by the Firefighter and Lieutenant to make entry into the side Alpha entrance was unsuccessful due to the extreme heat and smoke conditions.

The second due engine, E-10, arrived at 1823 with staffing of a Captain, Lieutenant, Driver/Operator, and a Firefighter. At 1823, E-10’s crew brought a 4″ supply line to E-11 from the hydrant at Deanwood Rd. and Dowling Circle and assisted the first-in crew with fire attack.

The Captain from E-10 conferred with Command and was instructed to advance a second 1 ¾” hand line.
The window to the first floor right apartment (Apt. T-2) was removed, and the second 1 ¾” line was advanced to the building by the crew of E-10.
Fire attack was initiated through the removed window. At 1827, Command requested a second alarm.

At this time, heat and smoke conditions just inside the front door improved enough to allow the Firefighter and Lieutenant from E-11 to make entry through the front door and into the stairwell. There they encountered heavy, thick black smoke and high heat conditions coming up the stairs from the terrace level apartment. The Lieutenant reported that the doorway to the first floor apartment was orange with fire and he had to fight his way through heavy heat and smoke conditions to attack the fire in the first floor right apartment (Apt. T-2). Entry was made approximately 3 feet into the doorway when the Firefighter’s low air alarm began to sound, and he exited the building. A member from E-10’s crew replaced the Firefighter from E-11 on the hose line.

At the same time, the Captain from E-11 proceeded to the rear of the structure to complete his initial 360 degree size up. He noted that there was fire emanating from the open sliding doors on the first floor Charlie/Delta apartment (Apt. T-2), extending to the balcony above. E-1, staffed by a Captain, Driver/Operator, and two Firefighters arrived and completed the hookup of the supply line that had been laid to the hydrant by E-10. The rest of Engine 1’s crew grabbed tools and an extension ladder and reported to the Charlie side of the building.

Figure 015 Charlie Side ( Rear) Extension

The Photo above referenced as Figure 015 shows conditions from rear of flames in apartment T2 and extension to the balcony above. Note the relative minimal volume of smoke as the sliding door serves as the inlet for ventilation into the apartment. The smoke and heat is flowing in from the rear, through the apartment and up the stairs.

This unidirectional flow path up the stairs is difficult to combat and is often experienced during basement fires as crews attempt to descend interior stairs.

The model indicates sustained air temperatures in the stairwell of approximately 600 Fahrenheit (315 Celsius) at velocities of approximately 6 mph (2.7 m/s) from floor to ceiling as crews attempted to descend the stairs.
This is consistent with statements from firefighting crews, who experienced extremely high heat conditions and indicated periodically seeing flames in the smoke layer flowing up the stairs.
The elevated air velocity of the stairwell flow path resulted in a high rate of convective energy transfer to the structural firefighting gear and high perceived temperatures as the firefighters attempted to descend the stairs.

Firefighting crews flowed a hoseline down the stairs to combat the high temperatures; however no significant cooling was noticed by firefighters because the hose stream could not reach the seat of the fully developed fire in the kitchen area.

The crews were simply cooling the ventilation flow path without cooling the source of the energy in the apartment.

It was not until a hose stream was directed through an exterior window and a portion of the fire was extinguished that gas temperatures and velocities began to decrease, allowing firefighters to make entry to the terrace apartment via the stairs.

Plan view of flow path and temperatures within the apartment. Note the location of the seat of the fire and the location of initial hose stream application down the stairs.

Figure 016

Photograph of hoselines being positioned at the stairwell entrance door and front window. Note the heavy smoke venting from all front openings in apartment T2. (Figure 017)

Figure 017 Alpha Side Entry Door

Figure 017 Hoselines being positioned at the stairwell entrance door and front window. Rapid Fire Progression Leading to Flashover of the Third LevelFlames extended upwards from the T2 apartment sliding door and ignited the rear balconies of the second and third level apartments above.

Fire on the second floor balcony extended into apartment A2 by failing the sliding glass door and igniting vertical plastic slat curtains that were suspended above.As crews searched within the second floor apartment, they noted seeing the burning curtains on the floor with flames extending to a nearby couch (containing polyurethane foam padding) adjacent to the sliding doorway.

The fire continued to grow unsuppressed and spread to a second couch as interior firefighting crews were engaged in rescuing two victims from the living room in the second floor apartment.Personnel stated that at this point fire conditions seemed to improve, suggesting that crews were making progress extinguishing the fire. (The first arriving attack crew reported that they were able to see apparatus lights through the sliding doors on Charlie side, which indicated to them that smoke and fire conditions were improving.)Truck 1, a tiller unit staffed by a Lieutenant, two Driver/Operators, and a Firefighter, arrived on side Alpha and immediately began search and rescue operations.

Windows on the second floor Alpha/Delta side apartment (Apt. A-2) were vented and ladders were thrown to gain access. T-8 arrived at the alley on side Charlie. E-1 extended a ground ladder to the third floor balcony on the Charlie/Bravo side of the structure (Apt. B-1), and made access to the apartment to search for additional victims.They noted fire venting from the first floor Charlie/Delta apartment (Apt. T-2) out of the sliding glass doors progressing upwards towards the balcony on the second floor.

Upon entering the apartment, they conducted a primary search and noted minimal heat with light smoke conditions.The crew accessed the hallway via the apartment entry door and noticed an increase in the temperature and the amount of smoke.They immediately closed the door and exited the apartment via the ground ladder.Upon exiting the apartment, E-1’s crew observed E-292 on the scene with a hand line extending into the apartment of origin, (first floor, Charlie/Delta side, Apt. T-2).

The officer on E-1 noted white smoke coming from the unit.Having already laid a supply line from the intersection of the alley and Deanwood Road, E-292’s crew extended a 1 ¾” hand line into the apartment of origin. Moderate fire conditions with zero visibility were encountered, and they reported feeling a great deal of heat on their knees as they crawled through the apartment.The Lieutenant and the Firefighter from Truck-1 entered Apartment A-2 via a second floor bedroom window (Alpha/Delta side) and began a search for additional victims. As they traversed the living room area they found an unconscious male resident (victim #2).

At 1836 hours, the Lieutenant notified Command via an urgent transmission that a victim had been located and they needed assistance with evacuation. The Lieutenant and Firefighter noted a small fire in the rear corner near the victim as they exited the room. The crew returned to the bedroom from which they had entered and closed the door behind them. Victim #2 was then evacuated from the apartment via a ground ladder through the bedroom window, and transferred to EMS personnel on side Alpha.

Figure 019 Flame extension and suppression efforts at the rear of the structure. Flames caused the second level glass slider to fail and ignite plastic curtains in the doorway located

Figure 019

The middle level apartment (A2) entrance door was opened by a second search crew around the same time as the second couch ignited, creating a ventilation flow path from the second floor balcony, through the apartment, and upwards into the stairwell (third floor). This flow path follows the same general route through the apartment and into the stairwell as was seen in the terrace level apartment below. Squad 303’s crew arrived on scene after the bulk of the fire in the terrace level apartment had been suppressed and appeared to be under control. The crew entered the front stairwell, which had minimal smoke up to the second level and the crew began to systematically search the building.

Squad 303’s crew proceeded to search two apartments before entering the third floor right side apartment to conduct a search, leaving the entrance door open. It should also be noted that carpeting impacted the bottom of the door and prevented the apartment entrance doors on the second and third levels from closing automatically. The entry doors had to be actively pushed closed to overcome the friction of the carpet.

Photo depicting building smoke and fire conditions around the arrival of Squad 303.

Note the lack of heavy smoke or fire in the stairwell or terrace level.

There is also no indication of the growing fire in the second (middle) level apartment.

When Squad 303’s crew of two firefighters entered the third level apartment (B2), smoke was banked about halfway down the walls with moderate visibility. The crew could clearly see the floor of the apartment without the need to crawl below the smoke layer to search. Squad 303’s crew was unaware of the flames spreading across the two couches in the second floor apartment below them. The crew split in order to search the apartment faster, with one firefighter searching the front bedrooms and the officer searching the kitchen and living room.

As flames in the second level began to rollover into the apartment entranceway, the smoke layer in the third level quickly dropped to the floor with a rapid increase in temperature. With Squad 303’s crew searching above, flames began to extend into the stairwell, supplied by sufficient ventilation flowing through the apartment. This combination of fuel, heat and oxygen rich fresh air resulted in a rapid increase in heat release rate and flashover of the second level apartment followed by full room involvement.

The open entrance doors on the second and third levels created a ventilation flow path through the second floor apartment, into the sealed stairwell and up through the third floor apartment directly above. The flames followed this flow path and extended from the second floor, through the stairwell and into the living room area of the third floor apartment. Flashover of the third floor occurred approximately 30 seconds after the second floor experienced flashover.

: Figure 026 and 027

: Rollover from the second level apartment into the stairwell.

Flames followed the ventilation flow path and extend into the third floor apartment, resulting in ignition of the couches just inside the doorway.

Command sounded the building evacuation tones as flames extended into the hallway and up to the third level apartment.

Two couches just inside the entrance door on the third level ignited, blocking the primary means of egress for both firefighters from Squad 303. Upon hearing the evacuation horns from the trucks, the second firefighter from Squad 303 (searching the front bedrooms) attempted to exit the apartment via the apartment entrance door, however he was blocked by flames in the living room and stairwell.

Trapped in the bedroom, the firefighter bailed out headfirst down a ground ladder on the front side from the third floor. Squad 303 officer’s means of egress through the apartment entrance door was also blocked by the flames in the living room and stairwell. There were no windows located in the rear of the apartment.

The only means of escape was the balcony slider, however the entire balcony was engulfed in flames from the fully involved apartment below. With both escape routes blocked by flames and experiencing extremely high heat conditions, Squad 303’s officer requested assistance and declared a MAYDAY from the rear of the third floor apartment.

Firefighters re-entered the structure to combat the fire and locate the trapped firefighter. The downed firefighter was eventually located on the third level just inside the sliding glass door and was removed to the rear balcony. The firefighter was then extricated in a stokes rescue basket down the aerial ladder of a truck located in the rear, where he was subsequently transported to the hospital.

Effects of Compartmentation on Fire Spread

The Post Incident Analysis Team requested that alternate modeling scenarios be conducted to explore the effects of compartmentation on fire spread throughout the building.

The team specifically wanted to know how the ventilation flow paths through the stairwell would differ if the second or third level apartment entry doors were shut after entering/leaving the apartments. Two alternate computer fire modeling scenarios were conducted.

The first alternative modeling run featured the exact same fire scenario, except the second (middle) level apartment door was closed after the last victim was removed from that apartment. The apartment entry doors from the stairwell were fire-rated doors constructed of solid wood.

As soon as the door is shut, the ventilation flow path through the apartment and up the stairwell is blocked.

: Shutting the second level apartment door blocks the flow path and flame extension into the stairwell.

Even with the third floor apartment door left open, the model indicates that the stairwell and third floor remain tenable for firefighters. Flames eventually extend from the third floor balcony into the apartment, however the escape routes through the stairwell and the front apartment windows are accessible.

The model indicates that closing the second level apartment door prevents the flow of smoke, heat and other products of combustion from entering the stairwell, thus preventing flashover of the stairwell and the third level. As long as the second floor entry door remains shut, the model indicated that the conditions within the stairwell and third floor remain tenable for firefighters, even with the third floor apartment door open.

A second alternative modeling scenario was conducted where the third level entrance door was closed after crews made entry to search the apartment.The same fire conditions from the actual model were used.When the door remained closed, the outlet of the ventilation flow path was blocked at the top of the stairs. Without a complete flow path, there wasn’t sufficient oxygen flowing through the second floor apartment to support extended burning in the stairwell.

Consequently after flashover of the second floor, the flames in the stairwell only exist momentarily before consuming all available oxygen and becoming ventilation limited.The fire model indicated that temperatures within the third floor apartment stayed tenable for firefighters, even with a fully developed fire on the second floor and flames in the stairwell.

Flames would eventually extend up the rear balcony to the third level, however they would not block egress through the living room and front windows of the apartment.By closing the apartment door on the third floor and blocking the outlet for fire gases emanating from the second floor apartment, the third floor apartment remains tenable for firefighting crews and the temperatures only briefly spike in the stairwell before the fire becomes ventilation limited.The ventilation flow through the apartments results in an increased burning rate within both the second and third levels, as well as the stairwell.

Results of each modeling scenario describing extent of flame spread

Results of each modeling scenario describing extent of flame spread.

The Effects of Compartmentation on Fire Damage to the StructureThe impact of compartmentation on fire and smoke spread is evident by examining the post-fire damage throughout the structure. While other factors contributed to the relative fire damage, including fire department overhaul and relative apartment configuration, analyzing the damage to the building and the position of the apartment entry doors provides insight on the benefits of compartmentation.

By closing apartment unit entrance doors and interior hollow core doors, one can slow or even block the ventilation flow path through the structure, thus significantly reducing the rate of fire spread. The photos below represent the post-fire damage in all six apartments within the fire building. Four of the six apartment entry doors were open for the majority of the fire and the relative difference in damage is clearly evident.

Terrace level stairwell landing looking into T1 (left) and T2 (right) apartments.

: Door Closed……Door Open

Using doors to compartmentalize and limit fire and smoke spread in a structure is not limited to fire-rated entrance doors. Interior hollow core doors also offer considerable protection for compartmentation purposes.

A search crew utilizing the Vent, Enter and Search (VES) technique through a front window used a hollow core bedroom door to isolate themselves from the developing fire in the living room of apartment A2.

As the crews removed the second victim from the living room to the bedroom, they shut the bedroom hollow core door behind them.

The living room soon experienced flashover followed by full room involvement, however the bedroom remained isolated from the heat and smoke for the duration of the fire. The photos below illustrate this effective use of compartmentation to protect firefighters during a search.

: Controling the Doors during VES

SUMMARY:
While no fire model will exactly replicate a fire, this model provided insight on the route of fire spread, the rapid fire growth leading to flashover of the second and third level, and the benefits of compartmentation on slowing fire and smoke spread.

The unidirectional flow path up the stairs from the terrace level apartment resulted in a high rate of convective heat transfer to the firefighters initially attempting to descend the stairs, making attacking the seat of the fire very difficult.
The model then supported the fact that the main stairwell acted as an open channel for fire and smoke spread between the second and third levels, resulting in flashover of the third level in approximately 30 seconds after the second level.
This rapid fire growth leading to flashover is supported by photographs, witness statements and fireground audio.
The model was then utilized to explore the effects of compartmentation using apartment entrance doors.
The FDS model supported the scene observations and indicated that shutting the entrance doors blocked the flow of buoyancy driven fire gases through the structure, ultimately preventing fire extension to the third floor apartment via the stairwell.
The FDS model was utilized as part of the overall engineering analysis of this tragic fire and allowed for a better understanding of the events that led to the firefighter MAYDAY and subsequent Line of Duty Death.
The model was also used as an educational tool providing insight on potential methods of preventing similar tragedies in the future.
The results of this engineering analysis are intended to be reviewed by the Post Incident Analysis Team to assist in the creation of recommendations to mitigate the danger associated with future fire incidents.

References:

NIST http://fire.nist.gov/bfrlpubs/fire07/PDF/f07053.pdf
NIST: http://www.fire.nist.gov/fds/
CommandSafety.com: Fire Modeling http://commandsafety.com/2011/11/fire-modeling-software/
NIST: Home Page
VTT: Home Page
EL: Fire Research
VTT: Fire Research
EL: Fire Modeling Group

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SFFD Firefighter Memorials and Updates

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More details emerged Monday about last week’s fatal Diamond Heights blaze, as fire officials said an emergency alert accidentally went off on a nearby fire engine about the same time two firefighters’ personal alarms sounded inside the burning building according to published reports.

Lt. Vincent Perez, 48, and firefighter-paramedic Anthony Valerio, 53, of Engine Company 26 both died from injuries they suffered while battling a blaze at a four-story home at 133 Berkeley Way on Thursday morning.

While fighting the fire, one or both of Valerio and Perez’s personal alert safety system devices went off. Around the same time, a firefighter on Engine Company 20 — which had yet to arrive on the scene — had inadvertently hit the emergency button on the engine.

Read more at the San Francisco Examiner: http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/2011/06/sffd-juggled-multiple-safety-alarms-day-fatal-diamond-heights-fire
Memorial planned for fallen firefighters Friday: Link and Details HERE

Firefighter memorials

A joint funeral for fire Lt. Vincent Perez and firefighter-paramedic Anthony Valerio will be held at 12:30 p.m. Friday at St. Mary’s Cathedral, 1111 Gough St. in San Francisco. A vigil for the two men will be held at 7 p.m. Thursday, also at St. Mary’s.

San Francisco Fire Fighters Local 798 has established trust accounts at the San Francisco Fire Credit Union for the families of Perez and Valerio. Donations can be made to SFFCU, 3201 California St., San Francisco, CA 94118.

Condolence messages can be sent to Fire Station 26, 80 Digby St., San Francisco, CA 94131.

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Posted by Christopher Naum on June 7, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, company officer, Fire Dynamics, Fire Fighting, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, fires, in-the-line-of-duty, LODD, major-incidents, Residential, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: building, building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, Chris Naum, christopher naum, combat fire suppression, Commandsafety.com, Diamond Heights section, Double LODD, fire behavior, Fire Dynamics, Fire Fighting, Fire Suppression, FireFighter Anthony Valerio, flashover, flashover lodd, incident command, Initial Fire Attack, LODD, Lt Vincent Perez, operations, residential occupancy, San Francisco FD, San Francisco FD LODD June 2011, SFFD, SFFD Diamond Heights Fire, SFFD Double LODD, tactics, Wind Driven Fire

San Francisco FD mourns the loss of a Second Firefighter LODD After Diamond Heights Fire

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SFFD Firefighter Anthony Valerio

It’s being reported that San Francisco Fire Fighter Anthony Valerio passed away this morning as a result of injuries sustained while operating the Diamond Heights fire on Thursday June 2nd. This becomes the second line of duty death from this incident that also resulted in the LODD of Lt. Vincent Perez. Anthony “Tony” Valerio, a 53-year-old firefighter and paramedic critically injured in the Thursday blaze, died at San Francisco General Hospital at about 7:40 a.m., city officials said.

San Francisco firefighter Anthony Valerio is the second firefighter to die from Thursday’s Diamond Heights fire. According to San Francisco Fire Chief Joanne Hayes-White, Valerio had “significant damage to his respiratory system” and burns across his body after Thursday’s fire. Valerio has burns to 12 percent of his body.

WKGO TV ABC7 reports that according to San Francisco Fire Deputy Chief Mike Gardner said most of Fire Fighter Valerio’s burns were from steam and not from fire, adding that the temperature inside the structure was between 500 and 700 degrees.

Previous Coverage, HERE, HERE and HERE

Logs show desperate hunt for doomed SF firefighters, HERE

Updated Sunday June 5

San Francisco’s fire chief says this is the first time in her 21 years with the department that two firefighters have died in the same fire.

Slowly and silently, Valerio’s body was wheeled to an awaiting van; the silence finally broken by the rain and his family’s tears. The pain hung in the air outside San Francisco General Hospital – a place that became a gathering spot for the hopeful. Valerio’s family and friends had been there around the clock since Thursday. Valerio and Perez were rushed to the hospital after the two were found unresponsive inside a burning house in Diamond Heights – a sudden blast knocked them down. Perez died late Thursday. From Reports published by WKGO-TV ABC 7 ; “It is particularly difficult, you’re mourning the loss of one and then to have another one very close from the same fire is challenging,” said San Francisco Fire Chief Joanne Hayes-White.

Saturday was the first time Valerio’s doctors gave details about the uphill battle the 53-year-old faced – including the fact that he was in cardiac arrest the moment he arrived at SF General.

“Between all the injuries he had from the initial blast, the smoke inhalation, the fact that he had a really bad lung injury, which was precipitated by what happened on the scene, but we try to do everything we can,” said SF General Hospital Dr. Andre Campbell.

But in the end it wasn’t enough. On this day, the firefighter’s two families, his work family at Station 26 and his immediate family – realized Valerio’s 40 hour long fight to survive was over.

The fire department and the families have agreed to have a joint funeral for both Tony Valerio and Lt. Perez on Friday at Saint Mary’s Cathedral.

Lt. Vincent Perez, San Francisco FD

Firefighter Anthony Valerio

From Thursday

Previous postings from Commandsafety.com;

Courtesy Patty Stanton

Updates from San Francisco;

SAN FRANCISCO: A Faulty Wire May Have Cau …

SAN FRANCISCO: Emergency Call Audio Revea …

Charlie Side

Charlie Side, Fire Extending

Alpha Street Side from Google Streets

Aerial Charlie Side

Coincidentially, we posted a remembrance to the DCFD Cherry Road Townhouse Fire and Double FireFighter LODD from May, 1999 that is worth another look as it has similar connotations related to fire behavior, flashover conditions and multiple floor level construction factors during initial fire suppression operations, HERE

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Posted by Christopher Naum on June 4, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Crew Integrity, Fire Dynamics, Fire Fighter Safety, Fire Fighting, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, fires, line-of-duty, LODD • Tagged: building, building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, Chris Naum, christopher naum, combat fire suppression, Commandsafety.com, Diamond Heights section, Double LODD, fire behavior, Fire Dynamics, Fire Fighting, Fire Suppression, FireFighter Anthony Valerio, flashover, flashover lodd, incident command, Initial Fire Attack, LODD, Lt Vincent Perez, operations, residential occupancy, San Francisco FD, San Francisco FD LODD June 2011, SFFD, SFFD Diamond Heights Fire, SFFD Double LODD, tactics, thecompanyofficer.com, Wind Driven Fire

Casa Grande Fire Fighting

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Casa Grande Mega Mansion Fire

At 2356 hours on Saturday March 19, 2011, the Huntingtown (MD) Volunteer Fire Department was alerted for the reported Chimney Fire in a residential house. The home was not conventional by any accounts as it was a 10,000 Square foot single family dwelling. While en-route, firefighters received information that the owner was trying to extinguish the fire and believed it had spread to the attic.

The first arriving chief officer arrived to find smoke showing from the second floor eaves of this 10,000 square foot mega-mansion. The first-due Engine laying a supply line, advancing a 400′ pre-connect and began pulling the ceiling within the interior, at which time they found fire in the truss loft concealed attic spreading rapidly. Within seconds, conditions deteriorated rapidly resulting in zero visibility accompanied by intense heat. Command immediately ordered evacuation tones.

Due to high winds off the adjacent river, coupled with water supply issues, response distance times from quarters, and the size of the structure (10,000 square feet), fire spread rapidly resulting in nine firefighter injuries during the rapid egress and bailout from the interior positions. Immediately thereafter, the second floor flashed ,several firefighters took extreme measures such as jumping out of windows and running through walls to evacuate the structure.

A detailed account of the incident with video, photos and pre-fire house images is available on CommandSafety.com, HERE

Additional References:

10,000 SF Residential Fire MD, Commandsafety.com HERE
Behind the Ever-Expanding American Dream House, NRP HERE
LAFD LODD: Hollywood Hills Mansion Investigating Building Standards, CommandSafety.com HERE

Insights and discussion points;

Are you aware of large or mega-sized residential occupancies within your district, greater alarm or mutual/automatic aid response areas?
Do you pre-fire plan these occupancies?
Have you established special protocols, SOPs or procedure for potential operations at these occupancies?
Have you considered augmented first-alarm, supplemental or immediate greater alarm response deployments at these structures?
Do you have adequate first-due fire suppression capabilities AND fire flow; (GMP and sustainable water flow and pressure) to implement an offensive tactical IAP?
Do you have adequate staffing to support the above?
Have you practices operations that require deployment and coordinated actions?
Do you treat an 8,000 SF; 9,000 or 10,000 SF SFR occupancy the same as you would a 3,000-4,000 SF residence? Does this matter?
Do you think the fire load package within today’s residential (minor or mega-house) settings has any bearing on fire suppression capabilities and the containment?
What have your past experiences indicating to you?
Are your personnel and command staff prepared to address “Wind-Driven fires?”
Different Strategies and Tactics?
Are you adequatly trained, prepared and resourced to address a working fire in a casa grande, mega-residential occupancy?
Do Commercial Fire based tactics have their place at “residential” occupancies?
Do you understand the concept of; “Occupancy Risk versus Occupancy Type?
How does Fire Dynamics, Fire Load, Occupancy compartmentation and fire suppression capabilities or gaps relate to incident scene operations?
Are fires in mega-mansions a special concern? If so, what are you doing about it?

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Posted by Christopher Naum on March 22, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Fire Dynamics, Fire Fighting, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations • Tagged: Buildingsonfire.com, Chris Naum, christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, fire flashover, fire flows, fire load package, Fire Suppression, firefighter injuries, firefighting, house fire, Huntingtown (MD) Volunteer Fire Department, large area square footage, mega mansions, minor and mega mansions, multiple alarms, NIST Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions: Laboratory Experiments, occupancy risk versus occupancy type, Residential, tactics, thecompanyofficer.com, type v construction, UL Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction, Wind Driven Fire, wood frame

FDNY Brooklyn Box 4080: 17 Vandalia Avenue 12.18.1998

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Take a moment to look back at an incident: On December 18, 1998, Three FDNY Firefighters died in-the line of duty while conducting suppression and rescue operations at fire on the tenth floor of 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. At 0454 hours Brooklyn transmitted box 4080 for a top floor fire at 17 Vandalia Avenue in the Starrett City development complex. The sprawling complex is located on Brooklyn’s south shore in the Spring Creek section. The 10 story 50 x 200 fireproof building is used as a senior citizen’s residence. Engine 257 and ladder 170, both quartered in Canarsie, were assigned 1st due and arrived within 4 minutes. By that time the fire already could be seen blowing through two windows. Second and 3rd alarms were quickly transmitted.

As the 1st due Ladder Company, L170′s duty is to search the fire floor. Lieutenant Joseph Cavalieri, and fire fighters Christopher Bopp and James Bohan ascended 10 flights of stairs with extinguishers and forcible entry tools. Their mission was to rescue the resident of apartment 10-D who was believed trapped inside.

NIOSH INVESIGATIVE REPORT SUMMARY (F99-01) On December 18, 1998, several fire companies and fire fighters responded at 0454 hours to a reported fire on the tenth floor of a 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. The fire had been burning for 20 to 30 minutes before it was called in because the resident attempted to put the fire out with small pans of water. As the fire fighters approached the building from the rear, an orange glow was observed in the window of Apartment 10D. As the fire fighters were arriving in front of the high-rise, a call was received from Central Dispatch that a female resident in the apartment next door to the fire apartment was trapped in her apartment and needed help. Several fire fighters entered the lobby area, and some took the stairs to the ninth floor, while others took the elevator to the ninth floor. A Lieutenant and two fire fighters on Ladder 170 (the victims), along with the Lieutenant on Engine 290, took the B-stairs from the ninth floor to the tenth floor, and entered the hallway, in search of the fire, while 4 fire fighters on Engine 290 were flaking out the hose line on the ninth floor and in the stairwell between the ninth and tenth floor in preparation for hookup.

During this same time period, other fire fighters had gone to the tenth floor A-stairwell landing to attempt a hose line hookup to the standpipe in the landing. Engine Company 257 fire fighters, who were attempting to make a hook-up on the fire floor landing, experienced trouble with the heat, heavy smoke, and heavy insulation on the standpipe and were forced to abandon this hook-up. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 and the victims, who were on the B-side, were approaching the center smoke doors (see diagram), when the Lieutenant radioed his driver on the outside, and asked, “Where is the fire?”

The driver radioed back, the fire is in the rear, towards exposure 4. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 then left the tenth floor, descended the stairs to the ninth floor and helped his men drag the hose to the A-stairwell, where they met up with fire fighters on Engine 257, who assisted them in stretching their line and hook-up on the ninth floor. The victims proceeded through the center smoke doors in search of the fire. From the information obtained during this investigation, it is believed the victims found the fire apartment, with the door partially opened, allowing smoke and hot gases to enter the hallway. They then opened the door fully, the wind pushed the fire and extreme heat in the apartment into the hallway, and a flashover occurred, exposing the victims to extreme radiant heat that potentially elevated their body core temperature.

The last radio transmission from the victims was a Mayday call. When the victims were found, all were unresponsive, they were treated at the scene and taken to the hospital where they were pronounced dead by the attending physician.

This wind-driven fire event and the lessons-learned contributed directly to the current body of research and new insights on emerging strategies and tactics. The NIOSH Investigative Report HERE. NIST References on Wind Driven Fire Research HERE . FDNewYork.com HERE. New York Times Archived Articles, HERE and HERE. Photos and legacy, HERE

Take the time to remember FDNY Lt. Joseph Cavaleiri, FF Christopher Bopp and Firefighter James Bohan from Ladder 170

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Posted by Christopher Naum on December 18, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, High-rise • Tagged: "Situational Awareness" assessment, Brooklyn, building construction, construction, dynamics, FDNY, FDNY FF Christopher Bopp and FDNY Firefighter James Bohan from Ladder 170, FDNY Lt. Joseph Cavaleiri, fire behavior, Firefighter Safety, First-due, high-rise, History Repeating Event, NIOSH, NIOSH Fire Investigative Reports, NIOSH INVESIGATIVE REPORT SUMMARY (F99-01), NIST, NIST References on Wind Driven Fire Research, Occupancies, structure fires, survival, tactics, thecompanyofficer.com

Taking it to the Streets: Looking Forward Through the Rear View Mirror Parts I and II

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Taking it to the Streets Hosted by Christopher Naum

Download and Listen in on an insightful look back at 2010 and forward into 2011 with a stellar line-up of fire service leaders. The lineup of scheduled guests on the program included, Deputy Coordinator Tiger Schmittendorf (NY), Chief Glenn Usdin (PA), Captain Willie Wines (VA), Bill Carey (MD), Chief Doug Cline (NC), Lt. Rhett Fleitz (VA), Lt. John Mitchell (IL), and a few others on the invite list who just drop in on us.

Grab a cup of coffee and sit down for this special two part, two hour program with Taking it to the Streets on Firefighernetcast.com where we were Looking Forward Through the Rear View Mirror with Christopher Naum and this outstanding group of fire officers, fire service leaders and visionaries.

Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.

Looking Forward Through the Rear View Mirror: A review back into the year 2010 Part I Download the program HERE
Looking Forward Through the Rear View Mirror: A discusison of what we might look forward to in 2011 Part II Download the program HERE

Join in on the live open discussion with fire service personnel from around the country. Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.

Tune in to the Program, HERE
Firefighternetcast.com HERE
Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE
Look back at Twenty Ten, for 2010, HERE

Taking it to the Streets^TM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by Christopher Naum and is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production, © 2010 All Rights Reserved

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Posted by Christopher Naum on December 17, 2010 • Filed under: firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, Taking it to the Streets, thecompanyofficer.com, training-fire-rescue-topics • Tagged: Bill Carey (MD), Buildingsonfire.com, Capt. Willie Wines (VA), Chief Doug Cline (NC), Chief Glenn Usdin (PA), christopher naum, Combat Fire Suppression Operations, Commandsafety.com, Deputy Coordinator Tiger Schmittendorf (NY), Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement, fire service, Fire Service Training, Fire Suppression, Firefighter Safety, firefighting, leadership, Lt. John Mitchell (IL), Lt. Rhett Fleitz (VA), Predictive Strategic Process, Professional Development, progress, Safety Culture, strategies, tactics, Taking it to the Streets on Firefighernetcast.com, Taking it to the Streets Radio Program, training

Taking it to the Streets: Looking Forward Through the Rear View Mirror

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Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum

Taking it to the Streets: Looking Forward Through the Rear View Mirror

On Your Street, In Your City, Across the Country, Around the World^TM

Join us on Wednesday night December 15^th at 9:00 pm EST for an insightful look back at 2010 and forward into 2011 and beyond with a stellar line-up of fire service leaders.

The lineup of Scheduled guests include, Deputy Coordinator Tiger Schmittendorf (NY), Chief Glenn Usdin (PA), Captain Willie Wines (VA), Bill Carey (MD), Chief Doug Cline (NC), Lt. Rhett Fleitz (VA), Lt. John Mitchell (IL), and a few others on the invite list who might just drop in on us.

Grab a cup of coffee and sit down for a special two part, two hour program with Taking it to the Streets on Firefighernetcast.com where we’ll be Looking Forward Through the Rear View Mirror with Christopher Naum and this outstanding group of fire officers, fire service leaders and visionaries.

Tune in to the Program Wednesday evening December 15^th at 9:00 pm EST, HERE
Firefighternetcast.com HERE
Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE
Look back at Twenty Ten, for 2010, HERE

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Posted by Christopher Naum on December 14, 2010 • Filed under: command-leadership, Fire Fighter Safety, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, Taking it to the Streets, thecompanyofficer.com, training-development, training-fire-rescue-topics • Tagged: Bill Carey (MD), Captain Willie Wines (VA), Chief Doug Cline (NC), Chief Glenn Usdin (PA), christopher naum, Combat Fire Suppression Operations, Commandsafety.com, Deputy Coordinator Tiger Schmittendorf (NY), Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement, fire service, Fire Service Training, Fire Suppression, Firefighter Safety, firefighting, leadership, Lt. John Mitchell (IL), Lt. Rhett Fleitz (VA), Predictive Strategic Process, Professional Development, progress, QNBA6H4AS9BB, Safety Culture, strategies, tactics, Taking it to the Streets on Firefighernetcast.com, Taking it to the Streets Radio Program, training

Taking it to the Streets; “Redefining the Fire Ground” Rescheduled

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Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum

Wednesday Night’s Program has been postponed due to Emergent Server issues at BlogTalkRadio.

The Program has been rescheduled for Thursday November 4th at 9:00pm EDT

Turn Out to FireFighter NetCast.com and Taking it to the Streets for; “Redefining the Fire Ground”

If you missed last month’s program on the Tactical Renaissance of Combat Fire Suppression Operations and the new Rules of Engagement, with Chief Gary Morris (ret) Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department and Dr. Burt Clark from the NFA, then you missed out a some great insights and discussion. This month Taking it to the Streets is looking to further the dialog and look at “Redefining the Fire Ground”. Many would argue that the fire ground doesn’t need to be “redefined”; that the way we do business in the Streets is just fine and that the American Fire Service knows how to get the job done, at any cost.

The recent release of the NIST Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire – South Carolina, June 18, 2007 has presented compelling data and information that provides further discernments of how our buildings react under fire conditions and how our tactical assumptions and deployments continue to be willfully miscued. Joining Chris will be Chief Douglas Cline, from the City of High Point FD, North Carolina, a highly regarded national instructor, author, advocate, tactician and incident command.

Don’t miss out on debating and dialoging the transitional fire ground. It is here and it’s here to stay; you just didn’t know that it was changing. But then again, was anyone paying attention? Join the live broadcast on Thursday night November 4th at 9:00pm ET, or download the post production podcast from Firefighter NetCast.com.

For additional Taking it to the Streets programming, HERE
Firefighter NetCast.com HERE
Taking it to the Streets for; “Tactical Renaissance and the Rules of Engagement” Show Link, HERE

Taking it to the Streets is hosted by Christopher Naum and is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Fire Fighter NetCast.com Production.

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Posted by Christopher Naum on November 3, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, command-leadership, Commandsafety.com, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, Taking it to the Streets, thecompanyofficer.com • Tagged: active fire protectives, alterations, automatic sprinkler systems, Blogtalkradio, Building codes, building construction, building permits, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, City of Charleston Sofa Super Store LODD, Combat Fire Suppression Operations, Commandsafety.com, commerical fire, construction, Doug Cline, Dynamic Risk Assessment, FierFighting Tactics, fire behavior, Fire Codes, Fire Fighting Strategy and Tactics, Fire Ground, fire inspections, fire loading, fire modeling, fire spread, Fire Suppression, fire tenability, firefighter Netcast, Firefighter Safety, firefighting, Fuel Load, ICC, Incident Command Management, International Code Council, local codes, LODD, Mercantile Occupancies, National Institute of Standards & Technology, National Model Building Codes, NFA, NIST, passive fire protectives, pre-fire, Pre-fire Planning, rapid spread of fire, Risk Assessment, Routley Report, Rules of Engagement of Structural Firefighting, Smoke migration, smoke movement, smoke ventilation, Sofa Super Store Fire, Sofa Super Store Fire Behavior, Sprinklers, Strategy and Tactics, tactics, taking it to the streets, thecompanyofficer.com, ventilation

IAFC FRI Company & Command Officer Leadership Symposiums

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The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) recently held its annual Fire Rescue International (FRI) Conference in the great City of Chicago. A stellar addition to extensive pre-conference and workshop presentations was the IAF’s comprehensive Flagship programs entitled; The Company Officer Leadership Symposium (COLS) and the newest addition, The Chief Officer Leadership Symposium.

New to 2010, The Chief Officer Leadership Symposium consisted of three days of education geared toward those newly promoted to battalion chief. Similar to the Company Officer Leadership Symposium (COLS), this program was built around and into a three-level course for those in various stages of their career. This year at FRI, the IAFC introduced level one for recent graduates of The Company Officer Leadership Symposium (COLS) program and those looking for education specifically geared toward battalion chiefs.

The three-day Company Officer Leadership Symposium (COLS) provided the perfect mix of what company officers are looking for and what chief’s want for their company officers. The program offerings at FRI 2010 provided in-depth leadership education like for newly promoted company officers and those transitioning to battalion chief. Take a look at the program offerings at FRI for both programs HERE and HERE.

Some Key Reasons that drew participates to these programs included:

Great takeaways: All Company Officer participants received their own copy of the IAFC Officer Development Handbook
Unparalleled networking: build relationships as company officers and other battalion chiefs and commander that will benefit participants throughout their career and as they move up the ranks.
Returning company officers could build on their education and skills. Additionally, graduating from this program demonstrates exceptional professional growth for promotional assessments.
Participation in these symposiums is a professional development and mentoring opportunity that will benefit company officers, chiefs and the whole department.
No other program offers such comprehensive classes taught by industry leaders

New responsibilities come with this new title. Learn from those who have successfully made the transition to company officers and battalion chiefs and how to do effectively.
Strategic thinking. These sessions were designed to meet the needs of incident commanders out on the fireground while dealing with interpersonal dynamics in the station.
Learn from the best. According to the IAFC, no other program offers such comprehensive classes taught by prominent national fire service leaders.

TheCompanyOfficer.com and CommandSafety.com’s Christopher Naum, provided a key note general session delivery at the end of day one of the three day symposium and presented a powerful and insightful look at the Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement 2010. Presented to a joint session of students from The Company Officer Leadership Symposium (COLS), the Chief Officer Leadership Symposium and participants of the iWomen’s 2010 Leadership Conference, the multi-media lecture was presented to a standing room only crowd of over 325 participants. The Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement 2010 examined common attributes and emerging insights related to buildings, structures and occupancies that comprise typical response districts and the unique challenges during structural fire attack that require new insights and skill sets for company and command officers and fire service personnel.

Christopher Naum's Joint Session Presentation at IAFC FRI

The program examined and advocated strong principled new views of various buildings and occupancies, providing examples that define and determine how firefighters access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm. Naum introduced defining new concepts related to Tactical Patience, Command Compression, Tactical Entertainment and aligned the Anatomy of Buildings on Fire, Building Construction and Reading Building Profiles and Occupancy Risk while stressing the importance of the emerging Tactical Renaissance and continued emphasis on the Everyone Goes Home Program and 16 Fire Fighter Life Safety Initiatives. The Predictability of Building Performance and the emphasis on dynamic command risk assessment aligned with defined fire suppression operations filled the two hour session.

If you are an emerging, newly appointed or practicing company or command officer, the IAFC ‘s Company Officer Leadership Symposium (COLS) and the newest addition, The Chief Officer Leadership Symposium should be on your radar screen for attendance at IAFC FRI 2011 in Atlanta, Georgia. Keep track of 2011 FRI announcements on the IAFC web page, HERE.

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Posted by Christopher Naum on September 3, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, command-leadership, Commandsafety.com, company officer, Fire Fighter Safety, Fire Suppression, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, leadership, Professional Development, promotion, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Strategy and Tactics, Succession Planning, Uncategorized • Tagged: 16 Fire Fighter Life Safety Initiatives., Battalion Chief, building construction, christopher naum, COLS, Command Compression, command officer, company officer, Everyone Goes Home Program, IAFC, IAFC COLS, IAFC FRI, IAFC FRI 2010, IAFC FRI 2011, International Association of Women in Fire and Emergency Service, iWomen's Leadership Conference, safety, safety practices, safety through leadership, Tactical Entertainment, Tactical Patience, tactics, the Anatomy of Buildings on Fire, The Art of Reading Buildings, the Chief Officer Leadership Symposium, The Company Officer Leadership Symposium, the companyofficer.com, The International Association of Fire Chiefs, training

Six Detroit Firefighters Injured at Taxpayer Fire from Wall Collapse

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Detroit News

Six Detroit firefighters were injured during operations at a two alarm fire at a commercial taxpayer fire on the city’s east side. Initial reports indicate a roof collapse and subsequent compromise and further collapse occurred on the alpha side of operations with additional reports of an explosion preceding the collapse. Additional information provided by the Detroit Fire Department indicated the building structure had sustained some degree of damage from fire operations a few hours earlier and that during the suppression operations at 07:00 hours, while companies were operating, a facade collapse of the perimeter brick wall occured.

The brick facade collapse trapped a number of firefighters under the debris pile requiring extrication and removal. Published report indicate that the following Detroit Firefighters were injured as a result of the collapsing facade wall;

• Lt. Gerald Rutkowski, 46; 23 years with department

• Shane Raxter, 32; 9 years with department.

• Brian Baulch, 31; 9 years with department.

• Jeron Whitehorn 30; 8 years with department.

• Eric Jurmo, 31; 11 years with department.

• Brendan Milewski, 31; 11 years with department

It appears the two story brick structure located at the corner block had commercial occupancies on the number one floor, with the second floor boarded up, evidenced by the coverings over the windows.

The facade collapse of the alpha side in the predominate location of perimeter windows is typically the least stable of areas in buildings of type III ordinary construction. Lacking any significant mass and increased wythe, non-bearing walls have less mass and require stability of the adjacent floor systems and load bearing lintels and beams to maintain structural stability and integrity. Gravity affects unstable brick veneer and in-fill walls greatly as does other imposed loads, hose and master streams impacts. We’ll post more building construction insights and safety aides to increase your operational awareness on these type of building structures.

Here are the links to the lastest information forthcoming;

Detroit News, HERE
Firegeezer Coverage, HERE
Detroit Fox News, HERE
Latest news on FireFighter Nation, HERE
Statter911.com, Here
The Detroit Free Press, Here
Photo Gallery, Here

Here’s a link to a PPT program that’s available on the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting System site on Operational Safety Considerations at Buildings of Ordinary and Heavy Timber Construction; Type III and IV Structures. An accompanying narrative is available on the same NMRS Resource page that I posted in 2009.

Some recent NIOSH Reports related to Commercial Building Occupancy Fires and their lessons;

Career Lieutenant Dies Following Floor Collapse into Basement Fire and a Career Fire Fighter Dies Attempting to Rescue the Career Lieutenant – New York, HERE
Floor Collapse at Commercial Structure Fire Claims the Lives of One Career Lieutenant and One Career Fire Fighter – New York, Here
Hardware Store Explosion Claims the Lives of Three Career Fire Fighters-New York, Here
Volunteer Fire Chief Killed when Buried by Brick Parapet Wall Collapse – Texas, Here
Commercial Structure Fire Claims the Life of One Firefighter-California, Here
Partial roof collapse in commercial structure fire claims the lives of two career fire fighters – Tennessee, Here

Additionally here are some images pulled from various online sources depicting the building, it’s construction, layout and configuration.

Detroit New Photo

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Posted by Christopher Naum on August 13, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, christopher naum, Collapse, company officer, firefighting-operations, mass-casualty-incident, NIOSH Reports, Occupancies, Strategy and Tactics, Structural Collapse • Tagged: brick and joist, brick facade, building construction, Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety, building performance, Buildingsonfire.com, christopher naum, Collapse, collapse indicators, collapse rescue operations, Detroit FD, explosion, incident command, Mayday, Risk Assessment, RIT, Roof Collapse, roof operations, size-up, Structural Anatomy of Buildings, Structural Collapse, tactics, taxpayer, Type III, wall collapse

Remembering Hackensack and Gloucester City

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Hackensack (NJ) Ford Fire July 1, 1988

As we approach the July 4th holiday period, two significant LODD incidents previously occurred during this time frame that hold a number of lessons learned related to command management, operations, building construction principles and building performance, fire behavior and the ever present dangers of the job. Take the opportunity to learn more about these events, and expand your insights and knowledge base. Take a moment to reflect upon the supreme sacrifice made by these heroic firefighters and the messages that lay within the pages of the incident case studies, reports and summaries.

There’s a lot of practical safety and operational information on these events along with a tremendous volume of information in the various text books on strategy and tactics, incident command and building construction.

Learn from the past so we don’t repeat it. Remember- NO MORE HISTORY REPEATING EVENTS!

The Hackensack Ford Fire & Collapse occurred nearly ten years AFTER another tragic LODD event involving a bowstring truss roof collapse; the August 2nd, 1978 FDNY Waldbaum’s Fire, Brooklyn, New York that took the lives of six FDNY firefighters.

Street Smarts for Safety and Survival…………Stay safe.
Additional Relevant Safety considerations, HERE and HERE

Twenty-Two Year Anniversary Hackensack Ford Fire and Truss roof collapse, Hackensack Fire Department. July 1st, 1988

Pause to remember our brothers who made the ultimate sacrifice twenty-one years ago, on July 1st, 1988 and the lessons learned from this event.

On July 1, 1988 Hackensack’s Captain RICHARD L. WILLIAMS, Lieutenant RICHARD REINHAGEN, Firefighter WILLIAM KREJSA, firefighter LEONARD RADUMSKI, and Firefighter STEPHEN ENNIS lost their lives at Hackensack Ford when a bowstring arch truss collapsed entrapping them in the area below. The five firefighters were in the structure, a bowstring truss building, when the roof suddenly collapsed a 60-foot square section of the building’s wood bowstring truss roof collapsed, and an intense fire immediately engulfed the area. Williams, Kresja and Radumski were killed instantly, and four other firefighters escaped. Reinhagen and Ennis survived the initial collapse and found refuge in a tool room where they spent the next 13 minutes calling for help.. . despite heroic rescue attempts, succumbed to carbon monoxide poisoning. Approximately 90 minutes after the collapse, firefighters located the bodies of their fallen comrades.

Three (3) building factors contributed to the collapse of this bowstring trussed roof:

• Alterations that consisted of a heavy ceiling of cementitious material on wire lathe;
• Auto parts storage in the attic; and
• The Fire burned for a significant length of time and was well advanced prior to detection.
• This roof collapsed 35 Minutes after the initial units arrived.

Remember:
• CAPT. RICHARD L. WILLIAMS, Engine Co. No. 304
• LIEUT. RICHARD REINHAGEN, Engine Co. No. 302
• F/F WILLIAM KREJSA, Engine Co. No. 301
• F/F LEONARD RADUMSKI, Engine Co. No. 302
• F/F STEPHEN ENNIS, Rescue Co. No. 308

NFPA SUMMARY
Hackensack, New Jersey Fire Fighter Fatalities July 1, 1988

Five fire fighters from the Hackensack, New Jersey Fire Department were killed while they were engaged in interior fire suppression efforts at an automobile dealership when portions of the building’s wood bowstring truss roof suddenly collapsed. The incident occurred on Friday, July 1, 1988, at approximately 3:00 p.m., when the fire department began to receive the first of a series of telephone calls reporting “flames and smoke” coming from the roof of the Hackensack Ford Dealership.

Two engines, a ladder company, and a battalion chief responded to the first alarm assignment. The first arriving fire fighters observed a “heavy smoke condition” at the roof area of the building. Engine company crews investigated the source of the smoke inside the building while the truck company crew assessed conditions on the roof. For the next 20 minutes, the focus of the suppression effort was concentrated on these initial tactics.

During this time, however, little headway appeared to have been made by the initial suppression efforts, and the magnitude of the fire continued to grow. The overall fire ground tactics were shifted to a more “defensive” posture (exterior operation) and the battalion chief gave the order to “back your lines out.” However, before suppression crews could exit form the interior, a sudden partial collapse of the truss roof occurred, trapping six fire fighters. An intense fire immediately engulfed the area of the collapse. One trapped fire fighter was able to escape through an opening in the debris. The other five died as a result of the collapse. This incident and several others before and since, provide important lessons to the fire service regarding the fire ground hazards of wood truss roof assemblies.

This NFPA Summary may be reproduced in whole or in part for fire safety educational purposes as long as the meaning of the summary is not altered, credit is given to NFPA and the copyright of the NFPA is protected.

Following is an excerpt from the New York Times article:
Demers contended that Chief Williams, primarily because of the volume of fire on the rooftop, should have ordered nine firefighters out of the garage within 7 minutes of his arrival. The order to pull out was given at 3:34 p.m., about 30 minutes after his arrival, the report said.

“This radio message was not acknowledged by any companies,” the report said.

The roof collapsed at 3:36 p.m. Three firefighters were hit by burning debris and killed, four escaped, and two, Lieut. Richard R. Reinhagen and Stephen Ennis, took refuge in the tool room.

At 3:39 p.m., Lieutenant Reinhagen began to radio his location and appeal for help, the report said.

In one of the major communications flaws cited by Mr. Demers at the fire scene, all departmental communications were transmitted on a single channel, or frequency. Consequently, Lieutenant Reinhagen’s appeals for help were intermingled with orders for deploying men and hoses and instructions to arriving companies.

“You have to hurry, we’re running out of air,” Lieutenant Reinhagen said at 3:42 p.m.

Headquarters then radioed to Chief Williams: “Expedite on that, they’re running out of air.” The transcript did not show any response from Chief Williams.Over the next 6 minutes, through 3:48 p.m., Lieutenant Reinhagen made 10 more calls. None was answered. For three of the minutes, bells indicating depletion of his air tanks’ supply were ringing repeatedly. At one point, a civilian who overheard the ringing on a radio scanner called fire headquarters to tell officials of the noise.

At 3:49 p.m., the Lieutenant radioed: “Chief, this is Lieutenant Reinhagen. I’m still stuck back in the right rear of the building in the closet. We are out of air in a closet. We’re out of air.”
“What’s your location?” Chief Williams said. The response was inaudible and the Chief began ordering water from a truck.

At 3:50 p.m., the Lieutenant got the Chief directly and repeated that they were “stuck in a closet” and “out of air.”

“Stuck in a closet?” Chief Williams asked.

Twelve seconds later, the Chief Williams asked: “Where you at?”

“Right there in the closet,” came the response.
Fourteen seconds later, Lieutenant Reinhagen radioed again: “Help. The right rear. Out of air. Anybody out there? Stuck in the closet, right rear. No air. Help.”

The Lieutenant was asked if he was on the first or second floor. “First floor, underneath the collapsed ceiling,” the Lieutenant said at 3:52 p.m. It was his last transmission. Firemen eventually punched a hole through an exterior wall about 10 feet from the tool room, but saw only a mass of flame, Mr. Demers said. The burning timbers were leaning against the tool room, he said, but neither fireman was burned.

Learn from the past so we don’t repeat it. Remember- NO MORE HISTORY REPEATING EVENTS!

Some Open Questions;

What impact did the Hackensack Ford Fire & Collapse have upon you in your career?
Were you aware of this event and its lessons learned prior to this posting?
What do you feel you need to learn related to Building Construction, Fire Behavior or Strategy and Tactics related to various occupancies and construction types?
What is you knowledge base on Truss Construction related to Timber Bow String or Engineered Structural Systems?

Additional References:
NFPA REPORT, HERE

Dave STATter’s 2008 Coverage, HERE

Fire Rescue Magazine Article, A Failure in Command; HERE

Lessons Learned from Tim Sendelbach, Editor-in-Chief, FireRescue magazine, HERE

Other Resource Links:
http://www.wusa9.com/news/columnist/blogs/2008/06/hackensack-ford-20-years-later.html
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940DE3D6143FF931A357…
http://www3.gendisasters.com/new-jersey/6534/hackensack-nj-fire-aut…
http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=442&itemID=18676&;…;…

Memorial Park, Hackensack, NJ (http://www.cyberonic.net/~mikef6/p0000120.htm)

Three Firefighters and Three Sisters Killed in Gloucester City, New Jersey Building Collapse during Fire Attack, Rescue Operation, July 4th, 2002

Gloucester City (NJ) Collapse 2002

On July 4th, 2002 at 0136 hrs.,The Gloucester City Fire Department was dispatched to 200 North Broadway for a reported house fire. Responding units were advised that occupants may be trapped. First arriving units were on location in less than three minutes.

They found heavy fire on all exposures of a three-story multi-family dwelling and initiated a search for entrapped occupants. (Various reports from bystanders were at times conflicting regarding the number and location of victims). While providing an aggressive interior attack and rescue operation, an occupant was rescued from the dwelling. Due to the severity of their injuries they were unable to give direction regarding the whereabouts of any other occupants.

While all hands were operating by continuing an aggressive interior attack and rescue, a partial collapse of the structure occurred. An emergency evacuation signal was sounded and while that was commencing a further and much more substantial collapse occurred trapping eight firefighters inside the burning debris.

Additional specialized collapse rescue resources were requested, firefighter accountability was initiated and rescue efforts were intensified. Five of the eight trapped firefighters were rescued. Three of the eight gave the ultimate sacrifice in service to their fellow man. Unfortunately these three children did not survive. A total of nine victims were transported to area hospitals, one civilian and eight firefighters.

Remember:
• James Sylvester
Fire Chief, Mount Ephraim Fire Department
Sylvester, 31, a 17 year veteran, was survived by his wife, who was pregnant with the couple’s first child
• John West
Deputy Chief, Mount Ephraim Fire Department
West, 40, a 23-year veteran, was survived by his wife and three children
• Thomas G. Stewart III
Paid Firefighter, Gloucester City Fire Department
Stewart, 30, a 13 year veteran, was survived by his fiancée and their son. Stewart publicly proposed to his girlfriend, hours before the fire while they watched the city’s fireworks from high atop a fire truck ladder at Gloucester City High School.

NIOSH REPORT: Structural Collapse at Residential Fire Claims Lives of Two Volunteer Fire Chiefs and One Career Fire Fighter – New Jersey, HERE

Philadelphia Inquirer Posting, HERE

Everyone Goes Home Newsletter Article by Chris Collier, HERE

New Jersey Division of Fire Safety LODD Report, HERE

SUMMARY
On July 4, 2002, a 30-year-old male volunteer fire chief, a 40-year-old male volunteer deputy fire chief, and a 30-year-old male career fire fighter died when a residential structure collapsed, trapping them, along with four fire fighters and an officer who survived. At 0136 hours, a combination fire department and a mutual-aid volunteer fire department were dispatched to a structure fire. Local law enforcement radioed Central Dispatch reporting a fully involved structure with three children trapped on the second floor. The first officer on the scene assumed incident command and reported to Central Dispatch that the incident site was a three-story structure with fire showing and that people could be seen at the windows. Note: The female resident (survivor) was the person seen in the window.

The three children that were reported as being trapped did not survive and were later found in the debris. Additional units were requested, including a mutual-aid ladder company from a career department. Crews were on the scene searching for occupants and fighting the fire for approximately 27 minutes when the building collapsed.

NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar incidents, fire departments should;
• Ensure that the department’s structural fire fighting standard operating guidelines (SOGs) are followed and refresher training is provided
• Ensure that the Incident Commander (IC) formulates and establishes a strategic plan for offensive and defensive operations
• Ensure that the incident commander (IC) continuously evaluates the risk versus gain during operations at an incident
• Ensure that a separate Incident Safety Officer, independent from the Incident Commander, is appointed
• Ensure that fire fighters conducting interior operations (e.g., search and rescue, initial attack, etc.) provide progress reports to the IC
• Ensure that accountability for all personnel at the fire scene is maintained
• Ensure that a Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) is established and in position
• Ensure that the officer in charge of an incident recognize factors (e.g., structural defects, large body of fire in an old structure, etc.) when analyzing potential building collapse
• Ensure, when feasible, that fire fighters should respond together, in one emergency vehicle, as a crew
Additionally, municipalities should consider
• Establishing and maintaining regional mutual-aid radio channels to coordinate and communicate activities involving units from multiple jurisdictions

In order to minimize the risk of similar incidents, the New Jersey Division of Fire Safety identified key issues that must be addressed and remedies that should be implemented within all departments.

1. FACTOR: There appears to be a disconnect between career and volunteer personnel in the Gloucester City Fire Department (GCFD). Many personnel expressed the concern that the GCFD operated as separate fire departments rather than as one.

REMEDY: It is essential that all firefighters put individual differences aside in order to work together successfully as a team to achieve their common goal of saving lives and property.

2. FACTOR: The GCFD, faces a common dilemma associated with combination fire departments: staffing levels may be unpredictable depending on how many volunteers are available to respond to any one incident. This unpredictability can result in insufficient staff to perform required tasks until additional staff arrives.

REMEDY: Elected or appointed municipal officials need to make a commitment to the adequate staffing of the fire department and staffing levels must allow for compliance with the two-in / two-out provisions of the Public Employees Occupational Safety and Health (PEOSH) Standard 29CFR1910.134. The New Jersey Division of Fire Safety can provide assistance to the municipalities and provide examples of how this can be accomplished

3. FACTOR: Due to the limited number of firefighting personnel who arrived at this incident, all initial efforts were focused on the rescue of occupants. This postponed fire suppression operations until additional resources arrived. Because rescue and fire suppression operations were performed sequentially rather than simultaneously, the fire may have spread more quickly resulting in the early failure of the structure.

REMEDY: Sufficient personnel are critical to ensure that all necessary operations can be performed at the appropriate time. Furthermore, a continual size-up assessment must be maintained so that the Incident Commander (IC) can be kept aware of the conditions as the incident progresses. This continual size-up will allow the IC to modify the strategy and / or tactics as deemed necessary.

4. FACTOR: Although the GCFD was equipped with a thermal imaging camera (TIC), firefighters failed to utilize it for the initial search for victims. The TIC was also not used properly to analyze the scope of the incident and determine what tactics to employ.

REMEDY: Fire departments that possess TIC units should use them regularly during routine operations such as training, scene size up, search and rescue and structural fire fighting.

5. FACTOR: From the onset of operations, the Incident Management System (IMS) was not properly expanded as the incident progressed. Given the scale of this incident, the span of control quickly became too large for the IC to effectively manage and additional functions were not delegated to subordinates. Critical tasks such as safety and accountability were not effectively implemented.

REMEDY: N.J.A.C. 5:75 mandates that all fire departments utilize an IMS. It is a modular system, which allows the IC to apply only those elements that are necessary at a particular incident, and allows elements to be activated or deactivated as incidents escalate or decline. Fire departments are required to adopt written plans, or Standard Operating Guidelines (SOG’s) based on the IMS, to address different types of incidents. The NJ Division of Fire Safety distributed suggested SOGs upon adoption of this regulation and they continue to be available to all fire departments.

6. FACTOR: The GCFD did not assign a dedicated safety officer (SO) to observe operations and terminate potentially unsafe actions.

REMEDY: IMS regulations under N.J.A.C. 5:75 mandate the use of safety officers (SO’s) at all incidents. An SO is required to observe operations on the fire scene, identify next steps and order the correction of safety hazards to personnel. Given the scope of this incident, the IC should have assigned at least one SO.

7. FACTOR: The GCFD did not designate accountability officers to monitor each area of entry into the structure. Nor was a Personal Accountability Report (PAR) or roll sheet utilized to track personnel and monitor their functions. Therefore, the concept of accountability of personnel location, function, and time failed.

REMEDY: Although not enforceable at the time of this incident, the regulations for the NJ Personal Accountability System (NJPAS) under N.J.A.C 5:75 now require that fire departments utilize an accountability system. This system includes the designation of accountability officers and the use of PAR’s / roll calls, all within the framework of the IMS that is required to be utilized at all incidents. The NJ Division of Fire Safety is in the process of finalizing suggested SOGs and will distribute them to all fire departments when complete.

8. FACTOR: Although firefighters Sylvester and Stewart were equipped with Personal Alert Safety System (PASS) devices, they did not activate them prior to entering the structure. It should be further noted that their PASS devices were not automated; they had to be manually activated by the user. Firefighter West was not equipped with a PASS device.

REMEDY: PASS devices must be provided, used, and maintained in accordance with PEOSH regulations under N.J.A.C. 12:100-10 et seq. Although many departments still rely on PASS devices that must be activated manually, – devices that are acceptable by PEOSH regulations – they are not ideal because the firefighter must remember to activate the PASS device. For this reason, fire departments should strongly consider upgrading their SCBA to those employing automatic activating PASS devices.

9. FACTOR: The GCFD did not specifically designate the required personnel for the rescue of distressed firefighters through the establishment of Rapid Intervention Teams (RIT) or Firefighter Assist and Search Teams (FAST). Consequently, when the building collapsed, there was not a properly equipped team in place for immediate rescue operations.

REMEDY: IMS regulations under N.J.A.C. 5:75 require that fire departments utilize RIT or FAST to rescue distressed firefighters when operating in a hazardous atmosphere. The IC should request a RIT or FAST as soon as possible after dispatch to allow the team to arrive quickly.

10. FACTOR: Not all fire departments operating on the fire ground were communicating on the same radio frequency, which resulted in communication failures. Although, the Camden Fire Department (CFD) did have the capability to communicate on the GCFD “Fire 5” frequency they chose not to.

REMEDY: IMS regulations under N.J.A.C. 5:75 require that a communication system allow for inter-agency communication during mutual aid responses by providing a direct communication link between companies. Fire departments should work with other departments that are used routinely for mutual aid to ensure radio interoperability.

11. FACTOR: An emergency evacuation signal was sounded upon reports of a firefighter missing inside the structure before the impending collapse, however, the signal was never sounded at any other time prior to the collapse, nor was it sounded immediately after the collapse.

REMEDY: In the event an emergency evacuation becomes necessary and an emergency signal is required, N.J.A.C. 5:75 requires that fire departments utilize an emergency evacuation signal that is easily recognizable and distinguishable from all other fireground noises. The signal must be utilized when conditions on the fireground indicate an imminent and extreme risk to firefighters. At this time NJ DFS is finalizing a proposal that would establish a statewide emergency evacuation signal.

12. FACTOR: During this incident, fireground conditions were not properly analyzed, which led to the failure to recognize an impending building collapse.

REMEDY: Firefighters and officers need to learn the warning signs and causes of building collapses. Often following a collapse, as was the case with this incident, personnel on the scene report that the structure collapsed “without warning”. However, this is usually not the case; the reality is that the IC and firefighters simply failed to identify the indicators that were present prior to the collapse.

13. FACTOR: After removal of all victims, the remaining structure was demolished and the incident scene was cleared of all debris within 48 hours of law enforcement concluding their origin and cause investigation. This prevented a thorough assessment of the remaining structure in order to identify the cause and contributing factors of the collapse.

REMEDY: A protocol should be adopted to ensure that fire scenes are secured in a manner that not only allows for public safety, but also prevents immediate demolition. This will provide agencies with an opportunity to conduct any investigations that may be necessary.

14. FACTOR It was difficult to gauge the amount of training for all GCFD personnel due to insufficient record keeping. Although it was determined that the GCFD firefighters and officers met the minimum regulatory training requirements, many members did not possess a great deal of supplemental training with regard to structural firefighting. Additionally, the volunteer firefighters and officers often did not attend the scheduled departmental drills and rarely trained with the career personnel despite having frequent opportunities to participate.

REMEDY: Standards such as NFPA 1500 recommend that fire departments establish a regular training and education program that is commensurate with the duties and functions that firefighters are expected to perform. Additionally, proper record keeping is essential to certify that all personnel have received both required and supplemental training or education.

15. FACTOR: Qualifications of volunteer officers were difficult to judge and there were serious concerns voiced by the career members of the department regarding the suitability of some of the volunteer officers. This resulted in a lack of confidence by several career personnel in the volunteer officers and reluctance to take direction from them.

REMEDY: In addition to the NJ DFS requirement that all fire service supervisors obtain incident management certification; municipal officials need to establish uniform minimum qualifications for fire officers in order to ensure the effective provision of fire suppression services to the public. The NJ DFS recently adopted voluntary fire officer standards and will be developing a training curriculum to meet those standards.

16. FACTOR: It was not possible to determine if a smoke detector inspection was conducted in the building after a change in occupancy in October of 2001 as required by the NJ Uniform Fire Code. The city’s housing department, who has the responsibility for these inspections, was unable to provide documentation of such an inspection to either the Division of Fire Safety or to the Camden County Prosecutor’s Office. It was not clear whether smoke detectors were activated during this fire incident.

REMEDY: It is recommended that the responsibility for smoke detector inspections be transferred to the fire department to ensure complete and documented inspections.

Discovery Channel Special on the Gloucester City Incident. A must see for all Company and Command Officers…

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Posted by Christopher Naum on July 2, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, christopher naum, firefighting-operations, History Repeating Event, LODD, major-incidents, NIOSH Reports, Occupancies, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics, Structural Collapse, Uncategorized • Tagged: Bowstring Truss, building construction, building construction principles, christopher naum, Collapse, command, Command Disfunction, command management, Communications, Dynamic Risk Assessment, fire behavior, Fire Flow, Fire load, firefighting, Gloucester City, Gloucester City NJ, Hackensack LODD, LODD, manpower, NFPA, operations, Overload, Rescue, Resources, risk, Risk Assessment, RIT, Situational Awareness, tactics, Truss, Truss collapse, Truss Roof

The Rules for Combat Structural Fire Suppression Have Changed: Did anyone Tell You?

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Our buildings have changed; the structural systems of support, the degree of compartmentation, the characteristics of materials and the magnitude of fire loading. The structural anatomy, predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and the extreme fire behavior; accelerated growth rate and intensively levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term combat fire engagement.

The rules for combat structural fire suppression have changed, but we have yet to write the rule book from which the new games plans must be derived. We seek the elusive “Rosetta stone” that aligns and interprets the emerging and traditionalist acumen related to fire stream effectiveness, flow rates, cooling capacity, extreme fire behavior and fire dynamics, compartment fire theory, propagation and cooling capacity and tactical deployment all relate towards defining an engineering approach to firefighting tactics versus the manual, labor-driven tactics of line deployment and rudiment placement of water on a fuel source within the fire compartment (room).

It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that defines structural fire suppression operations. It begs to suggest that many of today’s incident commanders, company officers and firefighters lack the clarity of understanding and comprehension that correlate to the inherent characteristics of today’s buildings, construction and occupancies and the need for refined engine company operations within the modern building construction setting. We assume that the routiness or successes of our operations and incident responses equates with predictability and diminished risk to our firefighting personnel.

The work of such notable suppression theory pioneers as P. Grimwood, E. Hartin, S. Särdqvist and S. Svennson and the concepts surrounding 3D firefighting, B-SAHF and other emerging research from the NIST and UL are areas that today’s discerning and progressive fire officer and commanders must become well-informed and conversant. The quantitative scientific data and emerging concepts from continuing research and testing such as the NIST’s Wind Drive Fire Studies and UL’s The Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions are providing enlightenment on fire development, fuel controlled and ventilation controlled fire development, operational time-duration parameters and degradation and failure mechanisms related to compromise and structural collapse in occupancies.

Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction, therefore risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of combat structural fire engagement.

Building Construction Systems
- Heritage
  - Pre-1919
- Legacy
  - 1920-1949
- Conventional
  - 1950-1979
- Engineered
  - 1980-2010
- Hybrid
- Chameleon

The fundamental compartment that comprised a typical room configuration in terms of area (square footage), volume (height/Width), furnishings (fire load package) and materials of construction (structural anatomy) found within conventional, legacy or heritage construction provided predictability in terms of fire suppression, fire behavior, operational time and survivability (civilian/firefighter). The dramatic changes since the early 1980’s in the evolution of modern building construction and the institutionalization of engineered structural systems (ESS) have created compartment (room) areas in excess 500 SF, volumes that are open and spaciously interconnected to other habitable space, fire load packages that create extreme fire behavior, compromising structural stability in shorter time spans creating decreasing interior operational time and requiring increasing fire flow rates and volume to sustain requisite extinguishment demands.

Commanders and Company Offices need to gain new insights and knowledge related to the modern building occupancy and to modify and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type and must have the combined adequacy of sufficient staffing, fire flow and nozzle appliances orchestrated in a manner that identifies with the fire profiling, predictability of the occupancy profile and accounts for presumed fire behavior. Today’s engine company operations and fire suppression theory has to progress beyond the pragmatic approaches to fire suppression such as “Big Fire-Big Water principle.

When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future. Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis. We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system; in addition to having an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions.

Executing tactical plans based upon faulted or inaccurate strategic insights and indicators has proven to be a common apparent cause in numerous case studies, after action reports and LODD reports. Our years of predictable fireground experience have ultimately embedded and clouded our ability to predict, assess, plan and implement incident action plans and ultimately deploy our companies-based upon the predictable performance expected of modern construction and especially those with engineered structural systems.

If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner, that is no longer acceptable within many of our modern building types, occupancies and structures. This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die, it’s that simple; it’s that obvious.

Considerations for changing fire flow rates, the sizing of hose line and the adequacies for fire flow demand and application rates, staffing needs for safe operations, considerations for defensive positioning and defensive operating postures must be considered, and it warrants repeating again; Reckless-Aggressive firefighting must be redefined in the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments- with determined, effective and proactive firefighting

Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement
- Predictive Strategic Process
- Tactical Deployment Model
- Dynamic Tactical Deployment
- Performance Indicators and Street Aides
  - Fire Dynamics
  - Resistance
  - Resilience
  - Structural Systems
  - Occupancy Hazard Profiles

The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics must not only be questioned, they need to be adjusted and modified; risk assessment, risk-benefit analysis, safety and survivability profiling, operational value and firefighter injury and LODD reduction must be further institutionalized to become a recognized part of modern firefighting operations.

Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments.

Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional or legacy construction and occupancies;

Risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement.
You need to gain the knowledge and insights and to change and adjust your operating profile in order to safe guard your companies, personnel and team compositions.
Again strategic firefighting operations; Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type.

The following are quotes from Fire Chief Anthony Aiellos (ret) Hackensack (NJ) Fire Department, Fire Chief during the Hackensack Ford Fire, July, 1988…

“If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner. This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes”.

As a Company or Command Officer, how have your skill sets as well as your attitudes towards combat fire suppression operations have changed. Are you still thinking in terms of “old school” tactics and operations? (Think carefully before you answer….because there’s more to this reply than you think). I’ve asked this question before: “What do you truly know about building construction, fire dynamics and risk profiling?” Have you spent the time to become knowledgeable on rapid changes that have evolved within the building construction industry? Have you taken a good look around your district? If you haven’t, maybe It’s time…remember you have a company or a contingent of companies that are counting on you to make the right call at that next structural fire incident.

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Posted by Christopher Naum on April 9, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, christopher naum, company officer, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, KSA, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: building performance, christopher naum, combat fire suppression, command officer, company officer, competencies, construction, District, Fire Dynamics, Fire Suppression, firefighting, KSA, Pre-fire Planning, predictability, risk profile, size-up, structural anatomy, tactics, thecompanyofficer.com, training

Ten Minutes in the Street: Stretchin’ the line on the First-Due Scenario

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Head on over to Firefigher Nation to the Fireground Tactics & Firefighter Safety Forum for a new Ten Minutes in the Street Scenario.

We’ve just posted Ten Minutes in the Street: Stretchin’ the line on the First-Due . Join in on the discussions and dialog on strategies, tactics, command, decision-making and firefighter safety. There’s lots to be gained either by active participation or side-line observations of the postings and view points from a wide lattitude of firefighters, company and command officers from around the United States and abroad. So don’t just sit there, get ready to stretch that line in on the action.

Check out other previously published Ten Minutes in the Street Scenarios HERE

These scenarios make for great drill topics, table top exercises and discussion points for all ranks and personnel

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Posted by Christopher Naum on March 27, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, christopher naum, company officer, Crew Integrity, Crew Management, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, Risk Assessment, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics, Ten Minutes in the Street Scenarios • Tagged: building construction, christopher naum, command, Commander, engine company, Firefighter Nation, First-due, IAP, Officer, Residential, risk profile, Scenarios, tactics, Ten Minutes in the Street Scenarios, thecompanyofficer.com

Reloaded

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“It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations. Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments, while maintaining the values and traditions that defines the fire service.”- Christopher Naum

How does this fit into your “culture, values and philosophy?”

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Posted by Christopher Naum on January 15, 2010 • Filed under: christopher naum, Commandsafety.com, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, Leaderhip, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: 2010, best practices, buildings, christopher naum, combat fire suppression, Commandsafety.com, Fire Suppression, firefighting, IAP, LODD, occupancy, operations, risk, Risk Assessment, safety, tactics

Vacant or Unoccupied: Tactical Risk and Safety

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We seem to do a lot of things at times out of common practice and repetition, you know; “We’ve always done it that way….” syndrome. There’s a resonating theme that is making its way around the fire service dealing with going to a defensive tactical posture at vacant or unoccupied structure fires.

This command posture leads to limiting interior operating engagement, while promoting a high degree of risk management.With that being said, there are also plenty of opinions on these types of policies as such, since this type of tactical effort may be contrary to the local “culture and traditions” of the responding agencies and may be a hard pill to swallow, since we’re in the job of “ fighting ALL fires..” Please refresh your memories on a past post on Tactical Entertainment HERE and HERE

Here are some basic definitions to keep us all on the same playing field;

Vacant; refers to a building that is not currently in use, but which could be used in the future. The term “vacant” could apply to a property that is for sale or rent, undergoing renovations, or empty of contents in the period between the departure of one tenant and the arrival of another tenant. A vacant building has inherent property value, even though it does not contain valuable contents or human occupants.

Unoccupied; generally refers to a building that is not occupied by any persons at the time an incident occurs. An unoccupied building could be used by a business that is temporarily closed (i.e. overnight or for a weekend). The term unoccupied could also apply to a building that is routinely or periodically occupied; however the occupants are not present at the time an incident occurs. A residential structure could be temporarily unoccupied because the residents are at work or on vacation. A building that is temporarily unoccupied has inherent property value as well as valuable contents.

The question today is this. As a responding company, you arrive at the scene of a vacant or unoccupied structure. The building’s construction features and systems have inherent risk associated with the occupancy, (as is the case with nearly all of our structures and occupancies).

Your company determines that you’re going to go defensive, even though you probably could make a reasonably safe entry and engage in interior structural fire suppression.

Would there be any repercussions in your station, battalion/district/community or organization if you took this tactic? What are YOUR personal thoughts on this form of risk management?

Some insights, HERE and HERE, HERE, HERE and HERE

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Posted by Christopher Naum on January 13, 2010 • Filed under: Crew Integrity, Fire Suppression, fires, Leaderhip, Officer, operations, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Situational Awareness, Strategy and Tactics • Tagged: arrival, building, building construction, christopher naum, command, company, construction, occupancy, operations, risk, Risk Assessment, risk profile, safety, search & rescue, status, tactics, thecompanyofficer.com, unoccupied, vacant

BECOME SAFE

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How do you think these elements fit into the Big Picture during combat fire suppression operations at working structure fire?

What’s your experience gauge telling you as it related to these elements?

As a Company Officer it is imperative that you maintain a balanced operational safety perspective to ensure the safety and well being of your company and those personnel assigned under your oversight and management during incident operations.

You need to BECOME SAFE in the conduct of your operations during combat fire suppression missions.

Building
Evaluation
Construction/Occupancy
Operational Hazards
Manage-Time & Elements
Engagement
Situational Awareness
Assessment & Fluid Analysis
Fire Behavior & Effects
Evaluate & Execute

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Posted by Christopher Naum on January 5, 2010 • Filed under: BECOME SAFE, christopher naum, command-leadership, company officer, Crew Integrity, Fire Suppression, firefighting-operations, Leaderhip, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Situational Awareness • Tagged: accountability, BECOME SAFE, building, christopher naum, combat fire suppression, command, firefighting, occupancy, operations, responsibilities, risk, safet culture, safety, Situational Awareness, supervision, tactics

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